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OVERCOMING THE BLOCKCHAIN AND 
CYBERCURRENCY HYPE: 
INTRODUCTION TO MONEYLAB READER 2
INTE GLOERICH, GEERT LOVINK, AND PATRICIA DE VRIES
From place to place, to those many still left open,  
where there’s perplexity and darkness but also gaps and rapture…  
—Wisława Szymborska, Labyrinth
Welcome to Overcoming the Hype. This second MoneyLab Reader prods emerging, 
rising, crashing and burning digital money memes. Ever since its inception, in 2013, 
the MoneyLab project tinkers with digital money and finance experiments. We ques-
tion persistent beliefs, from Calvinist austerity, growth, and up-scaling, to trustless 
automated decision-making, and freedom on the dark web, from (anarcho-)capitalist 
dreams of the days of yore to the special sauce of neoliberal entrepreneurialism and its 
right-wing libertarian counterparts.
Entering the 10th year of the global financial crisis, it still remains a difficult yet 
crucial task to distinguish old wine from its fancy new bottles. We need to recog-
nize the ruling financial system in its ostensible alternatives. Neoliberal concepts 
and convictions such as growth, scale and free markets are often repackaged in 
mystifying and depoliticizing wrapping paper such as ‘sustainable’, ‘parallel’, ‘local 
economies’, ‘co-ops’, ‘disruption’, ‘universal basic income (UBI)’, and ‘flexibility’ 
but lack or misfire structural and systemic critique, or cleverly shadow-box their 
way around it. We are ‘willing slaves of capital’, as Frédéric Lordon wrote,1 and if we 
trust the Believers, we will soon be (neo-)liberated by internet-based, autonomous 
payment systems or UBI.
With the monopoly of Central Banks crumbling, the very definition of money is up for 
grabs. MoneyLab considers blockchain technology, cybercurrencies and other experi-
ments with value exchanges as spaces of political contestation and possibility. De-
signing internet-based payment and network-based revenue models is a political proj-
ect, and one with an equally important aesthetic program. MoneyLab asks designers, 
geeks, researchers, artists and activists: what role can criticism play when technology 
accelerates? And how can we work together to make a difference?
Over the past years, the Cyberworld fantasies of yesteryear have been rekindled, in 
updated and automated form, in stories about invincible, decentralized blockchains 
and heroic crypto-currencies, promoted as a refreshed parallel universe of digital value 
storage that can weather any storm as well as overcome the incessant global financial 
crisis. This tweet by Brett Scott pretty much sums up the MoneyLab critique of the 
1 Frédéric Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire, New York, NY: Verso 
Books, 2014.
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hype: ‘Crypto logic 101: Bitcoin is worth holding onto because it will become worth 
more Why will it be worth more? Because more people will start using it But aren't 
they just holding it, rather than using it? Yeah, but eventually we'll use it What for? To 
cash out into US dollars.’2 For many, such Bitcoin critique is Maoist-style self-criticism. 
There is not much intellectual clout in constantly having to ‘reveal’ the bubble nature 
of financial schemes. For fintech speculators, there is no deeper value in crypto-cur-
rencies, only possible profits in buying and selling after an uncertain period of hoard-
ing. For them, Ethereum is just another financial asset, accumulated under the sign of 
‘collective self-interest’.
The question of how digital money can actually be woven into the broader architecture 
of the internet is not their concern in the least. Due to speculation fever, the larger 
debate around what design of digital money would be desirable has come to a com-
plete hold. What remains are security questions of wallets and exchanges, the use of 
crypto-currencies inside countries in crisis (such as Venezuela), as payment method in 
the case of ransomware, and as carrier in (illegal) cross-border transactions.
While blockchain technology offers some interesting visions on future scenarios, most 
of the potential has been swallowed up by business logistics. Decentralized, free soft-
ware approaches have been sidelined along the way. Unfortunately, the new toys are 
often ideologically damaged, dead on arrival or corrupted early on by a handful of 
fund managers looking for ways to jump the crypto-currency bandwagon. Blockchain 
technology, too, raises fresh concerns over citizen privacy and the rise of financial 
surveillance, and while a cashless society looms closer, the virtues of paper money are 
rekindled. As crypto-currencies are so far failing as payment systems, it is important 
to diversify the issue of alternative internet-based revenue models and complement it 
with community funding, subscription-based support (such as Patreon), local barter 
exchanges, mobile money, and blockchain solutions that are disconnected from any 
speculative crypto-currencies.
Chained on a block, automated, wireless, digitized and cashless: money has become 
a virtual medium of exchange, an interface, yet another speculative asset, and there-
fore highly vulnerable to political currents, sudden glitches such as stock market 
crashes, infrastructure breakdowns, miscalculations, cyberwar, ransomware, and the 
five elements of nature.
With Yanis Varoufakis we say: there’s no such thing as apolitical money.3 And there 
is no such thing as an apolitical crisis. Ever since the 2008 ‘crisis,’ financial activ-
ism has played a role for people’s parties in Europe, demanding transparent, open, 
and more democratic forms of governance. Populist policies, regardless of being 
left or right wing, inherently form around a general desire to unhook politics from fi-
2 @Suitpossum, ‘Crypto logic 101: Bitcoin is worth holding onto because it will become worth 
more Why will it be worth more? Because more people will start using it But aren't they just 
holding it, rather than using it? Yeah, but eventually we'll use it What for? To cash out into 
US dollars.’, Twitter post, 13 November 2017, 9:38 AM, https://twitter.com/Suitpossum/
status/929991744648810496.
3 Yanis Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer What They Must? London: Penguin Random House, 2016, 
pp. 98-99.
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nancial corruption. As popular people’s parties near an electoral majority, what can 
be learned from these types of decentralized, bottom-up movements? Campaigns 
for UBI and transparent participatory budgeting should also be contextualized 
from an increasing awareness of financial corruption and economic inequality. As 
political reformation spreads through Europe, small alterations within local and na-
tional governments have been made, but are these improvements minor repairs to 
a broken system?
For Valarie Solanas, author the radical-feminist-punk-anarcho Scum Manifesto (1967), 
real liberation does not come from economic equality. Part satire, part political sci-
ence-fiction, part pamphlet, Scum Manifesto states that economic equality amounts to 
nothing other than ‘co-managing the shit pile.’ Solanas therefore argues for what could 
be labelled as a fully automated society without a money system. The real challenge 
we are facing, Solanas observes quite appositely, is a conflict between those that buy 
into the money-work system and those that refuse the money-work system altogether.4 
Today, fifty years later, the money-work system is still wading nostril-deep through a 
quagmire of systemic malaise and oppressions of various kinds and degrees. Auto-
mation is considered both the Pearly Gate and the Final Countdown. Concern over 
wealth distribution, poverty, precarity and accountability has given rise to both political 
populism and a financial counterculture. If we want the ‘whole bloody bakery,’ and not 
some leftover bird-crumbs, we need to go the core, and reimagine and redefine the 
power of money itself.
The black box of finance has been etched into the imagination of the public and there 
has rarely been a more generous context to manifest working alternatives for the 99%. 
Cooperative platforms, decentralized technologies and direct democracy movements 
indicate profound attempts to rebalance the distribution of wealth and power. As re-
sistance towards poverty, precarity, tax havens, algorithmic speculation, and financial 
crimes grows, the challenge ahead is to find ways to improve and sustain such finan-
cial experimentations and do more than ‘fail better’.
In amongst the cacophony of economic dissent of the past decennium, some brave 
the ‘shit pile’ and invent practical solutions to protect their livelihoods and design new 
ways to distribute value and make a living. Rather than wait to implement changes in 
traditional legislation, they are attempting to transform governance by writing smart 
contracts into decentralized systems. Programmers and designers quickly meet the 
increasing demand for decentralized services by building infrastructures that harness 
the scope of the network and rely on the database to enforce new forms of gover-
nance with smart contracts. In their efforts, artists offer perspectives on how collec-
tive ownership can provide security or establish terms for contracts and licenses that 
enable equitable incomes.
Platform coops are not just ethically responsible alternatives to exploitative on-de-
mand business models: they offer practical solutions for providing social security 
and equitable income for the ‘unnescessariat’. Writers and publishers also endeavor 
to create working solutions that circumvent extractive platform monopolies. Musi-
4 Valerie Solanas, Scum Manifesto, New York, NY: Verso Books, 2004.
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cians are equally desperate to reshape an industry that, in an attempt to stamp 
out piracy, has turned digital streaming into a murky, penniless revenue model that 
only serves platform-based superiority. They all join a growing precarious class of 
creative workers desperate for an exit strategy from exploitative platform monopo-
lies and inequitable licenses that siphon off and centralize profits. From p2p distribu-
tion models to collective piracy, print and digital publishing, all demonstrate intuitive 
alternative means to survive within a digital economy. MoneyLab continues to inves-
tigate these and other attempts to circumvent and overcome the challenges faced in 
the austerity economy.
For god’s sake, don’t take financial advice from cryptographers.  
—Matthew Green
MoneyLab steps away from old-school critique of the political economy. It is justi-
fied to make pyramid schemes and parasitic logic inside fintech software visible, 
but this is not yet a strategy for change. In his dialogue with Krystian Woznicki, 
Brian Massumi explains how we can move beyond the accelerationist agenda of 
‘outsmarting’ capitalism with IT innovations through ‘adventure capital’. The new 
models (also expanded upon by the Economic Space Agency in this Reader) ‘would 
be owned collectively, without division into individual shares, and would be only 
used to further the activities of the collective.’ A key idea that is pushed further, 
here, is the trustless automatic execution of contracts with the aim to ‘refuse any 
formal decision-making procedures, whether vote-based or consensus-based.’ The 
idea would be to ‘activate tendencies agitating at the infra-individual level [...] gen-
erating a surplus value of life that is irreducibly collective, and entirely event-based.’ 
Terms developed in this context are ‘event-derivative’ and ‘occurency’. The overall 
aim is ‘to hijack cutting-edge tools of runaway speculative finance’, to become more 
speculative than the speculators, turning the dark casino parasite logic of financial 
capital into a gift economy.5 The MoneyLab line is here to bring together radical cri-
tique with an equally radical imagination. We will never accept having our ruthless 
negative attacks be played out against a so-called constructive form of New Age 
positivism. Experiments at MoneyLab are notoriously beyond good and evil, and do 
not accept any Denkverbot.
We need to get a critical understanding of the nature of the Financial Intellect. What is 
the social expression of all these alternative efforts? We’re not only producing software 
and platforms. Our class-in-becoming is well aware that the internet and its infrastruc-
ture no longer is a tool, a means to something else. There is no more money outside 
the digital. Production can no longer be situated outside of digital flows through net-
works. In the past, geeks tickered with obscure operating systems. No one cared. 
Today, geeks are entering highly attractive, dangerous territory. As apprentices they 
enter a Faustian workshop where digital alchemists are creating money out of nothing 
(but energy…). Let’s return to Goethe to find out how this episode will end. Is it time 
to rewrite and update your Goethe? Do you agree with Johan Sjerpstra’s statement: 
‘I think of crime when I’m in a crypto state of mind’?
5 Brian Massumi and Krystian Woznicki, After the Planes: A Dialogue about Movement, Perception 
and Politics, Berlin: Diamondpaper, 2017, pp. 146-147.
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Whereas the first MoneyLab Reader from 2015 dealt with payment systems, money 
theory, critical currencies and projects that accelerated our financial imagination, this 
second Reader presents an update on alternative models such as platform cooperativ-
ism (Trebor Scholz), debates around universal basic income (Patrice Riemens; Dmytri 
Kleiner), and cashless society (Brett Scott). The idea of a coin of the commons that was 
proposed in the first Reader is now embedded in a broader concept of a Common-
fare society that combats widespread precarity (General Intellect) like that evidenced 
by crowdfunding campaigns for medical procedures (Silvio Lorusso). In 2015 we still 
wondered whether internet banking was the real killer app. We're now witnessing the 
unforgiving consequences of the demonitization project in India (Tripta Chandola). The 
Panama and Paradise Papers showed the true cash cows of tax evaporation/evasion 
are to be found at the top of financial hierarchies; still the US government continues 
to double down on petty welfare fraud and individual freedom for the poor (Nathalie 
Maréchal). Monetary and financial instruments subject society to their automated vi-
sions through data captures and surveillance (Emily Rosamond), while popular repre-
sentations of the financial sector fail to move beyond the epic tale of the Wall Street 
(anti-)hero (David Hollanders).
Two approaches stand out in both MoneyLab Readers. First of all, the critique of 
right-wing libertarian tendencies inside fintech is not expressed out of some re-
sentment but always coupled with alternative practices. The second angle is the 
way in which we integrate artists and art projects into the larger picture. The art 
contributions here are neither illustrations nor isolated pieces. We see art as a ve-
hicle to focus on the very basics of value creation and exchange. That being said, 
MoneyLab does not want to repeat the old Romantic chestnut of the artistic genius 
evading the political and climatic dissipation of Western capitalist civilization. We 
repeat, we do not believe an automated workforce or blockchained currencies will 
found a new global social order routed in equity, love and solidarity. We do aim 
for broadening a critical space for the deconstruction of capitalist realism,6 and to 
enlarge and diversify digital non-capitalist imaginaries, concepts, activities, and ex-
changes of value. As a result, some authors critically engage with a diverse array of 
waxing and waning practices that have been over-coated, overlooked or overrated 
by capitalist realists. Others work to broaden the scope of our economic imaginar-
ies. Taken together they form a necessary contribution to overcome the hype and 
a counterargument to capitalist realists that cannot think of alternatives outside of 
their self-maintained capitalist cage.
We start off with such a priori complexity withdrawal and capitalist realism (Patricia 
Reed) and move on to questions such as: how do we imagine ourselves as part of 
the world/system called necro-capitalism (Nina Power)? What happens when digital 
money invades our lives as apps, stored and traded on our intimate smart devices 
(Nathaniel Tkacz & Pablo Velasco)? How can we cut through the algo-mysticism 
that surrounds supposedly disruptive financial technology (Martin Zeilinger) and see 
the power relations that they perpetuate (Robert Herian)? How did we end up with 
the vision of blockchain marriages in which vows are seen as smart contracts (Max 
Dovey)? Can 'code is law' be subverted by rebelliousness and wokeness on the 
6 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There no Alternative? London: Zero Books, 2009.
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blockchain (Jaya Klara Brekke) or can economic spaces be programmed to be modu-
lar and flexible in nature (Economic Space Agency)? Tokenization as art form (Laura 
Lotti) and the financialization of the arts (Max Haiven) are both already implemented 
phenomena. What does human agency mean among algorithm-based, market-driven 
Internet of Things objects that transact increasingly independently (Rachel O'Dwyer)?
Fintech rushes through our veins, causing a whirlwind of concepts in our head, fea-
turing all the possibilities and alternatives that our imagination and political spaces 
can bring. Welcome back to MoneyLab.
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OPTIMIST REALISM: FINANCE AND 
THE POLITICIZATION OF ANTICIPATION
PATRICIA REED
 
With almost a decade since the climax of the 2008 global financial crisis, two poi-
gnant, parallel phenomena can be noted. On the one hand, the financial sector 
seems to have lost little grip on capital-power (or ‘finance-power’).1 Banks have 
been bailed out, financial ‘services’ have returned to ‘business as usual’ and, more 
generally (despite policy papers otherwise),2 austerity and growth (debt and credit), 
the neoliberal yin and yang par excellence, persist as the ‘necessary’ creed for eco-
nomic advancement. On the other hand, we have seen a popular consciousness-
raising regarding today’s gaping inequality; this is due in part to widespread, global 
protest movements (notably Occupy! and its infamous ‘we are the 99%’ refrain), 
and to the sheer material/existential effects our order has fostered as it has ex-
tended its tentacles over time. The aftermath of the crisis has produced what many 
on the left have been clamoring for: A popular deflation in the ideological promise 
of the neoliberal myth. The latter’s ‘internal contradictions’ and inability to deliver 
on pledges of trickle-down prosperity have become blatantly apparent far beyond 
the walls of academic discourse. Yet, in what ought to have been a pivotal context 
for political mobilization towards alternative horizons of socio-economic justice (or 
even modest restructuring), we have seen, rather, an entirely more frightening, neo-
fascist political reality emerge. Why is it that we are not seizing this momentous, 
mythical deflation towards the politicization of a new socio-economic model bend-
ing towards the service of the many? The answers to this arguably naïve ques-
tion are of course numerous, and there are certainly powerful vested interests and 
peoples who gain from status-quo crises and social instability. However it would be 
equally naïve to suggest this debilitating and regressive ‘change’ can be reduced to 
problems exclusively in the frame of personal greed and self-interest; as problems 
located entirely within the domain of morality. I’d like to direct attention to two inter-
woven factors that have, to my mind, played an important role in driving our current 
political landscape, and ultimately how new socio-economic conceptions may find 
mesopolitical3 potential in making claims on one of the distinguishing markers of 
our era: the transformation of temporality itself.
Put succinctly, two interconnected factors blocking the transformative capacities of 
this ideological deflationary moment include what could be called ‘complexity with-
drawal’, and the persistent naturalization of capitalism (what Mark Fisher notably 
1 Suhail Malik, ‘The Ontology of Finance: Price, Power, and the Arkhéderivative’, in Robin Mackay 
(ed.), Collapse Volume VIII, Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014, p. 637.
2 Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’, Finance and 
Development 53.2 (June 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm.
3 Isabelle Stengers interviewed by Brian Massumi and Erin Manning, ‘History through the Middle: 
Between Macro and Mesopolitics’, Inflexions: A Journal for Research-Creation 3 (October 2009), 
http://www.senselab.ca/inflexions/volume_3/node_i3/stengers_en_inflexions_vol03.html.
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coined as ‘Capitalist Realism’ — an obstinacy he insisted could survive beyond the 
collapse of the neoliberal capitalist paradigm).4 Let’s start with the second formula-
tion, as it feeds-forward into the first.
Petrified Futurity
Capitalist Realism indexes not only our economic condition, but more pervasively, 
the ‘atmosphere’ of political resignation which denies the possibility for any other 
socio-economic structural scenario. This ‘atmosphere’ permeates both conscious 
and unconscious life, including the arena of cultural production (music, art, film, etc.) 
where instead of seeing boundless innovation (a capitalist premise), we seem caught 
in retroparalysis: loops of re-makes and pop-cultural revivalism,5 where substantial 
technological development devolves into trivial consumer gadgetry.6 Within such an 
atmosphere, mental distress and illness has also proliferated as a debilitating symp-
tom of the behavioral imperatives this naturalization entails. This is in the way one is 
compelled to ‘govern from within’ to adapt to the world successfully in full, entrepre-
neurial self-reliance. Such naturalization is internalized as the only system compat-
ible with ‘innate’ humanness, where this picture of ‘innateness’ is both self-referential 
and self-reinforcing, coercing the human into a narrow mold wherein the incentive of 
accumulation through competition is isomorphic with our ‘intrinsic’ selfishness and 
self-interest (those very social biases buttressing neoclassical economics, upon which 
neoliberalism is built). In this framing, capitalism is upheld as the only system com-
mensurate with the ‘nature’ of the human; to suggest otherwise is to fall prey to folly, 
almost as nonsensical as fighting the fact of gravity on earth. The diagnosis Fisher puts 
forth, quite pointedly, is that Capitalist Realism petrifies politics because it stifles our 
imaginative and perspectival horizons. The axiom then gets extrapolated: if futurity is 
always a political project and politics is dead-locked, our future, as such, has become 
cancelled — a point to which we will return.
Complexity Withdrawal
The second factor leading to our inability to seize upon this neoliberal deflationary 
moment is what I like to call ‘complexity withdrawal’. As a response to the debilitat-
ing effects of globalization (understood only in its negative delineation, as rampant 
financialization and corporatization), we have seen a retreat to nationalisms, based 
on assurances of economic betterment through isolationism, coupled with identitar-
ian essentialisms. Such tendencies can be read as a reflex against the complexity of 
globalization (again, construed only negatively); making things simpler, graspable and 
(relatively) immediate as a reaction against the intractability of today’s interconnected 
reality. Because Capitalist Realism imbues in us a domineering condition of political 
impotence, there is nothing to anticipate besides catastrophe and the dystopian. With 
nothing to look forward to, we can only look back; eyes fixated on romanticized his-
tories (for very few, and those that never were), to ‘make great’ again with full West-
phalian vigor. Capitalist Realism nourishes complexity withdrawal, where its hold over 
political transformation renders any demand for counter-hegemonic-scaled change 
4 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative, London: Zero Books, 2009.
5 Ibid., p. 7.
6 Exemplified by the proliferation of ‘Weird Face Apps’, where highly sophisticated machine learning 
and A.I. systems are used for quite trivial, entertainment-rich outputs: face matching celebrity-
likeness, for example.
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unthinkable, unsensible, unimaginable. It locks us into (at best) modest proportions, 
at odds with the scale of the system we seek to contest. The engagement with com-
plexity certainly does not offer the guarantee of causal immediacy, nor ‘fixable’ or 
fully determinate outcomes. But the withdrawal from it disengages the potentiality for 
counter-hegemony, understood as an emergent phenomenon (and not a prefigured 
template) between agency (human intentions) and structure (non-human factors).7 Our 
current theoretical landscape often also echoes this hopelessness; densely packed 
with dismal-to-horrific non-futural diagnoses. These meditations are quite accurate, 
in the sense that one cannot disagree with the course they carefully plot. Yet does not 
the surety of their description and unwillingness to propose alternatives inadvertently 
reinforce the ‘changeless-change’8 of capitalist realism itself, despite the oppositional 
claims made against it? Such scenarios demonstrate the futility in substantially con-
fronting capitalist hegemony based on grounds of sheer criticism (as an end) or moral 
rejection, without contributing to the libidinal imaginings and/or functional diagrams 
of alternative possibilities. When the production of theory declines to engage with the 
propositional, there remains little optimism for material practice or a pragmatics of 
just, futural speculation to emerge. The omission of optimism from (non)-politics today, 
and indeed much of social life in general can, as Rory Rowan has written, ‘…tacitly 
legitimate the lessons of individualized quietude taught by conservatives who tell us 
that the ‘small, happy life’ offers deliverance from the dangerous delusion of collective 
transformation […] Just as blind optimism risks lubricating existing forms of power, 
an equally blind pessimism risks stunting the collective capacities required to oppose 
them.’9 What is asserted here is the need for an optimist realism, not one where we 
conceive of the inevitability of ‘progress’ through wishful thinking, or transformation 
actionable through heroic will — but an optimism tethered to our capacity for artifici-
ality.10 That is, to the plasticity of politics embedded in, and constrained by reality that 
is partially constructable by us, whilst simultaneously indifferent and invariant to us.
Denaturalizing (A)Social Myths
Before proceeding, let me emphasize an important point. What we can glean from the 
articulation of these double forces of capitalist realism and complexity withdrawal, 
is that any alternative socio-economic paradigm requires not only the modeling of 
a new system, but the profound denaturalization of the (a)social myth of ‘human na-
ture’ through which capitalism is repeatedly performed, incorporated and enabled. To 
advocate exclusively for a remodeling of our economic system as an external thing, 
reinforces the Silicon Valley doctrine of what Evgeny Morozov termed ‘solutionism’, 
wherein problems can be remedied through techno-scientific innovations alone.11 
Such solutionism (at ease and quite profitable within neoliberalism) may placate symp-
toms, but leaves underlying causes untouched. A Fitbit (or any activity tracker) may 
7 Alex Williams, ‘Complexity & Hegemony’, PhD diss., London: University of East London, 2015.
8 Sebastian Olma, In Defense of Serendipity: For a Radical Politics of Innovation, London: Repeater 
Press, 2016.
9 Rory Rowan, ‘Extinction as Usual?: Geo-Social Futures and Left Optimism’, e-flux 
Supercommunity, 31 July 2015, http://supercommunity.e-flux.com/texts/extinction-as-usual-geo-
social-futures-and-left-optimism/.
10 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 1963, p. 20.
11 Ian Tucker, ‘Evgeny Morozov: “We are abandoning all the checks and balances”’, The Guardian, 
9 March 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/mar/09/evgeny-morozov-
technology-solutionism-interview.
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tell us we need to do more exercise or notify us of high blood-pressure, but it ad-
dresses nothing of the socio-economic, and indeed mental landscape where stress 
and lack-of time (the high estimation of busy-ness) are the everyday consequences of 
our existing hegemony of life’s demands, for example. The solutionist doctrine trans-
forms socio-structural and ideological problems into private, behavioral ones that can 
be surmounted on one’s own (more discipline!). This bolsters the very emphasis of 
personal responsibility and self-governance that sustain neoliberalism. Because of the 
inadequacy of solutionism, the transition to an inexistent system we might temporarily 
call ‘postcapitalism’ (since we don’t yet know what it is, and therefore how to name it), 
requires a movement on two planes: the external transformation of the system itself 
(of valuation, tokening, distribution, production, labor, exchange, etc.), coupled with 
an internal transformation of our collective self-conception of the ‘human’ as well. 
Leveraging the entanglements between conceptual ideality and physical reality,12 it is 
along these mutually contaminating vectors of human self-understanding and material 
functionalism where an ‘optimist realism’ needs to take hold.
Any mode of social ordering requires bodies, ideas and processes to sustain it — 
whether these conceptual predispositions are explicitly known, or silently embodied 
through everyday gestures. The habituation of these modes reinforces underlying as-
sumptions in a positive feedback dynamic, normalizing these social concepts into a 
quasi-natural order. The logic of our neoliberal order is no different; it requires con-
stituent human actors (and the systems through which they engage) to behave within 
a landscape of naturalized myths. These myths are necessary for cohesion, but are 
always artificial and subject to revision. In Capitalist Realism, these myths mapping 
who we are as humans have been petrified and treated as the only system accommo-
dating our ‘nature’; a brutally ironic enablement of our ‘nature’ that destroys the very 
biosphere we need for even the most basic biological life support. As a denaturalizing 
demand, optimist realism must begin with the labor of separating norm (myth) from 
fact. Such a labor can be encapsulated by the concept of alienation — of articulating 
chasms between norm and fact, not to attain some telos of scientific facticity as a 
guiding social horizon, but in an effort to retrain the myths of social cohesion we need 
towards the care of the many. As a capacity to separate what is towards what could 
be, alienation can no longer be conceived as a strictly negative force of disconnection, 
but must be embraced for its abstractive capacities to separate from what is before us 
as a naturalized logic, towards a speculative investment of future possibilities, requir-
ing alien myths of human ‘givenness’.
Operationalizing Derivative Temporality
When politics (in both its imaginative and infra/-structural forms) is trapped in stag-
nation, it’s purchase on futurity is cancelled.13 This, however, does not mean the 
future is absolutely annulled, but it signals the displacement of the future from the 
domain of politics. Where can we locate the future today? From the perspective 
of power and pragmatics, the future has been coopted by the category of finance; 
the future has dissolved (and bifurcated) into futures. One cannot begin to describe 
12 Ray Brassier, ‘The View from Nowhere’, Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 8.2 (Summer 
2011), pp. 6-23.
13 Mark Fisher, ‘The Slow Cancellation of the Future’, Lecture: MaMa, Zagreb, Croatia, 2014, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCgkLICTskQ.
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the paradigm of financialization without emphasizing the particular shift in temporal 
operations it has brought about — far more elaborate than the common lamentation 
of pure ‘out of control speed’. As Elena Esposito has made clear, in classical forms 
of capitalism (like industrial production) the present was sacrificed for the future, 
insofar as one would reinvest current profits to generate increased future revenues. 
With finance this temporal relationship is reversed: one spends money one ex-
pects to accrue at a future date in the present.14 In its more virtuous form, finance, 
predicated on credit, can ‘exploit in the present the openness [my emphasis] of the 
future’15 — meaning that one imposes constraints on the future (the debt / respon-
sibility for repayment accrued through credit) to construct a more prosperous one, 
which would not have been possible without having initiated the constraint.16 This 
process points to the underlying recursivity of the operations (and power dynamics) 
involved in construction of futurity today. 
Deploying the derivative as the defining object through which to parse the set of 
generic operations qualified as ‘finance’, Suhail Malik highlights the potency of an-
ticipation in this reorganized temporality of our political economy, wherein a price in 
a future that has not yet happened, is expected, and that future (unknowable) even-
tuality is operationalized for gains.17 The force of anticipation as it were, isn’t simply 
blind chance wagering (and waiting) on what the future will be (analogies to finance 
reduced to mere ‘gambling’ are insufficient); it is the very enactment (or forcing) 
of anticipation (the investment) that influences and molds not only the actualiza-
tion of the future, but transforms the present as well because anticipation imposes 
constraints/enablers on existing, current possibilities. What we have here, is what 
Esposito identified as ‘Retrospective Causation’ where effects (actualized futures) 
depend on causes, for which they themselves (performatively) operate as causal 
agents.18 Armen Avanessian and Malik extend this radical temporal shift outside 
of pure finance through to society in general, where their ‘Time-Complex’ model 
applies to large-scale, integrated capitalist societies on the whole. The Time-Com-
plex indexes the operationalization of the future on the present, as a condition for 
‘judgements, calculations and actions in the present [like] predictive analytics in big 
data, derivatives, [and] global supply chains’, setting up an order where the future 
precedes the present; where the speculative mode is a socio-technical condition 
enabled by computational infrastructures.19 In this temporal order, conventions of 
rationality break down, since all quasi-knowledge we may possess is always in the 
form of unknowns, as risks — prompting Malik to call for a ‘Risk Rationality’ com-
mensurate with complex societies, wherein we may think the future, but we cannot 
know it. This ability to think the future unknown, is the anticipatory; it is the logic of 
14 Elena Esposito, ‘The Construction of Unpredictability’, Fear of Content, Berlin Biennale 9, 2016, 
http://bb9.berlinbiennale.de/the-construction-of-unpredictability/.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik, ‘The Time-Complex. Postcontemporary’, Fear of Content, 
Berlin Biennale 9, 2016, http://bb9.berlinbiennale.de/the-time-complex-postcontemporary/.
18 Elena Esposito, The Future of Futures: The Time of Money in Financing and Society, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, p. 16.
19 Suhail Malik, ‘Why a Rationalist Art’, lecture organized by Glass Bead, Les Laboratoires 
d’Aubervilliers, Paris, 20 February 2016, http://www.glass-bead.org/audio-research/suhail-
malik/?lang=enview.
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the derivative (as a cipher for finance) that has come to define the distinct opera-
tions and causal modalities of our complex societies. This logic of the functioning 
of anticipation qua an unactualized future is the enactment of planning (a claim, as 
we know, not only on the future, but on the present as well), leading to J.W. Mason’s 
insistence on the need to politicize this constitutive quality of finance:
…the financial system is […] where conscious planning takes its most fully devel-
oped form under capitalism. Banks are, in Schumpeter’s phrase, the private equiva-
lent of Gosplan, the Soviet planning agency. Their lending decisions determine what 
new projects will get a share of society’s resources, and suspend — or enforce — 
the ‘judgment of the market’ on money-losing enterprises.
A socialist program must respond to both these faces of finance. We oppose the 
power of finance if we want to progressively reduce the extent to which human life 
is organized around the accumulation of money. We embrace the planning already 
inherent in finance because we want to expand the domain of conscious choice, 
and reduce the domain of blind necessity.20
Such a call to socialize the anticipatory operation of finance is precisely what is cap-
tured by an Optimist Realism. It is a complicit position strategically responding to the 
causal affordances organising contemporary reality today, to demonopolize (or un-
cancel) the future (and the present) from the purview of the very few, who are the only 
beneficiaries in the design of finance as it is. The call for the socialization of the antici-
patory function of finance, must equally assume the politicization of uncertainty itself 
as a risk-rationality — for as we know, in any complex system, outcomes are never 
fully determinate, but are more aligned with qualities of steering, weighting, and guid-
ing. Furthermore, hijacking the logic of finance for socialized and not private means/
ends also equates with an exit from the logic of scarcity as an economic governing 
rational (manifest as austerity). The sheer wealth created in the financial sector is at 
roughly 20 times that of world GDP,21 pointing to an instrumentalized irrationality at 
work today. Although operationalizing gains on a quasi ‘openness’ of the future, the 
design of finance itself already constrains what those contingent affordances could be, 
in line with its molding of individualized profit incentives. Despite the power for futurity 
performed in the financial derivative function, when it is constrained by the interface of 
private-gains, it can only ever benefit the few. In this way, the radical contingency of 
future unknowns are domesticated, pre and post-emptively coerced into the mold of 
‘naturalized’ private interest under capitalist realist affordances; gains made in its own 
logical image. If, under finance, our reality has never been more susceptible to fictional 
(unactual, anticipatory) procedures, it is time to politicize this mode of effectual retro-
spective causation and make claims on this operation.
If the contingency of the future has more agency than ever, due to the speculative force 
of uncertainty and modes of temporal causation at work in contemporary reality, when 
it remains bound to the interfacial paradigm of finance (as it is currently designed), 
20 J.W. Mason, ‘Socialize Finance’, Jacobin, 28 November 2016, https://www.jacobinmag.
com/2016/11/finance-banks-capitalism-markets-socialism-planning/.
21 Randy Martin, ‘Dance and Finance — Social Kinesthetics and Derivative Logics’, lecture. EMPAC, 
Troy, NY, 9 October 2013, http://empac.rpi.edu/events/2013/fall/other-words/randy-martin.
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our future will remain but beneficial for the (increasingly) few. In his seminal book, The 
Stack, Benjamin Bratton defines the interface (beyond the screen-based, button with 
words GUI’s we are accustomed to) in the generic, as ‘any point of contact between 
two complex systems that governs the conditions of exchange between those sys-
tems’ where a ‘diagram plus computation equals interface’.22 Additionally, the interface 
can not only make complexity tractable (the problem of complexity withdrawal), foster-
ing interactive accessibility that not only arbitrates translations of signals bidirection-
ally across disparate domains, but most importantly, where the interface ‘fixes and 
limits’ navigational possibility, ‘narrativizing’ the meaning of those very possibilities.23
Because the politics of the interface operate in both directions, there is a potency here 
isomorphic to finance-power not to be undervalued; we cannot lose sight of the force 
of narrative anticipation, of other ionose sight of th embedding themselves into the 
diagramming of those very navigational limits. This, of course, is not to advocate for 
‘ideal’ optimism, where we can simply re-narrativize a ‘better world’, as if the stakes 
are purely imaginary and plastic, totally susceptible to fictional procedures. Reality is 
simultaneously shaped by us, indifferent to us, and invariant to us, and our subsequent 
narratives for reverse uptake need to mobilize these constraints. For narrative forces 
to politically and substantially engage in the reciprocal dynamics of the interface, they 
too must entangle themselves in the reciprocal dynamics between ideality and real-
ity, not as a space of dreamy whimsy, but in ramifying the anticipatory. That is, not 
just presenting or narrating what a new, just socio-economic order could be, but in 
enacting the anticipation such novel transitions afford as a corresponding onionnting 
or nar. The anticipatory, as a mobile uncertain concept is always unknowlable, never 
without risk, but always potential. To be sure, this potential is volatile; susceptible to 
both utopian and dystopian promises. It conditions the very he veryonthout risk, but 
always potential. To be sure, this potentialfuturity can never be an excuse for inertia 
nertiaxcuseout risk, bution and social speculation. The future will only ever be contin-
gent and anticipatory; to resign ourselves from its molding otherwise, simply because 
we cannot guarantee its outcome, is a pessimistic resignation in denying the mutability 
of the given, a conceptual calcification that holds, at present, the guaranteed stagna-
tion of politics under finance power. A pessimism that is only ‘affordable’ by the few 
who are not acutely threatened (or may even benefit from) existing interfacial givens. 
We need to alienate the naturalized myths of who we are as human creatures (what 
incentivizes us as social animals) for reverse up-take, retraining our interfaces for a 
mode of futurity premised on collective care, separating from our debilitating narratives 
of self-enclosed sufficiency.
22 Benjamin H. Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015, 
p. 220.
23 Ibid., p. 219.
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NECRO-CAPITALISM AND COUNTER-IMAGES
NINA POWER
We are still flooded with images. The images that capitalism has of itself — a series of 
never-ceasing electric pulses travelling at light speed across the globe, perhaps — and 
the images we have of our relation to it. We might regard ourselves as ‘postcapitalist’ 
subjects, as citizens, as consumers, as neoliberalized individuals, or as members of 
collectives, communes and communities, as members of a religious or ethnic group, 
a political party, or as geographical beings, or even as members of a certain kind 
of internationalism, global humanism, or cosmic wholeness. It matters a lot how we 
understand who we are — as an isolated body, as part of a collective body, as a de-
pressed subject, as a worker, a carer — and it matters how we conceive of ourselves 
in relation to broader abstractions that we have no individual control over. Relatedly, 
how we respond to the futures that are spoken about in our name, but not necessarily 
in the name of everyone, give us an image of what is possible. One of the hardest tasks 
before us lies in untangling what particular images of the world mean — which images 
of capital come from capital itself, and which from alternatives to it? Which abstrac-
tions damage us, and which offer us images of hope? What should we be mapping and 
how should we be acting? Where do our enemies lie — in front of us, or hidden? When 
we talk about the future, what are saying we believe in? Dare we talk about the future 
when so much of the present lies in ruins around us?
Recent left proposals have called for a strong constructive attempt to bring about cer-
tain futures — here automation will replace horrible work, Universal Basic Income will 
ensure that no one (or at least those in particular countries) will be absolutely poor and 
platforms, from online to governmental, will be taken over by those with a sustainable 
plan for the future, against those who seek to exhaust the earth and enslave humanity 
in the name of profit for a small few.1 ‘Postcapitalist’ thinkers like Paul Mason attempt 
to describe new political subjects, following the death of older images (the proletariat, 
above all else): ‘By creating millions of networked people, financially exploited but with 
the whole of human intelligence one thumb-swipe away, info-capitalism has created 
a new agent of change in history: the educated and connected human being’.2 These 
educated and connected beings lie at one end of the production chain, a kind of canny 
consumer. What change might these ‘new agents’ bring about? Must they by neces-
sity forget the routes through which the instruments they swipe come about? Is the 
connected human being immune from reactionary ideas, cult-like thinking or hatred? 
Franco ‘Bifo’ Beradi identifies three aspects of what he calls the ‘looming war’:
The first front is the neoliberal power that is tightening its grip of governance, pur-
suing the agenda of austerity and privatization. The second front is the anti-global 
Trumpism based on white resentment and working-class despair. The third front, 
1 See Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future, London: Verso, 2015.
2 Paul Mason, ‘The End of Capitalism Has Begun’, The Guardian, 17 July 2015, https://www.
theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/17/postcapitalism-end-of-capitalism-begun.
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taking place largely back-stage, is the growing necro-empire of terrorism, in all its 
different shapes of religious bigotry, national rage and economic strategy, that I 
identify as necro-capital.3
Included in this diagnosis is a mixture of governmental power, economic strategy, ra-
cial politics, religious impulses, and violence. We are immediately familiar with the 
‘war’ that Bifo describes, and we can point to images, forces and activism that directly 
seeks to oppose this war with a militant kind of peace: a call for a return to social 
democratic politics, re-nationalization of public services, government funding of edu-
cation; anti-racist politics and the ‘second civil rights movement’ in the form of Black 
Lives Matter protests in the US, UK and elsewhere; an endless call for tolerance in the 
face of nationalist and religious violence. But what exactly is necro-capital? Elsewhere, 
Bifo describes it in the following way:
Neoliberal deregulation has opened the way to a regime of worldwide necro-
economy: the all-encompassing law of competition has cancelled out moral pre-
scriptions and legal regulations. Since its earliest phases, Thatcher’s neoliberal 
philosophy prescribed war among individuals. Hobbes, Darwin, and Hayek have 
all been summoned to conceptualize the end of social civilization, the end of 
peace. Forget about the religious or ideological labels of the agents of massive 
violence, and look at their true nature. Take the Sinaloa Cartel and Daesh and 
compare them to Blackwater and Exxon Mobil. They have much more in com-
mon than you may think. Their common goal is to extract the maximum amount 
of money from their investments in the most exciting products of the contempo-
rary economy: terror, horror, and death. Necro-capitalism is the emerging eco-
nomic order of the world.4
Bifo’s concludes with the stark claim that ‘at the end, suicide’.5 Neoliberalism, itself 
based on the resurrection of the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, has, according to 
Bifo, given way to a necro-neoliberalism that seeks to profit off of excitement in ‘ter-
ror, horror and death’.6 There is no doubt that war, drugs, sex, trafficking in bodies, 
terrorism are extremely profitable. The individual and collective corpses generated 
by these trades are sometimes circulated as images if they are deemed both palat-
able and shocking enough (think of the image of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian Kurdish boy 
whose drowned corpse was rendered horribly iconic by international media). But 
these images do not seem to generate a political depth but merely a kind of brief, 
horrified, sentimental response. Instead of opening houses to refugees, campaign-
ing for open borders and safe passage, Western populations forget about these 
images within a matter of days. Necro-capitalism is also the profiting of the images 
of the dead, and we can talk about necro-capitalism as a kind of visual field as well 
as an economic tendency. We might also pause here for a moment here and ask a 
question that crosses economics and aesthetics — why exactly are ‘terror, horror 
3 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility, London: 
Verso, 2017, p. 41.
4 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, ‘The Coming Global War: Is There Any Way Out?’, e-flux journal 69 (January 
2016), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/69/60582/the-coming-global-civil-war-is-there-any-way-out/.
5 Ibid.
6.  Ibid.
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and death’ exciting? Why are there markets in these emotions and states of being? 
How do fictional and real images of violence contribute to the idea made material 
that these primal fears and forces are in any way something desirable?
Achille Mbembe’s work on ‘Necropolitics’ has been extremely important for thinking 
about the real relationships at the heart of politics. He writes: ‘[i]nstead of considering 
reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that 
are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death’.7 Mbembe, through a read-
ing of Hegel, Bataille and Foucault that centres upon the relationship between politics, 
violence and death, points out the central role of slavery in any worthwhile conception 
of history: ‘the humanity of the slave appears as the perfect figure of a shadow. In-
deed, the slave condition results from a triple loss: loss of a “home”, loss of rights over 
his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss is identical with absolute 
domination, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity altogether).’8 
The slave, Mbembe states, is kept alive, but in a permanent ‘state of injury’.9 Slave 
life, Mbembe claims, is a form of ‘death-in-life’. By combining Bifo and Mbembe’s 
analyses, we can say that necro-capitalism is not simply the profiting from violence 
and terror, but is predicated upon violence and terror, and the entire history of humanity 
must be seen in this light if we are to understand how death and life are central to both 
aesthetics and economics, no matter how much both pretend to beauty or normality.
I am interested in ways of thinking about an anti-necro-capitalism that, in the first 
place, takes seriously the subjects and the suffering constructed by this kind of econ-
omy. I am interested in an aesthetics that recognises the power of violent images, and 
refuses to accept that all images are equal. We might be cynical, ‘open to anything and 
everything’, be worried about censorship, keep our safe search off, pride ourselves on 
our ability to watch graphic violence, to ‘take’ the most violent scenes of murder, rape 
and torture, but if we lose the ability to differentiate between real violence and fictional-
ized violence, because we have watched too many films and played too many games, 
then we are easy prey for necro-capitalism. It is difficult to make this argument, though, 
without appearing to take a moralistic or censorious approach. Yet, we should remem-
ber that we already live online in a world in which we are protected from certain images 
by people paid very little: ‘content moderation’ workers for Facebook, largely based in 
the Philippines, must see ‘pornography, gore, minors, sexual solicitation, sexual body 
parts/images, racism’ and remove these images and texts before users might also 
see them.10 The psychological toll of this work is extreme and many of these workers 
quickly experience burnout. We may seek out images that horrify and terrorize us, but 
many workers do not have this choice.
By recognizing our complicity in the production and reproduction of violent words and 
images, we can begin to think and work with care to undoing the lust for pain that sus-
tains necro-capitalism. But how is this possible when so many revolutionary images 
are themselves saturated in blood? Perhaps one of the images that most symbolizes 
7 Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, trans. Libby Mientjes, Public Culture 15.1 (2003): 14.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
9.  Ibid., p. 21.
10 Adrian Chen, ‘The Laborers who keep Dick Pics and Beheadings out of your Facebook Feed’, 
Wired, 23 October 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/.
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necro-capitalism is beheading/decapitation — used by IS in their videos in particular 
as a warning to Westerners and other Muslims, as well as a recruiting tool for those 
whose bloodlust has been triggered. If we concern ourselves with images of behead-
ing — after all, what did peasants do to monarchs, revolutionaries to their enemies — 
are we contributing to the same ‘terror, horror and death’ that Bifo identifies as central 
to necro-capitalism?
Against the violence of video-taped beheadings, I want to resurrect some ideas of 
positive acephalism, of political subjects that begin without heads. Hobbes’s famous 
frontispiece to Leviathan, the sovereign head with the multitudinous body, is perhaps 
the clearest, and certainly one of the oldest, images we have of the state conceived 
of as a literal ‘head’ as well as a metaphorical ‘head’ of state. We know that, or we 
are supposed to know that, without the head the body will die. But each person in the 
multitude has a head, and none of these will stop working just because the crown has 
lost his ‘crown’. In Stasis, Agamben discusses the various historical readings of the 
famous frontispiece to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), noting that in the manuscript pre-
pared for Charles II, the tiny men that make up the body of the Leviathan were turned 
outwards to face the monarch, whereas in the other, main, frontispiece they face up-
wards towards the head of the sovereign. Both editions, in fact, therefore present the 
‘same’ image, just for different readers. Pointing out that the Leviathan in the image 
appears behind the earth, and possibly in or above the sea, Agamben notes that the 
‘mortal-God’ does not then reside in the city but outside it, in a kind of no-man’s-land: 
‘The Common-wealth — the body political — does not coincide with the physical body 
of the city’.11 The city in the image is also bereft of people, as they are all making up the 
body of the sovereign.
These two frontispieces may be 366 years old, but I think it has at least two things 
to tell us: one, that we should never be too hasty to give up on ideas of sovereignty 
and the state — even when platform and techno-capitalism seems to present us 
with models of horizontalism and globalism. States are repressive — the surveil-
lance state, undercover policing, and border control – and privatization and fran-
chising does not diminish the ultimate power of the state. The head in the shape 
of the ruling class is a false head, a head that pretends we need it when it is in fact 
parasitic upon the body of those who labor. And there are other reasons why decap-
itation seems so unpalatable. As Freud noted in a short text, ‘Medusa’s Head’ from 
1922, simply ‘To decapitate = to castrate’. The fear of decapitation is an intensely 
sexed question. As Freud continues: ‘The terror of Medusa is thus a terror of cas-
tration that is linked to the sight of something. Numerous analyses have made us 
familiar with the occasion for this: it occurs when a boy, who has hitherto been un-
willing to believe the threat of castration, catches sight of the female genitals, prob-
ably those of an adult, surrounded by hair, and essentially those of his mother’.12 
Women, on this analysis, are already decapitated, headless. Why not then assume 
the role of the decapitated, the acephalic (and the aphallic!) from the start? What 
politics would follow?
11 Giorgio Agamben, Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm (Homo Sacer, II, 2), trans. Nicholas 
Heron, Edinburgh: University Press, 2015, pp. 27-29.
12 Sigmund Freud, ‘Medusa’s Head’, 1922.
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The voiceless head, the head that is removed by force: perhaps is there some power 
here. How can we take back this always already decapitated and castrated position 
from those who would seek to behead us many times over? In Bataille’s ‘Programme 
(Relative to Acéphale)’ from 1936, he writes the following: ‘Realize the universal ac-
complishment of personal being in the irony of the animal world and through the rev-
elation of an acephalic universe, one of play, not of state or duty’.13 The final point in 
the programme says: ‘Affirm the value of violence and the will to aggression insofar as 
they are the foundation of all power’.14 Understanding the nature of violence, affirming 
it even, underpins Bataille’s call for a headless universe, one where man war and labour 
out of duty, guilt or coercion. Bataille begins with the acceptance of destruction and 
violence — ‘Take part in the destruction of the existing world, with eyes open to the 
world to come’15 — in a way that might not accord with whatever residual feelings of 
pacifism, humanism and preservation we might want to hang onto. But, at the same 
time, it acknowledges the reality of aggression as a fundamental, perhaps the funda-
mental feature, of human life. Acephalism, understood as the revelation of a headless 
universe, a universe without rules, despite the need of those who wish to lead to invent 
them, is a playful, creative endeavour. It loathes the fascist state as much as it loathes 
the monarchical state, though is profoundly aware of those forces that can lead to the 
former taking hold.
Capital likes to pretend it is acephalic, as if networks are spontaneously generated from 
markets, but as austerity has shown us, it needs the state to squeeze those without 
money in order to bail out and redirect finance upwards. Capital pretends to hate the 
state, but needs it to maintain its own self-image. For many people, the state stripped 
of any public aspect, is merely repressive: courts, prisons, borders, refugee camps. 
What would it mean to seriously consider removing these apparatuses, of leading a 
collective, stateless life? It is necro-capital that makes us immediately conceive of such 
a decapitated existence as immediately one of scarcity and violence. But it is necro-
capital that constructs the conditions for scarcity and violence, that replicates and 
profits from such conditions, from food to images and everything else. What images 
do we have of the energy that constitutes such a world? We do not think enough about 
how various kinds of energy constitutes our economics and our politics, and how our 
images of technological futures, however they are managed (by the state, or by multi-
national corporations), depend upon presumptions about what energy is and where it 
comes from. As Bataille puts it elsewhere:
Man’s disregard for the material basis of his life still causes him to err in a serious 
way. Humanity exploits given material resources, but by restricting them as it does 
to a resolution of the immediate difficulties it encounters […] it assigns to the forces 
it employs an end which they cannot have. Beyond our immediate ends, man’s ac-
tivity in fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfilment of the universe.16
13 Georges Bataille, ‘Programme (Relative to Acéphale)’, The Bataille Reader, Fred Botting and Scott 
Wilson (eds), Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, p. 121.
14 Ibid., p. 121.
15 Ibid., p. 121.
16 Georges Bataille, ‘The Meaning of General Economy’, The Bataille Reader, op. cit., 183.
28 MONEYLAB READER 2
A
Is necro-capital an attempt, in the most destructive way possible, to pretend that there 
is control over the material basis of our lives? Is it the excess energy generated by 
capitalism, fed back into a system that thinks nothing of monetizing pain and slaugh-
ter? For Bataille, it is the sun that provides humanity with a model of energy without 
exchange (‘The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, 
which dispenses energy — wealth — without any return’17). Does necro-capitalism pro-
ceed under the image of a black sun? We forget the sky too often in our political and 
economic analyses, ceding the language of ‘horizons’ to dusty philosophies and the 
heavens to religion. If we imagine instead that the sky is our ‘head’, we will not need 
leaders with their heads pretending to look down, all the while dealing in the most cor-
rupt things imaginable. Necro-capitalism is a beast of many heads, all of which start to 
resemble each other. But they forget where their energy comes from, preferring instead 
to dwell in the most destructive impulses. Those of us who do not believe in heads can 
nevertheless turn ours to the sky for an image of the world that understands that one 
does not need to traffic in violence to understand its power.
But we could also turn to another mythical character, another beast with many heads: 
the Hydra. As Peter Linebaugh points out:
From the beginning of English colonial expansion in the early seventeenth century 
through the metropolitan industrialization of the early nineteenth, rulers referred 
to the Hercules-hydra myth to describe the difficulty of imposing order on in-
creasingly global systems of labor. They variously designated dispossessed com-
moners, transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban 
laborers, soldiers, sailors, and African slaves as the numerous, ever-changing 
heads of the monster. But the heads, though originally brought into productive 
combination by their Herculean rulers, soon developed among themselves new 
forms of cooperation against those rulers, from mutinies and strikes to riots and 
insurrections and revolution.18
The horrors of necro-capitalism, the history of human violence, and the making 
economic of horror in slavery and exploitation, are seemingly insurmountable. Yet 
we must become better readers of images that neutralize us and make us complicit 
in this violence, and look and think instead towards images of alternative worlds 
that do not thrive upon and promote violence. Somewhere between acephalism 
and the many-headed hydra. This position would not pretend that destructive im-
ages and actions do not exist, or must be ignored, but rather understands the 
temptation and power of such a vision of the world. We should not seek to protect 
ourselves from horrible images, or rely on others to do the hard labour of image 
selection, but rather cultivate powerful political images that dialectically reverse 
necro-capitalist desires. Aggression may be a central feature of human life, but it 
can be addressed if it is understood, and channelled away from cruelty towards 
compassion and care.19
17 Georges Bataille, ‘Laws of General Economy’, The Bataille Reader, op. cit., 189.
18 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and 
the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000, pp. 3-4.
19 Parts of this text draw upon earlier work done for the Amsterdam Sonic Acts festival, 2017.
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Appification
Industry researchers and anthropologists in the ‘payment space’ are talking of a ‘Cam-
brian explosion of payments’.1 The explosion is Cambrian, explains Bill Maurer, ‘in 
that new body forms, adaptations of existing structures, and novel relationships in a 
variegating ecology of retail payment are coming into being all at once’.2 Readers with 
an interest in the payment space are no doubt familiar with some of these ways to pay 
(or otherwise transfer), from M-PESA to Venmo, Bitcoin to Alipay, and while not all rely 
on the bundle of technologies we (still) call the phone, it is doubtful there would be talk 
of such an explosion without the prior explosion of these digital devices.
Part of what is happening with payments is a becoming-money-like of phones, of 
phones substituting for other money artefacts such as cash or card. Of course, it is 
by no means a straightforward substitution: the becoming-money-like of phones is 
equally a becoming-phone-like of money. And since the phone is always already a 
bundle or stack of technologies, what is happening with money and what that might 
mean more generally in terms of (political) economy is anything but clear.
As Maurer points out, payments made through phones involve ‘adaptations of existing 
infrastructures’. Just at the level of phone hardware, for example, he points out how 
payment software variously makes use of the phone’s camera, display and earphone 
jack, none of which were intended for payment. In addition to these novel material 
adaptations, something (at least) as significant is happening as money-practices — 
paying, transferring, budgeting, converting, investing, and so on — are increasingly 
encoded as software. Money is becoming ‘appified’.
Another way to get at this ‘explosion’ in the payment space is precisely to look to the 
major app stores — and indeed one does find rapid growth in money-related apps 
over the last five years.3 In the form of applications, internet banking services from 
Natwest, Barclays or Lloyds (in the UK) sit alongside payment processors such as 
Paypal. There are any number of Bitcoin wallets, and the new generation of ‘smart’ or 
‘challenger’ banking and payment apps such as Monzo, Monese, or Yolt. Then there 
are the 1st party platform apps, such as Android Pay and Google Wallet, or Apple 
Pay and Apple Wallet. As a further, fractal, iteration on this platform-app dynamic, 
Apple Wallet is also fashioned as its own mini-platform of sorts, a kind of wallet-as-
1 Bill Maurer, ‘Blockchains Are a Diamond’s Best Friend: Zelizer for the Bitcoin Moment,’ in Nina 
Bandelj, Frederick F. Wherry, and Viviana A. Zelizer (eds), Money Talks: Explaining How Money 
Really Works, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017, pp. 215–29; Taylor Nelms, 
‘“Ecuador Bans Bitcoin”! A Monetary Mix-Up,’ King’s Review Magazine, 20 October 2015, http://
kingsreview.co.uk/articles/ecuador-bans-bitcoin-a-monetary-mix-up/.
2 Maurer, ‘Blockchains Are a Diamond’s Best Friend’, p. 215.
3 Of course, both the Apple App Store and Google’s Play Store have experienced significant app 
growth in general.
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platform, where users can connect to other apps (British Airways, Starbucks, Hotels.
com, Expedia, Airbnb, Eventbrite, etc.). Wallet will ‘store your boarding passes, tick-
ets, reward cards, coupons and gift cards in one place’.4 
These money apps push and pull money in different directions. They code its func-
tionality in different ways, ways that ‘operationalise’ the sociological theories of money 
as ‘marked’ developed by writers like Viviana Zelizer:5 apps for moving money across 
borders; for saving and managing finances; for gift-giving; for playful gestures; for 
gambling; for retail payments; for specific platform transactions; for spending in this 
space, this store, this thing, now, for you and you only.6 The notion of money as ‘uni-
versal equivalent’ is superseded by money as situated, ‘embodied interaction’.7 And 
thus, the spectrum of monetary situations become available for appification. There 
is much to be said about monetary appification: how it reconfigures hardware and 
infrastructures; how it realigns industries and industry players (banks, mobile network 
operators, software companies, merchants and so on), creating new allegiances and 
competitors; how it is part of a privatisation of money-space; or, indeed, how it ex-
pands money’s materiality and augments its functionality (or not), while blurring the 
distinction between money as artefact and process or milieu, for example. In what 
follows, we limit ourselves to a discussion of what we see as the becoming experiential 
of money; that is, of money becoming subjected to specific design techniques and 
framings as experience. As we shall see, experience (design) informs how the vast 
majority of money-related apps are made. It is a way of doing things; a set (or sets) 
of principles and corresponding methods. Experience is also the criterion upon which 
apps are evaluated and the ‘value proposition’ upon which new apps are brought into 
being. A turn to experience, then, helps us understand something of the cultural logics 
of this so-called Cambrian explosion. It provides one way into thinking about what is 
happening to money as it is remediated through phones, and where we might look to 
gain a critical purchase on the present in terms of political and cultural economy.
Experience
While money has long been the subject of design (in terms of materials, preventing 
counterfeit, or for symbolic ends), as app the entire money-sphere is subject to a 
particular kind of design mediation. Money is becoming a subset of the user experi-
ence. Understood through the lens of user experience, money’s commonly-attributed 
functions — as medium, measure, store, etc. — persist, but only inasmuch as money 
is now also something else. This new experience ‘layer’ of mediation does not cancel 
4 As much as Android and Apple Pay have a significant competitive advantage as the native 
offerings of their respective appospheres, neither has made inroads comparable to their Chinese 
counterparts. Alipay, for example, reportedly has 450 million users, and a 54% share of China’s 
$5.5 trillion mobile payments market. Alipay’s main competitor is WeixinPay (or WeChat Pay), 
which currently has 37% of the market. See Louise Lucas, ‘Ant Financial claims doubling of daily 
users’, Financial Times, 17 May 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/8925ad98-3add-11e7-821a-
6027b8a20f23?mhq5j=e2.
5 Viviana A. Zelizer, Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010; Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: Pin Money, Paychecks, 
Poor Relief, and Other Currencies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
6 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2016.
7 Paul Dourish, Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2004.
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out other functions, although, as we will see, it is not the case of money-as-usual. 
What is experience in this context? There are at least two trajectories that converge 
in money-as-experience, one economic and one design-based.
The significance of experience as an economic concept was perhaps first explored 
by Alvin Toffler in Future Shock.8 Toffler wrote of the rise of the ‘experiential indus-
tries’, which specialises in neither goods or services but experiences, experienc-
es which in turn becomes central to the mediation of these other sources of value 
(goods and services):
Bankers and brokers, real estate and insurance companies will employ the most 
carefully chosen decor, music, closed circuit color television, engineered tastes and 
smells, along with the most advanced mixed-media equipment to heighten (or neu-
tralize) the psychological charge that accompanies even the most routine transac-
tion. No important service will be offered to the consumer before it has been ana-
lyzed by teams of behavioral engineers to improve its psychic loading.9
Experience, in this regard, pans much of the contemporary ‘culture industries’, and is 
always explicitly part of an economic relation. It appears as a kind of extra layer (similar 
to how design itself was understood at the time), but Toffler also imagines such experi-
ences floating more freely: ‘The experience is, so to speak, the frosting on the cake. As 
we advance into the future, however, more and more experiences will be sold strictly 
on their own merits, exactly as if they were things’.10
Roughly 30 years after Future Shock, Joseph Pine and James Gilmore wrote their influ-
ential book, The Experience Economy.11 These authors similarly distinguish experience 
from goods and services:
Experiences represent an existing but previously unarticulated genre of economic 
output. Decoupling experiences from services in accounting for what businesses 
create opens up possibilities for extraordinary economic expansion just as recogniz-
ing services as a distinct and legitimate offering led to a vibrant economic founda-
tion in the face of a declining industrial base.12
For these authors, experience is separated out as a new ‘unit of value’, which emerg-
es through ‘mass customization’ and where ‘every business is a stage, and there-
fore work is theatre’.13 Mass customization is achieved through different forms of 
‘staging’. If this sounds like an operationalization of Erving Goffman’s seminal Frame 
Analysis — where theatre is used as a primary example to elucidate the ‘framing’ of 
everyday experience — it is because it is.14 The Experience Economy reads like a 
8 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York: Bantam Books, 1970. p. 226.
9 Ibid., p. 228.
10 Ibid.
11 B. Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work Is Theater & Every 
Business a Stage, Brighton: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Erving Goffman and Bennett Berger, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, 
New Edition, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1986.
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business undergraduate mistakenly took a course in sociology, and read Goffman 
as if he were a business guru. The result is employees and managers reimagined 
as actors and places of work reimagined as different types of theatre. Find yourself 
in a dynamic environment? Strategy: Improv Theatre. How about a familiar, routine 
situation? Platform Theatre. As industrial production retreats from the overdeveloped 
nations and services reach their limits, the staging of experiences, Pine and Gilmore 
suggest, ‘provides the key to future economic growth’.15
By the time The Experience Economy was reissued in 2011, the authors could write 
of Apple as the new masters of experience: ‘what store is now the envy of every mall 
owner and developer? Apple. Why? Customers clearly flock there not only for the 
goods but also the store experience…’.16 A year after this reissue, Carmine Gallo 
published her book length account of this development in The Apple Experience.17 
Gallo continues to rely on theatrical metaphors, with discussions of scripts and stage 
setting, heroes and villains, but also give experience an expanded set of coordinates. 
In a chapter dedicated to creating ‘wow moments’, for example, readers are treated 
to an opening epigraph from neuroscientist John Medina: ‘The brain remembers the 
emotional components of an experience better than any other aspect’.18 The staging 
of experiences comes to refer explicitly to a cognitive and emotional actor, with the 
task of experience design, in this chapter at least, to create ‘emotionally charged 
events’. Apple’s famous Super Bowl ad ‘1984’ is reframed as the prototypical ‘wow 
moment’. Whatever else there is to say about this ad, it certainly can be read as a 
kind of experience proposition (as the voiceover proclaims): ‘And you’ll see why 1984 
won’t be like 1984’.19
It is with Apple that the two trajectories of experience as designed encounter and 
source of economic value reach their apotheosis. Of course, experience as ‘unit of val-
ue’ and as design practice are deeply interwoven, but they can be separated out. De-
signing for ‘the user experience’20 is precisely a practice, a way of designing that differs 
from other design traditions, and one in which economic considerations (of experience) 
become backgrounded and only re-enter at specific moments of the design process.
User experience (UX) design falls within what has been called the ‘third paradigm’ 
of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) as influentially described by Steve Harrison, 
Deborah Tatar, and Phoebe Sengers.21 These authors summarise the first paradigm 
as engineering and ‘human factors’ led, with a focus on ‘optimizing man-machine 
fit’; the second was based in cognitive science and focusing on how the computer 
15 B. Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy, Updated Edition, Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business Review Press, 2011. 
16 Pine and Gilmore, The Experience Economy.
17 Carmine Gallo, The Apple Experience: Secrets to Building Insanely Great Customer Loyalty, New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education, 2012.
18 Ibid., 143.
19 Ridley Scott, Apple - 1984, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R706isyDrqI.
20 Jesse James Garrett, Elements of User Experience: User-Centered Design for the Web, 1st edition, 
Indianapolis, IN: New Riders, 2002.
21 Steve Harrison, Deborah Tatar, and Phoebe Sengers, ‘The Three Paradigms of HCI’, SIGCHI 
Conherence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, San Jose, CA, 2007, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/215835951_The_three_paradigms_of_HCI.
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and ‘human mind’ interact; while the third paradigm is described as a ‘phenomeno-
logical matrix’, one which takes into account things like affect, embodiment, situat-
ed meaning, values and social issues.22 In a different take on this history, Microsoft 
researcher Jonathan Grudin defines the third ‘face’ (in his terms) through the rise 
of ‘discretionary use’.23 His idea correlates with the rise of the PC (and later mobile 
devices), which place computers outside the workplace and the practice of work 
itself. Discretionary use is use beyond work; use that, at least in some aspects, is 
reconfigured as consumption.24
Research under the ‘third paradigm’ attained heightened influence as computa-
tional objects increasingly entered the everyday – the becoming ‘ubiquitous’ of 
computing.25 Pioneering work by HCI researchers at Xerox PARC, including Lucy 
Suchman on ‘situated action’ and Paul Dourish on ‘embodied interaction’, offered 
convincing criticisms of the instrumental and Cartesian underpinnings of earlier ap-
proaches to HCI, while also drawing on sociological and phenomenological insights 
to advance their own agendas.26 Donald Norman, who was foundational to the sec-
ond ‘cognitive’ paradigm of HCI, revised his earlier position and also began focus-
ing on things like ‘emotional design’.27 In this third paradigm, the user of technology 
was thoroughly reworked; now depicted in situations closer to Geertz’s Balinese 
Cockfights than the formalised cognitive task and office workflows of days past.28 
The term ‘user’ itself came under attack by Norman and others as being too tainted 
by these older paradigms. Norman started championing ordinary ‘people’ and sug-
gesting technology ‘should get out of the way’ — the so-called invisible paradigm 
— while others suggested UX should lose its ‘U’ and focus solely on experiences. 
So, users and situations become decidedly thicker, and claims to knowing the user 
attained new empirical coordinates. Users were now placed in ‘user scenarios’ 
within larger ‘user journeys’; they were now in a world full of rich experiences and 
the task of design was to focus on these. Even when ‘real’ users were missing in ac-
tion, designers invented detailed but effectively fictitious characters or ‘personas’. 
While products and services remain important throughout these changes, experi-
ence design begins from this position (of experience) and works backwards through 
to the product or service.
Drawing insights from behavioural psychology, cognitive approaches to interac-
tion design had already assumed users were not rational and this assumption was 
carried into the experience paradigm. It’s not to say that cognitive approaches 
22 Harrison, Tatar, and Sengers, ‘The Three Paradigms of HCI’.
23 Jonathan Grudin, ‘Three Faces of Human — Computer Interaction’, IEEE Annals of the History of 
Computing 27.4 (October 2005): 46–62.
24 Soren Bro Pold and Christian Ulrik Andersen, ‘Controlled Consumption Culture: When Digital 
Culture Becomes Software Business,’ in Paul D. Miller and Svitlana Matviyenko (eds), The 
Imaginary App, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014, pp. 17–34.
25 Mark Weiser, ‘Ubiquitous Computing,’ Ubiquitous Computing, 2017, http://www.ubiq.com/
hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html.
26 Lucy A. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine Communication, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Dourish, Where the Action Is.
27 Donald Norman, Emotional Design: Why We Love (or Hate) Everyday Things, New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2005.
28 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New Ed edition, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977.
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presumed an irrational user, but rather a full spectrum of cognitive ‘behaviours’ 
were put on the table. Indeed, the very premise of the second paradigm was that 
designers and engineers could not assume in advance that users would use as 
intended by design; Engelbart-style ‘augmenting’ of the human intellect through 
the interface was not a given.29 Industry books like Don’t Make Me Think30 and 
Designing with the Mind in Mind31 provided practical advice on designing for the 
cognitively-flawed user.
This a-rational or behavioural user underpins much contemporary interaction de-
sign, where creating a desired experience is evaluated in terms of its capacity to 
elicit specific behaviours. Here, the design of experience to shape behaviour ex-
plicitly blends socio-cultural, psychological and behavioural-economic insights, as 
seen in the well-documented form of ‘nudging’.32 The most sinister of the cognitive-
behavioural approaches at the level of experience design are manifested as ‘dark’ 
design patterns, which deliberately aim to trick and misguide users by preying on 
their cognitive weaknesses.33 However, deliberate attempts to nudge and deceive 
are only the most obvious instances of experiences that are always already de-
signed to direct cognition.
Thus, while there is a thickness to the imagined, designed and real experiences of 
the user, a lingering instrumentality necessarily exists in the user experience as sub-
ject of design. Experiences are designed to ‘act upon’ the user to enact a change or 
achieve a designed outcome. While cognition is not the only target of design, as the 
locus of decision-making and other, lower-level responses,34 the cognitive element is 
often privileged. The behavioural economists, for example, are now inclined to speak 
of designing ‘choice architectures’, material environments constructed to encourage 
specific choices (over others), while also producing an active, decision-making user – a 
user understood as decision-maker, and one who must decide in order to validate the 
premise of the (choice) architecture.
This cognitive-behavioural user has its roots in behavioural psychology, where the 
mind or psyche were black-boxed. The psychological way of knowing came to revolve 
around creating controlled experiments, which focused on observing the cognitive be-
haviours of subjects.35 This black-boxing of the mind and privileging of a peculiar form 
of empiricism proved attractive to a generation of economists who had become inter-
ested in testing the presumed utility-maximising individual underpinning neoclassical 
29 Douglas C. Engelbart, ‘Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework,’ Doug Engelbart 
Institute, 1962, http://www.dougengelbart.org/pubs/augment-3906.html.
30 Steve Krug, Don’t Make Me Think!: A Common Sense Approach to Web Usability, 2nd edition, 
Berkeley, CA: New Riders, 2005.
31 Jeff Johnson, Designing with the Mind in Mind: Simple Guide to Understanding User Interface 
Design Rules, 1st edition, Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann, 2010.
32 Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness, London: Penguin, 2012.
33 See D. Berry and M. Dieter (eds), Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation And Design, 2015 
edition, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Harry Brignull, ‘Dark Patterns’, 2017, https://
darkpatterns.org/.
34 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, London: Penguin, 2012.
35 John A. Mills, Control: A History of Behavioral Psychology, New York, NY: NYU Press, 2000.
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economics and they used experiments to undermine this rational figure at the heart 
of economics.36 Such a black-boxing of the mind attains a new specificity and a new 
function in the experience paradigm.
While the process of design may well involve qualitative or even ethnographic modes 
of inquiry, the actual interfacing of user and experience, when people use money 
apps, for example, lends itself to behavioural insights (and methods) because the 
actual user is generally only registered as a series of digital traces. That is, while the 
user may be ‘in’ an experience in all its symbolic richness, the interaction is fed back 
through the interface as a string of data signals.37 While early web design was barely 
conscious of the ‘informating’38 dimension of digital communication, today experi-
ences come jam-packed with any number of behavioural data points and these are 
used to measure the performance of the experience (in terms of conversion rates, 
for example), but also as a set of coordinates for conducting experiments.39 A/B and 
multivariate testing, which roll out subtly different versions of an interface to differ-
ent users and then measure the resulting behaviours against a predefined criteria, 
are based precisely on the experience as an unfolding experiment, and as consti-
tuted through behaviours which are not only the basis of ‘knowing’ but also acting. 
This post-ethnographic and post-demographic40 user (as data signals) moves to the 
centre of design considerations as the actual users of applications scales into the 
millions. Indeed, as initially designed experiences (and their ethnographically thick 
users) are set wild into the digital everyday, the scaling of behavioural data and re-
framing of experience as experiment suggest the third paradigm may be morphing 
into something else. These hybrid experiements, increasingly form the modus ope-
randi of innovation in platform capitalism. In the case of data-driven experiments, 
we are literally talking about quasi-blind innovation. A data-design hybrid authority 
replaces the Schumpeterian heroic entrepreneur. The experience economy is guided 
by the invisible hand of behaviour.
The Cambrian explosion in the ‘payments space’ is an implosion of money as ex-
change and a rebirth of money as experience. Experience becomes a distinct value 
proposition — indeed, a selling point — upon which any number of money-sphere 
applications can lay claim. Experience is staging, performance, scripting, instrumen-
talized Goffmanian framing; it is a new ‘unit of value’, a 1984 ‘wow moment’. But it is 
also a worldview of ethnographic thickness attached to design practice. Experience is 
where people are (embodied, situated), what they have (affects, emotions, behaviours) 
and what design actively (re)creates, acts upon and experiments on; experience hovers 
between methodology and worldview.
36 Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics, 1st edition, London: 
Penguin, 2015; Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow; Floris Heukelom, Behavioral 
Economics: A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
37 Frieder Nake, ‘Human-Computer Interaction: Signs and Signals Interfacing,’ Languages of Design 
2, 1994, pp. 193–205.
38 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization’, Journal of Information Technology 30.1 (March 2015): 75.
39 Gary Angel, Measuring the Digital World: Using Digital Analytics to Drive Better Digital Experiences, 
1st edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson FT Press, 2015; Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance 
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’.
40 Richard Rogers, Digital Methods, Cambrige, MA: MIT Press, 2013.
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Apple Pay
To consider this recasting of money as experience, let’s return to Apple. Apple Pay 
was publicly introduced at the launch event for the iPhone 6 in 2014. After a gen-
eral introduction to the then new iPhone 6, Apple CEO Tim Cook strolls (back) onto 
the stage and announces that he’d ‘like to talk about an entirely new category of 
service’.41 After a lengthy pause, he continues, ‘And it’s all about the wallet’. A bulky 
black leather wallet appears on the screen behind Cook; it is held slightly ajar to 
reveal a couple of bank cards and some unruly bills. ‘Our vision’ he continues, ‘is to 
replace this.’ Apple Pay is presented as the first step in this vision. The audience is 
given an overview of the payments industry in the US (four trillion US dollars annually, 
200 million transactions processed daily), after which Cook’s rhetoric takes a turn: 
‘That’s 200 million times we scramble for our credit cards, and go through what is 
a fairly antiquated payment process’. He provides a short and somewhat elaborate 
video of a woman paying for a store purchase using a Visa bank card: she fumbles 
around with her purse; the card is difficult to pry out of its slot; ID is required; the 
magstripe doesn’t read; the card is returned with a receipt, and both need to be 
sorted away. The bank card — and its magstripe technology — come under full at-
tack: it’s ‘five decades old’; ‘outdated and vulnerable’; ‘it’s so easy to lose your card 
or have it compromised’.
Cook goes on to acknowledge that many have already tried and failed to create a mo-
bile wallet which gains a foothold in the payment business. ‘Why is this?’, he ponders,
It’s because as it turns out most people that have worked on this have started by 
focusing on creating a business model that was centred around their self-interest, 
instead of focusing on the user experience. We love this kind of problem. This is 
exactly what Apple does best.
The audience is reintroduced to the scenario of the woman paying in store. This 
time she is equipped with Apple Pay. At the register, the store keeper once again an-
nounces the total. The woman holds her phone to a wireless payment terminal and 
presses her thumb on the iPhone’s fingerprint scanner. A small beep confirms the 
transaction is complete. ‘That’s it!’, Cook announces. And again, ‘That’s it!’ He shows 
the video again, in case the audience ‘blinked’ and missed it. At that point, Cook 
leaves the stage to Eddy Cue (Senior VP of Software and Services) to go through all 
the technical details. While these details surely matter a great deal when it comes to 
evaluating the actual functioning of Apple Pay, the main work is already done. ‘That’s 
it’ is Apply Pay’s ‘wow moment’.
In the first video Cook establishes payment as a theatre of experience. It is a wom-
an in a store, with a handbag and a purse. It is a shopkeeper, a bench, goods and 
bags, swipe terminals and cash registers. It involves communication, both verbal 
and gestural, and a range of bodily movements — grasping, sorting, swiping, pull-
ing, glancing, reading, and so on. Swipe cards appear as the main villains, sup-
41 Apple, Apple - September Event 2014, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38IqQpwPe7s; 
Note: all subsequent references to Tim Cook are taken from this video. The relevant section 
begins at the 43-minute mark.
39UPDATING DIGITAL ECONOMY
ported by purses, swipe terminals and ID checks. Apple Pay emerges as the under-
stated hero; it rewrites the script, taking the user on a new, simpler journey.
We will not speculate too much on the strategic behavioural dimensions of this re-
scripted experience, but the temporal changes alone — That’s it! — is presumably 
relevant to the so-called purchase or conversion ‘funnel’, particularly at the final point 
of purchase. It would also presumably impact the user’s ‘present bias’ (a privileg-
ing of the present when making decisions), by reducing opportunities for consumer 
reflexivity. Such speculation is in fact not necessary as Apple overtly advertises the 
behavioural dimensions of Apple Pay on the company’s developer site, where early 
adopters provide testimony of the benefits of switching to Pay.42 Consider a selection 
of these testimonies:
A product manager from Groupon: ‘Apple Pay has facilitated greater real-time com-
merce, improved conversion and enhanced the overall Groupon mobile experience.’
A product director from Indiegogo: ‘We’ve seen a 250% increase in our conversion 
rate with Apple Pay.’
A ‘VP of Product’ from Chairish: ‘With Apple Pay, our conversion rate has tripled.’
The CEO of Fancy: ‘Apple Pay customers have a 30% higher purchase frequency 
than other users.’
Each of these testimonies is followed with further elaboration from Apple’s copy writ-
ers: ‘new customers can purchase a deal with a single tap’; ‘the DoorDash team re-
moved friction from the checkout experience for new users’; ‘With Apple Pay, there’s 
no need for payment method selection or data entry, resulting in an optimal customer 
experience’; and ‘With a better first time experience, customers come back more fre-
quently.’ The ‘value proposition’ of Apple Pay is an improved payment experience 
resulting in higher sales conversion rates. That is, as experience money, Apple Pay 
promises to leave its owners hands (or phones?) more often and more efficiently than 
other ways to pay.
Critical Coordinates
Whether or not Apple Pay (Android Pay, Samsung Pay, Alipay, WeChat Pay, Paypal, 
or the like) will establish itself as the killer app for payments is secondary to the gen-
eral rise of experience money. Competition in the payment space and the larger app 
ecology is being forged in terms of this re-scripting of experience. What to make of 
this experience money?
Experience money should trouble classical and neoclassical economists because it 
introduces a behavioural, a-rational, actor into the market, a priori. That is, experi-
ence money acts on users through the very process of facilitating market activity. The 
behavioural approach to economics also finds itself in an odd situation: the insight it 
42 Apple. ‘Apple Pay - Apple Developer’, https://developer.apple.com/apple-pay/; Note: all 
subsequent testimonials are taken from this page.
40 MONEYLAB READER 2
A
borrows from behavioural psychology to better account for empirical economic activ-
ity (with regards to neoclassical approaches) is now already written into the empirical. 
Attempts to explain economic realities from this position therefore suffer from a type 
of ontological circularity. In other words, behavioural economics is having its ‘engine 
not a camera’ moment.43 This should not trouble too many readers of MoneyLab, 
who hail from more critical and creative horizons. Indeed, it suggests the empirical 
realities of experience money can be used as ammunition against attempts to explain 
economic activity by the means just mentioned. But we might also ask some more 
fundamental questions.
As Apple, Google, Alibaba, Tencent and others continue the march into banking, pay-
ment, transfer and other services traditionally the preserve of banks and credit card 
companies, the distance between global finance and digital cultures further collapses. 
What would it mean to take these players and their experiential interventions as the 
basis for a critique of political economy? When four of the top five most valuable public 
companies (Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft and Amazon) are all experimenting with experi-
ence money, this question is pressing. What does criticism look like, when its object 
is an economy of experiences? What can we learn from these experience-mongers? 
Future interventions must learn from and act upon this experiential state of the art.
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Discussing computer operating systems, the economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that, 
‘Just as it’s very convenient for everyone to speak the same language, it’s very con-
venient for everyone to use the same operating system’.1 There’s a simple and plain 
truth in what he says. And in what can now be seen as a clear echo of the prevail-
ing trend in Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), or blockchain research, as well as 
development off the back of financial technologies markets towards multi-domain 
usages, Stiglitz continues by suggesting that, ‘[i]ncreasing interconnectivity across 
the world naturally leads to standardisation. Those with a monopoly over the stan-
dard that is chosen benefit’.2 Blockchain may not presently be a standard owned or 
intellectually controlled by a single economic actor, but there are certainly a growing 
number of consortia made up of major legacy financial and tech players hoping to 
benefit from it. But will this remain the case in the near future, and does it really mat-
ter if the development of blockchain technology ends up under the control of, say, 
one tech giant?
In a very short space of time, arguably the last three to five years, blockchain has 
risen to capture the feverish imagination of capitalists and entrepreneurs alike across 
the globe. There is now a morass of such players scrambling over one another in 
fierce competition to be the winners in this latest round of onanistic technological 
innovation. Fuelled almost exclusively by hyperbole and, contrary to the nature of the 
technology itself, a gradual centralization and aggregation of peripheral technological 
practices that is a direct result of the influence of capitalist logic, blockchain is rapidly 
emerging as a profitable mainstream means for generating the surplus interventions, 
accumulations, exploitations and reproductions demanded by the capitalist imagi-
nation. Under the duel banners of ‘innovation’ and ‘progress’ blockchain has be-
come the means du jour for the reproduction of capitalist class power through ‘world 
changing’ technology in the so-called fourth-industrial age in which advanced West-
ern capitalist societies now imagine themselves.3 And the forward thrust of block-
chain innovation is furious, with record levels of investment as of 2016/17 measured 
in billions of dollars of venture capital.4
1 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, London: Penguin, 2013, p. 56.
2 Ibid., p. 56.
3 For some commentators it is less an ‘age’ and more another industrial revolution. For example, 
Klaus Schwab, the founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum. See Klaus 
Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, New York, NY: Crown, 2017.
4 See James Ovenden, ‘Blockchain Top Trends in 2017: What Lies Ahead for One of the World’s 
Most Exciting Technologies?’, The Innovation Enterprise, 29 November 2016, https://channels.
theinnovationenterprise.com/articles/blockchain-top-trends-in-2017.
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Capital and ‘Disruptive’ Innovation: An Entrepreneurial Love Affair
The issue of blockchain as a means of reproducing capitalist class power does not 
begin (or end for that matter) with the technology itself but with people. Those who 
engineer and build the technology might care about blockchain solely as an intellec-
tual challenge. The extent to which it is possible to separate those who, for instance, 
engineer a piece of software or build a platform from those who seek to exploit the 
technology (for the purposes of not simply generating personal fortunes in the short 
to medium term but also for the sheer thrill of the process of being an active eco-
nomic subject) becomes less clear when they are one and the same person, namely 
a so-called tech entrepreneur. For this cabal of tech-minded libertarians and anarcho-
capitalists blockchain technology offers an opportunity to leverage new markets and 
enable, as David Golumbia argues, ‘a wide range of extractive and exploitative busi-
ness practices’ that ultimately ‘increase the power of corporations and capital outside 
the scope of any attempts by democratic polities to constrain them’.5 When discussing 
technology it is easy to forget the people behind it. Likewise, it is easy for those self-
same people to hide behind the technology and ultimately use it to both facilitate and 
conceal their desires and motivations. Desires that can be markedly different from 
those to which the technology appears to be aimed — or, at least, towards which they 
tell the world the technology is aimed.
A single basic technological form with many different uses is the Holy Grail of techno-
logical innovation in engineering terms. Just as Stiglitz suggests in the quote earlier. 
But the economics of these innovations make happy reading for many as well. The 
reason is simple. If you don’t need to spend time or money changing technology to 
make it fit multiple applications then you are likely to have the gift of a technological 
‘organizational form’ that is highly cost-effective and organizationally efficient.6 It is 
trite these days to highlight capital’s insistence on superseding the old with the new, 
whether via material obsolescence or some other form of cynical immaterial manipula-
tion of one’s personal and subjective desires (advertising, marketing etc.). We must 
recognise what the process of making way for (or forcing) the new represents in this 
context however: a deeply ideological and often highly cynical process that determines 
the accrual of benefits into only a few sets of hands, and the onward march of capitalist 
class power through the creation of a constant tension between (supposed) problems 
and (necessary) solutions.
Much like the comic plotlines of the hit HBO comedy Silicon Valley, entrepreneurial 
narratives of progress and innovation are fraught with fanciful thinking and dream-
like logic that see problems as always already indexed to solutions and vice versa, 
ad infinitum. Central to the reproduction of capitalist class power on this score is the 
necessity of a call to duty of individuals willing to play the game of problem versus so-
lution. Akin to Louis Althusser’s interpellated economic subjects, entrepreneurs don’t 
just answer this call (the hail) made by capitalism, however; they locate their object 
of desire in the internal reason and (il)logic of capital. Entrepreneurs fall in love with 
5 David Golumbia, The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism, Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016, p. 69.
6 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, London: Profile Books, 2015, 
p. 92.
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innovation, they enjoy the promise of it, and it becomes their ‘passion’.7 As such they 
tell themselves that ideas not income are important, whilst searching, via a cycle of 
success and failure, for the one big idea that will secure their fortune.8
For entrepreneurs and capitalists alike the aim is always to unearth innovations and 
technologies that ‘disrupt’, which are capable of creating more competition and mar-
kets. Blockchain is a prime example of just such a ‘disruptive’ technology, hence why 
it forms the latest chapter in the enduring love story between capital and innovation. 
But it is important not to confuse technology with innovation. The latter ‘is what capi-
talism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in’.9 Innovation, 
like progress, is rooted in historical contingency and narratives of power. ‘The idea 
of innovation is the idea of progress stripped of the aspirations of the Enlightenment, 
scrubbed clean of the horrors of the twentieth century, and relieved of its critics’, says 
Jill Lepore, ‘[d]isruptive innovation goes further, holding out the hope of salvation 
against the very damnation it describes: disrupt, and you will be saved’.10
Let’s be honest, however: what passes for technological revolution and disruption are 
entirely vacuous notions in many of the contexts in which they are celebrated. First 
and foremost, because nothing actually is disrupted by them. Instead the so-called 
disruptive technologies sustain and reinforce the status quo. In my book, disruption 
is, a lot of the time, radically conservative. Why? Simply because the economic base 
(infrastructure) of capitalism, the very reason why the technology is developed and 
deployed in the first place, always remains unchanged when exposed to the sup-
posed cosmological forces of disruption. Not only is disruption often a conservative 
enterprise, it is nothing more than rearranging the furniture in a room but then trying 
to convince people it’s a different room. There is no shift, radical or otherwise, in what 
Althusser calls, ‘the determination in the last instance of what happens in the upper 
‘floors’ (of the superstructure) by what happens in the economic base’.11 Far from 
being shaken by innovation, capitalism, like it does post-crises, flourishes thanks to 
the tinkering of entrepreneurs who like to believe they are changing the world and are 
champions of social justice. As Joseph Schumpeter says (albeit from another side of 
the debate), innovation as technological mutation only ‘incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within’.12
The economic base flourishes as an embodiment of ideas and practices that have un-
derpinned capitalism, largely unchanged, since Adam Smith. Innovation has never in-
terrupted the conditions nor the normal course of the ambitions of capital. Quite the 
opposite. Time and again, capital is reinforced and reinvigorated by the love shown 
it by economic subjects keen to prostrate themselves at the feet of God-like market 
7 Louis Althusser, On Ideology, London: Verso, 2008.
8 A popular term in Silicon Valley for those entrepreneurs who aim to build companies from 
the ground up is ‘bootstrappers’, the classic image derived from the late 19th century fiction 
of Horatio Alger who painted the romanticism of the American Dream in terms of the plucky 
ingenuity of the underdog who climbs the ladder to prosperity.
9 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 73.
10 Jill Lepore, ‘The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong’, The New Yorker, 
23 June 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine.
11 Althusser, On Ideology, p. 8-9.
12 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 73.
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forces, and recite evolving incantations of technological innovation. The technology 
might change but, in this process, it is the only thing that does. Only subtle and inef-
fectual disruptions to the narratives surrounding desires, needs and motivations (i.e. 
problems), that the technology is mobilized to address (i.e. solutions), occur. Narratives 
that can themselves be constantly rephrased or even ‘leveraged’ by capital in order to, 
for example, justify the pleasure of incessant innovation and why more individuals and 
businesses ought to indulge in risk in the name of innovation. ‘The advocates of disrup-
tion have an affinity with circular arguments’, claims Lepore, ‘if an established company 
doesn’t disrupt, it will fail, and if it fails it must be because it didn’t disrupt. When a start-
up fails, that’s a success, since epidemic failure is a hallmark of disruptive innovation’.13
Insofar as it can only truly be understood within the confines of its own logic and reason, 
disruption is perhaps best understood as a story of self-love. As an ethos, disruption ser-
vices the self-regarding needs and desires of the capitalist class. That’s why we can think 
of it as a form of onanistic self-love that ultimately reinforces the ideological dominance 
of capital. Entrepreneurs are preachers of innovation and the natural foot-soldiers, narra-
tors and story-tellers of capital. With spiritualized fervour, their narratives are constructed 
to rationalize innovation for innovation sake, and innovation as the Good. But the fact 
that the same old stories of how this or that technology will change the world for the bet-
terment of all are parroted by entrepreneurs only makes them all the more disingenuous. 
What’s more, it highlights that behind the pretence of such stories are the basic demands 
of capital steering the desires of the entrepreneur. As a computer science graduate of 
Stanford University, the intellectual heart of Silicon Valley, put it when asked by the Uni-
versity’s magazine to comment on the truth of the motivations of entrepreneurs and the 
start-up culture he had experienced there: ‘entrepreneurs like to “put that spin on it, that 
we’re going to change the world […] A lot of times, for lack of a better word, that’s just 
bullshit”, he said. “The bottom line is that people want to make money”’.14
‘We have seen that the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pat-
tern of production by exploiting an invention’, claims Joseph Schumpeter, ‘or, more 
generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or pro-
ducing an old one in a new way’.15 Schumpeter’s statement paints entrepreneurs as 
revolutionaries, but let us once again ask: beyond superficialities, what are entrepre-
neurs really interested in changing, let alone revolting against? Entrepreneurs adopt 
risk and sacrifice themselves in the name of capital in situations that function as arenas 
for the display of risk and sacrifice. Failure (not success) is the sine qua non of what it 
means to engage in authentic modern business practices. It’s as though the myth of 
Sisyphus has become a principle for the modern entrepreneur to live by, and the world 
of blockchain is merely the latest stage for the drama to play out on.
Technology > Efficiency > Monopoly
The strategies employed by capitalism regarding the role and place of technologies 
have remained largely unchanged for two centuries. It is something that is echoed in 
Althusser’s claim as to the radical eternity of (capitalist) ideology: ‘The peculiarity of 
13 Lepore, ‘The Disruption Machine’.
14 Fiona Kelliher, ‘The Privilege to Fail: For Startup Founders at Stanford, “Anti-Establishment” and 
Privilege Go Hand in Hand’, The Stanford Daily Magazine 1.5 (7 April 2017): 9.
15 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 117.
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ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a 
non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that structure 
and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call 
history’.16 Amid the many technologies put into the service of capital over the course of 
two hundred years, some have proven of use in multiple domains of industry.
Steam power is a classic example from the rise of industrial capitalism in the 19th cen-
tury, and now there are various computational forms such as blockchain that appear to 
fulfil the same multi-domain criteria. As cost-effective and efficient, the success engen-
dered by technologies such as these is directly attributable to desires for accelerated 
innovation and their ability to produce a greater surplus for less labour input, or what 
André Gorz calls the pushing back of ‘the frontier of the sufficient’.17
Efficiency is only one measure of innovative success. Yet, in contemporary Western 
capitalist societies, efficiency has become the measure of what it means for commer-
cial (and social) spheres to function properly. In short, in all walks of life efficiency is 
good and inefficiency is bad. This determination is rooted in the fundamental logic of 
capitalism, namely ‘to maximise profits, facilitate endless capital accumulation and re-
produce capitalist class power’.18 Innovation has, under capitalism, become a byword 
for greater efficiency and the aggregation of advantages sought by capital to secure 
dominance over all social, cultural and political domains. Hence ‘the founding myth of 
liberal economic theory’ in the form of perfect (utopian) competitive markets is exactly 
that, a myth.19 Instead the logic of economic reason, the aggregation of advantages 
sought by capital, ultimately points elsewhere, namely monopoly.20
Even apparent radical exponents of the decentralized liberal nature of capitalism such 
as Ludwig Von Mises cannot help but acknowledge the intractability of monopolies in 
capitalist reasoning. As Von Mises admits, the centralization of capitalist power in mo-
nopolies demonstrates that one’s fellow capitalists have managed to find a way to yield 
greater profits, which is, after all, precisely the aim.21 And where profit is the aim it is 
also that which must ultimately be respected. Therefore, innovation must be examined 
in light of what it can facilitate not in terms of competition and the growth of markets, at 
least not as ends in themselves, but rather, in terms of consolidation and monopoly.22 
16 Althusser, On Ideology, p. 35.
17 André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, London: Verso, 1989, p. 115.
18 Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, pp. 96-97.
19 Ibid., p. 132.
20 The tendency towards monopolization is not simply defined in terms of an individual or 
corporation assuming complete control over a particular resource, but also assumes more subtle 
forms, such as monopoly rents and pricing that have the effect of restricting the production of 
certain commodities (see, for example Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality; Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, MA and London: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. Notwithstanding the subtlety however, a 
singular logic remains apparent, one predicated on its own peculiar efficiencies. Hence, one of the 
most economical (i.e. efficient) ways for an individual to yield the greatest profits for themselves is 
to deny the source of those profits to others.
21 Ludwig Von Mises, Liberalism: The Classical Tradition, Bettina Bien Greaves (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: 
Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 65.
22 Even Schumpeter admits as much. See for example: Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, pp. 68-69.
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After all, both competition and markets are inherently risk-based, uncertain (unpredict-
able) and messy, all features that threaten profit and thus also the associated reproduc-
tion of capitalist class power. If competition and markets can either be avoided entirely 
or made to perform or act less like ordinary manifestations of competition and markets 
do, as largely risk-free entities for instance, then this is the direction in which economic 
reason under capitalism will ultimately pull. It is the way that entrepreneurs will pave for 
their capitalist masters. Certainty and immutability, both of which can be achieved in 
non-competitive monopolies, are highly favoured by capital on this basis.23
Blockchain (De)centralization
Blockchain came to prominence in 2007/08 with cryptocurrencies. Instrumental in solv-
ing the so-called ‘double-spend’ problem, blockchain represented a novel approach to 
anonymous, secure, distributed and decentralized exchange practices that enabled 
cryptocurrency communities to circumvent mainstream, traditional and legacy modes 
of centralized capitalism — what Satoshi Nakamoto referred to as ‘not going through 
financial institutions’.24 However, as blockchain moves rapidly through its latest round 
of iterations (blockchain 2.0) expectations are that it will help solve far more than just 
financial transaction issues. For some the goal is to restore the decentralized make-up 
of the internet, in its entirety.25
‘Decentralisation’, as David Harvey claims, ‘is one of the best means to preserve highly 
centralized power, because it masks the nature of this centralized power behind a 
veneer of individual liberty’.26 In this brief statement Harvey manages perfectly to de-
scribe what we are told blockchain is supposed to achieve, and what it is actually being 
geared-up to achieve in the service of capital. Decentralization is a structural reality in 
the way blockchain functions. Fine. But if desires that tend towards and are in many 
cases rooted in centralization are what ultimately inform and are, more importantly, 
funding blockchain research and development then decentralization very quickly be-
comes a tool of centralization.
As ideological modalities, cryptocurrencies are by and large situated within the scope 
of high libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism.27 This is, therefore, the soil from which 
blockchain in its contemporary form grew. Blockchain 2.0 possess the same DNA 
but is under the influence of far more mainstream and orthodox forms of capitalism. 
This means more capitalism and less anarchism. Also, the ‘disruption’ of orthodox 
23 To some extent law is a form of social organisation that capital has long expected to make 
the (business) world more certain and predictable. For its part law often ends up in the face 
of technological proliferation looking highly conservative, which is not helped by instances of 
law’s rather ineffectual relationship with technology. A classic example in England and Wales 
concerns the failure to implement an electronic conveyancing system. See, for example, Michael 
Cross, ‘Society Backs Reform of “Distracting” E-Conveyancing Law’, The Law Society Gazette, 
2016, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/society-backs-reform-of-distracting-e-conveyancing-
law/5057115.article.
24 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 2008, https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf, p. 1
25 See Kelliher, ‘The Privilege to Fail’, p. 8.
26 Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism.
27 See for example Samuel Edward Konkin III, New Libertarian Manifesto, Koman Publishing, 1983, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120223021118/http://agorism.info/NewLibertarianManifesto.pdf; 
and, Fiona Kelliher, ‘The Privilege to Fail’, p. 9.
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financial models proposed by Nakamoto has not translated into the actual disruption 
of the fundamental logic of capitalism underlying the research, development and use 
of cryptocurrencies and blockchain. In the hands of entrepreneurs who service their 
capitalist masters, therefore, blockchain is providing a means of (re-)centralizing cer-
tain networks and systems rather than decentralizing them.28
Appearing to contradict the centralizing tendencies of capitalist class power (the fact 
that capital seeks monopoly), it is believed by the faithful that blockchain reproduces 
new freedoms and libertarian class power across distributed, decentralized computa-
tional nodes.29 In accordance with a liberal myth of capitalism that favours more mar-
kets and more competition in order to countermand the threat of monopoly and central-
ization, blockchain creates the perfect illusion of decentralization. Those who insist on 
decentralization as the essence of blockchain’s libertarian credentials are misguided.30 
Captured by the ‘force-field of contemporary capitalism’ each fragmented node in-
stead plays a part in sustaining the dominance of capitalism’s economic reason.31 One 
thing is for sure, blockchain is now firmly established as a play-thing of legacy capitalist 
institutions and the various startups who come begging to the table for crumbs in order 
to satisfy their desire for failure. As Lepore argues, ‘the upstarts who work at startups’ 
are told by venture capitalists and investors ‘forget rules, obligations, your conscience, 
loyalty, a sense of the commonwealth. If you start a business and it succeeds, sell it and 
take the cash. Don’t look back. Never pause. Disrupt or be disrupted’.32
Innovation is and has always been ‘immediately perceived as opening new avenues 
for economic growth’, countering the threat to capital of finite economic expansion 
and consequently heralding the dawn of a new and expansive ‘vision imposed by a 
widening of technological horizons’.33 Yet innovation for innovation sake, if that is the 
28 Centralization is a problematic concept in this context precisely because it is often seen and 
spoken about by the likes of Hayek, for example, as symptomatic of anti-capitalist (communist) 
tendencies rather than the ultimate aim for capital itself. As a product of capitalist economic 
reason and a logic that privileges efficiency as essential to maximising accumulation and 
profit however, centralization qua monopoly clearly offers a ‘solution’ to the messy uncertainty 
(‘problems’) of competition and markets faced by stakeholders of capitalism. In other words, 
given the choice between negotiating with other stakeholders in the marketplace, or the ultimate 
concentration and consolidation of resources, wealth and power in one pair of hands, capitalist 
logic and reason favours the latter. As Marx claimed in his definition of the law of centralization: 
‘Capital aggregates into great masses in one hand because, elsewhere, it is taken out of many 
hands’ (Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 2, London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1930, p. 691).
29 As David Golumbia claims: ‘From a cyberlibertarian perspective, governments – all governments, 
not simply whatever current ‘bad’ government we describe as doing wrong – exist only to curtail 
the freedom that is inherently negative […] to be ‘free’ simply is to be ‘free’ from government’ 
(David Golumbia, The Politics of Bitcoin, p. 6).
30 Blockchain might appear to represent a breakthrough for anarcho-capitalists seeking the 
complete absence of government from cyberspace. But, at least from the perspective of left 
critique, the vacuum left by the retreat of the State threatens to be filled, even more than at 
present, by the insidious forces of economic reason that colonise and cannibalise the political. 
The State may not be the best option as a force in the development or control of blockchain, but 
the alternative in the form of capitalism is hardly an improvement. What both positions share 
however is the ability to conceal the centralization that begets decentralization.
31 Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano, ‘Agape and the Anonymous Religion of Atheism’, Angelaki 
Journal of Theoretical Humanities 12.1 (April 2007): 118.
32 Lepore, ‘The Disruption Machine’.
33 Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, London: Penguin, 2000, pp. 102-103.
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truth of what we are more often than not faced with, straddles a line between barbarism 
and civilization, and produces, as André Gorz argues, an ‘a-critical submission to the 
technological imperatives of any kind of machinery whatsoever’.34
Blockchain research, development and use is suffused by capitalist class power. Far 
from being wholly novel or causing any radical shifts in the socioeconomic world (what 
entrepreneurs like to imagine as ‘disruption’), blockchain, at least as we presently find 
it, can simply be added to the long list of technologies that have been drafted into 
the service of capital. This in order to reinforce and guarantee the reproduction of 
capitalist class power. Even Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ that 
only revolutionizes capitalism ‘from within’ reflects the type of ‘innovative’ capitalist 
strategy that blockchain is truly part of.35 And so blockchain really only deserves to be 
understood in light of the fundamental aims of capitalism. This makes critique of the 
technology and its sociocultural affects, rather than a-critical fetishization of the new, 
central to understanding what is at stake from blockchain now and in the near future.
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POSTCARDS FROM THE WORLD OF DECENTRALIZED 
MONEY: A STORY IN THREE PARTS
JAYA KLARA BREKKE
Part 1: Alienation, I love you
Barcelona city centre, in an office, 6th floor, 2015
The sunrays were streaming in through the windows, lighting up the faces of a gather-
ing of city council activists, local Bitcoin entrepreneurs, Faircoin anarchists, Freecoin 
freaks1 and some levelheaded and very dedicated complementary currency organizers.
Sometimes a single sentence can overshadow plenty of otherwise profound conversa-
tion, so I am going to draw up some quick notes on these profundities before letting 
loose about the statement that echoed in my mind since that afternoon. This is just to 
tell you that on that spring day in Barcelona there was much interesting and inspiring 
talk, covering things like:
 – the political implications of different currency designs;
 – how competitive mining in the Bitcoin proof-of-work consensus protocol for verify-
ing transactions might be replaced by a proof-of-cooperation collaborative process 
of automated mining turns;2
 – how multi-signature cryptocurrency wallets can allow for things like communally 
held digital wallets, ‘money totems’;3
 – how functional coding languages, and bringing code closer to natural languages, 
can contribute towards intelligibility of complex systems;
 – how this is essential for empowering and involving people in the development of sys-
tems that increasingly shape their/our lives, including future money infrastructures;
 – how the city of Barcelona is working on developing a social currency for poverty 
reduction and public services;4
 – that there is a need and interest amongst those present in establishing how these 
different currencies, for different functions and geographies, interface with each 
other in some form of common bank to facilitate a currency eco-system;5
(… and much, much more that has informed me in my thinking, writing and presentations6).
1 I mean freaks in the original sense, not ‘weirdos’ (read Shelton’s Fabulous Furry Freak Brothers for 
reference).
2 See Thomas König and Enric Duran, ‘FairCoin2 White Paper’, Fair-coin.org, June 2016, https://
fair-coin.org/de/faircoin2-white-paper/.
3 See ‘D5.5 Implementation of Digital Social Currency Infrastructure’, Dcentproject.eu, p. 30 
September 2015, https://dcentproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/D5.5-Implementation-of-
digital-social-currency-infrastructure-.pdf.
4 See for example Clara Blanchar, ‘Barcelona Contrará con una Moneda Social Propia Pese al 
Recelo del Banco de España’, El Pais, 15 November 2016, https://elpais.com/ccaa/2016/11/14/
catalunya/1479126762_781950.html.
5 https://bankofthecommons.coop/.
6 See http://distributingchains.org and http://www.jayapapaya.net.
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And so the conversations and presentations continued, blah, b-b-bla blah, blockchain, 
until suddenly the interesting talk took a surreal, slow-motion turn, and I heard:
Then we can have a truly free market!
Rewind a bit; this was the conclusion of a story by a person working for the progres-
sive Barcelona City Council, Barcelona En Comu, on their social currency project. The 
person had been explicating how technology now allowed for the creation of curren-
cies that can do all kinds of fun and interesting things. And after mentioning a few of 
these, like self-destructing money — which I agree is very interesting and refers in part 
to the concept of demurrage7 where money loses value over time, which has the effect 
of encouraging circulation instead of accumulation — the person gave an example of 
how such currencies might allow us to assign value to the things we truly value. In this 
proposed scenario, a child might draw a drawing, which might indeed be valued by a 
few members of a community, a grandfather or a neighbor; so why not actually value 
it, and translate it into a value token? This could then be spent in the local bar on some 
locally brewed beer… Value assigned freely by anyone to anything we value, instead of 
what banks or bosses value, then we can have
 a truly
  free
   market.8
Now, it would be unfair to read this brief example, a clumsy brain dump and play on 
words haphazardly thrown into the discussion that afternoon, as the position of the 
city council on social currencies. It isn’t, and the Barcelona social currency is not the 
topic of this story. No, what I want to talk about here is how blockchain technology 
seems to have spun lots of people into strange, contradictory and entirely unex-
pected positions on money, markets, power and technology, and my attempts at 
regaining some stable ground.
What caught me was the glee with which this person wanted to incorporate a child 
drawing into the circuits and demands of productive activity.
The statement by this municipalist activist, although not representative of policy as 
such, does point to a broader proposal of possibly monetizing new forms of activity, 
7 I heartedly encourage anyone to explore the history and social effects of demurrage currencies 
— see for example Lietaer’s fascinating excavation of demurrage and the incredible prosperity 
of Medieval Europe in B. Lieataer, The Mystery of Money: Beyond Greed and Scarcity, Munich: 
Riemann Verlag, 2000, pp. 140-203, see also http://www.lietaer.com and https://dcentproject.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/design_of_social_digital_currency_publication.pdf and https://
dcentproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/D3.4-Field-research-currency_FINAL-v2.pdf.
8 Part of the reason it was surprising was because usually, a political economy of the progressive 
left would take the position that the ‘free market’ is a myth because it in fact relies heavily on 
police enforcement, pro-business government policies and legal processes. The notion of 
automated governance and law in crypto-currencies is no exception — it’s just that some aspects 
of such regulation would be somehow encoded for automated enforcement. It is no closer to 
some ‘free’ or ‘natural’ state than government, it is just a radically different form or method of 
government.
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work done ‘for the social good’ and so on. It also points to creating new currencies as 
a way to incentivize efforts that are needed in a community, while relieving pressures 
from a lack of income from increased unemployment and the dwindling of any welfare 
support. The background to this is on the one hand a critique of the ways that gi-
ant tech companies monetize our social relations and everyday activities through data 
markets, responding by demanding a wage for these activities they are profiting from, 
or better yet, wresting these systems from the hands of these companies and running 
them via public institutions, inventing new currencies to make sure that this work is 
now paid for. On the other, the anarchist extension of this analysis is: why run them 
publicly when we can run them ourselves through peer-to-peer networks?
While I might agree with the sentiment — dignifying with an appropriate wage what 
might otherwise be an exploitative/extractive situation — it can be hard to see how this 
doesn’t also expand the realms of work and the reach of what is considered tradable. 
Suddenly, instead of limiting the amount we have to work and keeping certain valued 
things outside of market dynamics, activities that would normally constitute our free 
time are made tradable.
I am not going to replicate here a critique that has already been articulated by others9 
about how blockchain is the ultimate vehicle for reproducing neoliberal subjectivity, 
which amounts to something along the lines of:
the explosive arrival of blockchain technology has splintered neo-liberalism into tiny 
shards that instead of being destroyed have rained down and pierced into all of us and 
our stuff, turning all our things into capital/assets and all of our endeavors into work/
financial speculation.
There is some hard truth in that. My punk friends are checking the Bitcoin exchange 
charts daily and diversifying their portfolios into NEO,10 OMG,11 Dash,12 and Ether,13 
banding together to form asset management coops and the like,14 while other an-
archist compañera/os are looking into ways of digitizing and scaling the bartering 
economy. This is an idea that aligns in an eerie fashion with the ambition of FinTech 
entrepreneurs of creating not just an Internet of Things and Internet Of Money, but 
indeed also what we might call an automated Economy Of Things that would allow 
‘any object to be rented, sold or shared — without middlemen’.15 (A truly free market 
— where even money itself is disintermediated, replaced by self-trading objects and 
interlocking reputation systems?)
9 See for example Rachel O’Dwyer, ‘The Revolution will (Not) be Decentralized: Blockchains’, 
Commons Transition, 11 June 2015, http://commonstransition.org/the-revolution-will-not-be-
decentralised-blockchains/ and David Golumbia, ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right Wing 
Extremism’, in Geert Lovink, Nathaniel Tkacz and Patricia de Vries (eds), MoneyLab Reader: An 
Intervention in Digital Economy, Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2015, pp. 117-131.
10 https://neo.org.
11 https://omg.omise.co.
12 https://www.dash.org.
13 https://www.ethereum.org.
14 I take part in these activities myself, so be careful and do NOT read this as a criticism of my 
friends.
15 See for example https://slock.it.
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There is much to be worked out, in terms of the politics and what such new behaviors 
and developments mean in terms of power and efforts to systematize equal access 
and solidarity. Part of me doesn’t mind seeing my friends, some of which have been 
left tight for cash in the recent economic downturns, find other ways to get rich fast, 
whether through DIY speculation or new forms of employment. Making money can feel 
brilliantly empowering. I also think the processes of subjectification are still open and 
more complicated than simply replicating a capitalist logic/subjectivity. For now, it is 
hard to see much beyond the replication of speculative behaviors because we are in 
the middle of a gold rush — everyone running head- over-heals to grab a bit (more on 
this in the next stories.) But for now the monopoly of money has been broken and, for 
a moment at least, there is experimentation going on that is neither in the hands of any 
state nor any corporation.16
With Bitcoin and the invention of the blockchain,17 money became programmable and 
open source and, in the years since, has inspired much experimentation and creativ-
ity in this new intersection of computation, currencies, governance and accounting. 
This new field allows for very fine-grained (re)programming of the medium of money, 
from what constitutes, and how to measure, value-generating activity to the setting of 
parameters on the means and conditions of exchange – what is spendable, where and 
by whom. This also means that the design and programming of money allows for ev-
ermore complex means for behavioral engineering, remunerating some behavior over 
others in ways that can target and apply to some people rather than others.
Money — store of value, a means of exchange or social engineering? I say this not as 
some sort of gloomy commentary on contemporary society, but as a caution against 
assuming that bright-eyed intentions of doing good via blockchain currencies neces-
sarily has the effects one might assume. In particular, in efforts that target (the word is 
perhaps revealing) poverty and the poor.
I would like to offer up just one hopefully helpful concept for thinking through the swirl-
ing, changing power dynamics of blockchain and new currency designs: access.
What makes a currency powerful? The fact that it grants access to things, people, 
services and places. The choice of what you want to monetize or not is power. Allow-
ing or disallowing access via particular currencies is power. The more universal the 
currency, the more powerful it is. We are most used to this in terms of national curren-
cies granting access to things within a given territory (and the presence of the dollar 
in other territories as evidence of empire etc.) But programmable currencies can/will 
also mediate access in relation to different industries, product ranges, demographic, 
behavior, brand, reputation, identity etc. in an ever more fine-grained manner.
What used to be generalized for a particular territory is about to fracture into layers of 
differential access — not necessarily a bad thing; this is indeed what a ‘currency eco-
system’ entails. However, when developing and designing such new political econo-
16 So far this is the case for Bitcoin at least, the first blockchain project, and still very much an 
experiment run by a community of computer scientists, programmers and enthusiasts.
17 See Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’, Bitcoin.org, October 
2008, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
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mies, the ways differential access relates to inequality, identity and personal/ collective 
histories needs to be carefully analyzed. Differential conditions on access for specific 
goods or services can be disempowering and oppressive or empowering and exclusive, 
depending on whether you are the one who gets to determine the conditions for access. 
This is how inequality plays a significant role in the effects of differential access.
In a private conversation at a local Barcelona neighborhood street party, a city coun-
cilor in fact voiced some of these concerns. That any social currency project aimed 
at the poor has the danger of creeping towards behavioral engineering whereby for 
example remuneration is accessed on the conditions of good behavior and is only 
spendable for certain goods at certified shops. Instead, she said, ideally a social cur-
rency project should aim for generalized access to public services, including for the 
middle class, instead of determined by finely monitored personal or class conditions. 
Just to mention one example.
So, how, then, did I come to love alienation? That afternoon on the 6th floor in Barce-
lona, I had a moment of feeling that the only good aspect of the hyper-exploitative free 
market — you know, the ‘free’ bit — was slipping away, and I was being chained to an 
immutable record of past fuck-ups by a vast crowd of smiling activists telling me it’s for 
the common good. I realized I LIKE the fact that cold cash doesn’t care about me, you 
or anyone else. A public utility18 for general use regardless of who you are.
Money gets blamed for a lot of things. It is seen as the root of all Evil, generating greed 
and creating alienation by putting a cold medium between our productive efforts and 
the fulfillment of our needs. But that gap between what was done to get the $$$ and 
the ability to spend it, the very attribute of alienation, money as the universal equalizer, 
is indeed also an equalizer in the sense that an outcast with a pound coin can spend 
that pound coin the same way as a respectable priest. A freedom of sorts, from the 
tyrannical opinions of others. Not necessarily a bad thing. Do NOT misunderstand — I 
am not saying that cash or the market is neutral. My point is the opposite, that now that 
money is open for redesign, it is the contingencies rather than intentions that are going 
to determine the effects, and so, rather than relying on existing political economic as-
sumptions, attention needs to be paid to these.
Strange things can happen in an attempt to humanize the market in the context of 
automated global network technology. Which in my mind that afternoon looked a little 
something like bartering + blockchain = possibly the worst of the village with the worst 
of the metropolis, trade secured by an immutable reputation system in which the re-
pressive whispers of village grannies are instantaneously globally relayed through hy-
per-connected nodes, lending them a veneer of objectivity while enforcing differential 
and finely catered mob-justice through alienated smart contract systems. Just to men-
tion yet another dystopian projection for blockchain tech. My point is that a concern for 
the broader social good can quickly become a sinister endeavor when equipped with 
the possibilities of powerful, networked technologies.
18 For some good insight into the privatization of cash, see Brett Scott, ‘Hang on to your Cash. 
This dash to Digitise Payments is Dangerous’, The Guardian, 13 September 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/13/cash-digitise-payments-money-cashless/.
57BLOCKCHAIN CRITICISM
That afternoon in Barcelona I had a sudden wave of premature nostalgia for cash. 
Nobody cared who I was, nobody cared where my money came from, I could use it to 
get my Turkish menemen on an easy Sunday morning and that felt great. Alienation, I 
love you and I miss you already.
 
Part 2: A tribute to those who will never be peers
Bitcoin github repo, August 1st, 2017
This day in Bitcoin-landia had been marked as the culmination and possible final reso-
lution of a conflict that had been raging for some three to four years. The conflict was 
about an existing hard limit on the data-size of blocks on the Bitcoin blockchain, set to 
1MB — whether and how it should be increased. And today was the day the protocol 
was going to be hard-and-soft forked19 into several versions for how to move forward 
on this question and the development of the project overall.
Other authors have written excellent informative pieces about the politicized na-
ture of what, to some, might seem an obscure technical question and the ways in 
which it in fact reflects very different understandings of decentralization, power and 
governance.20 The story I want to address here is slightly more meta. Here is what 
I think is really at stake in the Bitcoin scaling conflict: The possible shaping of new 
types of subjectivity.21
Bitcoin was first introduced in 2008 as a proposal for a peer-to-peer electronic mon-
ey system. In this enticing combination of network technology, cryptography and 
a systems-architecture-that-pays-for-its-own-security-through-some-basic-market-
logics the idea was that we could get rid of the need for authorities, like banks, to 
guarantee relations and trust between people who don’t know each other, replacing 
such trust with cryptographic proof, and thereby run global money systems through 
networks of peers.
The experiment has since grown immensely — in numbers of people, places, organiza-
tions and companies involved, and value moved through the system. It is now facing a 
19 A fork refers to when a change is made to the protocol that might not be agreed upon by everyone 
in the network so that different versions are run by different nodes. A hardfork is a change to the 
protocol that makes it incompatible with the previous version, essentially splitting the network, 
while a softfork is still compatible with the previous version. See https://www.btcforkmonitor.info/.
20 See especially van Aaron van Wirdum, ‘On Consensus, or Why Bitcoin's Blocksize Presents a 
Political Trade-Off’, Bitcoin Magazine, 15 January 2016, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/
on-consensus-or-why-bitcoin-s-block-size-presents-a-political-trade-off-1452887468/ and ‘Why 
Some Changes to Bitcoin Require Consensus: Bitcoin's 4 Layers’, Bitcoin Magazine, 26 February 
2016, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/why-some-changes-to-bitcoin-require-consensus-
bitcoin-s-layers-1456512578/.
21 I chose the word subjectivity here (instead of 'identity', 'persona', or 'self') because it is interior 
and exterior, personal and political, it is shaped by the systems and contexts we inhabit as much 
as our personal evolution, decisions and development. And it is shaped through and in relation to 
the systems we engage with.
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problem of scaling. If you read through crypto-currency news sites,22 Twitter,23 threads 
on Reddit24 and commentary on Medium,25 the conflict over scaling was brought on 
by a concern that the increasing number of transactions were clogging the network 
because of the hard limit on size of blocks of transactions that were being verified. 
Some therefore argue the hard limit needs to be increased, while others are wary of 
such a development as it might centralize aspects of the network and have therefore 
developed other solutions.26
The point is that there are different versions of what decentralization and scaling means 
and what is important in terms of use-cases and features and the future of the system. 
While some want to out-compete existing payment systems (Pay-pal, Visa, Master-
card), possibly risking centralization of aspects of the network in the process, others 
want to hold out on such ambitions in order to keep moving towards something entirely 
different, a vision, perhaps, of Bitcoin more as a vast and still open-ended scientific 
experiment27 than (or in addition to) a new global payment system.
Let’s look closer at the word ‘scale’. Scale has many different meanings: increase in 
quantity, size, volume and geographical spread. I would like to introduce another vec-
tor to the concept of scale — differentiation. As the Bitcoin network grows, the fact that 
you have increasingly differentiated users, uses, and roles means that the nature of the 
network changes, as do questions of power.
Here’s where I am going with this: for a system to be peer-to-peer you need to have 
a network of, well, peers. The assumptions that are usually associated with peer-to-
peer, such as horizontality, decentralized power, neutrality, equality and openness can 
only be considered true if those involved indeed are peers. As more and more people 
get invested, and are interacting with and developing different aspects of the system, 
these applications, interactions and people will be different, have different capabilities, 
experiences, abilities and needs (and hey, that do not necessarily run a full client, con-
tribute to or fork the code base.)
This is a tribute to all those who are never going to (be able to) be peers. They might 
be busy doing other useful things.
22 See van Aaron van Wirdum, ‘On Consensus, or Why Bitcoin’s Blocksize Presents a Political Trade-
Off’.
23 See for example @sthenc, ‘Confession: I was briefly a Bitcoin Classic supporter, before learning 
more about how bitcoin works.’, Twitter post, 4 December 2016, 12:11 AM, https://twitter.com/
sthenc/status/805187632929964032.
24 For example VonnDooom, ‘Informative BTC vs BCH Articles?’, Reddit, 6 August 2017, https://
np.reddit.com/r/BitcoinMarkets/comments/6rxw7k/informative_btc_vs_bch_articles/.
25 See for example Valery Vavilov, ‘Keep Calm and Bitcoin On’, Medium, 18 January 2016, https://
medium.com/@BitFuryGroup/keep-calm-and-bitcoin-on-4f29d581276 or Mike Hearn, ‘The 
Resolution of the Bitcoin Experiment’, Medium, 14 January 2016, https://blog.plan99.net/the-
resolution-of-the-bitcoin-experiment-dabb30201f7/.
26 See Aaron van Wirdum, ‘Segregated Witness, Part 1: How a Clever Hack Could Significantly 
Increase Bitcoin's Potential’, Bitcoin Magazine, 19 December 2015, https://bitcoinmagazine.
com/articles/segregated-witness-part-how-a-clever-hack-could-significantly-increase-bitcoin-s-
potential-1450553618/.
27 Jaromil in ‘Kaiser Report: Make Bitcoin Great Again (Summer Solutions E1099)’, Youtube, 20 July 
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiXAaa_cvbk&feature=youtu.be/.
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‘Peer’ is one of those curious words that (potentially) means both a person and a node 
in a technical network. In Bitcoin, a peer would be miners and full nodes that verify and 
secure the network, but it also alludes to these people who contribute, are developers 
and researchers and so on. There is indeed an incredibly active and lively network of 
actual peers that maintain, experiment with and develop Bitcoin. But I would dare say 
that most interactions with the infrastructure are no longer by miners nor full nodes, 
but by people transacting using exchanges and wallets that they probably don’t even 
hold the keys to.
The scaling conflict is not only about increasing block sizes on the blockchain, it is 
also about Bitcoin having reached such a scale that it can no longer be thought of as 
composed by peers. 
The conflict and now quite high stakes of this infrastructure raises questions of ac-
countability in the decisions being made — by developers, by miners and full nodes 
(see #UASF). Some aspects of the infrastructure provide an outstanding basis for this: 
‘commits’ and contributions to the code are transparent, the developer’s mailing list 
is all open and there is an impressive amount of glossaries and guides for those who 
want to look into it. But to benefit from such openness requires not an insignificant 
level of literacy, time and interest, and the big rifts and murky rumors that have char-
acterized the scaling conflict are not easy to comprehend. Many people are left having 
to trust the word of some over the word of another (an ironic condition for what is sup-
posed to be a trustless system28).
It might be fair to say that a lot of non-peer interactions are by users that we might 
want to call ‘DIY financial speculators’, who should take full responsibility for any risk 
they get themselves involved in. The project started in a sense as a giddy experiment 
in which the scientists, cryptographers and hackers involved were only really account-
able to themselves and their own curiosity and tinkering. And certainly there is an ele-
ment of this still, the project is as of yet a vast collaborative effort of enthusiasts. Why 
should they bother about such people?
If the infrastructure is indeed to grow and have use beyond speculation while still stay-
ing true to non-state, non-corporate sentiments, then it might be the time to recognize 
and consider new subjectivities that would form in the process, and the fact that not all 
of them are going to be peers. So who do we consider to be part of this new constitu-
ency and how do we take care of them? Are they ‘users’ or something else? If a state 
is supposedly accountable to ‘citizens’, a corporation is accountable to ‘customers’ 
or ‘clients’ and platforms are accountable to ‘users’, who are peer-to-peer networks 
accountable to? When peer-to-peer networks scale how do they deal with differentia-
tion and the emergence of non-peers who are dependent on the system? From a less 
conspiratorial perspective, regulation might be considered a response to this condition 
in order to ensure accountability. But surely it must be possible to work out some more 
28 Trustless refers to the concept of a system that works even if actors within it cannot be trusted. 
This idea, particular to networks of computers, is assumed to be applicable to other realms 
such that with the blockchain one would not have to trust institutions, banks or authorities with 
transactions and balances of accounts as these would be replaced by cryptographic proof 
instead.
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interesting ways to go about accountability and taking care of differences and differen-
tial capacities that feel better than the-long-arm-of-the-law, or that do not entail black 
holes of tedious reporting, nor automated village granny reputation systems…
Unless this is worked out, and until then, this project of ‘disintermediation’ for those 
who are not peers is actually a project of reintermediation — simply swapping one 
set of intermediaries (the banks, politicians and legal system) for another (developers, 
computer scientists and network technology), or, even worse, adding another layer of 
intermediation and complexity.
 
Part 3: Be woke, be free
In a café, somewhere recently in old Europa
What do these two stories have in common? They are both really a caution against 
double-speak. I have nothing against double-speak as a cunning strategy and not 
even that much when it is used as a cynical marketing ploy, but when it is used uncon-
sciously — you, fooling yourself — that, my friend, is unforgivable.
There is a sense that we are in a unique period, that the doors to the money-press have 
been flung open and we have limited time before the police come running. Literally? 
Sure, maybe that too,29 but I actually mean it more broadly in the sense of Ranciere: 
the police as the re-establishment of some form of order. 
In contrast to the ‘police’, (let’s carry on a bit with Ranciere) his understanding of 
‘politics’ refers to those moments when a given order is disrupted30 and renegotiated 
and new subjectivities emerge as recognized actors. Ranciere calls this a redistribu-
tion of the sensible — literally, what and who is seen, who counts and is able to act 
in a given space, is changed, and redistributed across new spaces. This age of cryp-
tocurrencies most definitely resonates with such a description — new subjectivities 
are emerging, new spaces are being developed (literally) in which those who were not 
supposed to be able to do certain things, like issue new kinds of money and autho-
rize transactions — they are enthusiastically doing so, defining new conditions and 
spaces for these actions.
But wait, so where exactly are we now? We are in a café, somewhere in the old Eu-
ropa, and with me, nibbling a slice of cake, is a European Commission expert advisor, 
a highly respected computer-engineering professor and soon to join us is a successful 
blockchain entrepreneur. A bit of intellectual posturing, some networking and the con-
versation winds its way to the question of what big themes and issues are pressing and 
how best to structure R&D funding for these. ‘The boring sounding problem of taxation 
might actually be the most urgent and worthwhile to solve’ says the computer engineer. 
And that is what stuck with me from that conversation.
29 See for example the story of E-Gold.
30 I just want to declare that while I used to be I am no longer a fan of ‘disruption’. It has been 
thoroughly coopted for purposes of chasing competitive advantage rather than freeing up new 
spaces of doing and being. Instead we are constantly disrupted in all kinds of ways whether we 
like it or not. Preservation seems more radical these days than disruption.
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I would put it differently: the problem, strictly speaking, is of redistribution, for which 
taxation is the awkward solution we have today, ensuring commonly held and essen-
tial infrastructures, services and wealth. But I agree that redistribution is absolutely 
one of the most urgent and worthwhile problems to work out in a way that is mean-
ingful and effective.
The question of redistribution addresses what many projects of decentralization and 
local autonomy (or sure, individual autonomy if you’re one of those assholes) tend to 
overlook, a point I have tried to make a few times throughout this short story: that 
pre-existing conditions of inequality and access to resources means that what might 
seem progressive can easily be distorted into a nightmare. What looks like Ah! Nice! 
Local autonomy and decentralization of power might in fact simply be decentralization 
of risk. There is no such thing as a level playing field, land is luscious and bountiful in 
some parts and contaminated and toxic in others.
If you find yourself bright-eyed before these shiny new architectures, enthusiastically 
contributing to a machine for automating utopia, take a moment to blink, squint and 
look again at what you are doing and if it really does, should or ever will live up to 
the promises on whichever website banner. Be woke so you can stay free when the 
police come knocking.
So far, redistribution efforts that I have seen in crypto have taken place through two 
different strategies: collective speculation in which the aim is essentially to take advan-
tage of a window of opportunity, use and abuse the crypto bubble, cash out and give 
it to cash-strapped solidarity projects. The other is currency creation. There are many 
different ways that money systems can be designed and programmed. With a rapidly 
growing field of possibilities that we are facing, literacy in such matters and especially 
an awareness of the distorting effects of contingencies and interfaces between sys-
tems is urgently needed. I believe that currency designers as a new profession, who 
are able to map contingencies across scales and disciplines, are going to be in high 
demand. It would be brilliant if some talented, sharp and empathetic heads could look 
seriously at redistribution and the organization of solidarity across scales.
So, what would happen when cops arrive and catch us covered in ink and paper? 
What would the re-establishment of order look like? When do we know the gold rush 
is over? Well, there is obviously the possibility that these (ponzi?) schemes simply 
collapse, that the dosh we so frantically printed is worthless, crypto suddenly has no 
value, the bubble bursts, tulips,31 back to the euro, dollar and so on. Or, the owners 
of the money-press (would that be the state or private banks?) bring in the police and 
set out some terms and conditions for our use of the money press, (regulation) limiting 
access for certain people and purposes.
OR, in a much more interesting twist to the story, that this new tech actually proves 
itself, that it allows for a true redistribution of the sensible, in which new subjectivities 
emerge that are empowered to engage in the shaping and governing of commonly 
held global infrastructures. Bitcoin was introduced to the world as online cash, a noble 
31 See tulip mania in 1619-1622 – a favorite historical reference for critics of Bitcoin.
62 MONEYLAB READER 2
A
proposition in a world headed for privately controlled and surveilled electronic pay-
ment systems, whether one disagrees with its anarcho-capitalist protocol design and 
speculative tendencies or not. But blockchain, while originally invented to support this 
online cash, in fact allows for much more fine-grained design and control of money, its 
flows and conditions — and in its evolution these contradictory possibilities have ex-
ploded in all directions. In the midst of the start-up mania, the vortex of life-changing, 
make money moneeeey opportunities, remember to stay woke: What is now at stake is 
the question of developing a global money system that is neither a public utility (cash) 
nor private infrastructure (electronic payments via banks), a question of governance as 
much as cryptographic properties, currency design and technical features. Indeed, an 
experiment with lots of risky, unintentional, clumsy and strange outcomes that simul-
taneously raises all the right questions.
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LOVE ON THE BLOCK
MAX DOVEY
This article first appeared in Artists Re:Thinking the Blockchain.1
 
Bitcoin Transaction = 5ff791ac0c4e4f04cceefe178e9a25ae2f0eb00f30d5eb4cd73aaea0d3
45f541 
Hex = 6a1d57652077696c6c207368617265207468697320736f6c656d6e20766f77 
Ascii = We will share this solemn vow 
$ 708.93 - $ 708.75 
Transaction fee = $ 0.19 
(231 bytes) 
86653 Confirmations 
17ePTBvtX6msSC6jqPbgacyvo6r5QttWkM 
16Cz5s37SwhThspFfQZCE8ttYpmVRx6miJ
Bitcoin Transaction = c20f6b396208cadc951a33cd1ee7ce4a8b8c7cc1bfffcc22eb9156e-
b0af68dae 
Hex = 6a247769746820657665726c617374696e67206c6f766520696e-
206f7572206865617274732c 
Ascii = with everlasting love in our hearts, 
$ 79.97 - $ 79.78 
Transaction fee = $ 0.19 
(238 bytes) 
86653 Confirmations 
1FoJPn8mHZTeiPhLpzxWe29ds5MWhEPvXG 
1C6MFsat54HeD51uzjbVSbL6YdsQWVJh3D
Bitcoin Transaction = 1be8855420bf4cbb4b0e23a74e42f6c04195d78ab149fb0a5f67d-
f216739e2a9 
Hex = 6a1566726f6d20746869732076657279206d6f6d656e74 
Ascii = from this very moment 
$111.97 - $111.78 
Transaction fee = $ 0.19 
(223 bytes) 
86652 Confirmations 
1DYcB34vPPSD1Ex93FEV73TWpizHB7yKjP 
12X8o3ZKWXAqF1J111fLiaxH9PCnMNzzFm
Bitcoin Transaction = 017202287321d49bdd4a793d5a1a112d3fd853df193b-
97b0578797a759f1552f 
Hex = 6a18756e74696c206f7572206479696e6720627265617468732e 
Ascii = until our dying breaths. 
$124.65 - $124.47 
Transaction fee = $ 0.19 
(226bytes) 
86653 Confirmations 
1EV4qtBCUAVGmd99uFJoNDetQVYWq39jcE 
198Yi4E4M4TtTWDVGtmx54aP11kt6Hb1FN
1. Ruth Catlow, Marc Garrett, Nathan Jones and Sam Skinner (eds), Artists Re:Thinking the 
Blockchain, Liverpool and London: Torque and Furtherfield, 2017.
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For better or worse, till death do us part, because the blockchain is forever. 
—Wedding Vows of David Mondrus and Joyce Bayo2
For many, using bitcoin to officiate a marriage sounds as romantic as a first date out-
side a high street bank, but the various ways in which people are developing bitcoin, 
blockchain and cryptography to encapsulate love and administrate civic arrangements, 
such as marriage, reveal a deeper devotion towards blockchain technology as the new 
church and state. Since the first bitcoin marriage ceremony in 2014, couples have 
continued to express their love on the blockchain and adapt the marital contract from 
encrypting vows into bitcoin payments to designing ‘smart contracts’ that combine 
networked devices with coded contracts stored on the blockchain. Whilst some initial 
wedding ceremonies were performed by a small number of extreme bitcoin fanatics 
there has since been further experimentation occurring within a wider movement in the 
crypto-community — one that aims to proliferate the viability of the blockchain as a 
governance technology that replaces central authorities. Looking at bitcoin weddings, 
we see not just individuals invested in the notions of permanence and viability implicit 
in the blockchain, but a spiritual commitment to the blockchain ideal – a faith that it 
will not only transform legal arrangements, but inaugurate a technologically absolutist 
model of governance that defies and circumvents traditional organizations of power. 
Bitcoin weddings are the start of a sermon that aims to persuade society of the block-
chain as an alternative system for the administration of society. They are symbolic of 
a wider-culture within crypto communities that go beyond political ambition to reveal 
a spiritual dimension to cryptographic protocol where belief, faith and performed acts 
of software sovereignty become lived commitments to technological fundamentalism.
What do libertarians find the most romantic in marriage? The contract. 
—Reddit user engelk3
The first recorded example of a bitcoin wedding ceremony was between Joyce Bayo 
and David Mondrus in Disneyworld Florida, where the couple stood in front of the alt-
altar of a bitcoin ATM machine. The pair used the ATM to pay one another with the at-
tached comment: ‘For better or worse, till death do us part, because the blockchain is 
forever’. Bitcoin is used in this case to cement a belief in the permanence of blockchain 
ledger, however anyone unfamiliar with the underlying technology would be forgiven 
for asking why the couple didn’t just use their credit cards and alter their vows to ‘For 
better or worse, till death do us part, because Visa is forever’. Swapping the alter for 
a bitcoin ATM signifies a growing ambition to use encryption, cryptography and the 
blockchain database to pursue the notion of using financial transactions as more than 
payments but also as contractual agreements. Oscar and Yenni from Indonesia per-
formed their marriage in a similar way, but encoded much lengthier vows as hex strings 
into a series of transactions. Each transaction contains a hex string that when con-
verted into ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) reveals their 
2 ‘How Humans Now Use the Blockchain to Declare Love and Marriage’, Blogchain.info, 14 
February 2017, http://blogchain.info/post/how-humans-now-use-the-blockchain-to-declare-love-
and-marriage.
3 ‘Couple to use Blockchain to Contract Marriage. I'm Honored to be Officiating’, Reddit, 25 
September 2014, https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2hffwd/couple_to_use_blockchain_
to_contract_marriage_im/.
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personalized, encrypted vows. Oscar transferred over $2,000 to eighteen arbitrary ac-
counts in order to encode the vows over a series of bitcoin payments into a number of 
blocks. With each block taking on average 10 minutes to clear the process of validat-
ing the vows would have taken longer than David and Joyce’s one off payment and 
perhaps distributing one’s vows over multiple payments shows a longer lasting love. 
The grooms in both marriages (David Mondrus and Oscar Darmawan) are well known 
bitcoin investors and publicity stunts such as this are often engineered to serve their 
financial interests. In this sense both weddings were successful and circulated widely 
on crypto-currency news sites and Oscar was awarded a certificate for holding the first 
Indonesian bitcoin wedding.4 David Mondrus is the CEO of a bitcoin jewellery store, 
so the wedding appears to be a staged opportunity to promote the QR Code rings he 
had on sale at the time (unfortunately ‘red box jewels’ no longer seems to be online).5
 
Fig. 1. The BTC ring (http://thebtcring.com, 2015).
For these grooms the bitcoin wedding serves as a novel way to inflate the market price 
of your favourite crypto-currency, however these symbolic acts also reveal personal 
devotion towards bitcoin and turns the belief in blockchain’s permanence toward a 
spiritual dimension. By turning ‘proof of work’, the cryptographic process for validat-
ing bitcoin transactions, into ‘proof of love’, what other feelings, relations and social 
bonds can be re-configured as blockchain transactions? The marriage is one of the 
more popular civic arrangements to become cryptographically re-configured and en-
crypting one’s vows is just the beginning of a series of experiments with programming 
contracts, which will also include property rights and even automating divorce.
4 Rahmat and Ori, ‘Indonesian Record Museum (MURI) Bestowed a Special Award at CEO Bitcoin.
co.id’, Steemit, 5 July 2016, https://steemit.com/bitcoin/@rahmat/2gwcng-indonesian-record-
museum-muri-bestowed-a-special-award-at-ceo-bitcoin-co-id.
5 http://www.redboxjewels.com.
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Fig. 2. Oscar & Yenni Wedding Invitation (http://bitcinwedding.com, 2015).
I have participated in the design of a blockchain based wedding application with The 
Design Informatics department from University of Edinburgh where we designed proto-
types based on a geo-locative crypto-currency called ‘GeoCoin’.6 ‘GeoCoin’ is a plat-
form that connects GPS data to digital wallets for crypto-currencies, enabling users 
to design financial or economic arrangements based on location and movement. We 
developed a smart contract that would enable people to create temporary shared bank 
accounts between one another whose spending would be bound by their location data. 
Like marriage, it joined individuals to share finances based on their physical proximity. 
This application was named Handfastr after the informal practice of ‘handfasting’ in the 
middle ages — a temporary marital arrangement that was valid without having to be 
solemnized by a priest or the church.7 Handfastr uses GPS data to enforce a smart con-
tract — a self-executing script stored on the blockchain — so that when two or more 
people are together in the same physical space they can access and spend money 
6 http://geocoin.site/.
7 ‘History of Marriage in Great Britain and Ireland’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_
of_marriage_in_Great_Britain_and_Ireland.
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from the same digital wallet. The difference between blockchain based smart contracts 
such as Handfastr and the bitcoin wedding ceremonies previously mentioned is that 
while a bitcoin ceremony happens once with a financial transaction (or series of trans-
actions), a smart contract is a piece of code containing rules and conditions that can 
be executed over a period of time. Think of a bitcoin wedding as a ceremony, and the 
smart contract as the marriage that emerges, requiring laws to untangle and annul it.
 
Fig. 3. Handfastr (Corina Angheloiu, Max Dovey, James Stewart, 2016).
Programmers have also begun experimenting with how smart contracts could be used 
to process — even anticipate — the conditions for a divorce or separation of couples. 
The opportunity to code legal procedures that involve the splitting of property, own-
ership and access rights is a logical application of these tools for blockchain based 
programmers’ eager to demonstrate the viable efficiency of networked governance. A 
common attitude is that blockchain technology liberates individuals from the central-
ized powers such as the church and state, however, experiments in smart contract 
systems such as this should be critically reflected upon and we should ask what kind 
of arrangements do we want to turn into autonomous governing system(s).
Weddings & divorces are just one of many civic and legal procedures that are being 
engineered into blockchain contracts and it is interesting to consider this development 
as part of a political trajectory that originated from an obscure cypherpunk mailing list. 
In The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism David Golumbia highlights 
the extreme libertarian free market attitudes that have driven cryptology and technology 
to enable greater individual freedoms.8 The ambitions within this community no longer 
merely lie within unregulated currencies, and the shift towards bitcoin weddings and 
blockchain governance has given rise to a notion of ‘crypto-sovereignty’ where block-
8 David Golumbia, The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism, Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
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chain software, protocol and encryption provide founding ideals with which to form and 
experiment with exclusionary sovereign states. Blockchain platforms such as Ethereum 
— a platform that allows people to write and develop code onto a custom blockchain 
that can host and execute smart contracts and Decentralized Autonomous Organiza-
tions (DAOs) — encourages programmers to envision how decentralized ledgers can be 
used to create consensus based systems and experiments in creating non-hierarchical 
organizations. I would argue that while the libertarian crusade to undermine institutional 
powers such as the state and church remains the dominant political ideology that moti-
vates a large extent of blockchain culture, there is a committed devotion forming within 
certain sub communities towards different software that informs ambitious visions of 
crypto-sovereignty, borderless nationalism and blockchain fundamentalism.
My goal is to take_under government. Let them invite us in and do a few things. 
Eventually government replaces itself on the blockchain. 
—Comment from BirdsPointOfView in response to thread: ‘Using Ethereum to 
create a digital political party?’9
Ethereum is a blockchain based platform that explicitly encourages developers to build 
experiments in voting systems, legal applications and democratic organizations which 
are broadly defined as ‘governance 2.0.’ applications. For example, Ethereum’s land-
ing page displays a visual guide on how to ‘build a democracy on the blockchain’ and 
many applications use the platform to demonstrate alternative governance structures 
that use non-hierarchical voting to reach a consensus.10 The consequence of facilitating 
the creation of ‘unstoppable applications’ has been that a large portion of the Ethe-
reum community now harbours ambitious visions of how blockchain, DAOs and smart 
contracts can replace traditional state governments.
Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin maintains the belief that Ethereum will one day be 
a ‘world computer’ that could potentially manage citizens through decentralized ap-
plications, or in turn via a combination of de facto coded law and self-executing soft-
ware connected to Internet of Things (IoT) devices. While many experiments to ‘take 
under’ government remain speculative thought experiments within the Ethereum red-
dit community, Bitnation has undertaken the most prolific experiment into crypto-
sovereignty with what it calls a ‘Decentralized Borderless Voluntary Nation’ through 
situated embassies, bitcoin ID citizenships and a ‘blockchain powered jurisdiction’.11 
In an attempt to transcode all existing law into coded self executing contracts, Bitna-
tion have also tried their hand at smart contract weddings. Called Smart Love, the 
contract turns the commitment of ‘legacy weddings’ into 3 defined protocols:
 – Proof-of-Commitment to sustain an enduring relationship
 – Proof-of-Acceptance of the union by friends and family, and the community at large
 – Proof-of-Support of each other, including shared risks and shared rewards12
9 CuttieSark, ‘Using Ethereum to Create a Digital Political Party?’, Reddit, 1 October 2016, https://
www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/55dxnq/using_ethereum_to_create_a_digital_political_
party/.
10 For an up-to-date list of the most recent check http://dapps.ethercasts.com/.
11 ‘Governance 2.0’, Bitnation, 21 March 2017, https://bitnation.co/.
12 ‘Smart Love’, Bitnation, 5 November 2016, https://blog.bitnation.co/smart-love/.
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The Smart Love experiment is yet another example of experimentation that ques-
tions the boundaries of how common and civic laws can be adapted into coded 
smart contracts. The applications interface incorporates the deployment of smart 
contracts within a chat messaging client that would allow for emoji and other sym-
bols to activate coded contracts between different parties. The integration into 
messaging applications obfuscates coded contracts into communication technol-
ogy and hopes to turn messaging interactions and emoji into activations of ‘com-
mon law’. The authority of this ‘common law’ will only be created through the adop-
tion of mass users and until then, even the developers admit that it remains purely 
symbolic (for now).13 The question remains weather the current marketing strat-
egy of ‘democratizing power’ will be effective in convincing others to participate 
in ‘de-centralized borderless nations’ in favour of sovereign nation states. While 
DIY experiments such as Bitnation are still in their infancy, there is very little that 
deters the ambition within the blockchain community of the potential for crypto-
sovereignty and de-centralized governance.
The confidence within the blockchain community to eventually ‘take under’ govern-
ment bodies combines both libertarian political sentiment with a spiritual belief in the 
blockchain’s ungoverned autonomy. This belief came under scrutiny in June 2016 
when over $50 million was leaked from a DAO with over 10,000 members. The Ethe-
reum foundation found themselves in a difficult position — to intervene and hard fork 
(rolling back all transactions to a point in time that preceded the alleged hack), or to 
continue and permit the transactions associated to the hack and lose a lot of investors 
and a lot of money. The majority of them voted to intervene, undermining the founding 
philosophy of blockchain as an un-regulated autonomous entity, consequently splitting 
the community based on differing blockchain ideas and philosophy. What emerged — 
and what is important to the subject of this chapter — was a small alliance of die-hards 
that expressed their devotion towards Ethereum’s roots as non-regulated — refusing 
to acknowledge the new fork as it was the product of (human) intervention. This alli-
ance continued to trade on the blocks that had been affected by the hack, forming a 
devoted group of blockchain purists that divorced themselves from Ethereum and are 
known as the ‘Ethereum Classic’ community:
Let it be known to the entire world that on July 20th, 2016, at block 1,920,000, we 
as a community of sovereign individuals stood united by a common vision to con-
tinue the original Ethereum blockchain that is truly free from censorship, fraud or 
third party interference. In realizing that the blockchain represents absolute truth, we 
stand by it, supporting its immutability and its future. We do not make this declara-
tion lightly, nor without forethought to the consequences of our actions.14
The Deceleration of Independence is interesting in many ways. Firstly, it reveals con-
flict between the communities’ differing crypto philosophies, and illustrates that when 
things don’t go to plan, it is useful for someone to be able to step in and fix the ‘unstop-
pable application’. Secondly, it highlights the proto-patriotic language that represents 
13 ‘Smart Love’, Bitnation.
14 ‘The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence’, The Ethereum Classic Community, 2017, 
https://ethereumclassic.github.io/assets/ETC_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf.
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an emerging sovereignty within the blockchain community and an extreme devotion 
with which some individuals make towards different blockchain legions.
At first sight, bitcoin weddings may appear as novelty acts of public devotion but 
as I have indicated, they pave the way for such further pseudo-religious and pro-
to-patriotic acts such as the ‘statement of independence’. These language acts of 
crypto-sovereignty do not occur in isolation and emerge at a time when blockchain 
technology is not only being adopted by the financial sector but NGOs and govern-
ment bodies. Bitnation’s experiments into creating decentralized borderless nations 
has resonated with the Estonian government to such an extent that they are now 
working together on providing borderless citizenship with the e-residency program.15 
This demonstrates how the initially novel, strange or more extreme fantasies within 
the crypto-community emerge and get integrated within governments on an (inter)
national scale. In order to prevent, or even critically reflect on such projects, it is im-
portant to articulate and engage with the political and spiritual motivations that drive 
the proliferation of such applications to begin with. Failing to do so will end up with 
us falling for blockchain’s ‘revolutionary potential’16 without engaging with some of 
the radical sub cultures and extreme fundamental views that initiate and proliferate 
projects such as e-citizenship, marriage contracts and statements of independence. 
This will lead to the creative and imaginative potential getting captured and pre-
determined within a dominant crypto hegemony and it will become even harder to 
experiment and design in this space without encountering a spiritual or extreme fun-
damentalism towards different crypto-cultures. How far away are we from blockchain 
funerals, blockchain birth registries, blockchain medical records? It is already pos-
sible to encode your DNA genome onto the blockchain17 perhaps encouraging fur-
ther experimentation into how bio immortality could lead to further spiritual relations 
towards the permanence of blockchain and a ledger afterlife. Analyzing patriotic acts 
of sovereignty, faith and wedlock should help us critique and counter the proposi-
tions made by some of the more extreme members within the blockchain community 
and become aware of the spiritual beliefs that fundamentally drive the transition of 
blockchain from banks and business to church and state.
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CONTEMPORARY ART BETWEEN 
ALGOMYSTICISM AND FINTECH ACTIVISM
MARTIN ZEILINGER
Among recent artworks dealing with cryptocurrencies, the blockchain, and distributed 
ledger technology (DLT), Simon Denny’s Blockchain Visionaries and Blockchain Future 
States (both 2016) may be the most well-known. The works were prominently exhib-
ited at the 2016 Berlin Biennale and at Petzel Gallery in New York City, where they 
received a more than considerable amount of critical and popular attention. In tandem, 
Blockchain Visionaries and Blockchain Future States form a sprawling arrangement 
of sculptural pieces, display cases, canvas-based pieces, game culture parapherna-
lia, and A/V materials.1 All components are created in a playfully inflected documen-
tary mode, designed to educate audiences about the technologies they concern. The 
aspiration of the two works is to ‘capture the essence’ of ongoing developments in 
blockchain-based computing and commerce;2 this is undoubtedly an important (and 
ambitious) undertaking, considering that it is still far from obvious what the essence 
of these developments might indeed be. One problem that has been identified with 
Denny’s approach3 is that the artist does little to elucidate the blockchain’s underlying 
technologies in lay terms, choosing instead to focus on the narratives surrounding their 
emergence and ongoing development. While technical details might invite discussion 
and critiques of blockchain technology politics, a focus on blockchain narratives will 
yield, at best, critiques of blockchain rhetoric, and, at worst, emulation of such rheto-
ric. Key aspects of the modes in which the technology in question operates may thus 
be ignored, or remain obscured.
Within this vast and complicated subject matter, Denny’s works replace much-needed 
critical commentary with a predominant focus on the ‘inspiring stories’4 of the compa-
nies and entrepreneurs developing blockchain-based services and applications. The 
artist has frequently commented that ‘the story being told’ about these technologies is 
what he felt most drawn to.5 This aligns Blockchain Visionaries and Blockchain Future 
States with prevailing popular treatments of blockchain-related issues, namely a narra-
tivization of financial technologies that tends to mystify where it could offer clarification 
and critique, and that can come across as imprecise and uncritical.
1 A/V documentation of the works can be found at http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/
superhumanity/68703/blockchain-future-states/; http://www.petzel.com/exhibitions/2016-09-08_
simon-denny/; and http://bb9.berlinbiennale.de/participants/simon-denny/.
2 Isabella Kaminska, ‘Blockchain as Gosplan 2.0’, Berlin Biennale, http://bb9.berlinbiennale.de/
blockchain-as-gosplan-2-0/.
3 See for example Andrew Weiner, who offers one of the more scathing reviews of Denny’s work. 
Andrew Weiner, ‘Simon Denny’s “Blockchain Future States”’, Art Agenda, 25 October 2016, http://
www.art-agenda.com/reviews/simon-dennys-blockchain-future-states/.
4 See Kaminska, ‘Blockchain as Gosplan 2.0’.
5 See for example Sam Skinner, ‘Blockchain Future States – An Interview with Simon Denny’, 
in Ruth Catlow, Marc Garrett, Nathan Jones, and Sam Skinner (eds), Artists Re:Thinking the 
Blockchain, London: Torque Editions & Furtherfield, 2017, pp. 141-155.
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Elsewhere, Denny has shown himself to be an astute and insightful critical observer 
of the inner workings of digital capital (see, for example, his recent contribution to 
Texte zur Kunst).6 This makes the relatively uncritical approach of Blockchain Visionar-
ies and Blockchain Future States all the more noteworthy. Is the goal of such works to 
critique shallow engagement with financial technologies by amplifying this same kind 
of engagement (perhaps in a parodic mode), thereby to draw attention to the kinds 
of rhetoric that often saturate popular discussion of blockchain technologies? Or are 
such works simply extensions of the same rhetoric, lost opportunities for properly criti-
cal engagement? In consideration of these questions, Denny’s work will here serve as 
the backdrop for some remarks on the role of contemporary art in relation to emerging 
financial technologies. I will discuss creative approaches that border on what might 
be called fintech algomysticism — a substitution of technical, ideological, and socio-
economic discussion of financial technologies for a foregrounding of their fantastic, 
magical, unknowable qualities. Following such approaches, Bitcoin can easily appear 
as ‘magical internet money’,7 and the complexity of distributed ledger technology can 
easily render its computational foundations as superhuman. In view of this, however, it 
becomes ever more important to counter algomysticism with fintech activism.
 
Fig. 1. Magic Internet Money meme by Reddit user /u/mavensbot.
6 Simon Denny, ‘Face the Market on Your Own’, Texte Zur Kunst 106 (2017): pp. 124-133.
7 Paul Bars, ‘Magic Internet Money: How a Reddit Ad Made Bitcoin Hit $1000 and Inspired South 
Park’s Art Department’, 18 February 2013, https://medium.com/@paulbars/magic-internet-money-
how-a-reddit-ad-made-bitcoin-hit-1000-and-inspired-south-parks-art-b414ec7a5598.
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Summoning Nakamoto’s Magic
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and related decentralized computing were 
shrouded in mystery from the very beginning. When, around 2008, the pseudonymous 
‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ cast the computational spell that would go on to spawn Bitcoin 
with the publication of a hugely influential white paper, many aspects surrounding this 
spell-casting were ideally positioned to forge and amplify the mysterious and mystical 
qualities of cryptocurrencies and other blockchain-based applications. The real iden-
tity of the white paper’s author remains unconfirmed to this day, feeding wide-ranging 
conspiracy theories; the publication of the material followed closely in the footsteps 
of the 2008 global financial crisis (or was it a consolidation?), which had polarized 
opinion about the state of the global economy; the ideas outlined in the white paper 
emphasized faults and inequities of mind-boggling proportions underlying our domi-
nant financial systems, while simultaneously envisaging the creation of new wealth of 
equally unbelievable proportions; and finally, the technologies engendered by Naka-
moto’s white paper seemed to lack a clear ideological tack, and were therefore poised 
to support radical projects ranging from the ultra-conservative to the ultra-progressive.
By emulating and mirroring popular accounts of the technology, Denny’s blockchain-
related work draws directly on many of the mystical qualities surrounding the block-
chain. For example, a display case devoted to Nakamoto’s unknown identity is for-
mally reminiscent of poster presentations at popular science exhibitions or academic 
conferences, even though in terms of its content it plays directly to the conspiracy 
theories surrounding this figure. Denny’s use of the popular kids’ game franchise Poké-
mon8 as an explanatory framework for the blockchain functions similarly, in that ulti-
mately it serves primarily to play down the complexity of the subject matter, even in 
the process of seemingly clarifying it. Overall, Denny’s mirroring of vague blockchain-
related rhetoric raises questions concerning the role of contemporary art in recognizing 
and exposing the fabulations currently surrounding the blockchain. Do communities 
of contemporary artists and art critics, many of them presumably critical of global 
capital, share an obsession with narratives perpetuating the magic and mystery of 
emerging financial technologies (in an updated version of Marx’s riddle of the money 
fetish?) How can contemporary art cut through prevailing fintech mysticism so that, 
rather than regurgitating befuddling narratives prevalent in popular accounts, art could 
develop properly critical perspectives on the subject, to move from fintech mysticism 
to fintech activism?
Roughly a decade after Nakamoto, cryptocurreny technology is now well-documented 
and explained both in specialist and in lay contexts. There isn’t a need, it would seem, 
to consider them as mythical entities descended from the digital heavens (or risen 
from a digital hell). An abundance of examples nevertheless indicates that the mys-
tical qualities of the technology continue to be purposefully perpetuated and even 
amplified. Take, for example, Bitcoin Golem, a recently founded (and already defunct) 
cryptocurreny trading company that was positively otherworldly both in its name and in 
8 For in-depth visual documentation of Denny’s use of Pokémon imagery, visit the Petzel Gallery 
website at http://www.petzel.com/exhibitions/2016-09-08_simon-denny/.
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terms of its return-of-investment promises (e.g., ‘1% Hourly Forever’).9 For another ex-
ample, take the distributed computing system Ethereum,10 which is built around trans-
actions of value tokens bearing the mystically evocative name ‘Ether,’ uses as its logo 
two floating, semi-translucent pyramids, and which has been deeply embroiled in a 
looming algo-financial day of reckoning (Ethereum’s superseding of Bitcoin) popularly 
called ‘The Flippening’.11 Such language can only serve to cement the mystical status 
of blockchain applications, rather than challenging it. Contemporary art, if it wants to 
participate meaningfully in discourses on digital capital, has to recognize an obligation 
to engage its subjects critically, whether it is performatively (i.e., through technologi-
cal means) or through narrative inflection and subversion. Documentation and playful 
adoption of obfuscating narratives is not enough.
Art, in particular experimental art and the avant-garde, has always played a key role 
in investigating political and socio-economic developments that are difficult to reg-
ister in more institutionalized frameworks, and in attempting a recuperation of the 
radical in everyday life, as Peter Bürger has so memorably (if contentiously) formu-
lated.12 What could this mean in the context of emerging financial technologies, spe-
cifically related to the blockchain? As a first example, we might think of Dutch artist 
Femke Herregraven’s ongoing series Rogue Waves, begun in 2015.13 Rogue Waves 
is a sculptural work that plays on the object of the tally stick, what might be called 
a pre-print ledger. As analogue storage devices for financial information, used by 
ancient cultures to record transactions and holdings (this was done, for example, by 
carving notches in bone), tally sticks strike a curious balance between fetish object 
and financial technology. In Herregraven’s sculptures, the sticks have become rect-
angular, carved aluminum poles that carry engravings of information about illegal 
algorithmic stock-market manipulation through high-speed trading. The artist thus 
visualizes computational financial activities and data in physical form, and creates 
aesthetic objects whose deceptively beautiful patterns trace the malevolence of digi-
tal capital. Notably, the artist chooses to do so in an ancient object-type which, like 
money itself, carries totemic qualities that are here instrumentalized in a critique of 
rogue trading practices.
Techno-Utopianism Begets Algomysticism
The initial appearance of blockchain-based cryptocurrency technology in the Nakamo-
to white paper was a punctilious, sharp stab in the side of existing financial technology 
and economic theory, a storm of utopian dimensions brewing on the horizons of digital 
capital. The flood of experimentation and innovation it triggered quickly took on mysti-
cal dimensions. This should perhaps not be surprising — surely, to laypeople and even 
many specialists, the core ingredients of blockchain applications, including algorith-
9 Bitcoin Golem (formerly located at https://bitcoingolem.com) ceased operation during the summer 
of 2017, only a few months after its founding in March of that year. However, online image 
searches for the company name still yield most of the site’s content.
10 See the Ethereum Project home website at https://ethereum.org/.
11 A good place to track this process is the Flippening Watch website, at https://www.flippening.
watch/.
12 See Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984.
13 For documentation of Femke Herregraven’s work, visit her website at http://femkeherregraven.net/
rogue-waves-ii-scar-tissue/.
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mic encryption, trustless transaction, decentralized information storage, self-enforcing 
contracts, and decentralized autonomous organizations, must appear as bewildering 
conjurations emerging from the realms of the unreal and superhuman.
Consequently, examples of mainstream blockchain mysticism abound. Most of 
them are richly varnished with slogans and imagery that invoke unthinkable wealth 
forming somewhere in a chaotic, cosmic churn of informational bits, yielding riches 
that float through virtual, intergalactic space. In addition to already-mentioned in-
ternet memes portraying Bitcoin as magical internet money, here we might also 
include the depiction of Ethereum’s founder as a wealth-conjuring sage (such il-
lustrations, often found on ‘EthTrader’ and similar discussion threads, frequently 
supplement interviews with Vitalik Buterin);14 the incessant framing of mainstream 
fintech ‘financial analysis’ in the rhetoric of soothsaying (e.g., ‘A $2,000 Bitcoin (and 
9 Other 2017 Blockchain Predictions)’;15 and frequent references to biblical imagery 
in commentary on current developments in the cryptocurrency landscape.16 Den-
ny’s work reflects such rhetoric in the integration of fintech-related information with 
references to massively popular fictions of Western mainstream culture, such as 
when Denny describes the Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin as ‘the Luke Skywalker 
of the cryptocurrency circuit’.17
To some extent, these examples are linked to techno-utopian ideas regarding the 
radical changes that blockchain-based financial services are supposed to bring.18 
However, they add a significant dimension to traditional techno-utopianism, and rep-
resent an important rhetorical shift in focus. Techno-utopianism tends to be charac-
terized by a language of revolutionary change, and thus carries important political 
dimensions; it is linked to a (real or imagined) mastery of a given technology for a 
common good. But when blockchain-based technologies are furnished with mysti-
cal qualities, when they are discussed as magical, otherworldly, or superhuman, the 
techno-utopian belief that a technology can be put to good (radical) use will give way 
to the algomystical assumption that, for better or worse, the technology in question 
exists outside the reach of human control (incidentally, this is a major selling point 
of supposedly ‘incorruptible’ blockchain-based systems), and that the technology is 
quasi-unknowable in an almost godlike fashion.
14 See for example John Frost, ‘Interview With Vitalik Buterin About Next Generation For 
Cryptocurrencies’, The Coin Telegraph, 8 December 2015, https://cointelegraph.com/news/
interview-with-vitalik-buterin-about-next-generation-for-cryptocurrencies; for a popular Ethtrader, 
see https://www.reddit.com/r/ethtrader/comments/6tamgo/what_is_the_origin_of_the_vitalik_
jesus_lambo/.
15 Ajit Tripathi, ‘A $2,000 Bitcoin (and 9 Other 2017 Blockchain Predictions)’, Coin Desk, 4 January 
2017, https://www.coindesk.com/2000-bitcoin-9-2017-blockchain-predictions/.
16 See for example http://i.imgur.com/QJcqH3A.jpg.
17 See Nadja Sayej, ‘Simon Denny: the artist explaining blockchain with Pokémon,’ The Guardian, 
26 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/aug/26/simon-denny-artist-
blockchain-pokemon.
18 Cf. Howard Segal, ‘The Technological Utopians’, in Joseph Corn (ed.), Imagining Tomorrow: 
History, Technology and the American Future, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
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Fig. 2. Etherium Lambo meme portraying Vitalik Buterin by Reddit user /u/earthquakequestion.
There are many examples demonstrating how such qualities are reinforced rhetorically 
and narratively, more or less overtly. Bitcoin Golem, the cryptocurrency trading com-
pany mentioned above, demonstrated this conceit extremely well. The now-defunct 
company was recently exposed as a scam that promised its investors wildly unrealistic 
profits that were supposed to be based simply on the totemic ownership of (a.k.a. ‘in-
vestment in’) cryptocurrency units. While operational, the company website, which had 
been registered with a London business address in March 2017, was characteristically 
opaque about the company’s corporate structure, and equally unclear about how its 
investment schemes worked.19 For example, Bitcoin Golem’s ‘Gold Plan,’ supposedly 
available to no more than 50 investors, promised a profit of 12,000% after 8 days, 
based on a minimum deposit of 0.12 Bitcoins. A golem, as everyone with as little as 
19 See footnote 9.
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a passing interest in the history of religion (or steampunk sci-fi) will know, is a virtually 
indestructible automaton, often constructed out of numerous amorphous pieces, that 
is incorruptible in ideal conditions, but which can also go dangerously out of control. 
As a kind of mystical robot, a golem appears nearly godlike and insurmountable, and 
does the bidding only of those who can recode the encrypted trigger needed to turn 
the automaton on and off (called the shem in Hebrew mysticism). This hardly sounds 
like a secure (let alone fool-proof) financial technology. When a cryptocurrency trading 
operation is called Bitcoin Golem, and when the owners of the service invoke fantasti-
cal rhetoric of unimaginable wealth rather than offering any explanation of how their 
magical system functions, then the conditions for a shift from techno-utopianism to al-
gomysticism are certainly met — indeed, any knowledge of and trust in the underlying 
technology will rely on mystified devotion. Arguably, a similar approach appears to be 
embodied in some of Denny’s work, particularly where it depicts entrepreneurial, hy-
per-capitalistic distributed ledger technology applications through references to popu-
lar games. Using Pokémon to explicate the blockchain serves, by implication, to imbue 
the technology in question with the fantastical qualities of the game world. In Pokémon 
video games (as in the many narrative versions of the franchise, existing in the form 
of graphic novels, TV shows, and collectibles) protagonists and players are constantly 
on the hunt for the valuable supernatural beings from which the franchise derives its 
name, which are religiously worshipped as powerful totems. In the extended metaphor 
of Denny’s work, Pokémons become units of supernatural cryptocurrency, and cryp-
tocurrency trading itself becomes a game. By implication, the underlying distributed 
ledger technologies are depicted as an esoteric, fantastical phenomenon which, like 
Pokémons (and like the Pokémon phenomenon itself), may be hard to grasp for the 
uninitiated, despite its massive popularity. Here, the technology is infantilized, and 
presumably game-like characteristics are foregrounded, while serious socio-economic 
concerns are ignored.20
When the algomysticism of blockchain technology applications and products is less 
overt than in examples such as the naming conventions of Ethereum, mainstream 
advertisement strategies, or the game culture contextualization in some of Denny’s 
work, then it frequently takes on pseudo-educational forms. The outcome has been 
a multitude of cryptocurrency ‘academies,’ many of which advertise aggressively on 
social media platforms, offering for sale supposedly informative materials (in the form 
of workshops, seminars, retreats, pamphlets, etc.) that are almost always framed as 
enlightening, semi-religious doctrine promising epiphanies on cryptocurrency trading. 
A current sampling of some of the offerings currently crowding my Facebook feed (the 
platform’s algorithms are translating my research interests in truly mysterious ways) in-
clude the following: Remitano, a trading platform registered in the Seychelles, features 
a banner ad with a gold-colored cryptocoin graphic emblazoned with the Bitcoin sym-
bol and an infinity symbol, floating among the stars. The image taunts me to become 
a multi-millionaire ‘CryptoPreneur!’ through subscription to a number of workshops. A 
mouse-click away, the banner photo of an organization simply called ‘CryptoCurrency 
Academy’ asks me, provocatively and in all caps, ‘WHO CONTROLS THE CREATION 
20 See also Max Haiven, ‘Coming of Age in the Financialized Pokéconomy’, 12 July 2016, https://
maxhaiven.com/2016/07/12/pokeconomy/.
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OF MONEY?’,21 implying that it is entirely within the means of the academy to impart 
this godlike power. This organization, in turn, is linked to OneCoin, a cryptocurrency 
platform widely reported to be an elaborate scam (recently, authorities shut down a 
major annual convention for OneCoin users and investors in Macau, which had been 
advertised with images invoking Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam fresco to sug-
gest a holy union between cryptocurrencies and capitalist riches).22 Gibraltar-based 
OneCoin is headed by the guru-like figure of ‘Dr. Ruja Ignatova,’ and operates primarily 
by selling educational material in the form of digital pamphlets. These seem designed 
to indoctrinate users to esoteric belief-systems sustaining the proprietary trading plat-
form and currency system, which essentially functions like a pyramid scheme.
A main shared characteristic of many blockchain-related ‘academies’ is that they are 
set up as temples rather than as educational institutions: they cultivate the assump-
tion that users need to ‘learn’ about cryptocurrencies, a desire that is satisfied through 
various pagan catechisms of crypto-finance (usually paid-subscription informational 
material promising the privilege of joining an inner circle of initiates to become true 
disciplines). Importantly, this rarely includes detailed information about the underlying 
technologies themselves. The blockchain, the technology around which transactions 
revolve, is here posited as being so difficult to understand that it borders on the un-
knowable, again shifting blockchain-based applications towards the mystic. Just as 
church-going is supposed to give me access to the word of God, but no guarantee that 
I will ever really understand it, joining one of the many existing algomysticist cryptocoin 
cults is a choice to believe in a technology, rather than a serious attempt to understand 
it. It is in this sense that the text-based and visual rhetoric surrounding trading technol-
ogies and platforms reinforces and amplifies the lack of clarity, even where it is pack-
aged in pseudo-explanations, and thus continues the algomysticism outlined above.
Some of Denny’s work picks up on this kind of rhetoric, which is here referenced in a 
mock-documentary mode that emulates the mystifying and mystical attitudes already 
discussed. A central component of Denny’s 2016 exhibition at Petzel Gallery was what 
the gallery PR text described as ‘sculptural infographics’;23 while some of these info-
graphics elevate Blockchain ‘visionaries’ like Ethereum founder Buterin into a mystical 
realm, others pull elusive fintech characters like Nakamoto into the real. Overall, this 
approach serves to reshape speculative content as content that appears documentary 
in nature, and the viewer’s attention is drawn to the mystical dimension of the technol-
ogy under discussion. A short video included in the project is a good example of this. 
The video summarizes technical features of the blockchain in a fashion that is reminis-
cent of TV infomercials. Against the visual background of a stylized globe of connected 
informational nodes floating through the cosmos, a voice-over narrative is delivered 
by a resonant male voice that might as well be talking about religion, the mysteries 
of the deep sea, or outer space: ‘The blockchain is the truth. It is a system enabling 
each and every one of us to take part in the real, vast, marvelous ever-changing pat-
tern of human interaction governed only by ourselves, enabled by a code belonging to 
21 See https://www.facebook.com/OneCoinCryptocurrencyNow/.
22 See ‘OneCoin Global Macau Event Prohibited by Chinese Authorities’, Behind MLM, 28 April 2017, 
http://behindmlm.com/companies/onecoin/onecoin-global-macau-event-prohibited-by-chinese-
authorities/.
23 See ‘Simon Denny’, Petzel, 8 September 2016, http://www.petzel.com/exhibitions/simon-denny3.
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all, reflecting all.’24 According to Denny, the purpose of the video was to ‘explain the 
technology at a very basic level, but also to contextualize the explanation by being 
partly propaganda-like, including emphasizing some of the economic and ideological 
assumptions [underlying the blockchain] as a given.’25 The result, however, much like 
the offerings of the pseudo-educational cryptocurrency academies discussed above, 
feels mantra-like rather than explanatory, catechistic rather than informative.
Non-Fintech fintech and the critical role of contemporary art
In a review in The Guardian, Denny has been described as a ‘technology finance 
groupie’ who makes ‘fan art,’ and who, in this project, uses the gallery as ‘an altar to 
worship’ important blockchain figures.26 Denny has confirmed this perspective, for ex-
ample by stating, ‘I am a fan of the culture of entrepreneurship. An artist is also a busi-
ness… The values associated with entrepreneurship seem very close to me. Highly 
motivated people with high-risk precarious ideas mixed with efficiency and metrics. 
What could be more beautiful?’27 A question to volley back to the artist here might be 
something like the following: What, given this viewpoint, distinguishes the artist’s per-
spective on the blockchain from the pseudo-educational scam pamphlets of OneCoin, 
or from the fantastical promises of companies like Bitcoin Golem? According to Denny, 
Blockchain Future States and Blockchain Visionaries are projects that want to inform 
viewers. But, as I have suggested above, the artist’s approach of adopting reverential 
and mythologizing stances do little more than to aestheticize the blockchain while 
perpetuating vague narratives without producing critical insight around cryptocurrency 
issues. Denny has stated that for him, assuming the speculative position of ‘what if’ – 
‘what if we accept [technologies] on the terms they are publicized with, with the terms 
of the community that is presenting the ideas and building the infrastructure, what 
would the implications of that be?’ — represents a critical position.28 I am doubtful that 
adopting such a position can amount to an effective rhetorical strategy for ‘opening 
up questions and discussions’29 around blockchain-related technology and politics, 
or that it can convey the skepticism and inspire the open-mindedness towards which 
newcomers to emerging financial technologies should be guided.
Blockchain discourse in an algomysticist vein tends to overlook or ignore the need to 
engage the emerging technologies it is concerned with analytically, and with a critical 
awareness of socio-economic implications. Algomysticism espouses the benefits that 
we can supposedly derive from the technologies in question, and the harmony in which 
we can supposedly co-exist with them, without accepting the need to understand 
and critically interrogate these same technologies and the socio-political realities they 
produce. In mainstream contexts that follow profit-seeking angles, and that aim to 
exploit lacking knowledge of financial technologies, the mysticism enshrouding the 
blockchain is understandable. In these contexts, the rhetoric is strategic, designed 
24 The video is embedded at http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/superhumanity/68703/blockchain-
future-states/.
25 See Skinner, ‘Blockchain Future States’, p. 142.
26 See footnote 11.
27 See ‘Artist SIMON DENNY is Shaping Berlin’s Disruptive Startup Culture’, 032c, 31 January 2014, 
https://032c.com/2014/artist-simon-denny-is-shaping-berlins-disruptive-startup-culture/.
28 See Skinner, ‘Blockchain Future States’, p. 144.
29 Ibid.
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to ensnare users in unpredictable, high-risk ‘investment’ activities. By contrast, art 
practices that engage emerging financial technologies have an opportunity — and, 
in my view, an obligation — to expose problems and explore alternatives. They must 
proceed tactically, cutting through the mystifying rhetoric of for-profit scams instead 
of emulating it. Experimental art practices have always functioned as laboratories in 
which the meanings, contours, and limits of emerging technologies can be discovered 
and challenged, and many fintech examples are available, such as Femke Herregrav-
en’s work referenced above.
In a non-DLT context, the much-discussed work of the Robin Hood Coop, with its cus-
tom-designed algorithm that mimics the behavior of successful investment operations, 
comes to mind as a powerful (if contested) example of working through the critical 
implications of financial technologies.30 Yes, it can be hard to understand how precisely 
the group’s ‘parasitical’ trading algorithm and ‘activist’ hedge fund can be framed as 
an art project. The point is that the Robin Hood Coop simultaneously is and isn’t art, 
and that the resulting contentions and contradictions open up extremely productive 
sites of critical thinking and critical practice. Despite its name, the Robin Hood Coop 
technically doesn’t steal anything, but benefits from the profitable, if ethically corrupt, 
capitalist investment strategies it copies; if this diminishes the project as an artwork, it 
certainly raises important and uncomfortable questions – on the one hand, about the 
technologies used, and, on the other, about the nature of critique itself, about system-
conformity of the art world, and about the limits of radical creative practice.
What might such practices look like in the context of blockchain technologies? Un-
doubtedly, blockchain-based digital art has a great potential for similarly contentious, 
difficult, and effective critiques. Specifically, such art might be most powerfully poised 
to engage with questions of the value and valuation, uniqueness, ownability, and trad-
ability of artworks — issues that commercial blockchain applications are also designed 
to tackle, openly and directly. The important thing is that such art practices must be 
positioned outside the mystifying rhetoric that is found, as discussed, in so many plac-
es. One way to achieve this might be to create works that don’t document, narrativize, 
or aestheticize the blockchain, but which, like the work of the Robin Hood Coop, pro-
duces subversive inflections and sites of critical debate through copying or mimicry. 
This would mean artworks that engages DLT productively, and that might shape what 
DLT can become because it is itself open to becoming DLT. In this sense, to use fintech 
does not necessarily mean to be fintech (see, again, the Robin Hood Coop).
Some of the most interesting artistic projects using emerging financial DLT do so in 
order to explore how the technology used can undermine aspects of traditional own-
ership structures (e.g., the ownership of artistic artifacts; ownership of the modes of 
production, circulation, and distribution of art; and control over the institution that (e-)
valuate artistic output). Ultimately, this might help us think about the reconfiguration 
(or abandonment?) of these structures — something that conceptual art, for example, 
has attempted (and failed) to do for decades throughout the mid-20th century.31 If we 
30 See http://www.robinhoodcoop.org/.
31 Cf. Martin Zeilinger, ‘Everything You’ve Always Wanted to Know About the Blockchain* (*But Were 
Afraid to Ask Mel Ramsden)’, in Artists Re:Thinking the Blockchain, op. cit., pp. 287-296.
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take the blockchain seriously as a substrate for critical art-making, then this calls for 
an art that engages with the technology rigorously and critically in order to explore and 
expose its capabilities, limits, and potential dangers. One form this is already begin-
ning to take is that of self-owning artworks, such as Plantoid (2015) and terra0 (2016), 
both of which were featured in the recent Furtherfield exhibition ‘New World Order’.32 
Plantoid has been discussed extensively in critical and creative communities over the 
past years; it is a blockchain-based sculpture capable of managing its own existence 
by controlling its wealth as represented in Bitcoins, and using this capital to commis-
sion additional copies of itself, which are then again sold, allowing the artwork to ex-
pand and grow. Following a similar principle, terra0 is a self-owning and self-managing 
forest designed to manage its own existence and growth in a sustainable fashion. 
Both works are — and are not — fintech. Engaging with these works is instructive 
with regard to the functionality of the underlying technologies. But ultimately, they also 
open up broader and more far-reaching avenues of inquiry. They help us rethink the 
blockchain, and, more generally, force us to reconsider the nature of the work of art 
in the age of DLT. A serious engagement of the issues raised by works such as terra0, 
and its highly rigorous non-mythologizing engagement with DLT, will yield a new per-
spective on the role of the artist in relation to the work, and a new agency of art in the 
world. This is not simply about decoupling art from its institutions and its markets (or 
empowering it with regard to them). Rather, what could emerge out of this exploration 
is a blockchain-based art that is — precisely thanks to its direct engagement with 
financial technologies — not merely a financial technology. While the blockchain can 
thus certainly serve to financialize art,33 by contrast it might also serve to make it unfi-
nancializable. This might serve to cut the corruptible, biased, greedy, selfish human out 
of the transactional equation — after all, to eliminate financial institutions as inevitable 
middlemen was, we must remember, the original promise of the blockchain. Contem-
porary art that engages meaningfully with the blockchain, then, should be inevitably 
orientated towards a radical emancipation of the artwork, and an exploration of a new 
kind of agency that the artwork can have vis a vis the artist. With this, contemporary art 
can perhaps return to operating in a utopian mode, shifting into activist work in numer-
ous ways. As a kind of emergent non-fintech fintech, this is no doubt preferable to the 
algomysticism discussed above.
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There are two art markets today. One is still regulated by a hierarchy of values, 
even if these are already of a speculative kind. The other resembles nothing so 
much as floating and uncontrollable capital in the financial market: it is pure 
speculation, movement for movement’s sake, with no apparent purpose other than 
to defy the law of value. This second market has much in common with poker or 
potlatch — it is a kind of space opera in the hyperspace of value. Should we be 
scandalized? No. There is nothing immoral here. Just as present-day art is beyond 
beautiful and ugly, the market, for its part, is beyond good and evil  
—Jean Baudrillard.1
Art is produced as a commodity, it doesn’t become one when it is sold  
—João Enxuto and Erica Love.2
Introduction
With the changing funding paradigm for the arts in neoliberal economies, which is 
increasingly a prerogative of private institutions and corporations, the relation between 
art and finance has acquired growing prominence within art discourses and practices.3 
Beginning in the 1960s when the first large professional investors entered the realm of 
art investment, the financialization of art is not a new phenomenon. However, in the last 
decade it has displayed unprecedented levels of professionalization, standardization, 
and ‘scientization of art investment’,4 aiming to turn art into a tool for portfolio diver-
sification and inflation hedging. In other words, financialization has turned art into an 
asset, commensurable to any other tradable commodity. This has encountered a mix 
1 Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. James Benedict, 
London: Verso, 1993, pp. 18–19.
2 João Enxuto and Erica Love, ‘Institute for Southern Contemporary Art,’ The Original Copy, 2016, 
http://theoriginalcopy.net/isca/.
3 For instance, in May 2017, Donald Trump’s 2018 budget proposed to eliminate altogether the 
National Endowment to the Arts, as part of a dramatic cut to federal funding. Eileen Kinsella, 
‘Trump Budget Proposes to Eliminate the NEA’, Artnet News, 23 May 2017, https://news.artnet.
com/art-world/trump-budget-proposes-steep-cuts-to-arts-funding-969641. In Australia the 
number of grants to individual artists has decreased by a stunning 70% since the 2013-14 
financial year – a trend, which has been maintained in the 2016-17 Federal Budget. Alison 
Croggon, ‘The 70% Drop in Australia Council Grants for Individual Artists is Staggering’, The 
Guardian, 18 May 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2016/may/19/the-70-drop-australia-
council-grants-artists-funding-cuts. Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips characterize this shift as 
the passage from an ethos of ‘public care’ to one of private ‘love of art,’ which today drives the 
dynamics in art market prices. Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips, ‘Tainted Love: Art’s Ethos and 
Capitalization’, in Maria Lind and Olav Velthuis (eds), Art and Its Commercial Markets: A Report on 
Current Changes and with Scenarios for the Future, Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012, pp. 209–40.
4 For a thorough overview of the historical progression of the financialization of art, see Olav 
Velthuis and Erica Coslor, ‘The Financialization of Art’, in Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
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of resistance and fascination by the art community and a new level of awareness with 
regard to the extent to which market dynamics bleed into the fabrics of the art milieu. 
This is because the art asset perfectly illustrates the tensions within the current logic 
of financialization in relation to the socio-cultural sphere. On the one hand, it exposes 
the inner limits of market valuation methods that, through processes of quantification, 
standardization and commensuration, aim to flatten the heterogeneity of cultural and 
aesthetic values onto the metric of price — without, however, subsuming them entire-
ly.5 On the other hand, it emphasizes the ‘derivative’ condition of contemporary art in 
computationally mediated culture, which today is valued, both socially and economi-
cally, according to algorithmic rules that map well onto the logic of derivative markets.6
Acknowledging art’s entanglement with private financial interests, artists and cultural 
practitioners have begun exploring the new affordances7 provided by blockchain tech-
nology and crypto-tokens in order to propose alternatives to the current paradigm. 
Tokens are an intrinsic component of the disintermediated logic of the blockchain ar-
chitecture, enabling the creation and transmission of programmable units of value in 
a peer-to-peer way. As I will explain in more depth below, in token-based networks 
every blockchain-mediated interaction corresponds to a transaction that occurs out-
side of established financial markets, portending a shift toward an even more ubiqui-
tous financialization of everything through blockchain. However, as recent art projects 
make clear (such as the ones I will discuss below — BitchCoin and terra0), this also 
ushers in new social and financial possibilities for the art field and, more broadly, for 
any endeavor seeking autonomy from the contemporary financial ecosystem through 
creativity and invention.
Taking seriously the promise (and dangers) of tokenization, and envisioning a block-
chain-based future in which financialization through tokens becomes seamlessly inte-
grated into the fabrics of everyday life, this essay asks: given the relevance of post-
internet art in foregrounding the aesthetic and operational dimensions of the derivative 
condition of contemporary art in current networked culture, what would a ‘post-block-
chain’ future for art actually look like? By which I mean: what would it mean for art to 
rely on blockchain technology (instead of the current internet stack) for its process of 
5 This is due to the very nature of the art object – an illiquid and costly commodity (in terms of 
storage and insurance expenses) in an unregulated and opaque financial environment. See Clare 
McAndrew (ed.), Fine Art and High Finance: Expert Advice on the Economics of Ownership, New 
York, NY: Bloomberg Press, 2010.
6 I discussed this, through a slightly different approach, in Laura Lotti, ‘Contemporary Art, 
Capitalization and the Blockchain: On the Autonomy and Automation of Art’s Value’, Finance and 
Society 2.2 (19 December 2016): 96–110.
7 Affordance is a working term for me that relates to the propositional character of things and 
objects and the potentials they yield for shaping new uses and behavioral patterns through their 
forms and operations. It is a concept used in several disciplines such as psychology, human-
computer interaction, industrial design and anthropology. In Don Norman, The Design of Everyday 
Things, New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002 [1988], p. 9, one of the seminal texts in interaction 
design, Norman defines affordances as ‘the perceived and actual properties of the thing, 
primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used.’ 
Furthermore, he observes that the affordances of objects 'convey messages about their possible 
uses, actions, and functions' (p. 82). In this case, I use the term to convey the new social and 
economic possibilities introduced by digital objects such as blockchains and tokens through their 
use and modes of operations, inflecting perceptions and behaviors.
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production and circulation? What tendencies would it harbor and how could they be 
leveraged for art’s autonomy? Given the embryonic development of the crypto-eco-
system, this question may sound premature. However, as blockchain is increasingly 
capturing the imagination of artists, technologists, and capitalists alike, it becomes 
crucial for the art field to start engaging, through the technology itself, with the pos-
sibility of a post-blockchain art. As BitchCoin and terra0 show, only by acknowledging 
the inherently financialized nature of the art asset and its embeddedness in a network 
of social and financial relations, art can be at the forefront of new modes of organizing 
toward one possible future, as foreshadowed by these new technologies. As such, 
these notes embrace the speculative nature of what they unashamedly propose: a vi-
sion for a future in which financialization becomes an art form and a propelling force for 
autonomous projects, thanks to the affordances introduced by blockchain technology.
Derivative Art and the Promise of Blockchain Technology
Lying at the junction between the new affordances provided by networked technol-
ogy and financialization, ‘post-internet art,’ as a now historicized style, corresponds 
to the aesthetics that made explicit the new derivative condition of the art milieu. Aris-
ing in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, post-internet art grappled with the 
changing conditions of production and circulation of the art object — from material 
and labor-intensive, to unabashedly dematerialized and fluidified — exposing the con-
tradictions inherent in contemporary art’s ‘informational milieu’.8 Post-internet artists 
acknowledged the increasing reliance by the field on social media’s algorithmic mode 
of parsing, ordering and matching data as indices of relations, to evaluate what is 
considered art and how much it can be worth. Furthermore, they denounced the fact 
that this automated mode of ordering neutralizes art’s critical thrust through homeo-
stazising feedback loops, revealing the limits of representation as a mode of critique 
in digital environments. Ben Vickers, in conversation with Brad Troemel and Artie Vier-
kant, poses the problem well in relation to Facebook’s newsfeed logic: ‘Hidden from 
the sight of users, a generative system has been developed to mine the implicit and 
explicit actions of millions of users globally […] condemning the user to experience all 
social relations through the lens of Facebook’s financially weighted algorithms’.9 Vick-
ers’ observation well encapsulates post-internet art’s inherently ‘derivative’ condition: 
analogously to a financial instrument, it fluctuates according to the relationality of its 
own field of operation without ever touching the ground of the underlying reality it is 
supposed to be embedded in.10
This is because the reach of financialization into the arts cannot be thought apart from 
the digital networked platforms that provide the substrate and infrastructural reality 
8 Curator Ceci Moss defines art's informational milieu as the ‘dynamic process of exchange among 
artist, artwork, and network’ made possible by today’s networked culture, which encompasses 
cultural and technical, but also institutional and financial relations. Ceci Moss, ‘Expanded Internet 
Art and the Informational Milieu’, Rhizome, 19 December 2013, http://rhizome.org/editorial/2013/
dec/19/expanded-internet-art-and-informational-milieu/.
9 Brad Troemel, Artie Vierkant, and Ben Vickers, ‘Club Kids: The Social Life of Artists on Facebook’, 
DIS Magazine, 2012, http://dismagazine.com/discussion/29786/club-kids-the-social-life-of-
artists-on-facebook/.
10 For a brilliant exposition of the relational nature of the derivative form see Melinda Cooper, 
‘Turbulent Worlds: Financial Markets and Environmental Crisis’, Theory, Culture & Society 27.2–3 
(2010): 167–90.
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upon which social, cultural and economic value is produced, distributed and harvested 
in the current paradigm.11 This paradigm is coextensive with the World Wide Web in-
frastructure, in which value is generated through the freely available communicative 
affordances of the protocol layer (such as TCP/IP, HTTP, SMTP). However, such value 
is immediately captured and re-aggregated as tradable data at the application layer 
through the centralized ownership of information by a few tech giants (e.g. Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, etc.).12 In this context, what counts as art becomes evaluated 
through the discretization, automation and commodification of informational interac-
tive processes (e.g., relations between artists-artworks-networks) at the application 
layer. While standing for ‘appreciation’ (in the form of likes, retweets, tags, shares, 
etc.), these informational processes also drive the valuation methods at the heart of the 
art market, as they are also being monetized in the reputation and attention economy 
– and from which it seems impossible to disentangle. This exposes the complexities of 
the logic of financialization and its inherently networked nature, based on specific ways 
in which notions of value, logic, meaning, and governance are woven in the computa-
tional architecture that creates and sustains the current system of power.
In order to break away from the entanglement with market logic, artists have started 
exploring the possibilities of blockchain technology and its promise of peer-to-peer 
disintermediated value creation and transmission as a way to move beyond the finan-
cialization of art. While a technical discussion of the blockchain protocol is beyond 
the scope of this essay, my goal here is to foreground the new kinds of financial (but 
also social and aesthetic) possibilities that this particular data structure opens up for 
how value is generated and distributed in digital networks — foreshadowing ‘the dawn 
of the decentralized business model’.13 This is made possible by so-called tokens. 
Broadly speaking, tokens are peer-to-peer coded units of value that can not only rep-
resent cryptocurrency, but also any other kind of digital assets (that is, any digital rep-
resentation of tradable commodities, from physical objects such as gold, to computing 
power and cloud storage space) — and specifically those assets that back the value 
of the tokens themselves. While Bitcoin’s tokens ended the taboo on money’14 by al-
lowing for the first time the disintermediated generation and transmission of value in 
a peer-to-peer network, Ethereum’s tokens enable the transmission of specific rights 
11 On the relation between social and financial dynamics, as they are mediated through current 
networks, see also: Adam Arvidsson, ‘Facebook and Finance: On the Social Logic of the 
Derivative’, Theory, Culture & Society 33.6 (1 November 2016): 3–23.
12 Joel Monégro, ‘Fat Protocols’, Union Square Ventures, 8 August 2016, http://www.usv.com/blog/
fat-protocols. Frank Pasquale has brilliantly illustrated the extent of the personal data market 
and data brokerage for advertising, financial, and surveillance purposes in: Frank Pasquale, The 
Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015; see also: Frank Pasquale, ‘The Dark Market for Personal Data’, 
The New York Times, 16 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/opinion/the-dark-
market-for-personal-data.html.
13 Fred Ehrsam, ‘Blockchain Tokens and the Dawn of the Decentralized Business Model’, The 
Coinbase Blog, 1 August 2016, https://blog.coinbase.com/app-coins-and-the-dawn-of-the-
decentralized-business-model-8b8c951e734f#.zd6jf0ut9.
14 Denis Roio, ‘Bitcoin, the End of the Taboo on Money’, 6 April 2013, http://www.dyndy.
net/2013/04/bitcoin-ends-the-taboo-on-money/.
91PERFORMING FUTURE FINANCE
in peer-to-peer, programmable and automated ways thanks to smart contracts.15 Fun-
damentally different from legal contracts,16 smart contracts are coded protocols (also 
called protocol tokens) whose logic and rules of self-execution are enforced through 
the underlying blockchain, in a way that is entirely automated and independent from 
the established financial system. By contrast, decentralized applications (dApps) to-
kens represent assets that exist decoupled from a blockchain. These assets could be 
fiat currency, gold, internet of things devices, and, as will be made clear, new types of 
assets such as art production itself, expressing the potential for appreciation inherent 
in such endeavors. Protocol tokens and dApps tokens together are the foundational 
tools for the construction of the new decentralized ecosystems on top of blockchain 
technology.17 Given the high level of programmability afforded by Ethereum’s smart 
contracts, each token’s properties and functionalities can be tuned in accordance to its 
intended use (in terms of supply, issuance, inflation rate, economic logic, usage, etc.) 
For instance, tokens can be used to access a network, as reward for contributions to 
the said network, or as a means for decentralized governance within an organization.
Tokens are often issued to the public either through mining (that is, generated through 
computational processes, as in the case of Bitcoin and Ethereum) or by participating 
in new types of crowdsales — also called Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Similar to the 
more mainstream Initial Public Offerings, in which private companies issue their own 
stocks to the public market, Initial Coin Offerings are decentralized forms of equity 
crowdfunding in which small-sized projects self-issue, or offer, tokens on the market 
as representations of the future utility and value provided by their project in potential, 
in order to fund themselves by creating equity relationships with the participants in 
the offering. For these reasons, the ICO funding model has been defined by insiders 
as a ‘Kickstarter on steroid’,18 exploding the range of social and financial possibili-
ties for small communities and individuals, and threatening to disrupt the traditional 
funding paradigm in the startup ecosystem. This new possibility is evidenced by 
the surge in high-profile Ethereum-based Initial Coin Offerings, recently surpassing 
venture capitalists funding, and resulting in the market capitalization of all cryptocur-
rencies eclipsing $175 billion.19
15 This is because Ethereum is a ‘universal machine’, in that it is able to compute any problem that a 
single Turing machine can process. In order to do so, Ethereum replaces Bitcoin’s blockchain with 
its own infrastructure.
16 Josh Stark, ‘Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts’, CoinDesk, 4 June 2016, http://www.
coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts/.
17 Melon, ‘The Difference Between Protocol Tokens and Traditional Asset Tokens’, Medium, 20 
April 2017, https://medium.com/melonport-blog/the-difference-between-protocol-tokens-and-
traditional-asset-tokens-89e0a9dcf4d1; Albert Wenger, ‘Crypto Tokens and the Coming Age of 
Protocol Innovation’, Continuations, 28 July 2016, http://continuations.com/post/148098927445/
crypto-tokens-and-the-coming-age-of-protocol.
18 Balaji S. Srinivasan, ‘Thoughts on Tokens’, news.21.co, 27 May 2017, https://news.21.co/
thoughts-on-tokens-436109aabcbe.
19 Josiah Wilmoth, ‘$175 Billion: Record Bitcoin Price Lifts Crypto Market Cap to New Heights’, 
CryptoCoinsNews, 1 September 2017, https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/175-billion-record-
bitcoin-price-lifts-crypto-market-cap-new-heights/; Alex Sunnarborg, ‘ICO Investments Pass 
VC Funding in Blockchain Market First,’ CoinDesk, 9 June 2017, http://www.coindesk.com/ico-
investments-pass-vc-funding-in-blockchain-market-first/.
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As crypto-enthusiasts praise the new capabilities introduced by tokens, amidst the 
pronounced volatility within the ecosystem,20 several voices from art and cultural the-
ory have opposed the incipient tokenization of everything by means of blockchain, 
since it exacerbates the logic of financialization by assuming it as the very basis of to-
ken-based economies. For instance, media artist and technologist Salvatore Iaconesi 
rightly observes that technologies such as blockchain and tokens are ‘powerful agents 
towards the “transactionalization of life”’,21 and that their uncritical adoption risks dis-
solving the fabrics of society into the algorithmic mesh that will eventually sustain our 
blockchained, financialized existences. Rather than dismissing altogether the novelty 
of blockchain technology and crypto-tokens, however, here I want to propose that 
tokenization — as a new, peer-to-peer, socio-financial practice — opens up important 
new avenues for experimentation toward the autonomy of art, and the cultural sphere 
at large, from the extractive logic of financial markets; and, for this reason, it needs to 
be reckoned with in concrete ways. In the next section I discuss two artworks, Bitch-
Coin and terra0, that illustrate different strategies through which artists today can le-
verage art’s derivative condition, by cunningly reappropriating and reprogramming the 
means of financialization thanks to blockchain-based tokens. As post-internet became 
the aesthetic of the new cultural-financial configuration for contemporary art — as 
doubly derivative, of both economic and computational valuation processes underly-
ing today’s art informational milieu — these projects gesture toward a post-blockchain 
horizon, in which art embraces its inherently economic status and role and, in so doing, 
finds novel ways to leverage it through decentralized modes of organization.
BitchCoin and terra0: Tokenization as an Art Form
Among the several art projects that currently engage with blockchain technology, two 
stand out for the ways in which they cleverly experiment with the new socio-financial 
affordances that tokens open up for ‘self-financialization,’ enabling artists to express 
and harvest the value of their own work in unprecedented ways. These are Sarah 
Meyohas’ BitchCoin (2016) and Paul Seidler, Paul Kolling, and Max Hampshire’s terra0 
(2016): the first highlights the peculiar nature of crypto-tokens, introducing new social, 
financial and aesthetic possibilities; the latter emphasizes the ecological — as in, the 
relational or ecosystemic — dimension of token-based economies. In so doing, both 
projects exemplify some of the new opportunities that tokens open up for artistic ex-
periments with the medium of finance itself, expressing in a non-reductive way the 
economic status of heterogeneous value forms such as art, which has to be accounted 
on its own terms.
Loosely based on the model of Bitcoin, BitchCoin is a cryptocurrency backed by the 
artist’s photography. Like Bitcoin, BitchCoin relies on a public blockchain. Like Bitcoin, 
furthermore, BitchCoin is mined, though in the case of BitchCoin, the tokens have 
been pre-mined in the gallery by the artist. Each coin costs $100 and gives access to 
25 inches of photographic print by Meyohas, in perpetuity, including all her current and 
20 Trent McConaghy, ‘Tokenize the Enterprise’, The BigchainDB Blog, 6 June 2017, https://blog.
bigchaindb.com/tokenize-the-enterprise-23d51bafb536; Fred Ehrsam, ‘Blockchain Tokens and 
the Dawn of the Decentralized Business Model’; Albert Wenger, ‘Crypto Tokens and the Coming 
Age of Protocol Innovation’.
21 Salvatore Iaconesi, ‘The Financialization of Life’, Startups & Venture Capital, 3 September 2017, 
https://startupsventurecapital.com/the-financialization-of-life-a90fe2cb839f.
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future works. Aptly launched in the context of an exhibition investigating prediction, 
BitchCoin is a peculiar kind of token: it serves as an art-backed currency — that is, a 
kind of commodity money that is backed by commodifying precisely the process of 
art production itself. In this sense, BitchCoin emphasizes the least discussed aspect 
of crypto-tokens — neither as a form of electronic cash as Bitcoin has originally been 
defined by its inventor(s), nor ‘digital gold’ as the libertarian fringe thinks about them, 
but as a form of liquid equity stakes in a common project. Importantly, here I under-
stand equity not in strictly financial terms, as stocks or shares, but more generally as 
an economic relation based on mutual stakeholding, in which both parties share the 
risks, but also the upside, of their cooperation.22 In this view, BitchCoin is a token that 
gives access to the future value of the artist’s work, while also being freely exchange-
able for its current market value.
Emphasizing the role of the artist as producer of cultural value and engaging with the 
audience as investors, BitchCoin sets up a new model that enables collectors to invest 
directly in the future success of the artist’s career, while also giving Meyohas ‘a stake 
in the supply, demand, and price of her own work’.23 In this sense, BitchCoin is also 
a speculative device on its own terms, allowing investors and collectors to become 
stakeholders in the artist’s career, but also to bet on her future success. From this 
standpoint, in contrast with the traditional view of the art object as a store of value,24 
BitchCoin gestures toward the programmability that tokens afford, by allowing the art-
ist to account for art as a ‘liquid commodity’ that is constantly generative of value – not 
only in the moment in which it is transacted in financial markets as a finite product but 
from the moment in which it is produced. This realization is crucial to an understanding 
of the financialized character of contemporary art. Furthermore, it opens up new possi-
bilities for artists to achieve autonomy from art’s underlying institutional-financial milieu 
by experimenting with the emergent affordances for disintermediated value transmis-
sion provided by blockchains.
By assuming art’s place in a socio-cultural milieu rife with economic interests, the proj-
ect provides an unconventional yet immediately operative approach to the entangle-
ment between art and markets. Acknowledging the inherently financialized nature of 
the art object, manifested in the commoditized (that is, tokenized) form of the art pro-
cess of production, and affirming the role of the artist as cultural producer, BitchCoin 
embraces art’s derivative condition and leverages it, by taking control over the means 
of financialization through her own art. This is illustrated by the ritualized launch of 
BitchCoin on the market during the opening of her exhibition, which resembles, and 
even predates, the already mentioned Initial Coin Offerings. By enabling the artist to 
‘self-issue’ her own tokens as indices of her artistic and cultural value, BitchCoin is 
about Meyohas financializing her own art process through the logic inherent in Bitcoin, 
and in so doing, creating a new milieu comprised of equity stakeholding in her own 
work — an emergent new space of possibilities for the artist and her supporters.
22 For a discussion of equity relations see: Robin Hood Cooperative, ‘Equity, Options, Assemblage: 
Robin Hood 2.0’, Future Art Base, 1 May 2015, https://speculativematerialism.files.wordpress.
com/2015/06/robin-hood-grey-paper-april-2015.pdf.
23 ‘Where 6: “Prediction,” with Sarah Meyohas’, Wherecam Tumblr, http://wherecontainer.tumblr.
com/post/110308568730/where-6-prediction-with-sarah-meyohas-bitch.
24 Velthuis and Coslor, ‘The Financialization of Art’.
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As BitchCoin experiments with the affordances of crypto-tokens for artists’ self-fi-
nancialization, terra0 takes this logic one step further and emphasizes the ecological 
dimension of token-based economies that, thanks to the new possibilities for incen-
tive alignments and automated coordination introduced by smart contracts, show po-
tential for the bootstrapping of new ecosystems of value. Initiated by Paul Seidler, 
Paul Kolling and Max Hampshire, terra0 is an augmented, self-owned forest in which 
self-governance is powered through the capacity of the forest to issue its own tokens 
based on the Ethereum blockchain. The project starts from an understanding of art as 
an ‘autonomously acting, self-sufficient economic unit’25 and aims to create an artwork 
that is also a fully autonomous ‘piece of capital’.26 In so doing, it explicitly plays with 
self-financialization by enabling a forest to turn, from a passive object of economic 
exploitation, to an active agent in the self-utilization of its own resources, for its own 
benefit, so that it can eventually buy itself.
terra0 essentially consists of a decentralized application built on top of Ethereum. 
Through smart contracts, the application automates the management of the forest’s 
resources, enabling it to self-utilize its own value with a combination of sensors, open 
data oracles, and AI bots. terra0 illustrates well the paradigmatic shift that blockchain-
based token economies have introduced in terms of how networked value is generated 
and circulated, enabling for the first time a programmable financial engine for decen-
tralized projects. In the economic logic of the system, the forest obtains legal owner-
ship over itself from its initial stakeholders, therefore it is autonomous, yet indebted to 
the initiators of the project who purchased the land. In order to buy itself out, terra0 
launches an Initial Coin Offering on Ethereum, offering tokens that represent the future 
returns of the sales of its wood. Leveraging the decentralized stakeholding enabled by 
the Ethereum blockchain, in terms of potential for governance and value distribution, 
terra0 is a software application that, by accepting Ether to run its contract, directly 
supports the development of the infrastructure, which in turn provides reliable ser-
vices for the flourishing of the application layer, to the benefit of the whole ecosystem. 
‘This is where the phenomenon goes beyond just a new way of raising money’ writes 
Fred Ehrsam, co-founder of Coinbase, one of the most renowned wallet and exchange 
platforms for cryptocurrencies. ‘It is projects creating their own economic ecosystems 
to make the entire thing tick’.27 In other words, by adopting a tokenized — that is, 
networked, decentralized, and financialized — approach to its own management and 
utilization, terra0 opens up a new funding paradigm for itself, as art, which belongs 
neither to the public nor to the private institutional milieu. Instead this emerges through 
participation in a common project – that is, through the network of tokenized stake-
holding relationships that enable token holders to become invested in the value system 
that backs the project’s offer: the possibility of the realization of an autonomous (that 
is, self-owning and self-managing) forest.
25 Paul Seidler, Paul Kolling, and Max Hampshire, ‘terra0’, GitBook, 2016, http://book.terra0.org/; 
see also: Leila Ueberschlag, ‘Terra0: The Self-Owning Augmented Forest’, Institute of Network 
Cultures, 29 September 2016, http://networkcultures.org/moneylab/2016/09/29/terra0-the-self-
owning-augmented-forest/.
26 Ueberschlag, ‘Terra0’.
27 Ehrsam, ‘Blockchain Tokens and the Dawn of the Decentralized Business Model’, emphasis 
added.
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Moreover, by exposing the multidimensionality of property rights as legal, economic, 
and social operators of subjectivation and power relations, terra0 underscores the 
challenges that peer-to-peer automated technologies pose to received notions of own-
ership, personhood and autonomy in a post-blockchain near future. It does so, not 
only in the self-management of capital, but also in the very definition of agency and au-
tonomy — in both artistic and economic terms — hinting toward a post-human future 
in which heterogeneous processes generative of value, such as ecosystemic services, 
as well as art, can be tokenized, automatized and cross-bound in very concrete ways. 
While the project stops at the case of the forest managing its own resources, in a not 
too distant future, financialization through programmable tokens may allow the forest 
to trade itself on the market for natural capital, autonomously entertaining financial, 
social and legal relations with NGOs, governmental institutions, corporations and lo-
cal communities. The forest may even be able to crowdsource the development and 
maintenance of its software to open source communities through bounty offers set up 
by AI bots. Moving forward, the autonomous AI-powered forest could even short on 
financial markets the very corporations encroaching upon it and destroying its integrity 
— ultimately collapsing the boundaries between art, ecology, economy, and politics.
*
Both works prefigure the possibility for artists to harness financial logic in order to con-
cretely inflect dynamics in the contemporary art market at large. They do so by reveal-
ing and instrumentalizing the multifaceted and decentralized nature of cryptographic 
tokens — part commodity money, part currency, part equity, part unit of distributed 
governance — in order to create minimal, programmable protocols for interaction in 
a peer-to-peer network on the basis of a mutually acknowledged value system. In the 
cases discussed above, these value systems are an artist’s career and a forest’s self-
management, respectively. Specifically, BitchCoin allows for the disintermediation and 
distribution of the process of valuation of Meyohas’ own current and future art produc-
tion, which is issued directly to her audience in the form of tokens backed by said value 
in potential. terra0 takes this logic to an ecosystemic level, by complementing self-
issuance with the practice of self-utilization; in this way, the project gestures toward 
new ways in which artists can automate and autonomize their art’s value by tokenizing 
it — that is, by distributing their potential yield through programmable equity stakes, 
enabling the ecosystemic circulation of art in autonomous ways. These two strategies 
— self-issuance (the capability for artists to issue their own value) and self-utilization 
(the possibility to automate and transparently manage the allocation and circulation 
of the value of one’s art) — are crucial to a project of art’s bootstrapping from its un-
derlying techno-financial substrate, precisely by appropriating and reprogramming the 
current logic of financial derivatives.
Like derivatives, tokens are speculative instruments in that they are abstract protocols 
that represent ‘a claim over event worlds that have yet to actualize in space and time’.28 
At the same time, in virtue of their abstract nature, derivatives are inherently relational; 
they operate, at a very concrete level, by way of a ‘power of potentiation through con-
nection, the power to liquefy and freeze relations, to potentialize and depotentialize 
28 Cooper, ‘Turbulent Worlds’, p. 179.
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connections, and thus to shape (and be shaped by) the possibilities of movement of 
everyday life’.29 In contrast to the current derivative form, however, blockchain tokens 
are effectively able to encode, and account for, singular kinds of value systems without 
flattening them onto the only metric that drives contemporary finance: price. Tokens 
do so by providing an index to express the value backing each particular kind of initial 
offering to the market, and inscribing it on the distributed ledger of the blockchain — 
which is precisely what Meyohas’ BitchCoin does by providing a unit of expression 
and distribution for the future value of the artist’s photography. Furthermore, tokens 
extend the derivative’s networked, relational and event-making character by making 
it peer-to-peer and open source. In so doing, they enable users (artists, startups, au-
tonomists) to program the kinds of social and economic relations informing the emer-
gence of an ecosystem, autonomously from the world of global finance. In this way, 
tokens unleash derivatives’ future-building potential and organizational affordances 
for the benefit of the inventors of, and participants in, such new socio-financial forms. 
By issuing the artist’s own value in the form of art-backed crypto-tokens, and by set-
ting specific economic protocols for the forest’s self-management, respectively, both 
BitchCoin and terra0 are able to subject audience, collectors, and galleries to each’s 
own economic logics, and not vice versa. In this way, both BitchCoin and terra0 seed 
a post-blockchain future in which leveraging financialization, through the issuance of 
one’s own value system and encoding of one’s own economic logic for self-utilization, 
opens up new horizons for the creation of autonomous milieus.
Toward a Post-Blockchain Art: From Money Making to Making Offers
BitchCoin and terra0 potentiate the financialized character of the art object and pro-
cess — as fluid and inherently networked — by disintermediating and reprogramming it 
through blockchain technology and the new affordances provided by smart contracts. 
Specifically, BitchCoin hints to the multidimensionality of tokens, as they are capable of 
expressing heterogeneous forms of value and sharing them as such; terra0 illustrates the 
full extent of the new decentralized ecosystem that artists — and any autonomist proj-
ects — can build (and participate in) through token-based economies. In so doing, they 
provide a glimpse of a post-blockchain future perhaps not too far away, in which tokeni-
zation, and the new affordances it provides in terms of self-issuance and self-utilization, 
becomes the condition for art’s autonomy through automated smart contracts. As post-
internet became the aesthetics of the derivative condition of contemporary art, the post-
blockchain horizon for art has to assume its inherently economic status but also move 
beyond the limitations of the current paradigm. As BitchCoin shows, tokens explode 
the traditional money form by enabling it to account for a generative process such as 
art. They do so by providing the means to open a temporal horizon that gives unlimited 
access to the artist’s own appreciating value, thereby enabling the emergence of new 
relational possibilities for her and her stakeholders. terra0 extends this logic by inscrib-
ing the practices of self-issuance and self-utilization within a network that enables the 
crystallization of an ecosystem around the common project of allowing a forest to own it-
self. By experimenting with the design and logic of token-based economies, both works 
exemplify how artists can use finance as a creative tool, leveraging the new affordances 
of blockchain-based tokens, in order to distribute the kinds of social, cultural, aesthetic, 
and ecological values that are not accounted for in the current financial paradigm.
29 Cooper, ‘Turbulent Worlds’.
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As a crucial difference from the post-internet era of art, which limited itself to unveiling 
the changing nature of the art object and its fluid conditions of production and circu-
lation, both BitchCoin and terra0 open onto a post-blockchain future. It is one that 
reckons with the nature of the art object as a commodity that is tokenizable from the 
process of production, which can then appreciate in value according to the networked 
effort of artists, artworks and audiences in the art informational milieu. In other words, 
both projects illustrate that the challenge for artists seeking autonomy from the current 
extractive-computational paradigm has to be played at both the ‘derivative’ level (that 
of self-issuance and valuation) and at the ‘infrastructural’ level (that of organizational 
platform). In so doing, rather than simply exposing the derivative condition of the art 
object and process under planetary computation, both projects assume it as a start-
ing point from which to manipulate the deeper fabrics of the art milieu through the 
programmability and openness of blockchain technology — using financialization as 
a medium to program, through tokens, new informational milieus and organizational 
formations for themselves.
As such, the post-blockchain horizon for art is not just about expressing the art of 
money making (by embracing the fluidity of the art object as it circulates, like a cur-
rency, through networks and markets alike, as post-internet art did). More expansively, 
it is about the art of making offers, as the careful crafting and programming of tokens 
— that is, decentralized financial instruments (liquid equities) for mutual stakeholding 
— to be offered to the public for the creation of peer-to-peer ecosystems of value. As 
both BitchCoin and terra0 exemplify through their own Initial Coin Offerings, the art 
of crafting offers corresponds to the capacity of blockchain tokens to set one's own 
terms of circulation and protocols for interaction, to design one's own terms of self-
utilization through the tools of finance, and to set these tools loose through distributed 
units (of liquid equity and governance) that weave new ecosystems of value as they are 
transacted and interacted with. This allows for the possibility to issue value in the world 
and have it be acknowledged by peers according to programmable rules that enable 
the autonomy of that said ecosystem of value. By allowing for the self-issuance and 
automated control over the self-utilization of one’s own surplus value, these projects 
play with the affordances of financialization as their own expressive medium and, in so 
doing, seed a future in which autonomy may be achieved through the self-harvesting 
of one’s own value. Thus, the blockchain revolution and incipient tokenization of every-
thing can open up new possibilities for the arts not only in terms of creating art works 
but of generating art worlds — that is, ecosystems that operate according to log-
ics and values produced autonomously by artists and communities themselves. This 
means that, if contemporary art cannot be divorced from the socio-cultural logic of de-
rivatives, artists can become active agents of their own financialization by experiment-
ing with blockchains, rather than passive objects of the financialization of the art world 
that we all know and recognize. This is to say that, as these art projects show, the way 
to fight the financialization of everything is to go through it, rather than try to resist it.
Of course, this proposition is fraught with danger, especially as we bear witness to the 
fact that dynamics in these crowdsourcing environments seem to propose once again 
old power asymmetries. This may be due, at least partially, to the technical limitations 
of current blockchains, in terms of scalability (due to low consensus speed and high 
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entrance costs, so that only big investors can enter the space)30 and interoperability 
(that is, the problem with the impossibility to have on-chain solutions for large applica-
tions, which raises questions about the security of those off-chain transactions). Finan-
cializing everything through tokenization could entail extreme risks, such as providing 
new surface areas and markets for capital accumulation and producing more virulent 
and capillary forms of extraction in the attention economy, thereby reinforcing familiar 
dynamics. As it is true that decentralized technologies do not automatically decentral-
ize power,31 the road to the construction of a post-blockchain future, not only for art, 
will have to take seriously the vertiginous wager this discussion has proposed — that 
is, seizing the means of financialization through blockchain for autonomous projects — 
with all the perils that this may entail. This includes grappling with the limitations of cur-
rent blockchain offers and addressing how these may hinder the full-blown realization 
of such visionary endeavors. As new promising projects are mushrooming, however, it 
remains of the utmost importance for artists to keep exploring the potential of decen-
tralized technologies and leverage them for their own good. As such the post-block-
chain frontier of art also entails opening up questions in relation to the ethico-aesthetic 
dimension of tokenization and the interoperability of value systems. Blockchain is not 
a panacea; only a new weapon to be experimented with and wielded. While we are still 
lacking the means for a deep interoperability for our decentralized future, BitchCoin 
and terra0 are examples of the possibilities ushered in by cryptographic tokens for ex-
perimenting with financialization in creative and speculative ways, toward the creation 
not of mere art works but of many, possible, interoperating, art worlds.32
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In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of a new phase of capitalism. 
Thus argues Shoshana Zuboff, who coined the term ‘surveillance capitalism’ to 
describe a new regime of accumulation according to which entrepreneurs mobilize 
new means of understanding online users, and directly intervene in their habits for 
profit. New, ‘born-digital’ firms capitalize on users’ ‘data exhaust’ — information 
unintentionally left behind that reveals something of their online habits.1 Early on, 
for instance, Google — surveillance capitalism’s most prominent pioneer — rein-
vented its business model, after realizing that it could profit from the data exhaust 
it was already collecting as a byproduct of its activities. By offering ostensibly free 
email services to users, it could analyze users’ data, in order to entice advertisers 
with the promise of reaching highly specialized audiences. Users’ online interests 
and behaviors — data-sets analyzed into ersatz subjectivities — were effectively 
sold to Google’s advertisers, who would bid for prominent spots in online keyword 
auctions through Google’s AdWords program. Gmail users could then click on key-
words automatically matched to their interests — with the AdWords auction win-
ners’ sites listed most prominently. As Zuboff contends, surveillance capitalism’s 
‘unexpected and often illegible mechanisms of extraction, commodification, and 
control… effectively exile persons from their own behavior while producing new 
markets of behavioral prediction and modification.’2 Zuboff’s theory counters those 
who would understand ‘big data’ as a purely technological construct.3 She insists 
that data analysis instantiates a power relation, and that it must be understood as 
part of a financial regime.
As surveillance capitalism takes hold (at least for the moment), what can be made 
of its aesthetic implications? The surveillance-capitalist regime instantiates new, 
impersonal ways of seeing users’ real-time flow of interests, and linking financial 
value to these acts of seeing — reconstituting and monetizing subjectivities through 
data-sets. Inevitably, these new ways of envisioning and intervening in subjectivity 
have shifted the cultural landscapes in which subjectivities take shape. In recent 
years, artists have responded to these shifts, agitating the borderlines between 
older and newer regimes through which habits come to matter, and through which 
subjectivity comes to bear significance. For instance, Erica Scourti’s Life in Ad-
Words (2012-2013) (which I have written about more extensively elsewhere4) stages 
an extended interaction between two apparatuses through which the artist’s pat-
1 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information 
civilization’, Journal of Information Technology 30 (2015): 79.
2 Zuboff, ‘Big Other’, p. 75.
3 Ibid.
4 Emily Rosamond, ‘Technologies of Attribution: Characterizing the Citizen-Consumer in 
Surveillance Performance’, International Journal of Performance Arts and Digital Media 11.2 
(2015): 148-164.
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terns of interest find witness and value: the diary and the AdWords algorithm. For 
nearly a year, Scourti emailed her diary to herself via her Gmail account, and per-
formed to webcam the list of keywords that turned up in her inbox as a result. 
(‘Lyrics lyrics. Feeling tired. Always feeling sad. Feeling depressed. Healthy eating 
food. Music and lyrics.’5) Fragments of her interests and behaviours, refracted by 
an algorithmic witness into keywords meant to prompt possible sales, paradigma-
tize the surveillance-capitalist moment. An automated analyst of Scourti’s subjec-
tivity steps in, precisely in the place where she puts it into her own words: in the 
seemingly private (but more accurately, privatized) space of the inbox. And yet, 
while this piece experiments with the ways in which subjectivity has been newly 
commodified, it by no means assumes that the links between commodification and 
subjectivity are new. Rather, it draws attention to a continual clash of literary and 
surveillance-capitalist technologies of selfhood; for the diary itself is also a tool for 
producing complex interiority, and if theorists such as Deidre Shauna Lynch are to 
be believed, literary constructs of complex, interior life are deeply tied to the ex-
pansion of commodity culture through international trade in the 18th century. Here, 
embedded in the deeper histories of commodification, we find yet another moment 
in which (in England, among other places) the capacity to see the world beyond the 
horizon — to look into the far distance for patterns of activity and exchange — was 
vastly expanded, through a newly international influx of objects. In Lynch’s view, 
the subjective correlates to these conditions were new sets of crises and questions 
around what constituted private life — and how to render it truly private. The devel-
opment of complex literary characters — exemplars of interior life — helped to rec-
oncile the newly internationalized flows of commodities with conceptions of private 
life.6 Scourti’s work emblematizes the surveillance-capitalist moment — precisely 
by pointing to the deeper history of the continually-mutating field of financially-in-
flected ways of knowing the self. Her work shows how surveillance-capitalist ways 
of understanding (and, thus, reshaping) subjectivity come into strange, conflicted 
alignment with older technologies through which subjectivity was pulled into line 
with commodification.
Here, I would like to continue what I see as the historical project in Scourti’s work, 
and look a bit further into the deep aesthetic histories of this new regime of financial 
surveillance. Rather than staying with the twenty-first century moment that Zuboff fo-
cuses on, I would like to begin by looking for the unexpected cultural prehistories of 
surveillance capitalism. How have artworks and narratives, long before the age of big 
data, questioned how financial interests themselves ‘see’ the world? Below are a few 
first steps toward what could be a much larger project: what I might term a cultural 
history of financial vision. To begin to get a sense of how financial vision might have 
shifted over the centuries, I’ll isolate works from a few quite disparate cultural mo-
ments: Thomas Bridges’ The Adventures of a Bank-Note (1770-1771), Mark’s Narrative 
Structures (late 1990s) and Amir Chasson’s painted diptychs of abject, slightly dis-
proportionate businessmen, paired with abstract graphs and diagrams (2009-2010). 
These works, I argue, might be understood as part of a history of impersonal, financial 
5 Erica Scourti, ‘Life in AdWords: March 2012’, https://vimeo.com/album/1944360/video/39677781.
6 See Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture and the Business of 
Inner Meaning, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
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vision. They are galvanized by the complex perceptual and conceptual tasks that ac-
crue around a simple aesthetic/narratological conceit: ‘it sees’. If carefully analyzed 
with an eye toward how they construct a financial ‘it’ that ‘sees’, these works might 
have the capacity to shift something in the way that we contextualize the new relations 
between acts of seeing and acts of valuation taking shape in our own time.
 
Fig. 1. Erica Scourti, Life in Adwords (screenshot view), 2012-2013.7
What follows comes from a strong sense of the importance of Zuboff’s theory, and 
of the urgent need to expand on its aesthetic and cultural implications. Yet it also 
necessitates a departure from Zuboff’s theorization and aims. For Zuboff, surveil-
lance capitalism represents a fundamental departure from how the neoliberal-era 
market was envisioned (by Hayek, for instance) as something ‘intrinsically ineffable 
7.  Image reprinted with permission from the artist.
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and unknowable’.8 For her, the ‘informating’ of the economy in the twentieth century 
— rendering it information-rich through smart machines — makes for a fundamental 
shift: for technologies of automation (say, scanner devices to automate supermarket 
checkouts) also produce data that can be used to change the very systems in which 
they function. Smart automation tools carry the capacity to ‘create a vast overview of 
an organization’s operations,’ which can then feed back into the system, changing the 
ways in which its various activities are coordinated and conceived as a whole.9 While 
in many ways, surveillance capitalism is indeed a fundamental shift, here I would like 
to consider an alternative to the above claim. Instead of assuming that the informating 
of the economy is entirely new, what if we imagine that at every turn in their develop-
ment — from the first bank-notes to the first derivatives — ever-more abstract financial 
products were newly informatic, in that their circulation and use produced new ways 
of impersonally seeing the world, and creating views of systems as a whole? In the 
history of which I’d like to put forward a few, tentative fragments, surveillance capital-
ism is part of a much older trajectory: of imagining how finance ‘sees.’ Below are a 
few fragments of a legacy of narrative and visual techniques which experiment with 
finance’s claim on impersonal vision.
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mark Lombardi, George W. Bush, Harken Energy, and Jackson Stephens, ca. 1979-
90 (5th Version), 1999.10
The Adventures of a Bank-Note
If we were to search for an early precursor to surveillance-capitalism, no better can-
didate could be found than Thomas Bridges’ serial novel The Adventures of a Bank-
Note. Bridges published the Adventures in two volumes in 1770, with a subsequent 
two volumes published in 1771.11 In this series, a bank-note, narrated in the first person, 
tells of its travels as it is passed from pocket to pocket. Bridges’ tale was one of the 
8 Zuboff, ‘Big Other’, p. 78.
9 Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 1988, p. 9.
10.  This reprint is for educational use only. No copyright infringement intended. 
11 Around this time in England, there were several popular stories which featured coins and bank-
notes occupying the first person, including Helenus Scott’s The Adventures of a Rupee, Wherein 
are Interspersed Various Anecdotes Asiatic and European (1772) and Charles Johnstone’s Chrysal, 
or, The Adventures of a Guinea (published in 1760 with two subsequent volumes in 1765). There 
are also a number of more recent examples of narratives that follow a single bank-note or coin 
as it weaves between people, places and situations. These include Bresson’s last film L’Argent 
(1983), which loosely adapts the first part of Tolstoy’s novella The Forged Coupon (first published 
in 1910), and Marguerite Yourcenar’s novel A Coin in Nine Hands (1934).
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18th-century it-narratives: novels which featured first-person objects as protagonists. 
This work enacts both a desire to witness money’s social life, and a fascination with the 
relationships between the circulation of money and the narrative form itself concep-
tualized as a kind of circulation. The Adventures of a Bank-Note and other stories like 
it from the mid-18th century explore narrative possibilities that, arguably, have been 
less accessible to writers since: both the depiction of money in the first person, and 
what could be seen from a contemporary perspective, at least, as a radical flattening 
out of human characters as they are seen from the perspective of money. As Deidre 
Shauna Lynch notes, the ability to think of bank-notes as having their own histories of 
circulation was readily available to mid-18th century minds due to the physical form 
of bank-notes at the time. Prior to 1797, when the Restriction Bill caused Britain to 
adopt a uniform, anonymous paper currency, bills of exchange would be produced by 
particular banks, and would require bearers to countersign them over to a third party, 
who would then be required to countersign them to another party, and so on.12 Thus, 
the form of the bills themselves bore witness to their previous activities through the list 
of endorsements they accrued. Yet these narratives were also useful tools for ‘readers 
and writers who found themselves dwelling in a new commercial world, one altered by 
new trade routes and new forms of credit and full of strange commodities that invited 
the gaze and emptied the pocketbook.’13 Money, Lynch notes, both acts as a vehicle 
for the narrative form, and stands in for a social agreement on a standard of value in 
this newly commoditized world.14 The first-person bank-note humanizes the economic 
system, even as it subordinates individual human actors to an impersonal circulation.
Bridges’ tale gives a light-hearted account of a series of interactions between a bank-
note and its owners, the tales they overhear, and the objects they encounter. In Volume 
IV, for instance, the bank-note describes its time with a Mr. Derbyshire, whose heart 
‘was as light as a feather’.15 As Mr. Derbyshire and a friend sit on a bench one evening, 
they observe a fashionable, comely woman walking with an exceedingly strangely 
dressed man; Mr. Derbyshire’s friend recounts the tale of how these oddly-matched 
figures came to meet. The man, being captain of a large ship that trades slaves on the 
African coast, had come to land on a rare occasion to pay a visit to his cousin, who 
had recently married the fashionable woman. Trying to look respectable, but unfamiliar 
with land customs, the sea captain had employed a tailor, a hatter, and a French barber 
to suit him up; the latter concealed his black locks with a strange white wig that he 
claimed was the height of fashion. When the captain called upon his cousins, he was 
taken into the parlour to wait. There, amidst all the unfamiliar objects of domestic life, 
he encountered a large mirror, which surprised him greatly, as he had not seen his own 
reflection before, and did not recognize himself in the new clothes and wig. Walking up 
to the mirror to see who was this strange person staring at him, he bashed into it and 
broke the glass, the surprise of which sent him barrelling backwards into an armchair, 
flattening a guitar. This caused him to upset the dessert glasses, sending them to the 
floor. On encountering this scene, the lady of the house admonished the servants for 
letting a madman into the house; finally, her husband arrived and explained that this 
12 Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character, p. 97.
13 Ibid., p. 24.
14 Ibid., p. 96.
15 Thomas Bridges, The Adventures of a Bank-Note, Vol. IV, London: T. Davies, 1771 (reprinted by 
Nabu Public Domain Reprints), p. 2.
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was, indeed, his seafaring cousin. Being a discerning woman, she saw the captain’s 
honesty, sincerity and artlessness, and ever since relished her visits with him. Here, 
the narrative form depicts a clash of commodities, customs and people brought to-
gether by exchange, and layered within three perceptual purviews (the friend’s, Mr. 
Derbyshire’s, and the bank-note’s). These nested layers of recounted tales place cer-
tain actors, be they objects or humans, very ‘close up’ (even too close, as in the mirror 
and the guitar), and certain others (such as the slave ship) in the extreme distance. 
The bank-note’s impersonal vision picks out extreme foregrounds and backgrounds in 
these overheard tales.
How might we further understand the relations, in this tale, between money’s way of 
observing the world and the narrative form itself as a kind of circulation? Alex Woloch’s 
narrative theory might help. Writing on 19th-century realist novels, Woloch describes 
narrative spaces as competitions between many characters for limited narrative atten-
tion and import.16 Minor characters, he contends, reflexively draw attention to the limits 
of the narrative’s attention, and function as the proletariat of the novel. If we transpose 
this thinking into the narrative spheres of The Adventures of a Bank-Note, we could 
conclude that all the characters (other than the bank-note itself) are minor, in a certain 
sense: none of them hold the plot’s attention for long. Together, they represent society 
as a multitude of particularities strung together by exchange, and economic exchange, 
in itself, as a chaos of encounter — always involving misunderstandings of objects and 
appearances. The shape of the narrative space is determined by the interplay between 
the bank-note’s passivity and activity. It cannot determine into whose hands it falls; 
and often, it repeats the conceit that it would have liked to tell us more about a particu-
lar story, except that it was whisked away too soon. It passively perchances upon the 
narrative thread it recounts, moved by the collective agency of circulation. However, 
within this conceit of passivity, the bank-note clearly chooses which stories to focus 
on, and develops dispositions toward the characters it portrays. Thus, it produces an 
interplay between monetary exchange and moral affinity.
This interplay rests on the bank-note’s ‘perception’ and discernment of its owners’ 
characters. Layers of perception and discernment link the perceptions of the bank-
note with those of other characters, which are often nested within each other; for 
instance, the bank-note observes Mr. Derbyshire’s conversation with his friend, in 
which is encased the observations of the sea captain and his land-dwelling cousins. 
The nested perceptual frameworks create a division of degrees of narrative contain-
ment between those who characterize and caricature others, and those who are cari-
catured. Roughly speaking, this differentiation between the characters who perceive, 
while having few features themselves (the bank-note, first and foremost, and sec-
ondarily, Mr. Derbyshire), and the characters who are merely perceived or caricatured 
within the novel’s narrative spaces expresses their relative proximity to the bank-note 
– both perceptually and morally. The characters who make a purchase, thus acquiring 
the note, also have a purchase on the narrative’s inflections, and are able to make a 
claim on its neutrality. However, this narrative proximity between the note’s and its 
possessors’ perspectives is not equally shared between owners; the bank-note takes 
16 Alex Woloch, The One Vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Novel, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003.
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a much more distanced stance toward its owner John the Ratcatcher than it does 
to Mr. Derbyshire (whom it ‘likes’ better), for instance. (John is a character afflicted 
with an un-Christian anger toward rats.) In addition to proximity to money differenti-
ating between the novel’s observers and observed, a moral and dispositional affinity 
between the bank-note and some of its owners — i.e. the bank-note’s perception 
of certain of them as good — creates a closer affinity of perspective. Thus, while 
the novel portrays economic exchange as a comedic clash of characterizations and 
encounters between disparate worldviews, it also portrays the economy as a relation 
between the bank-note’s circulation and an economy of representation based on an 
affinity with the good.
Within this comic clash of affinities, we find a theory of finance as focalization. The 
bank-note focalizes the story, outlines the range of its perceptual purview and moral 
affinities. The narrative space expresses new ways of understanding a whole system 
of exchange: from the extreme foregrounds of a bank-note’s companions, to the ex-
treme backgrounds of slave ships — which are taken for granted, here, as part of the 
background conditions through which commodity exchange takes place, and scantly 
brought to attention by the sea captain’s travels, of which the bank-note overhears. 
Contrary to Zuboff’s claim that informated ecomomies are new in their production 
of systemic information through data, if we look through the ‘eyes’ of money in The 
Adventures of a Bank-Note, we find a narrative expression of what was then a radi-
cally new way of understanding the world and its commodities, envisioned from the 
very perspective of monetary exchange. The Adventures are part of the long cultural 
prehistory of surveillance capitalism; they embody the conceit that money is a fo-
calizer, that it produces new configurations of knowing, that it sees. Thus, although 
there are, of course, many novel informatic, economic and technological develop-
ments in the field of financial vision within our own surveillance-capitalist moment, 
the difference between these and the kinds of new systemic knowledge accruing 
around the early bank-notes is a difference of degree, and not one of kind. Further, 
within this diagram of financial vision emerges a set of questions around finance 
and focalization relating to power. Who gets to claim affinity to money’s impersonal 
gaze? With whose interests and perspectives is financial vision aligned — and who 
gets cast into the background?
Mark Lombardi’s Narrative Structures
Now, let us try to think about how these questions, accruing around the narratives of 
financial vision, have been reshaped much closer to the present. In the past several 
decades, of course, the task of narrating international finance has become far more 
complex than it was in Bridges’ time. There has been a fundamental economic shift, 
away from the logic of exchange and toward logics of investment and credit. The de-
velopment of derivatives – financial products that bundle many investments to hedge 
risk — are dizzyingly complex. As the Bank of England’s then Director of Financial 
Stability, Andrew Haldane, quipped in 2009, the emergence of financial innovations 
such as structured credit (designed to diversify investment and thereby minimize 
risk) result in a situation in which end investors are ‘no more likely to know the name 
of the companies in their portfolios than the name of the cow or pig in their exotic 
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hot dog.’17 Certain forms of structured credit, such as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), would require over one billion pages of research in order for an investor to 
understand precisely where his or her money had been invested.18
Due to the complexity of international exchange, new forms of difficulty accrue 
around the questions: who can claim to narrate global finance? How can global 
finance be seen — and how does it see? Mark Lombardi’s drawings of global finan-
cial networks attempt to intervene in these questions. If Bridges’ Bank-Note narra-
tive constructs a first-person, embedded economic viewpoint, focalizing economy 
in the exchanged note’s range of abstract perceptions, Mark Lombardi’s drawings 
do the exact opposite. They construct an omniscient perspective on an overwhelm-
ing range of financial transactions, contacts and influences. His diagrammatic 
drawings (which he referred to as Narrative Structures) document complex financial 
scandals, international money laundering schemes and other nefarious machina-
tions of power. They were based on extensive research into events such as the Har-
ken Energy scandal (which involved alleged insider trading by George W. Bush after 
his failing oil company was purchased by Harken, largely in order that it could make 
Bush a board member and take advantage of his extensive political connections) 
and the Savings and Loan scandal (in which several troubled American Savings 
and Loan institutions — many with high profile board members and close connec-
tions with the CIA — turned themselves into Ponzi schemes during the 1980s and 
1990s in the wake of deregulation). Lombardi used a legend consistent across his 
mature work to indicate flows of money, influence and power between individuals 
and corporations. His drawings trace rhizomatic, diffused networks.19 If the finan-
cial transactions chronicled by Bridges’ bank-note represent an attempt to envision 
society as a whole, then Lombardi’s drawings translate a similar concern into an era 
in which it is not a quotidian clash of (financially-inflected) encounters that might 
seem remarkable to readers and writers newly experiencing an unprecedented level 
of imported goods, but rather the emergence of complex transnational systems of 
structured credit, and with these, a global elite of key players from a web of seem-
ingly ‘open’, networked transactional structures. In their very diffuseness, these 
structures both conceal this elite, and help to replicate its privilege. These drawings 
are attempts to make sense of the simultaneous dispersion and concentration of 
power within globalized neoliberal capitalism, by producing a new way to see the 
complex networks of global finance.
17 Andrew Haldane, ‘Speech: Rethinking the Financial Network’, Bank of England, 28 April 2009, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf, 
p. 16.
18 Ibid., p. 17.
19 These works closely relate to Hans Haacke’s earlier systems theory/institutional critique works 
(most famously Shapolsky et. al Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as 
of May 1, 1971, 1971), which were a major influence on Lombardi; however, here, the complexity 
Haacke envisions is taken almost unfathomably farther. As Herbert Ross puts it, these drawings 
‘update history painting in terms of theories of globalism and rhizomatic schematizations of power. 
In these works, [Lombardi] replaces the taproot theory crucial to history painting — that great 
individuals are the initiators of important events — with a new model based on less centralized, 
more serendipitous channels of power’ (Ross, in Robert Hobbs (ed.), Mark Lombardi: Global 
Networks, New York, NY: Independent Curators International, 2003, p. 13).
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This is a concern that Lombardi’s drawings explore through their experimentation with 
the narrative form itself.20 They can be considered to be both realistic and abstract: 
realistic in their use of names as static poles within the narrative, and abstract in that 
the actions and events themselves are lacunae within the drawings, mostly replaced 
by mere lines and arrows. Hobbs notes that the abstraction of events in these draw-
ings account for many viewers’ frustration in trying to ‘read’ them, as they have been 
given, as it were, an architecture of events but little explanation of them.21 Yet by ab-
stracting narrative in this way, Lombardi produces the meta-event — a structure of 
power and influence — which is represented, here, as a character structure of sorts; 
an associative play of recognizable individuals and institutions. By reducing events to 
lines, he can also tackle multiple ‘plots’ within the same narrative structure. Lombardi’s 
Narrative Structures grapple with financial liquidity’s challenge to narrative structure, 
which must be presented as a hybrid between literary and pictorial modes of experi-
ence. The arrows and lines in Lombardi’s drawings, which describe flows of exchange 
and influence, are roughly analogous to the narrative itself in Bridges’ Bank-Note. Yet, 
responding to the demands of a highly complex international financial world, Lombardi 
produces a meta-transactional narrative. His Narrative Structures imagine a new kind 
of impersonal gaze on finance — one that can make a synthetic claim on the totality of 
complex transactional webs, and thus, perhaps, provide a perceptual ground on which 
an activist stance can be founded. By ‘zooming out’ in the extreme, and synthesizing 
transactions and influences into diagrams of power, Lombardi constructs an imper-
sonal other who takes in the entirety of a hidden financial flow. From this position — 
and with this act of witnessing — comes the possibility to act against the centralization 
of financial power, hidden by so many gossamer strands of influence and exchange.
Amir Chasson and Fractured Financial Vision
This cumulative impulse — this urge to totalize elements of the financial sphere — 
represents one way in which the impersonal claim to financial vision has been mobi-
lized within late capitalism (in Lombardi’s case, before the surveillance-capitalist turn 
as such). Yet another possible approach is quite opposed to this totalizing aim: one 
which posits a fracturing of financial vision, and isolates a point of contact at which 
the exigencies of human perception and the ways in which financial apparatuses ‘see’ 
each undo the grounds on which the other stands. In Berlin-based Israeli artist Amir 
Chasson’s paintings, we find another form of analysis of the role of individuals within 
the narratives of business and finance. His series of painted diptychs from 2009-2011 
feature quasi-realistic portraits of slightly awkward looking men: presumably business-
men, most often against a plain background, as if posing at a portrait studio. Next to 
the portraits are textured, layered canvases portraying abstract diagrams and charts, 
which look as though they might convey financial or sociological information — except 
that there is no contextualizing information or legend with which to understand them. 
These works operate by means of stark contrasts: between portrait and diagram; be-
tween the rough, painterly texture of the diagram canvases and their ‘cool’, precisely-
rendered objects; and, more minutely, between the photorealistic conceit the portraits 
entertain and their deliberately awkward handling upon close examination.
20 As Hobbs writes, ‘We might hypothesize that Lombardi’s narratives correlate well with the 
enlarged scope of narrative studies and in fact expand them in a new direction, since his drawn 
arcs replace the core element of stories, i.e. their action’ (Hobbs, Mark Lombardi, p. 47).
21 Ibid., p. 47.
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Fig. 3. Amir Chasson, Ten dimensional tetrahedron, oil and household paint on canvas, 
2011.22
Awash with contrast, the eye seeks similarity. Darting back and forth between the 
pairs of canvases, it formulates transitions (formal, narrative, conceptual) between 
face and diagram. An arrow jutting out of a tetrahedron seems to answer to some-
thing of the upward tilt of a middle-aged man’s jaw; a topographical diagram, de-
scribing spiky irregularities emerging from a relatively flat surface, stands in for 
an idea of the portrait as a spatial descriptor, a device that morphs a flat surface, 
transforms a spatial plane into a facial plane by pulling out nose, cheek and brow. 
The diagrams’ spatial cues pull on the portraits, as if applying a bit of makeup to 
the latter’s spatial gestures.
The faces infuse the diagrams with possible narratives. Are these the faces of the 
thinkers ‘behind’ the sociological, mathematical or financial work presented in the 
diagrams? Are they the repressed of the diagrammatic image — the abject, psy-
chologised individuals who bear the privileges and burdens of such impersonal 
exactitudes of information? The portraits in Chasson’s paintings carry out the as-
pirational tendencies that the form of the businessman’s portrait implies, which is 
based, in part, on the projection of confidence (which, as Sianne Ngai puts it, is 
the affective tonality of capital itself23). But confidence — or perhaps we could say 
orbits of confidence, belonging to both face and diagram’s forms of assertiveness 
— break down, here, as they play out on faces and surfaces overfull with ambiva-
lence and distortion. Over-fullness — as it pulls apart faces or dances in diagrams 
awkwardly forced onto pockmarked surfaces — disallows the unanimity of feeling 
22.  Image reprinted with permission from the artist.
23 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 62. As Ngai points 
out, Melville’s story demonstrates that confidence can circulate within scenarios of capitalist 
exchange as a feeling that nobody actually feels – as one agent falsely projects it to the next, and 
so on.
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that the confident demeanour must display. These faces, so full, come in and out of 
comprehensibility; at times, they come into focus as a face, and at other times, the 
strange autonomy of features pulls them beyond recognition.
What happens to perception in Chasson’s portraits seems oddly akin to the perceptual 
operations Oliver Sacks chronicles in his narratives about encounters with patients 
suffering from rare neurological disorders. For instance, Sacks describes a patient 
who, owing to a tumour or pronounced degenerative process localized to the visual 
cortex of his brain, could see well, but was often completely unable to make the cogni-
tive leap from seeing to recognition. He could distinguish features but could not get a 
sense of a face as a whole, a persona or a picture.24 Sacks’ narratives pull apart so-
called ‘normal’ perception, reveal something of the layers of complex relational and 
cognitive procedures that must be in place in order for people to be able to take for 
granted how they know about what they see.25 In undoing normal perception, these 
narratives create fertile soil for thought experiments: what might it mean to subtract the 
persona from the person, to perceive the world abstractly?
Do Chasson’s abstracted diagrams have a physiognomy? The portrait — a device that, 
in the slow obstinacy of its features’ relations to the whole face, dismantles normal, 
transparent perception — inflicts its abstraction on the diagram. It asks us to recognize 
the tasks of understanding finance and other forms of informational power as physiog-
nomic in ways in which we are not necessarily equipped to perceive. It asks anew what 
kind of perception might naturalize the physiognomy of finance, might pull its ‘face’ 
into focus. In an era of information oversaturation, as Frederic Jameson describes 
it, the task of understanding globalized finance is one of unprecedented magnitude: 
‘to think a system so vast that it cannot be encompassed by the natural and his-
torically developed categories of perception with which human beings normally orient 
themselves.’26 In response to this complexity, Chasson’s works suggest that the task 
of synthesizing complex information into some form of understanding can be likened 
to the perceptual leap from information to its physiognomy. What might be required, 
these paintings seem to suggest, is to construct partial objects of study that denatu-
ralize perception, and in so doing, might themselves produce means for constructing, 
dismantling and reconstructing physiognomies of finance, which ferry finance to the 
edges of the knowable. Unlike Lombardi, who responds to the complexities of interna-
tional finance by constructing a totalizing perspective — an omniscient ‘it’ who ‘sees’ 
— Chasson fractures financial vision – inserting it into the act of looking at his diptychs 
24 For instance, when handed a glove and asked what it might be, the musician describes it as a 
‘continuous surface… infolded on itself’, that might be a container of some sort. When asked what, 
precisely, this infolded surface might contain, Dr. P. exclaims, ‘it would contain its contents!’ with 
a laugh — and then speculates that perhaps it could function as a coin purse for coins of five 
different sizes. As Sacks remarks, he ‘construed the world as a computer construes it, by means 
of key features and schematic relationships.’ Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a 
Hat and Other Clinical Tales, New York, NY: Harper Perennial Library, 1990, p. 8.
25 Though his work, of course, points to the importance of neural activity, Sacks never ascribes 
a purely neurological causality to his patient’s experiences; on the contrary, he insists on 
house visits, pays close attention to the ways in which his patients navigate their worlds, their 
relationships, their objects.
26 Frederic Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System, 
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 2.
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in such a way that it undoes what is taken for granted in human perception. Thus, he 
invites us to question how financial vision goes beyond what some might tend to as-
sume are naturalized human physiognomic capacities, and to think anew about what it 
might mean to grapple with the difficulty in imagining how, exactly, finance sees.
Conclusion
In surveillance capitalism, we become, I think, more and more familiar with being sub-
ject to newly automated, impersonal, financial forms of vision. In this regime, the sur-
veillant gaze is deeply impersonal, even as it exacts its vision on individual users’ most 
intimate habits, tendencies and interests. As Erica Scourti’s Life in AdWords (which 
shares some similarities with Chasson’s approach above) posits, in order to under-
stand how subjectivity is currently being reconfigured in relation to these evaluating 
apparatuses, there is a new sort of perceptual task coming to the fore: that of imagin-
ing the points of contact between various types of perception that have already come 
to be understood as part of the ‘personal,’ and the ever-evolving financial systems 
which exercise their own forms of impersonal vision on personal lives. This task, I 
argue, demands a theory of the deep histories of financial vision. Such a theory must 
continually keep in mind the recalcitrant impersonality of vision — the autonomy of the 
financial ‘it’ who ‘sees.’ Yet it must also keep in mind that narrative claims to be aligned 
with finance’s autonomous ways of seeing are, in themselves, succinct expressions 
of power. Who claims proximity to, or affinity with, the impersonal gaze of finance? 
In order to understand how new forms of financial power operate aesthetically, such 
questions must be kept in mind.
The Adventures of a Bank-Note, Lombardi’s Narrative Structures, and Chasson’s dip-
tychs represent three possible approaches to these questions surrounding financial 
vision: an embedded, first-person view of money, personified; narrative structures en-
veloping global finance in an omniscient perspective; and a calling into question of the 
perceptual schisms between feature and physiognomy, and between two seemingly 
distinct kinds of complex information: face and diagram. In Bridges’ narratives, the 
economy possesses perception; in Lombardi’s, the economy is rendered perceptible. 
Chasson’s paintings point to the inadequacies of human perception when it comes to 
understanding financial vision. By constructing financial imaginaries that draw atten-
tion, in various ways, to the impersonality of financial vision, these works challenge 
many of the ways in which art has previously been understood to relate to political 
economy: either, reductively, as a mere ‘reflection’ or ‘expression’ of monetary inter-
ests; as expressive of a reified set of signifiers and practices demarcating class posi-
tions through taste and conspicuous consumption; or, more broadly, as expressive of 
a ‘pan-capitalist’ alienation. With surveillance capitalism comes the need to study in 
far more detail the impersonal, financial ‘it’ that ‘sees.’ Paying attention to the com-
plex narrative and visual constructs according to which financial vision has been un-
derstood draws much-needed attention to how regimes of accumulation themselves 
identify their subjects.
In 2014, Trevor Paglen remarked that there is an urgent need for cultural practitioners 
to rethink how we understand vision — and to consider what might be at stake in trying 
to imagine how machines see:
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those of us who are interested in visual literacy will need to spend some time 
learning and thinking about how machines see images through unhuman eyes, 
and train ourselves to see like them. To do this, we will probably have to leave our 
human eyes behind.27
As Zuboff might add, we must also think carefully about how new regimes of accumu-
lation accrue around these acts of mechanical seeing — or, as I might put it, to shift 
the paradigm from mechanical to financial vision. And further, we must remember that 
impersonal, financial vision is neither purely mechanical, nor purely financial. By begin-
ning to assemble some fragments toward a cultural history of financial vision, I hope to 
draw attention to the complexities of visual, subjective and narrative conceits that will 
inevitably be intertwined in any attempt to understand how ‘it sees.’
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Introduction
The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) has resulted in several Hollywood blockbuster movies 
about the financial sector. There are at least four big-budget post-2008 movies on the 
GFC. If IMDB is any guide, the best is The Wolf of Wall Street1 (rating: 8.2), followed 
by The Big short2 (7.8), Margin Call3 (7.1) and Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps4 (6.2).
If the criterion is whether the movie has something interesting to say about the GFC, 
the order should actually be the exact opposite. Entertainment is not the same as 
analysis, nor should it be a substitute. Indeed, all four movies are testimony to an in-
trinsic limitation that all (big-budget) movies face. Hollywood movies are generally plot-
driven, event-rich, and suspenseful, featuring protagonists with whom audiences can 
easily identify. When these movies dramatize a slowly and unevenly unfolding political-
economic conjuncture, consisting of events like the 2008-Lehman Brothers collapse, 
they usually cannot readily be reduced to such events.
Be that as it may, three out of four of the movies do have something interesting to tell 
about the biggest crack so far in the post-Bretton Woods order. The GFC is embed-
ded in the outcome of the unravelling of the Keynesian Bretton Woods compromise, 
and has as such been a long time in the making. In 1971-73 Nixon reneged on the 
1944 Bretton Woods promise to peg the dollar to gold (and Western-European cur-
rencies to the dollar). The (financially) costly Vietnam war had turned the USA from a 
creditor-nation into a debtor-country. From then on, the USA had to borrow from the 
rest of the world. The solution was the financialization that unfolded from the seven-
ties onwards. Wall Street ensured that foreign capital was invested in the USA, while 
skimming a nice percentage in the process. Countries that didn’t play ball could always 
be occupied, but oftentimes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could convince 
countries to privatize their public sectors, to behave investor-friendly and to invest 
their savings on Wall Street. Of course, the incoming money didn’t reach the Ameri-
can majority: American wages have stagnated over the last three decades. The turn 
towards financial services and the simultaneous move away from production (which 
was outsourced to low-wage zones in Mexico and China) mainly enriched Wall Street. 
The only solution, albeit temporarily, for ordinary Americans was to borrow. Contrary to 
wages, consumption in the USA didn’t stagnate, because of a private-debt bonanza in 
which Wall Street banks lent money to people to finance houses, college degrees and 
cars they had needed but ultimately couldn’t afford.
1 The Wolf of Wall Street (dir. Martin Scorsese, 2013).
2 The Big Short (dir. Adam McKay, 2015).
3 Margin Call (dir. J.C. Chandor, 2011).
4 Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps (dir. Oliver Stone, 2010).
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This post-1973 financialization is a theme in three of the movies. An added advantage 
is that they inform a wider public about the greatest robbery in recent history. First 
and foremost, the GFC is a heist in which banks privatized the state, the state aided 
and abetted banks and citizens had to pick up the tab. This cannot be made clear 
often enough. All the same, the movies fall short of analysing why that came about 
and how that is interwoven with the current political moment. What they don’t show 
is therefore as relevant as what they do. But let’s first take a closer look at the four 
movies and their merits.
The Wolf of Wall Street (The WoWS)
The Wolf of Wall Street (2013) has the highest IMDB-rating. It is indeed the most 
straightforward of the four, depicting a small swindler (played by Leonardo DiCaprio), 
who hustles his way to a small fortune. He aggressively sells penny-stocks with a 
combination of intimidation, seduction and outright fraud. Besides being a fraud, the 
protagonist is decadent to the bone. He is a coke-sniffing, sexist, selfish man, and 
the audience is invited to see his point of view. The identification with the Leonardo 
DiCaprio character does not last the entire length of the film, as towards the end of the 
movie the main character derails and discredits himself completely, so viewers — most 
of them at least — will stop short of fully identifying with him. 
Be that as it may, you don’t need to be a Freudian to propose that the main character 
acts out pretty much all the secret wishes of the WASP. He is a white, heterosexual 
man who indulges in every cardinal sin — sex, drugs, lying, cheating, dominating — 
and who does so with the charm that indeed sometimes comes with unchallenged 
privilege. In the end, Leonardo DiCaprio’s character does not get away with it and ends 
up in jail. The Wolf of Wall Street is thus essentially a morality tale situated in the finan-
cial sector. Even a WASP-man can go too far, so be careful what you wish for (but wish 
for it we will). Whether the spree of sex, drugs and extravaganza is amusing depends 
on one’s taste; evidently many people think it is. Otherwise however, the movie does 
not even come close to analysing the crisis, or morality for that matter.
The movie problematically reduces the financial crisis to the biography of one man; a 
man who moreover is just a small fish. He is so small that the SEC (‘the financial FBI’) 
acts against him. He is thus far removed from the majority of bankers who steal and 
cheat with impunity. He is in all respects the outlier, the rotten apple, the guy you love 
to despise, the exception. He is the rotten apple, but with some charm added (which 
is the charm of someone breaking the rules). He is the guy you wish to be but are ulti-
mately also relieved not to have become. 
This is all analytically inadequate, as (rotten) apples are not a satisfactory unit of analy-
sis: one has to look at the trees, indeed the forest. Of course, there is plenty of deca-
dence, fornication, and lying in the financial sector and I have no doubt that all these 
vices are overrepresented in these districts. But these are symptoms rather than the 
disease. Conversely, it would be very surprising if young males, earning lots of money, 
taking lots of risk (albeit with other people’s money), operating without meaningful 
oversight, cheered on by the media (until 2008 at least) and with bosses recruited from 
WASP-fraternities, did not become decadent. Any adequate analysis has to be scaled 
up one or two levels. How and why are bankers in a position to waste, speculate and 
steal other people’s money in the first place?
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The Big Short
Although The Big Short (2015) does not address this last question either, it is already 
far more interesting than The Wolf of Wall Street. The Big Short presents three asset 
managers (played by, among others, Christian Bale and Ryan Gosling) who in 2005 
established that there was a gigantic housing bubble, with house-prices being higher 
than (stagnating) wages could ultimately sustain. Investment banks were however still 
massively trading financial products (so-called mortgage-backed-securities or MBS’s), 
the value of which was directly based on ever-rising house prices. So the asset manag-
ers decided to bet against the housing market by shorting the MBS’s that investment 
banks trade so voluminously. If they were correct and house prices would indeed fall, 
they will earn big time. Much of the movie revolves around the question of whether the 
asset managers can pull it off. And of course, the protagonists in the end do and thus 
walk away with a lot of money.
The movie exclusively depicts the perspective of the asset managers. They are the 
heroes of the movie, or at least they are heroic. The resulting lonely heroes vs. big 
villain story is far more interesting than  WoWS, as the villains consist of a group of 
investment banks. This set-up remains problematic nonetheless. For one thing, the as-
set managers are financial sector guys; they are supposedly the good guys but act on 
monetary motives only and thus confirm the capitalistic ethos. And, of course, they are 
all guys, so the audience can easily perceive them as heroic. This is further facilitated 
by them all being white, well-educated and urbanite (like virtually all bankers are). The 
victims of the banks, who were tricked and seduced into debt, are absent. These de-
plorables, as Hillary Clinton called them, do not have a voice in the story and are thus 
denied any political agency.
On the positive side, The Big Short tells the story from the perspective of people work-
ing against banks. Banks here are unambiguously on the wrong side. And so it should 
be. The banks however, also remain anonymous. They are the big bad wolf and as 
such also lack clear agency. They are just there and they are just bad. As such the Big 
Short is a version of the bad apple-morale, but now the rotten apples are stored in 
dozens on Wall Street and they are taken on by some brave (albeit profit-maximizing) 
asset managers. Research output:
Margin Call
Voters on IMDB rank Margin Call (2011) lower than  WoWS and The Big Short. I dis-
agree. Margin Call goes where The Big Short does not thread. It looks the beast in the 
eye. It looks inside investment banks and shows the anatomy of fraud, the systemic 
nature of it. It shows organized crime. Margin Call dramatizes the predicaments of a 
fictional bank (though inspired by the downfall of the investment banks Bear Stea-
rns and Lehman Brothers). The board members of this hypothetical bank realize that 
the financial products, such as the aforementioned MBS’s, are seriously overvalued. If 
they hold on to these worthless assets, the bank will go bankrupt. If they can sell them 
to oblivious investors (like pension funds) before news of the worthless subprime mort-
gages breaks, they’ll come out unharmed. Of course, the bank decides to do the latter.
Margin Call shows this decision-making-process, including the appointment of 
a fall guy (which, incidentally is a woman, played by Demi Moore). The fall guy 
takes all the blame (of course in exchange for a golden parachute). The strength 
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of Margin Call is that it shows how the crime of selling worthless securities (which 
is not different from the misdemeanours portrayed in the WoWS) is committed. 
The CEO, played by Jeremy Irons, understandably wants the firm to survive. The 
middle man, played by Kevin Spacey, just does what he is told. The junior guys 
don’t really know what is going on, and also do what they are told to do (for which 
they are generously rewarded). And the only man who was sceptical about it all 
has already been fired. It’s a system that an individual cannot take on (as The Big 
Short suggests), and Margin Call shows that. It shows the criminogenic zone that 
calls itself the financial sector.
This is not to say that Margin Call is flawless. Again, the movie follows the motivations 
of white, male banksters, once again reducing all victims to voiceless anonymity. What 
is more, the movie depicts the predicaments of one bank. Although this bank can be 
taken as a pars pro toto, it also echoes the rotten apple thesis, only scaled up a level. 
The problem is not that this or that bank was fraudulent. The problem is the function-
ing of the political-economic system, including supervisors, journalists, academics and 
politicians, in its entirety. Margin Call still suggests that a well-meaning CEO might 
have made a different decision than the Jeremy Irons-played culprit and that things 
would have turned out better then. But although investment banks are an important 
(and profiting) part of the system, they don’t control it. In the end they too have to play 
along (and of course they happily do so).
Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps (WS: MNS)
WS: MNS (2010) is a sequel to Wall Street (1987). It has the lowest rating. It is not 
difficult to see why. The love story that makes up a substantial part of it is disconnected 
from the main story, without being interesting in its own right. The master-apprentice 
relationship between characters played by Shia Labeouf and Josh Brolin doesn’t come 
close to the gripping admiration-turning-disgust-relationship of Charlie Sheen and 
Michael Douglas in Wall Street. So yes, parts of the movie are boring.
Yet Oliver Stone would not be the great director he is if the movie did not also contain 
several brilliant scenes. In the most important scenes, WS: MNS depicts the meetings 
at the Federal Reserve (the American central bank) where the biggest political robbery 
of all time was conducted. In 2008, 700 billion dollars (the so-called Troubled Asset 
Relief Program of Goldman Sachs’ banker-turned-treasurer Paulson) was poured into 
the financial sector, no strings attached. These so called ‘bail-outs’ rescued all the 
large banks, including Goldman Sachs, on which the investment bank in WS: MNS is 
seemingly based.
Stone thus goes straight to the horse’s mouth, to the meeting of the capos di tutti 
capi. In doing so, Stone shows what cannot be shown because it cannot be known 
(as central bankers are unelected, unaccountable, unremovable and operate in se-
cret, with minutes of meetings undisclosed). Stone fictionalizes. He shows that the 
difference between bankers and the mafia is that the former are a legitimate group. 
Any reform of the system that keeps these bankers in place is no reform at all, just 
a legitimation. Any reform that takes on small fish like the WoWS-hustler or even an 
investment bank is just a variation on the saying that ‘for things to remain the same, 
something will have to change.’
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Conclusion
Although WS: MNS is the most interesting movie of the set, it is not flawless. Besides 
the aforementioned redundant scenes, the victims are once again anonymous, and 
that is again problematic. That, however, is not the most problematic aspect of WS: 
MNS or any of the other movies. In all four movies the straightjacket of plot-driven 
storytelling is the gravest limitation. Movies and storytelling in general needs a plot. It 
needs events. It needs protagonists. It needs action. But how to show a crisis which is 
not an event, not even a series-of-events?
The crisis is the latest apotheosis of a crisis of democratic capitalism that has been 
in the making for at least 50 years. The Vietnam War not only discredited the last 
moral standing the USA might have had but also threw the post-war Keynesian, social-
democratic consensus off its feet. The seventies subsequently saw the awakening 
of a neoliberal project, which is liberal in its rejection of the welfare-state and is neo 
in its determination to not limit state power but to instead use it for the build-up of a 
crony Ersatz capitalism, characterized by financialization. In 2008 the banks were not 
nationalized. The state was privatized. Bankers didn’t so much plunder the treasury, 
but turned out to outright own it. The American state threw 700 billion at the banks. 
European banks were either bailed-out directly (the Dutch state for example bought 
the shares of the insolvent bank ABN AMRO) or indirectly (teaming up as the so called 
Troika, the European Central Bank, the IMF and the European Commission have oper-
ated since 2010 as debt collectors on behalf of French and German banks, enforcing 
banks’ claims on the insolvent Greek state by throwing Greece in debtor’s prison to be 
released at an unspecified moment in the future after all Greek utilities have been sold 
to German banks at fire sale prices, after wages and pensions have been decimated 
and after all employment rights have been torn up).
The Big Short, Margin Call and Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps illustrate aspects of 
the political predicament we are now in. The malpractices of banks that the movies 
depict is unsettling in a way books and articles cannot get across. And they have the 
potential to engage a wider public. But the movies do not get across the bigger pic-
ture. That is of course not the aim of most Hollywood directors, nor would film studios 
allow that if it was. But critical and engaged directors such as Oliver Stone are also 
confronted with intrinsic limitations. Particularly, here every director is confronted with 
the general problem of dramatization: how to tell a tale in such a way that it doesn’t be-
come a rounded just-so story with a happy, or at least not too unhappy, ending. And for 
the majority of people — that much is clear — the GFC will not have a happy ending.
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As I have argued in the first Moneylab Reader, money is a medium of the imagina-
tion.1 While it is often presumed to be a banal and basic substance marked by its 
fungibility, ease of use, widespread acceptance and legal status, money also has a 
dramatic impact on what and who we imagine is valuable. Conversely, money de-
pends on individuals’ and society’s constant imaginative labors to reaffirm its power, 
especially in an age of immaterial and fiat currencies devoid of any possible use-
value outside of capitalist exchange. By extension, I argued that we need to reassess 
and deepen our aspirations for currency reform: at some level all schemes for ‘fixing’ 
money, no matter how technocratic, have encrypted within them deep ideological 
and philosophical assumptions which, if we fail to disinter them, usually lead us to 
reproduce or re-inscribe the ills of the current system in our plans and protagonism 
for a new one.
With that in mind I want to, here, return to these questions of value, the imagination, 
currency and power by undertaking what might at first seem like a curious question: 
what can the fate of art today, in an age of its rapid and dramatic financialization, teach 
us about the pitfalls lying before those using the latest technological tools to develop 
supposedly ‘autonomous’ crypto-currencies? At stake here is, once again, to question 
the very relationship of value and imagination that so vexes anyone looking deeply 
into today’s capitalist economic system with an eye to change (or abolish) it.2 To ap-
proach an answer, however, we will have to exit the complex, if seductive, cathedral of 
monetary theory and philosophy for a moment and descend into the crypt, where the 
bodies are buried.
*
Sequestered in the winding roads of an industrial park, next to the airport tarmac, a 
mere block away from the garrison of the border police, the Singapore’s Le Freeport 
stands isolated from its neighbors behind layers of razor-wire fences. This is a pur-
pose-built, highly secured luxury warehouse for the storage of artworks. While dozens 
of freeports of this nature exist around the world--mostly in Europe--Le Freeport is 
unique in size, ambition and design.
1 Primavera de Filippi and Samer Hassan, ‘Measuring Value in the Commons-Based Ecosystem: 
Bridging the Gap between the Commons and the Market’, in Moneylab Reader: An Intervention in 
Digital Economy, Geert Lovink, Nathaniel Tkacz, and Patricia De Vries (Eds), Amsterdam: Institute 
for Network Cultures, 2015, pp. 74–91, http://networkcultures.org/blog/publication/moneylab-
reader-an-intervention-in-digital-economy/.
2 Max Haiven, Cultures of Financialization: Fictitious Capital in Popular Culture and Everyday Life, 
London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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With an invitation, you might speak through an intercom to guards and be buzzed 
through several state-of-the-art security gates before you enter the compound itself 
and take in the black and red facility. Then you will pass through a battery of check-
points more rigorous than any airport. You will hand your passport, through a two-way 
drawer, to an invisible guard in an office on the other side of one-way glass. Courteous 
staff will instruct you to empty your pockets into a small box and place it, along with 
your bags, in an x-ray machine while your body proceeds through the L3 full-body 
scanner. The millions of dollars of state-of-the-art security, and the slick, chrome, grey 
and red modernist style contribute to a feeling of weightless contemporariness, a sort 
of weaponized neutrality: the aesthetic of financial liquidity itself.
Security is only the secondary objective of all this infrastructure, the candid, curious, 
debonair warden of the horde explained in January of 2017 as he led me into Le Free-
port’s massive atrium, enmeshed in a huge specially commissioned sculpture and sur-
rounded by identical security doors. The designers and architects worked as closely as 
possible with the world’s leading insurance firms to guarantee that the building, mere 
meters from the tarmac of one of the busiest airports in Asia, presented an almost 
zero-risk environment. In any case, he joked: were a thief actually able to breach the 
state-of-the-art security, where would they go? Singapore is a highly militarized island 
connected to Malaysia by two bridges and otherwise surrounded by ocean.
The primary reason for the ‘extreme vetting’ of visitors, my guide confides, is the same 
reason for the ‘starchitecture’ and massive atrium sculpture: it’s a kind of financial 
theater. It is not only to impress upon wealthy clients that their art treasures are safe in 
the crypt, but that they are worthy and estimable subjects for owning objects worthy 
of such concern, and for investing in their protection. Like Foucault's panopticon, this 
hypersecuritized, infinitely surveilled dark-utopian apparatus not only controls space, 
it creates subjects.3
Here, an impossible to ascertain number of cultural treasures lie encrypted, from deli-
cate and one-of-a-kind ancient Chinese urns to conceptual artworks printed on A4 
paper. ‘We don’t know and we don’t want to know what’s in the vaults’ the warden 
tells me, a man who himself marvels at the ironies and contradictions of his vocation. 
His job, he explains, is to offer Le Freeport’s clients rooms (of variable dimensions, de-
pending on need) that are and will forever be 22 degrees centigrade, 55% relative hu-
midity (unless otherwise requested) and as close to risk-free as possible. What those 
clients chose to encrypt in Le Freeport is their private business, with a tiny modicum of 
state oversight. While technically objects stored in the luxury warehouse exist on Sin-
gaporean soil, until they leave the facility by the front door and enter Singapore-proper, 
their owners pay no tax — it is as if they are still sitting on the airport tarmac, to which 
Le Freeport has special access rights directly from its back gates. Backup generators 
stand ready in the unlikely event of power disruption, and a waterless fire-suppression 
system will suck out the oxygen from a room and replace it with nitrogen to ensure no 
damage comes to the art hoard within.
3 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: 
Vintage, 1979.
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The chain of accountability is nebulous, to say the least.4 The Swiss company that built 
the facility also has spun off a management company to operate it, which in turn leases 
space to clients like Christie’s and various other firms specializing in the delicate and 
secretive world of fine art sales, storage, handling and restoration. These companies 
might be hired by a museum of a collector or a gallery (or a shell company set up by 
any of the above) to house an artwork. What precisely is inside the crypt is anyone’s 
guess, though we can be reasonably sure that expensive works of art must be held 
therein. The record of ownership, like the owners themselves, could be anywhere in 
the world. What is certain is that Le Freeport exists in Singapore to take advantage of 
the quasi-authoritarian capitalist city-state’s unique location (close, but not too close 
to China), its notoriously strict laws, a militarized population of highly-educated native 
English speakers, a transparent system of property law in accordance with neoliberal 
international treaties, and, most importantly, proximity to booming Asian (especially 
Chinese) art markets.
Presuming that there is indeed art within Le Freeport, then it is art’s crypt. I mean this 
in three interwoven ways.
First, freeports are essentially is a hermetically sealed, risk-free zones where art ob-
jects can be placed to ensure that they retain their value purely as an investment 
vehicle.5 While there are viewing rooms within Le Freeport its real purpose is to re-
move art from worldly circulation, while preserving it for purely financial or speculative 
circulation. An art object thus encrypted may never move an inch, but the rights to its 
ownership may be sold or transferred thousands of times. So the freeport is a kind of 
architecture of global financialized capitalism that encrypts art within its walls. A crypt 
is not simply a tomb: a crypt seals in the dead in order that they still might live, after 
a fashion: we builds crypt around the dead to impress upon the living their value, to 
haunt the imagination.
Second, freeports encrypts art as a kind of money: the art exists in the world as a kind 
of financial code, a digitally-manipulated asset to be transferred and parlayed. Like an 
encoded word transmitted in a public broadcast, financialized art still transmits mean-
ing and value, but only to those who bear the keys of decryption, in this case those 
with enough wealth to buy the work, ship it to elsewhere and uncrate it again as art. 
Here art, that notoriously illiquid asset, that notoriously unruly child of capitalism, is 
liquefied into a market substance. This is thanks, in large part, to the rise of transna-
tional communications networks and computing power that have been turned towards 
creating a globe-spanning financial, logistical and legal infrastructure-ecology which 
can translate anything, even a thing so unique and disobedient as art, into an indiffer-
ent commodity for speculation.6
Finally, due to the way freeports transforms art into a purely conceptual object on capi-
tal’s terms, under its own economy and order of value it in a way completes the task of 
4 Sam Knight, ‘The Bouvier Affair’, The New Yorker, 8 February 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2016/02/08/the-bouvier-affair.
5 Hito Steyerl, ‘Duty-Free Art’, e-flux 63 (March 2015), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/duty-free-art/.
6 Randy Martin, Knowledge LTD: Towards a Social Logic of the Derivative, Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2015.
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the ‘death of art’ in a way the avant-garde was never able to. In Peter Bürger’s authori-
tative analysis, the objective of these art movements was to abolish the separation of 
art and life as a form of political agitation that sought to liberate human creativity from 
the gilded prison of artistic institutions and its chosen protagonists (those fortunate or 
privileged enough to be deemed ‘artists’).7 In the latter part of the 20th century radi-
cal artists spearheaded the ‘dematerialization’ of art itself towards this end, develop-
ing practices of conceptual art, activist art, performance art, institutional critique and 
participatory art.8 Le Freeport, and the financialized order of which it is a part, seems 
to have succeeded in part based on the radical labors of artists who insisted that art 
needed no physical presence or trace to function as a socially transformative force. 
But in the case of the Le Freeport, art has dissolved into a financialized everyday, not 
a horizon of liberation but of terrifying power and inequality. In this sense, the freeport 
is the tomb or crypt of art’s dreams of liberation.
Indeed, the rise of freeports like this one in Singapore is part and parcel of a broader 
tendency to transform art into a target of financialized manipulation and generator of 
speculative wealth. For as long as there has been a thing we call ‘art’ (since roughly the 
17th century) it has been tied up with money: the tastes and demands of the wealthy 
— often financiers and speculators — shaped the development of Western art history 
and, indeed, led to the manifestation of ‘art’ as a discrete area of human achievement, 
activity and production (as contrasted to craft, ornament, or kitsch).9 Art was a key 
vehicle for the reproduction of the capitalist class and art appreciation and collecting 
proved a means to cultivate belonging, distinction and esteem within elite worlds.10 But 
in previous times art proved a notoriously illiquid asset: it was difficult to find a buyer 
who shared one’s taste and who had ready money to pay. Further, the art market was 
(and to a large extent remains) opaque, corrupt and confounding to all but insiders.
Over the past decade institutions like Le Freeport, responding to the proliferation of 
financially-enriched so-called ‘high net worth individuals’ (HNWIs) the world over, have 
sought to increase the liquidity of art markets. These include all manner of ‘innova-
tions’: price indexes like the Mei-Moses that purport to offer a reflection on art in-
vestment trends;11 new online art tracking and pricing applications and websites that 
provide up-to-the-moment price information; developments in art insurance and col-
lateralized lending to allow collectors to leverage the value of their art/investments; 
increasing friendliness from banks and financial institutions towards art as investment 
and collateral; the concentration of art sales in the hands of a few branded global 
mega-galleries; the multiplication of art fairs into financial metropoles around the world 
7 Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnestoa Press, 1984.
8 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, London and New 
York: Verso, 2012; Stevphen Shukaitis, The Composition of Movements to Come: Aesthetics and 
Cultural Labor after the Avant-Garde, London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
9 Janet Wolff, The Social Production of Art, New York: New York UP, 1984.
10 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1984; Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, St. 
Louis, MO: Telos, 1981.
11 Noah Horowitz, Art of the Deal: Contemporary Art in a Global Financial Market, Princeton, NJ 
and London: Princeton University Press, 2011; ‘Art and Finance Report 2016’, Luxembourg: 
Deloitte, 2016, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/
artandfinance/lu-en-artandfinancereport-08092014.pdf.
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and their evolution from stuffy trade shows into luxury mega-events; the dominance of 
the auction market by essentially two ambitious corporations, but also the proliferation 
of start-up online auction and sales platforms; even the (overhyped but significant) 
development of art investment funds that essentially allow many investors to jointly 
purchase pieces purely for their speculative value.12
*
Yet the umbrage we often take at the ‘financialization of art’ should be tempered. First, 
while financialization is real, art is far from its most important victim, in spite of how 
much its profaning might hurt our romantic feelings. Financialization, I have argued, 
refers to an economic, political, sociological and cultural shift towards the dominance 
and the influence of finance; not only does the financial sector of capitalism have 
massive power over (other) corporations, the policies of nation-states and the prices 
of things like food, land, housing and water, but finance’s ‘logics’, its codes, measure-
ments, metaphors and methods begin to seep into and reconfigure a wide variety of 
social institutions (universities, charities, public sector services) and shape everyday 
cultural life as well.13 Why should art be afforded a special exemption?
As Suhail Malik has argued, the financialization of art is not the shocking exception 
to the rule; it actually has a lot to tell us about the nature of today’s financial markets 
themselves.14 We assume that, unlike other more ‘useful’ commodities that at their 
base have some material value, art’s price derives purely from its symbolic and rela-
tional value to collectors and art institutions. But Malik argues today ‘neoliberal finan-
cialization’ (my term, not his) is marked by the proliferation and power of money well 
beyond any referent to ‘real world value’: financial objects like derivative contracts, as 
Randy Martin notes, have real power over the economy but are seemingly completely 
detached from any tangible ‘reality’ of use-values or labor power.15 This being the case, 
Malik argues that the absurd shenanigans, occult practices and bad business of the 
art market are not the exception but the exemplar of how finance works today: it is the 
product of multiple interwoven, mutually dependent and institutionally reproduced acts 
of symbolic evaluation and pricing. Like the value of contemporary art, the value of 
12 On these trends, see Andrea Fraser, ‘L’1%, c’est Moi’, Texte Zur Kunst 83 (2011); Noah Horowitz, 
Art of the Deal; Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips, ‘Tainted Love: Art’s Ethos and Capitalization’, 
in Contemporary Art and Its Commercial Markets. A Report on Current Conditions and Future 
Scenarios, Maria Lind and Olav Velthuis (eds), Berlin: Sternberg, 2012, pp. 209–240; Emily 
Rosamond, ‘Shared Stakes, Distributed Investment: Socially Engaged Art and the Financialization 
of Social Impact’, Finance and Society 2.2 (19 December 2016): pp. 111–26; Hito Steyerl, ‘Duty-
Free Art’; Mark C. Taylor, ‘Financialization of Art’, Capitalism and Society 6.2 (9 January 2011); 
Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices: Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the Market for Contemporary Art, 
Princeton Studies in Cultural Sociology, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007; Olav 
Velthuis, Cosmopolitan Canvases: The Globalization of Markets for Contemporary Art, New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2015; ‘Art and Finance Report 2016’.
13 Haiven, Cultures of Financialization.
14 Suhail Malik, ‘The Ontology of Finance: Price, Power, and the Arkhéderivative’, in Collapse Vol. 
VIII: Casino Real, Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 629–811; Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips, 
‘Tainted Love: Art’s Ethos and Capitalization’.
15 Randy Martin, Knowledge LTD: Towards a Social Logic of the Derivative; Dick Bryan and Michael 
Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and 
Class, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
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financial products is (in spite of much pompous ballyhooing from insiders) the arbitrary 
manifestation of competing claims to value based on representation, cunning illusion, 
aesthetic manipulation and personal and professional relationships within interlocking 
social and institutional circles.
I agree with this assessment for the most part, but I am not convinced today’s forms 
of capitalist money, even in its highly financialized and weaponized form, has given up 
all relationship to an underlying ‘real’ form of value. Malik’s analysis draws upon the 
theories of Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, who make a complex argument 
summed up in the deceptively simple phrase ‘capital is power’.16 That is: the violent 
torrents of money that flood and recede around the world do not ultimately stem from 
any particular wellspring but churn endlessly. Money is the weapon of power, and 
money’s power is the result of it being weaponized by the powerful.
This stands in contrast to two more common theories of money’s origins and power. 
The first is the classically liberal and conventional neoliberal idea that money is simply 
a sophisticated evolution of the natural human act of bartering: producers come to the 
marketplace with different commodities to exchange; for the sake of convenience they 
consent to use one commodity as the universal referent to facilitate all trades, over-
coming a whole range of problems. For neoliberals, this mythological original moment 
of money defines its nature — today’s financialized fiat currencies are merely the more 
complicated expression of this tendency.17
In contrast, Marx’s notion of money questioned the peace and tranquility of this vi-
sion of money’s origins and argues that, under capitalism, the commodities brought to 
market are the result of the exploitation of workers.18 Money carries encrypted within 
it the residue of this exploitation, and it functions in the world to enable more exploita-
tion: it is the threat and reward that conscripts non-owning producers (the proletariat) 
to the will of non-producing owners (the bourgeoisie). Money is also, for Marx, the 
worldly manifestation or appearance of capital itself, the systemic presence behind the 
economy of capitalist accumulation, the totality of capitalist social relations that makes 
itself the means and the ends of almost all human activity.
For Nitzan and Bichler posing capital-as-power objects to both frames. On the one 
hand, it rejects the classical liberal and now neoliberal idea that money is simply a 
neutral tool. Rather, money is used and manipulated by the powerful (including im-
perialist nation-states and exploitative capitalists) to further entrench, reproduce or 
expand their power. On the other, this approach rejects the Marxian notion that money 
ultimately stems from the exploitation of workers and represents, in skewed form, their 
stolen labor power. In contrast, for Nitzan and Bichler while capitalist exploitation still 
occurs (and is enabled by and rewarded by money), money itself is not ultimately an 
expression of oppressed or exploited labor.
16 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power, London: Routledge, 2009.
17 For a radical anthropological critique of this position see David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 
Years, New York: Melville House, 2011.
18 Anita Nelson, Marx’s Concept of Money: The God of Commodities, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999; Costas Lapavitsas, Political Economy of Money and Finance, London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
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Certainly there is a great deal of merit to this claim, especially in an age of financializa-
tion where the value of money seems more dependent on financial currency specula-
tion and inter-imperialist manipulations of exchange rates and fiat money supplies. In 
an age when the outstanding volume of derivatives contracts — which can essentially 
function like money — exceeds the (already skewed measure of the) world’s GDP by 
a factor of thousands, it’s hard to make a case that ‘money’ (whatever that is) is either 
the ‘scaled-up’ expression of some basic human tendency to truck and barter (qua 
neo-classical economics) or the magnitude of hijacked socially necessary labor time 
invested in the creation of commodities (qua Marx).
Still, for both theoretical and political reasons, I retain a fidelity to some dimension 
of the labor theory of value and Marx’s insistence that we see labor as the source 
of all wealth and there for encrypted within the money form.19 Theoretically, I am 
wary of the idea that money is, today, merely the product of the play of arbitrary 
power relations. I think we need to hold fast to the reality that money is the means 
by which a global system of capitalism is orchestrated, regulated and organized, 
even if that organization is chaotic, nonsensical and plagued by morbid crises. 
Without discounting the very real power of the capitalist state (while not forget-
ting the adjective), no other force on earth other than capital has created a form 
of money like the one we witness today, and certainly no other force has elevated 
money to the alpha and omega of the world it creates. I agree that money is never 
neutral, but under capitalism the power that reproduces money, and that is repro-
duced by money, is capitalism, and its particular characteristics and dependency 
on the exploitation of labor is vital to keep in mind, even when we follow money into 
its financial extremis.
Second, I think we potentially make a dangerous political mistake when we think 
of money outside of labor. As Harry Cleaver illustrates, Marx wrote Capital and, in 
particular, the first chapter of Capital on commodities and money, as a means to 
put a conceptual weapon in the hands of the working class.20 It essentially argued, 
against the classical liberal economists who glorified wealth and power, that work-
ers were the source of all the world’s wealth, that they therefore had power if they 
acted together, and that they had the natural right to not only reclaim that wealth 
but reimagine, on a mass scale, the nature of value. Workers had the duty to negate 
their own negation, to overturn a system that made them miserable, exploited and 
alienated. I break with classical Marxists in my understanding of labor and value 
in broader terms. I see the term labor as in many ways a misnomer all too often 
reserved for industrialized manufacturing, when it ought, I think, to be more produc-
tively thought of as imaginative cooperative energies which take place both within 
formal workplaces and also in the realm of social reproduction (the bearing and 
raising of children and maintenance of homes and communities), whether waged 
19 I am here generally sympathetic to many of David Harvey’s efforts to likewise explain complex 
financial, monetary and economics shifts through this lens; see David Harvey, The Limits to 
Capital, 2nd edition, London and New York: Verso, 2006; David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions 
and the End of Capitalism, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
20 Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically, Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press, 2000.
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or unwaged.21 I see ‘value’, ultimately, not as a hard and fast thing to be measured 
in labor hours but the way the capitalist accumulation harnesses, shapes and con-
torts the realm of values; that is to say, capitalism transforms and depends on the 
transformation of what and who we imagine is valuable.22 There is a dialectical 
relationship between how we imagine value (individually and collectively) and how 
we cooperate together and to what ends. Capitalism ultimately seeks to shape this 
cooperation towards its own reproduction.
For that reason, I see money as the crypt of the imaginative-cooperative dimension 
of labor. Money, the worldly manifestation of capital, translates our cooperative ener-
gies into a solidified (even if still dematerialized) form, which is offered back to us as 
the means to access the fruits of our cooperation. This was the ultimate meaning of 
Marx’s notion of the commodity fetish, where we are so alienated from the thing we 
(the proletariat, the cooperating creators) have created that it appears to us not as 
our own creation but as if endowed with a kind of supernatural value.23 Money, the 
ur-commodity, the ultimate manifestation and facilitator of this process is also the 
ultimate manifestation and facilitator of commodity fetishism.24 As David Graeber 
argues, weaving together Marx’s theories and the ideas of 19th Century anthropolo-
gist Marcel Mauss, when we hold money we actually hold the counterfeit of our own 
dreams, a fragment of our own collective power offered back to us as a magical ob-
ject.25 As I argued in my contribution to the first Moneylab Reader, this is why money 
is a medium of the imagination, and why art involving money can be so potent. When 
we decrypt the collective cooperative potential within money it is like splitting the 
atom: untold power awaits.26
*
I have provided this all too brief theoretical explanation to make clear my further un-
packing of the notion of encryption, on our way to a final reconsideration of the politics 
and potentials of cryptocurrencies.
21 In this perspective I take inspiration from texts including Massimo de Angelis, The Beginning of 
History: Value Struggles and Global Capitalism, London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007; Massimo 
De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia: On the Commons and the Transformation to Postcapitalism, 
London: Zed, 2017; Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and 
Feminist Struggle, Brooklyn, NY and Oakland, CA: Common Notions (PM Press), 2012; George 
Caffentzis, ‘On the Notion of a Crisis of Social Reproduction: A Theoretical Review’, in Giovanna 
Franca Dalla Costa and Mariarosa Dalla Costa (eds), Women, Development, and Labor of 
Reproduction: Struggles and Movements, Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 
1999, pp. 153–88.
22 Max Haiven, Crises of Imagination, Crises of Power: Capitalism, Creativity and the Commons, 
London and New York: Zed, 2014.
23 Stephen Duncombe, ‘It Stands on Its Head: Commodity Fetishism, Consumer Activism, and the 
Strategic Use of Fantasy’, Culture and Organization 18.5 (2012): 359–375.
24 Nelson, Marx’s Concept of Money.
25 David Graeber, Toward and Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams, 
New York: Palgrave, 2001.
26 Brian Massumi, The Power at the End of the Economy, Durham: Duke University Press, 2015.
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I am drawing on the term’s psychoanalytic resonances as parsed by Jacques Der-
rida.27 Drawing on the re-reading of Freud presented by Nicholas Abraham and Maria 
Torok, Derrida’s notion of encryption names a process where a constitutive and es-
sential part of a system (language, philosophy, society) must be sealed in a structure, 
a crypt, where its status as living or dead is unknown. For Abraham and Torok, both 
practicing Freudian psychoanalysts working against the Lacanian turn, encryption 
occurs in patients who have witnessed (not necessarily endured) trauma at the hands 
of an idolized figure.28 In their re-reading of Freud’s analysis of the pseudonymous 
Wolf-Man, the patient’s speech is encrypted because he witnessed the sexual abuse 
of his beloved sister by his revered father at a sensitive moment of his development.29 
In order to defend the idolized father-object as a central element of his unconscious-
ness, he encrypted it within his psyche, preserving the projection in a state of both 
life and death. Symptomatically, the Wolf-Man exhibited an aversion to certain words 
and phrases tangentially related to the internal crypt, rendering his testimony an en-
crypted message for him and Freud to decrypt in the course of analysis. Yet a key 
feature of encryption is the mobilization of all psychic resources to avoid decryption, 
for fear of revealing the underlying trauma and being forced to reconstruct the en-
tire psyche without the encrypted object. Meanwhile, however, the Wolf-Man himself 
became encrypted within his own crypt — because the psyche is built around the 
preserved lost object in the crypt, it is actually the psyche itself that is in the crypt, 
both dead and alive.
Without wishing to engage in a lengthy discussion (and problematization) of psycho-
analytic methods and theories, the metaphor of the crypt can be highly useful, espe-
cially in the capacious sense Derrida gives the phrase: encryption is the process by 
which a lost object of projection and attachment is secretly maintained in a state that 
is both life and death. This act of inner encryption exhibits outwardly as encrypted 
speech or utterance that evades or actively avoids decryption in order to preserve 
the system or structure between life and death. For Derrida, as those familiar with his 
work might well imagine, some sort of final decryption and liberation from the crypt 
is impossible. He uses the metaphor of the archway (a term that shares an etymology 
with crypt in French) to illustrate how a crypt is, in fact, part of a system of mutual 
supports. Thus for Derrida decryption does not aim to reveal or discover some ‘true’ 
final meaning but, rather, to engage in a deconstructive process of revealing this ar-
chitecture of mutual reliances.
Like a crypt we might see in a graveyard, both art and money are functional concepts 
that, on the surface, appear stable, eternal, perhaps melancholy, but in any case 
majestic. Like a mausoleum (a large, public crypt) at the heart of a city, both art and 
money have pride of place in the ideological environment of late capitalism — they 
are akin to public monuments by which we navigate collective conceptual space. 
27 Jacques Derrida, ‘Foreword: Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’, 
trans. Barbara Johnson, in Nicholas Abraham and Marie Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A 
Cryptonymy, trans. Nicholas Rand, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
28 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy, trans. Nicholas 
Rand, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
29 Sigmund Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, in Peter Gay (ed.), The Freud Reader, 
New York: Norton, 1995.
130
They are usually completely taken for granted. To the extent they are examined, to 
carry the metaphor forward, it is to comment on the architectural features of the 
crypt itself: matters of aesthetics or of economics address art and money as if they 
were stable categories. My approach, by contrast, is to question what lies encrypted 
within, what is held, both living and dead, inside.
The Marxist answer, is, of course (always) labor, and indeed Marx provides us with a 
neatly fitting metaphor himself: living labor and dead labor. Briefly, living labor is Marx’s 
category to describe the forms of vital, cooperative human energies that capitalism 
seeks to harness and transform into commodities to be exchanged for capital;30 dead 
labor is the result: commodities created by the violent harnessing of living labor, the 
solidified essence of human cooperation into a coerced form. Such commodities, this 
dead labor, in turn, becomes part of the capitalist apparatus for exploitation of living 
labor: it becomes the commodities workers must buy to survive, the alienated infra-
structure of capitalist accumulation (factories, machines, housing stock, roads) and, 
ultimately, capital itself, including (especially) capital’s ultimate manifestation, money. 
Capital itself is the horrific undead rule of labor within and by systems and structures 
of its own creation. Money is the ultimate residual expression and reproductive vehicle 
of this exploitation and alienation.
In this sense, money might be understood as ‘the common’ in encrypted form. Eli 
Meyerhoff, parsing the work of Autonomist Marxist theorist Cesare Casarino, draws 
out a distinction between ‘the common’ and the ‘the commons’, also present (but not 
defined) in the work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt.31 The commons, of course, 
refers historically to those lands in England reserved for the use of peasants for the 
purposes of self-sufficiency, whose destruction and enclosure was key to the birth of 
capitalism and the rise of a proletarian class dependent on wages and commodities 
(rather than common land and self-sufficiency) for survival.32 Since that time, the com-
mons has come to name a whole range of ‘resources’ managed collectively, demo-
cratically and in an egalitarian way.33 For Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics laureate 
Elinor Ostrom, the commons represent a third option, besides the state and markets, 
30 Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003, 
pp. 61–102.
31 Eli Meyerhoff, Political Theory for an Alter-University Movement: Decolonial, Abolitionist Study 
Within, Against, and Beyond the Education Regime, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 
2013, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/175513/Meyerhoff_umn_0130E_14401.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Cesare Casarino, ‘Surplus Common’, in Cesare Casarino and 
Antonio Negri, In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics, Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, pp. 1–40; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War 
and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: Penguin, 2004.
32 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, New York: Pantheon Books, 1968; J. 
M. Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
33 Peter Linebaugh, Stop, Thief!: The Commons, Enclosures, and Resistance, Oakland, CA: PM 
Press, 2014; David Bollier and Silke Helfrich (eds), The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond 
Market and State, Amherst, MA: Levellers Press, 2012; David Bollier and Silke Helfrich (eds), 
Patterns of Commoning, Commons Strategies Group, 2015.
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for governing the use of and access to resources.34 For many Feminist and Marxist 
critics and activists, the commons represent both the method and the horizon of social 
change: building and reclaiming common resources (housing, schooling, health, land) 
in the present presages and helps set the stage for a more profound system-wide 
transformation in the future.35
The common is the virtual conjugation of the actuality of the commons, the force or po-
tential that stands behind every experiment in or instance of the actual commons. The 
common, for Cassarino and Meyerhof, represents the potential for commons-oriented 
activity pregnant throughout society. Indeed, the common is precisely what capitalism 
seeks to organize, coopt and control for its own reproduction and in the name of the 
accumulation of private profit. It is the raw force put to work in the capitalist economy, 
but rather than reproducing autonomous, democratic social life it is made to reproduce 
commodities for the market. Money, as the supreme commodity and the medium of 
commodity exchange, is in some sense, then, the representative of the alienation of 
the common: it is the crypt of the common, where the common is kept alive (as ‘living 
labor’ for the production of commodities) and dead (as in the ‘dead labor’ in the form 
of commodities, machines).
*
How then to decrypt the common from the cypher of money? How to escape or avoid 
financialization’s grasp? One technique that has been vigorously proposed and experi-
mented with is the development of cryptocurrencies, which other chapters in this book 
address in great detail and with varying levels of enthusiasm.
The optimism behind these currencies is that technological emergence of a method 
for organizing a currency without the need for either a physical value-bearing object 
(like gold or salt or cigarettes) or a centralized authority to oversee the ledger where 
transactions and savings are recorded.36 There are a range of useful applications for 
such innovations such as international currency transfers (today monopolized by co-
lonial-era companies like Western Union) or the ability to offer international solidarity 
resources to groups that struggle under oppressive regimes. Such developments have 
34 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
Camridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Max Haiven, ‘The Commons Against 
Neoliberalism, the Commons of Neoliberalism, the Commons Beyond Neoliberalism’, in Simon 
Springer, Kean Birch, and Julie MacLeavy (eds), The Handbook of Neoliberalism, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2016.
35 Sivlia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle, 
Brooklyn, NY, and Oakland, CA: Common Notions (PM Press), 2012; Massimo De Angelis, 
The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capitalism, London and Ann Arbor, MI: 
Pluto, 2007; De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia: On the Commons and the Transformation to 
Postcapitalism, London: Zed, 2017.
36 A few insightful and (refreshingly) critical approaches to Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies include 
Ole Bjerg, ‘How Is Bitcoin Money?’, Theory, Culture & Society 33.1 (January 2016): 53–72; Bill 
Maurer, Taylor C. Nelms, and Lana Swartz, ‘‘When Perhaps the Real Problem Is Money Itself!’: The 
Practical Materiality of Bitcoin’, Social Semiotics 23.2 (April 2013): 261–77; Brett Scott, ‘How Can 
Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Technology Play a Role in Building Social and Solidarity Finance?’, 
Geneva: United Nations Research Institute on Social Development, 2016, http://www.unrisd.org/
brett-scott.
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also proven useful in attempts to (partially) detach communities from the exploitative 
global economy, allowing them to set up reliable systems of local exchange and micro-
economies that support solidarity economies.37 The Cooperativa Integral Catalana is 
perhaps one of the most successful examples, although their digital currency does not 
use high-caliber cryptographic techniques and is very rudimentary (and, note, func-
tions just fine in spite of that).38
Yet in spite of these more practical applications of cryptocurrency technologies the 
vast majority of enthusiasts seem fixated on it portending a seemingly revolutionary 
and epochal transformation.39 Part of this is due simply to the fact that today cryp-
tocurrencies are the objects of intense speculation (though generally by a very small 
faction of people or investors). As in the art world, a speculative economy depends in 
no small part on ill-deserved hype, and there are numerous true believers, snake-oil 
salesmen and hangers-on eager to provide it. Unfortunately, as David Golumbia il-
lustrates (focusing on Bitcoin), all too often what underlies that hype is a far-right and 
free-market libertarian notion of money and society, one that largely sees the state and 
those ‘dependent’ on it as the reason why capitalism doesn’t function as it ought.40 For 
adherents to this paradigm (most of whom have little idea that their ideology has a dark 
and racist provenance), a decentred ‘autonomous’ currency will remove the state from 
the equation, allowing markets to function ‘naturally’ and delivering us to the peace 
of a fabled meritocracy wherein those with talent and determination will be rewarded, 
with better results for everyone.41
From this dominant approach, cryptocurrencies aim to decrypt money. According to 
this logic, money is, in essence, a pure and neutral tool, evolving out of humanity’s 
natural tendency to labor specialization and barter exchange. Along the way, between 
the mythic ‘then’ and the sordid ‘now’, money’s neutrality has been compromised or 
encrypted: its codes and values have been layered-over by a new set of codes and 
values. For some, money has been encrypted by the state: the right to create and 
manipulate money is jealously hoarded and monopolized by governments that use 
this power to reproduce their own power. For others, this encryption of money has 
emerged from the power of large banks and financial corporations that use their influ-
37 See Primavera de Filippi and Samer Hassan, ‘Measuring Value in the Commons-Based 
Ecosystem: Bridging the Gap between the Commons and the Market’, in Geert Lovink, Nathaniel 
Tkacz, and Patricia De Vries (eds), Moneylab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy,  
Amsterdam: Institute for Network Cultures, 2015, pp. 74–91, http://networkcultures.org/blog/
publication/moneylab-reader-an-intervention-in-digital-economy/.
38 Claudio Cattaneo and Aaron Vansintjan, ‘A Wealth of Possibilities: Alternatives to Growth’, 
Brussels: Green European Foundation, 2016, http://gef.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
GEF_BackgroundStudy-screen-ok.pdf; Hirota Yasuyuki, ‘Monedes Socials i Complementàries’, 
Oikonomics 6 (2016), http://oikonomics.uoc.edu/divulgacio/oikonomics/ca/numero06/dossier/
yhirota.html.
39 Nigel Dodd, ‘The Social Life of Bitcoin’, Theory, Culture & Society, Forthcoming (2017), http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/69229/1/Dodd_The%20social%20life%20of%20Bitcoin_author_2017%20
LSERO.pdf.
40 David Golumbia, The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
41 A. Maddox, S. Singh, H. Horst, and G. Adamson, ‘An Ethnography of Bitcoin: Towards a Future 
Research Agenda’, Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy 4.1 (2016), 
http://wombilical.net/ajtde/2016-03-v4-n1/a49.
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ence in markets and over governments to stymie competition. So even though they are 
based on the latest cryptographic developments, ideologically and practically crypto-
currencies promise to decrypt money and return it to its original source code.
By contrast, the notion of money I have provided here would centre on the way money 
is not and has never been a neutral or pure tendency. It’s not just that, as Nitzan and 
Bichler insist, money is always a weapon of power. It is also that, as I have argued, 
money takes on very particular characteristics under capitalism, characteristics that 
remain present (indeed, intensify and complicate) under financialization. To summarize: 
money is the false coin of our own dreams, our own imaginative-cooperative potential 
offered back to us in skewed and abusive form. It is both the lifeblood of capitalism 
and also the means by which capitalism disciplines, alienates and exploits us. Under 
capitalism money becomes the unquestionable and ruling force, the means and the 
ends of social relations. Financialization is not only the acceleration of the cycles of 
accumulation, it also represents the infiltration of this logic into all realms of social life. 
The financialization of art is a bellwether of this tendency: even the realm of allegedly 
non-purposeful or non-instrumental artistic action is turned into a generator of profit 
and an object of speculation.
From this perspective, what would decrypting money mean? It would mean to take 
collective actions that allow us to act, cooperate and produce value within, against and 
beyond capitalism. It would mean the decryption of the common that is today sealed 
within money through the creation and sustenance of particular commons or process-
es of commoning, as Massimo De Angelis frames them.42 It would mean the creation 
of alternative, non-capitalist solidarity economies. It would mean sabotage, subversion 
and theft from reigning capitalist institutions. All this in the name of creating more and 
more opportunities for people to exit their dependency on capitalism and create new 
relationships and communities, new autonomous socio-political formations, and new 
methodologies of social reproduction and care.
Cryptocurrencies and the underlying blockchain technologies could potentially help us 
achieve these ends. They can become means to manage, in transparent and efficient 
ways, the coordination of our cooperative energies in local and small-scale initiatives, 
though I’m not convinced that this requires the magnitude of cryptographic security 
most such currencies insist upon.
Further, these technologies could, if combined with developments in visualization and 
narrativization, help us imagine and make democratic and equitable decisions about 
the big-picture problems that face communities. They can also help us imagine and 
create networks between such initiatives that will allow for the complex coordination 
of cooperation in a world beyond capitalist money. For instance, how could these 
technologies help us imagine and implement a global (or at least translocal) system 
for managing and distributing highly specialized or fragile commodities (like comput-
ers or perishable medicines) beyond the current global assembly line and logistics 
mainframes which are hideously exploitative to workers, consumers and the planet?
42 De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia.
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There are numerous applications when we focus on the question of the common and 
the commons. What is key is to understand is that such applications will need to 
emerge from the material terrain of solidarity and struggle, not from the fantastical con-
jectures of enthusiasts. The reality is that we don’t actually need more ‘innovation’; we 
need developers to do the relatively unromantic work of training and facilitating non-
technical people’s use of these technologies, improving user interfaces and adapting 
and popularizing already-existing technologies. Moreover, we need more people to 
simply be involved with grassroots struggles for collective liberation, not wasting their 
time (and our resources) trying to come up with technologically-driven ‘solutions’ to 
social problems no one asked them to solve, or ‘disrupting’ things in ways that in no 
way challenge or change the existing power structures.
Those who would bear the cryptocurrency standard should take some time to examine 
the fate of the artistic avant-gardes addressed all too briefly above, whose renegade 
and hopeful artworks, each informed by admirable theoretical and political sophistica-
tion, lie encrypted in Le Freeport, a kind of grim monument to financialized capitalism’s 
powers of adaptation and cooptation.43 Brilliant individualistic acts of resistance or 
innovation, no matter how cunning, are easily enfolded back into that system: this is 
precisely how it evolves and survives. To challenge the system it is necessary instead 
to join the work of decrypting the common, allowing us to cooperate on the basis of 
non-capitalist values and, in so doing, produce non-capitalist value.
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When my wallet is connected to your wallet, something in its nature must change. 
[...] In 10 years’ time, my smart wallet and your smart wallet are going to be talking 
to each other and we won’t be in the loop so much, we won’t be bothered. 
—David Birch1
Eighteenth century literature was rife with stories of dumb, inanimate things: the inner 
life of a corkscrew, the hidden desires of a top hat, a day in the life of a watch, what 
the kite saw or the pin overheard. A subset of these ‘it narratives’, as they were called, 
concerned the secret lives of monetary tokens, with fictions tracing the circuitous jour-
neys of paper banknotes and the people they encountered. Mary Poovey observes 
how the ‘talking note’ illuminated the various social contracts and encounters that took 
place in economic exchanges at the time.2 Popular accounts were Thomas Bridge’s 
Adventures of a Bank Note (1759-1775),3 and Charles Jonhstone’s Chrysal; or, the 
Adventures of a Guinea (1760-1765).4 Chrysal tells his reader of the moment he was 
forged in a mine in Peru and the stories of who and what he encountered as he was 
passed from hand to hand. Talking notes betray the idea that the stuff of transactions 
was animate or sentient, more than a ‘dumb, lifeless prop’ in exchange. These things 
didn’t just serve the wishes of their immediate possessors: they were agents in their 
own right, they had wants and desires; they spurred action as they met and interacted 
with other stuff; they observed and recorded everything they came into contact with; 
and they might just as easily betray or ‘tattle’ on their owners.
Things have always intervened in the construction of markets. They transact, trade, 
intervene, monitor, calculate, circulate and abstract. As Viviana Zelizer5 and more re-
cently Bill Maurer and Lana Swartz have explored,6 economic mediation is composed 
of tons of different stuff, from paper tokens and coins, to checks, promissory notes, 
tallies, dongles, plastic, and electrical impulses. Things are always already ‘market 
devices’, part and parcel of the material-discursive assemblages that shape the econ-
omy.7 But today our things are really taking a front seat in economic exchange. The 
1 David Birch, cited in Bill Maurer, ‘Late to the Party: Debt and Data’, Social anthropology 20.4 
(2012): 474-481.
2 Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy, London: University of Chicago, 2008, p. 148.
3.  Thomas Bridge, Adventures of a Bank Note, New York, NY: Garland Pub., 1759-1775.
4.  Charles Johnstone, Chysal; or, the Adventures of a Guinea, London: Printed for T. Becket, 1760-
1765.
5 Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, London: Princeton University Press, 
1997.
6 Bill Maurer and Lana Swartz (eds), Paid, Tales of Dongles, Checks and Other Money Stuff, Boston, 
MA: MIT Press, 2017.
7 Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo, and Michel Callon, ‘An Introduction to Market Devices’. The 
Sociological Review 55.2 (2007): 1-12.
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OECD currently estimates some 25 billion connected things will be online by 2020.8 
One application of these devices is for mobile or ‘ambient’ payments, with the op-
tion to pay for things using things beyond the usual credit card or checkbook — with 
iPhones and FitBits, cars, fridges, cameras and shoes coming to the register.
This short piece is a call to recognize connected things not only as politically animate, 
participating in the shaping of discourses and action, as new materialists have been 
arguing for a while, but also to think of these connected things as economic actors that 
play a role in the shaping of market elements such as exchange, price, the produc-
tion and circulation of goods, and relations of debt and credit. With the proliferation of 
the ‘its that transact’, we can begin to ask: How will markets transform as connected 
things proliferate and come to the fore of exchange? What does it mean for things, 
not just humans, to exchange and transact? How does their appearance in the mar-
ketplace intensify trends towards algorithmic and data-driven market decisions? For 
example, how will things negotiate the construction of credit, risk and price? Or will 
people trust their personal objects to perform transactions on their behalf?
Our Objects are Playing a Greater Role in Exchange and Will Continue to Do So 
in the Future.
Much like the rise of ubiquitous computing and promised invisible computation,9 talk 
today of ‘seamless’, friction-free, and ambient commerce promises that, with the rise 
of an Internet of Things (IoT), the messiness of exchange will fade into the background. 
No more fumbling in your pocket for the right coins as your car approaches the toll-
booth, or standing in-line to make inane chitchat with the cashier about how well that 
dress will suit you. Intelligent things will come to the fore of the market, transacting, 
abstracting and calculating on behalf or even independently of human users. This in-
tervention doesn’t only occur at the point of sale, with the wrist tap, or an authoritative 
nod from an RFID or Bluetooth enabled device, but all throughout the market.
Connected things increasingly mediate transactions, either on behalf of their users or 
off their own bat in what are sometimes called machine-to-machine (M2M) payments. 
We are probably already familiar with instances of these — the growth of contactless 
payments, e-tolls that automatically pay for motorway use and the development of 
Amazon Dash buttons being a few examples. Phones, watches and FitBits also au-
thorize in-store purchases; household utensils and white goods stock up on everyday 
essentials; vehicles invisibly transact in fuel, parking spaces and repairs; smart grids 
and infrastructures purchase and exchange energy resources and data or engage 
in carbon trading.10 When things come to the fore of the market they produce new 
kinds of money and new payment infrastructures, but also potentially a whole new 
understanding of the sociality of exchange — how ‘its’ transact, negotiate, barter and 
8 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Party On Communication 
Infrastructures And Services Policy, ‘The Internet Of Things: Seizing The Benefits And 
Addressing The Challenges’, Background Report For Ministerial Panel 2.2, http://www.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2015)3/
FINAL&docLanguage=En.
9 See for example, Mark Weiser’s ‘The Computer for the 21st Century’, Scientific American 265.3 
(1991): 94-104.
10 Initiatives such as the Visa Ready Program exist to integrate tokenised/secure payments into a 
range of everyday wireless objects in collaboration with hardware manufacturers and retailers.
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settle, and the norms, practices and protocols that develop around these activities. 
What does the kettle desire? What did the fridge buy from the breast pump? What is 
your toaster saying about your credit worthiness?
Most human-to-human transactions are structured by legal and social norms (such as 
those around bargaining, haggling, and the construction of price), mediated by tokens 
like paper money and credit cards, and supported by age-old institutions such as 
banks that allow the rest of us to cooperate and transact with people we don’t know. 
In the future, transactions between humans and things and between things and other 
things may largely be structured by software-defined rules. Many technologists already 
propose the use of smart contracts,11 not only as a way of securing data produced by 
so many connected devices against hacking or government surveillance,12 but also as 
a means to automate trades and transactions between things and other things. Smart 
contracts recorded on the blockchain and designed to automatically execute condi-
tions for the use and transfer of property rights would allow objects connected to the 
Internet of Things (cars, houses, energy infrastructures and so on) to be sold or leased 
in pre-defined ways, or so the argument goes. Imagine a self-driving car that can be 
rented, paid for with personal data from a phone or wearable, opened with a smart key, 
and which stores some of its profits away in order to pay for fuel, repairs and parking 
spaces, all according to pre-ordained rules.
Autonomous machine-to-machine transactions raise questions not only about secu-
rity, as seen with the recent DDoS attacks mobilized by printers and baby monitors,13 
but also about cultures of exchange: Who wants transactions to be invisible or just 
‘fade into the background’? And how might the material or psychosocial attachments 
people have with their possessions shape the nature of these transactions? Does your 
weighing scales or your wardrobe mirror put you in the mood to shop? Are you more 
likely to trust your fridge to authorize a transaction over your necklace, or your car?
Things Will Transform and Produce New Markets
Another recent trend has been for material things to trade in the leftover capacities 
they produce, such as energy, excess computer processing units, spare bandwidth, 
or access to whatever utility or service they produce. In 2016, the Industry conference 
Money 2020 placed emphasis on how the Internet of Things might facilitate markets 
in this material latency a trend already rife in the sharing economy, where owners can 
trade the leftover capacities in their cars with taxi services, spare rooms in their hous-
11 Smart contracts are contracts that are recorded on the blockchain and designed to automatically 
execute predefined rules for the use and transfer of property.
12 Paul Brody and Pureswaran Veena. ‘Device Democracy: Saving the Future of the Internet of 
Things’, IBM, (September 2014).
13 On 21 October 2016, the Mirai botnet was used to coordinate a global DDoS attack on Dyn, a 
cloud based internet performance management company, resulting in outages for Airbnb, HPQ, 
the Guardian, Visa, Xbox Live, Twitter, Amazon and many more. What was significant about this 
attack was that the hackers targeted not personal computers in the sense many of us would 
understand it, but a host of seemingly innocuous devices – printers, baby monitors, IP cameras 
and digital video recorders. The botnet targeted IoT devices that were protected by little more 
than factory-default passwords, gained access and enlisted these objects in coordinated attacks 
on major internet platforms. It felt like Revenge of the Domestic Devices. This brings to the fore 
questions about the dangers of IoT infrastructure, namely regarding security and encryption, 
questions that become even more significant where transactional data is involved.
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es, or even their spare time. But with many networked devices transacting, as the new 
imaginary goes, a thing might trade equity in just about any ‘thing’ for anything else. 
Imagine, for example, an umbrella that sold shares itself whenever it rained — not too 
farfetched in China, where umbrella rental is already up and running — or an Airbnb 
style property with a fluctuating rental price that in turn speculated and purchased 
shares in profitable start-up companies nearby. ‘Its that transact’ imagines a kind of 
fluidity to connected things, that our leftover stuff might shake off their material cas-
ings and whatever makes them unwieldy or ‘lumpy’, as Yochai Benkler puts it (2004), 
and become instead pure value or information — the ingredients of an on-demand 
economy with a place for everything and everything in its place.
Money-like things, as Chrysal the guinea observed, have the peculiar ‘power of enter-
ing into the hearts of their immediate possessors and there reading all the secrets of 
their lives’.14 ‘It narratives’ were constructed around the idea that if only the coin could 
speak, oh, the stories it might tell! With connected devices, things now trade in what 
they’ve seen and where they’ve been. As well as transacting in and with other stuff, 
connected devices are developing techniques for negotiating the sale or barter of the 
data that they gather about their use, their users, and their broader environments. 
These see complex ‘data markets’ assembling around connected devices, as net-
worked objects develop new protocols and practices to appraise and autonomously 
exchange the material they gather from relational entanglements. Data becomes a 
currency that can be exchanged for goods and services or for other kinds of data sets. 
Complex matching systems have to be developed to evaluate and price this data and 
make it transferrable. Sometimes this data is traded, or it is sold or it gets turned into 
other kinds of value such as fiat money, airtime, or loyalty points. A washing machine, 
a water meter and a filtration system might enter into a market relationship about the 
exchange of water consumption data, for example. A self-tracking fitness wearable, a 
fridge, 0% fat yoghurt and an online retailer might transact in relevant behavioral and 
transactional data in exchange for rewards such as loyalty points or coupons. If we 
are already familiar with the ‘fridge-buys-milk’ vignette of the Internet of Things, here a 
connected fridge might trade data about its user’s grocery consumption with a retailer 
in exchange for discounts on future food purchases.
Connected Objects Also Intervene in Calculation and Abstraction.
Smart devices will define and intervene in the formation of prices and in the con-
struction of financial instruments such as credit and risk. Our things are learning 
to keep account. We are probably already familiar with the ways in which algorith-
mic devices such as high-frequency trading and pricing algorithms are reshaping 
markets, as well as the ways in which this can go very wrong (see, for example 
the Flash Crash of 2010 and the inconsistencies with Berkshire Hathaway stock), 
but now our smart things and their datasets, will also intervene. Though still very 
much a prospective practice,15 data gleaned from connected things, particularly 
self-tracking data from wearables and household devices, might soon play a role in 
the pricing of health insurance premiums. The use of wearables for personalized in-
14 Johnstone, op.cit, (1760), p. 3.
15 Liz McFall, ‘The Politics of Personalised Insurance Pricing in the Age of Wearable Devices’, Draft 
Paper, 2017.
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surance not only produces data that can precision risk but it also has the recursive 
effect of shaping its owners’ behavior, enabling these companies to optimize the 
ways humans exercise or eat, have sex and shop.
An Internet of connected Things will also contribute to the calculation of credit. The 
secret patterns and social life of our things may now determine our eligibility for a 
mortgage or loan. Mobile phone, transactional and social network data already play a 
significant role in credit for the ‘underbanked’, with companies such as Zest Finance 
and Kreditech offering loans based on multiple networked data points gleaned from 
mobile payments, device usage and social media. Connected things such as cars, 
wearables and household devices now also provide a greater degree of data monitor-
ing that can be used to produce credit offerings based on social graphs, biometric data 
or on logistical data provided by an Internet of Things. Kabbage, one such company 
that specializes in small loans for SMEs, makes use of over 5,000 data points from 
each loan applicant, including their existing credit data and mobile phone data, but 
also data gleaned from commercial vehicles, GPS logs, the manufacturing of goods, 
return rates, and supply chains, to determine the conditions of a loan.
How Might Things Fight Back?
Today connected things play a role in the transfer and circulation of property, in the 
construction of prices and evaluation, and in how credit and risk are calculated and 
apportioned. When things begin to transact with one another, when they become eco-
nomic actors, we should think about the implications this has for the future of markets. 
Arguably what’s new here is the peculiar materiality of these things and their intimate 
connections with people, not just that they represent an intensification of algorithmic 
governance in market processes.
As things get more lively, and as a vast range of data-gathering things proliferate 
around everyday users and their transactions, markets are becoming more dynamic 
but also harder to read and unpick. This is a question not only of how algorithmic 
governance and big data will shape the future of markets, but also how various mate-
rial cultures will play a role in shaping the economy going forward. Things are not just 
more of the stuff of software or data repositories; they are also lively objects with their 
own psychosocial narratives.16 In other words, it’s not only the status of the thing as 
a market device with computational and networked capacity that might be significant 
in the future, but also its own peculiar material culture and people’s relationship and 
attachment to it.
If the Internet of Things becomes central to payments we will also become more 
entangled with our things and entangled with markets. Much like other algorithmic 
market devices such as high-frequency trading algorithms and online pricing mech-
anisms, things are now ‘designed to detect and respond [not only to the rhythms 
of their users and their everyday interactions, but also] to market rhythms’.17 The 
sociality of exchange now includes the social lives of many non-human things and 
16 Anthony Dunne, Hertzian Tales, London: MIT Press, 1999.
17 Christian Borch, Kristian Bondo Hansen, and Ann-Christina Lange, ‘Markets, Bodies, and 
Rhythms: A Rhythmanalysis of Financial Markets from Open-Outcry Trading to High-Frequency 
Trading’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33.6 (2015): 1080-1097.
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their protocols and proclivities. Arguably this makes it very difficult for humans or 
users embedded in these systems to disentangle themselves or ‘opt out’ of a finan-
cial system, if such a thing were ever possible.
Mackenzie et al. call for us to consider the materiality of markets: their physical, tech-
nological and corporeal nature.18 In Mackenzie’s case this concerns how physical ge-
ography, distance and the materiality of wired signals help to construct prices. With 
the growth of things that transact, we should consider how the material specificity of 
our connected devices might come to shape and intervene in markets. We need to 
think about the socio-economic life of these actors as they enact exchanges, as they 
‘detach things from other things and attach them to other things’.19 How might fluctua-
tions in temperature and bacterial organisms shape the ways in which fridges transact, 
or environmental conditions transform the specifics of rental markets? How might our 
smart cars drive speculation over fuel up or down? How do objects work alongside 
humans, exerting influence on our moods, decisions and dispositions?
How might things begin to fight back? Equally important, we might start to think about 
how objects might frustrate or resist commodification in a market. Tales of IoT hacks, 
as well as playful findings like @internetofshit, open up an imaginary for a kind of eco-
nomic resistance that might be specifically non-human in nature. Like the household 
devices that double-crossed their owners in the Mirai Botnet attack, objects might 
fight back, changing cultures of exchange or resisting altogether. We should consider 
the ways in which objects — commodities, minerals, metals, plastics, sensors and 
actuators — might not only impede the will of homo economicus but act out economic 
trajectories, behaviors and ‘desires’ of their own.
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You cannot burn digital money. Not unless you are prepared to engage in arson. To 
burn digital fiat would require undertaking a mission to an industrial park to burn 
down the fortified datacentre of a large bank like Barclays. But even then, they 
would have backups, and to fully burn the digital money supply you would have 
to destroy all bank and central bank datacentres. Our everyday digital pounds, 
dollars and euros do not reside in your computer or on your phone. They reside as 
records imprinted on huge bank-controlled computer arrays, attended to by cooling 
systems and power generators. Your laptop or smartphone is just there to interact 
with those central hubs.
Cash, though, you can burn. In the 2008 Batman film The Dark Knight, Heath Ledger’s 
Joker burns a small mountain of it to demonstrate just how little he cares for the petty 
grasping of ordinary criminals who seek out the physical surety of paper dollars in 
hand. The desire to hoard cash — like Scrooge McDuck swimming in his money bin 
— is a defensive sign of fear, an attempt to build a direct buffer of control over other 
people and your environment.
The ability to burn, though, reveals a crucial distinction between cash and digital mon-
ey. Destruction requires personal autonomy over the thing being destroyed. You can-
not burn digital money for the simple reason that you do not directly control it.
Cash Versus Money
The first time I ritualistically sacrificed cash was at a music festival in the California 
desert. It burned with a green-blue flame, my claim upon the products of society re-
duced to smoke traces. These burning rituals can help to illuminate hidden dark arts 
of monetary policy. Money is not a store of value. Rather, it is a tokenized claim that 
enables you to access, control, or mobilize value that resides in goods and services. 
Burning money does not destroy value. Rather, it burns up your ability to control the 
value embedded in the products of other’s labor.
At the heart of modern economies is a two-part play. Real goods and services are pro-
duced by real people using real materials, aided by technology. This real value, though, 
is not directly exchanged in markets. Rather, one party — the ‘seller’ — gives a specific 
real good or service in exchange for tokens dispensed from a ‘buyer’ that grants the 
seller access to a general pool of potential goods and services from others in future. 
In other words, current and specific value is exchanged for claims upon potential and 
general value. The entire capitalist system is built upon this basic social algorithm. It 
forms a sprawling, interconnected web of enmeshed transactions, a myriad of real 
things flowing in response to movements of money tokens that grant access to a pool 
of potentially real things.
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In this context, the power to intervene in the money system is a means to exert control 
over the flow of underlying value and the labor that produces it. Central banks’ at-
tempts to expand or contract the money supply — via the commercial banks — are at-
tempts to exert indirect control over people’s bodies, minds, and emotions, mobilizing 
them to produce value, or slowing them down.
We live, however, with two modes of money. Cash is our system of physical tokens — 
the type you can burn — that are manually transferred to complete transactions. Then 
we have the bank datacentres. Here our money tokens take the form of ‘data objects’, 
inscriptions recorded onto a ledger by an authority granted power to record-into-exis-
tence and ‘keep score’ of money units for you. This is your bank account. Rather than 
physically transporting this money, we ‘move’ it by sending messages to our banks — 
for example, via our mobile phone — and asking them to edit the data. Money ‘moves’ 
to your landlord if your two respective banks can agree to edit accounts, reducing your 
score and increasing your landlord’s score.
This latter form of privately-issued digital bank money is much more dominant than 
cash, forming over 90% of the UK money supply.1 Nevertheless, the way we think 
about money always suggests physicality. We talk of money ‘moving’ or ‘flowing’, 
about ‘depositing’ and ‘storing’ it, and about ‘lending it out’, as if it were some kind of 
grain. Many economics textbooks still insist that a core feature of money is ‘portability’. 
Type ‘money’ into a Google image search, and you’ll find a mass of images of physi-
cal cash. Type ‘digital money’ in, and you’ll get pictures of cash dissolving into data, 
or cash flying through wires. Even in the digital realm, we fixate upon the cash form.
A mental and linguistic slip occurs. The term ‘money’ and the term ‘cash’ get blended. 
David Wolman’s 2012 book about the ‘coming cashless society’ was titled The End of 
Money, as if the end of cash meant the end of money itself, rather than the end of but 
one form of money. The term ‘demonetisation’ was used to refer to the Indian govern-
ment’s 2016 retraction of banknotes, rather than the term ‘de-cashification’.
This confusion seeps into the media. The Panama Papers were leaked in 2016, the 
website claiming to show tax-dodging ‘Politicians, criminals and the rogue industry 
that hides their cash’.2 It should have read ‘the rogue industry that hides their digital 
bank deposits’. Articles accompanying it showed men passing duffle-bags of dollar 
bills, rather than automated systems altering data entries in offshore bank accounts.
This fixation upon ‘cash-as-money’, therefore, doubles as a blindness towards the 
custodians of digital money. People imagine digital money as an emergent ‘update’ 
to cash, rather than an entirely parallel system run by banks. Digital money isn’t an 
update to cash. It’s an update to the old account books that old bankers used to write 
in with quill pens. Few people recognize that cash is one of the last bulwarks we have 
against a completely commercial bank-dominated money system.
1 See ‘Where Does Money Come From? A guide to the UK monetary and banking system’, New 
Economics Foundation, 12 December 2012, http://neweconomics.org/2012/12/where-does-
money-come-from/.
2 See ‘The Panama Papers: Politicians, Criminals and the Rogue Industry that Hides their Cash’, 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), https://panamapapers.icij.org/.
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The War on Cash
Against this backdrop of confusion, we see a concerted corporate and political effort 
to remove that bulwark. The emerging ‘cashless society’ looms — according to evan-
gelists — like a futuristic sunrise, cleansing us of these filthy notes with rays of hygienic 
digital salvation. And, it was in response to this flawed and disorientating public nar-
rative that I published two popular essays: The War on Cash3 and In Praise of Cash.4
A central point I tried to convey in both was that the phrase ‘cashless society’ is essen-
tially a euphemistic way of framing the ‘bank payments society’, a society in which you 
will have to rely upon the banking sector to move money around. Calling a bank digital 
money system ‘cashless’ is like calling an all-cash economy ‘the bankless society’. By 
drawing attention to what is not present, you distract from what actually is present.
There are three commercial interest groups who stand to benefit from such a society. 
The first is the banking sector itself, which controls the underlying bank account infra-
structure that people will have to use in a cashless society. The second is big payments 
companies like Visa and Mastercard, who facilitate the transfer — or, more accurately, 
editing — of money between those bank accounts. The third is the broader financial 
technology — or fintech — industry that builds services on top of this, like phone apps 
and payments gadgets that are plugged into this infrastructure.
While there have long been predictions of a cashless society, the fintech industry has 
in recent years become increasingly powerful in economic clout and political influ-
ence. They, alongside the established oligopoly players like Visa, are on the offensive 
against cash for purely self-interested reasons. This growing lobby attempt to use 
their media and advertising power to slowly erode the public’s attachment to cash, 
but their offensive is also conditioning elite political attitudes. In 2017, for example, 
the EU Commission suddenly saw it fit to investigate the implementation of cash 
thresholds5 — limits on the amount of cash that can be used. The EU has promot-
ed legislation like the Revised Payments Services Directive (PSD2) that encourages 
more integration between banks and fintech companies, a move that superficially 
appears to threaten individual banks but on net seeks to strengthen the overall digital 
finance ecosystem that is built upon the banking system. This innovative momentum 
is juxtaposed against older systems like cash. The digital payments industry presents 
itself as waiting in the wings to take over, making these types of political pushes more 
feasible than they were previously.
The political push for cashlessness, however, is not merely due to the capture of state 
authorities by financial corporations. Government officials have their own reasons too. 
In forcing people to use the banking system for all monetary transfers, the bank pay-
ments society allows far greater monitoring of people’s transactions. This is deemed a 
positive step forward in the battle against crime and terrorist financing, but the pros-
3 See Brett Scott, ‘The War on Cash’, TheLong+Short, 19 August 2016, http://thelongandshort.org/
society/war-on-cash.
4 See Brett Scott, ‘In Praise of Cash’, Aeon, 1 March 2017, https://aeon.co/essays/if-plastic-
replaces-cash-much-that-is-good-will-be-lost.
5 See ‘EU Initiative on Restrictions on Payments in Cash’, European Commission, 2017, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/eu-initiative-restrictions-payments-cash_en.
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pect of monitoring political subversion and opposition looms large in certain countries. 
And then there’s tax. A senior state tax official casually told me over drinks that the 
reason they’re pushing cashlessness is to better monitor the income and expenses of 
small businesses and individuals. Finally, there is the monetary policy angle. Central 
banks would like greater power to implement forms of monetary policy that cash ham-
pers, in particular the ability to remotely erode people’s bank balances through nega-
tive interest rates to get them to spend.
We see an emergent alliance between digital payments companies, banks, central 
banks and governments, and the far-reaching voice of such powerful interest groups 
calmly asserting the inevitability of cashlessness impacts public attitudes. The overt 
propaganda campaigns that flood people with positive messages about digital pay-
ments are but one element of this voice. Subtler forms of cultural hegemony — the 
mainstream newspaper reporting on the Bank of England cash study, or the respect-
able CEO talking about the EU cash thresholds debate on BBC — repeat and reinforce 
negative narratives about cash as a dangerous and outdated form.
Many people going about their everyday business do not have strong opinions or con-
cerns about cash — and are certainly not out there campaigning for its demise — but 
often in my conversations about this issue people repeat the mainstream mantra that 
cashlessness is inevitable. When asked why it is inevitable, they often vaguely allude 
to a kind of ‘natural progress’ towards digital payment. When asked what the driving 
force of this ‘progress’ is, they say things like ‘people just like technology’, or alterna-
tively, ‘digital payment is pretty convenient’.
The convenience narrative is very common, and yet it is problematic on two accounts. 
Firstly, it is not actually obvious that cash is inconvenient. I have experienced con-
texts in which the cash system has failed — in Mozambique in the early 2000s where 
certain remote towns suffered from acute shortages of cash, and in Zimbabwe — but 
those societies suffered from serious problems in non-cash payments too. In many 
economies it is extremely easy to use cash, and requires no prior setting up of bank 
accounts, waiting for cards, minimum payment amounts, and so on.
Secondly, inconvenience is not an inherent property of cash, but rather a contextual 
property that emerges when the cash-supporting infrastructure is neglected or with-
drawn. In other words, it is possible to engineer inconvenience and irritation by delib-
erately making cash harder to use. For example, banks in various European countries 
are cutting down on the number of ATMs and branches they provide,6 which in turn 
frustrates people trying to get cash, and which in turn makes digital payment look 
comparatively easy. They then showcase the inconvenience — that they themselves 
have engineered — as a reason for why digital payment is superior. On the back of 
India’s ‘demonetisation’ debacle, Visa launched its #KindnessIsCashless campaign 
6 See International Monetary Fund, ‘Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) (per 100,000 Adults)’, The 
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.ATM.TOTL.P5. The statistics show ATMs 
per 100,000 adults. Declines — some very significant — are noted for Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Belgium, Greece 
and France. The statistics show that the Euro area as a whole has seen a significant decline in 
ATMs per 100,000 adults since 2010.
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in the country. They produced a video7 showing a frustrated elderly teacher standing 
in a long queue for cash who is then rescued by his students who show him how to 
use a digital payments app on his phone. The campaign carefully avoids mention of 
the fact that the inefficiency of the Indian cash system has been orchestrated by the 
Indian government itself.
Breaking the All-or-Nothing Narrative
If I stand in front of an audience and say ‘Raise your hands if you’d like access to digital 
payment’, most would raise their hands. People find digital payment useful. But if I say 
‘raise your hands if you want to have the option to use cash removed’, people are more 
hesitant. While we may enjoy the benefits of digital payment in various circumstances 
— for example, in the context of internet purchases — many people have no inherent 
problem with using cash for everyday in-person purchases, and, given the choice, 
would prefer for it to remain an option.
Cashless society proponents, however, are crafting their narrative in such a way as to 
fuse the idea of ‘digital payment’ with the idea of ‘no cash’, framing it as a dualistic 
either-or choice. They present an all-cash world and pit it against an all-digital world, 
and then conclude that an all-digital world is superior. In reality, the best option would 
be a hybrid payments system where both are available.
An analogy will help here. Automobile evangelists in the early 1900s might have made 
grand claims like ‘cars are the future!’ and predicted the demise of all other forms of 
transport, such as the horse-drawn carriage. Indeed, the world’s first automobile ad-
vertisement in 1898 came from the Winton Motor Carriage Company with the tagline 
‘Dispense with a horse’.8 The digital payments lobby is doing that right now for cash, 
presenting it as the horse-drawn cart of the payments world, outmatched by digital in 
all possible respects.
But if we reframe the analogy, we can turn the story on its head. Enter the bicycle. 
Bicycles existed prior to cars, and yet in modern society we still use them both. We 
recognise them as having pros and cons in different situations, and we value having 
both available. But it’s deeper than that. In the subsequent history of transport, cars 
have led to big problems of congestion, road accidents, pollution, and urban sprawl. 
Bicycles, in this context, actually have come to represent a solution to the problems 
caused by the car. To bring the analogy back to money, cash is not the horse-cart of 
payments but the bicycle. Digital payment is being framed in a futuristic light right 
now, but it opens up some extremely negative possibilities that we may have to use 
cash to solve.
So what are those potentialities? Three problems need immediate mention. Firstly, the 
end of cash will probably mean the beginning of an all-encompassing financial panop-
ticon that can be used for widespread surveillance, tracking and manipulation of indi-
viduals by both states and corporations. Secondly, going all-digital exposes us to far 
7 See Visa India, ‘A Teacher and Student’s #KindnessIsCashless Story - Visa’, YouTube, 23 February 
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISpAtMgKdPw.
8 See Borroz, Tony. ‘July 30, 1898: Car Ads get Rolling’, Wired, 30 July 2009, https://www.wired.
com/2009/07/dayintech_0730/.
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greater risks of devastating financial cyberattacks and digital crime. Thirdly, cashless-
ness brings new forms of digital financial exclusion, the screening out of anyone who 
lacks the ability to interact with the digital bureaucracies of privately-run commercial 
institutions that control the money system.
Very few people seem to understand this right now, and the cashless lobby has very 
little interest in telling you about these dark sides. Ironically, they are actually trying to 
argue the opposite. Take, for example, The Better than Cash Alliance, a lobby-organ-
isation ostensibly run by the UN Capital Development Fund but started and funded by, 
among others, Citibank, Visa and Mastercard.9 The primary argument they put forward 
is that digital payment can be useful to people in situations of poverty. This in itself 
isn’t problematic: of course, if I live in an all-cash economy I may indeed benefit from 
the introduction of a new digital option. Their decision, though, to call themselves the 
‘Better than Cash Alliance’, rather than, say, the ‘Building Digital Payments Alliance’ is 
a bit like a bus transport initiative calling itself ‘The Better Than Bicycles Alliance’. Why 
the headline focus on attacking cash rather than showcasing how the digital might be 
a useful addition to a rural cash economy?
A cynical observer browsing through their website might conclude that it is a front-
group representing the interests of the payments industry under the guise of a humani-
tarian project. They have little to no transparency about who actually sits on their Ex-
ecutive Committee, and investigation reveals a range of current and former payments 
industry personnel — from companies like Paypal, Ripple and Square — who advise 
them. Among their target audiences are national governments, NGOs and multinational 
corporations with staff in developing countries. They see corporates — such as large 
clothing brands with outsourced production in poorer countries that pay their low-level 
employees in cash — as a leverage point to push digital payments. I met a textiles 
entrepreneur from Bangladesh who told me that a corporate member of the Alliance 
pressures its suppliers into paying staff digitally.
We need not see this as some kind of conspiracy: It makes sense that an organisa-
tion promoting digital payment would recruit the expert services of people working 
at digital payment companies, and people who work at digital payment companies 
are more likely than most to be convinced of the virtues of digital payment. Neverthe-
less, it is obvious that they specialize in presenting a one-sided glorification of the 
potential benefits of the digital, whilst ignoring its potential negative consequences, 
and then setting this against a negative interpretation of cash as a ‘burden’ upon 
poorer people. All of this despite the fact that cash is the one form of money that 
currently forms a lifeline to people excluded from services from banks. Every ele-
ment of their presentation is designed to associate the idea of digital payment with 
the idea of cashlessness, rather than presenting digital payment as being potentially 
complementary to cash.
Most perplexing, though, is that the Better Than Cash Alliance manages to do this 
all without ever really explicitly laying out an argument for why cash is negative. The 
9 See ‘Resource Partners’, Better than Cash Alliance, https://www.betterthancash.org/join-us/
resource-partners.
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malice of cash is merely implied, hinted at, and left to the reader to infer, as if it is so 
obvious as to not even be worth mentioning. Their flagship line of ‘digital is great’ is 
illuminated in such a to way as to cast a shadow of ‘cash is dangerous’.
This may seem pedestrian and benign to an affluent city-dweller in the Western world, 
but the message is insidious because it hides an implicit value judgement about for-
mality. It carries an assumption that getting drawn into the mainstream world domi-
nated by large-scale corporations and state authorities is obviously superior, and that 
parts of society that do not exist in that world should not rightfully exist at all. The cash 
economy is — apparently — a realm of uncontrolled darkness that people must be lib-
erated from, and if they cannot be liberated from it, they must be undesirables. This is a 
viewpoint that can flourish among people deeply steeped in privileged institutions, with 
economic interests in the ongoing success of those institutions and respectable posi-
tions within them. There is no place for the vast grey areas of marginality that includes 
people excluded from formal economies, people on the wrong side of official law, and 
people who thrive on small-scale non-institutional activities, like the busker on a street.
Defending the Grey Areas of Social Progress
The irony is that social progress — if we believe in such a thing — requires grey areas. 
In August 2017 I gave a talk at the Crypto-Cannabis Salon in Alameda, California, 
an event bringing together the cryptocurrency industry with the cannabis industry. 
Marijuana is in the process of being legalized in California and growers are cautiously 
stepping into the world of legal, respectable business. For many years, cash has kept 
the cannabis industry alive, allowing it to thrive while political activists pushed for its 
legalization. For many of those activists the ‘War on Drugs’ is more than just futile. It is 
an injustice, an attempt by states to quash ancient plant substances that have benefits 
to humanity, whilst arbitrarily accepting tobacco and alcohol corporations that push 
products far more damaging. The legalization of marijuana is seen by the activists as a 
progressive step forward in humanity.
Seen from this perspective, cash has not merely facilitated ‘drug crime’ — as pre-legal-
ization cannabis growing was categorized — but also simultaneously kept an industry 
alive for long enough for laws to be updated. Had cash not been around, the industry 
might not have developed, and there would be little to legalize. The strictures of the 
digital payments cage would have killed it before it had a chance to showcase its ben-
efits. In a sense, cash nurtured a practice that has now been legitimized.
The problem, however, is that US banks and payments companies are subject to US 
federal regulation, and this overrides individual US state regulations. Legal cannabis in-
dustry businesses in California, therefore, struggle to get bank accounts or services from 
payments companies. In this context, they now see themselves as being ‘forced’ to use 
cash, and denied the opportunity to gain the benefits that digital payments offer. The large 
amounts of cash they deal with presents a security problem, and now that they have to 
pay taxes, they are forced to physically present bundles of cash at the tax office. The 
money form that has kept them alive for decades is now being perceived as a ‘burden’.
This illustrates an important point, though. Cash is the money form of the underdog, of 
the excluded. If you are a new member of respectable elite society, and you are forced 
to use it, you feel like you are missing out on a more advanced form. To return to our 
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analogy, it is like being forced to ride a bicycle when other members of your class all 
have cars. Rather than the bicycle appearing as your friend, and as ‘better than noth-
ing’, it is characterized as ‘slow’ and ‘crude’ and you shout, ‘Why can’t I have a car!’ 
When, however, you get used to having a car, you may begin to see the bicycle in a 
new light. In combination with the car’s long-distance capabilities and speed, your 
bicycle appears nimble, efficient for short trips, requiring low maintenance, and so on. 
The perspective really depends on your context. Not wishing to rely upon a bicycle is 
different to saying that bicycles should not exist. Indeed, without bicycles the car might 
appear increasingly oppressive.
Third party malware in the capitalist market algorithm
In the cashless bank payments society there is never just a buyer of a product, and a 
seller. There is always a third party, a middleman who is required to pass the money be-
tween the buyer and the seller. This grants the middleman — banks and payments net-
works like Visa and Mastercard — a lot of power. They can see your transactions, when 
you do them, and where you do them. Furthermore, if they don’t like what you’re trans-
acting, they have the power to prevent it. We thus have the potential for both financial 
surveillance and financial censorship. When Visa, Mastercard and Paypal decided they 
didn’t want people to be able to donate money to Wikileaks,10 they censored not only 
Wikileaks but also all the people who felt a moral call to support the organisation.
It’s comparatively easy to alarm people by pointing to overt instances of aggressive 
payments gatekeeping and surveillance. The more insidious issue, however, may not 
actually be whether some Big Brother is really watching you or not. The cashless so-
ciety stands to create a widespread feeling of potentially being watched. This is the 
essence of a panopticon. The point of a panopticon is not to watch you, but rather to 
make you internalize the belief that you’re being watched, and to self-regulate your 
behaviour in response. No need to hire armies of watchers, when you can make people 
watchers of themselves.
Those who argue for the benefits of such surveillance effects always say ‘if you have 
nothing to hide you have nothing to fear’, but we value privacy for reasons beyond try-
ing to hide. Many of us like feeling that we have autonomy and that we can engage in 
private economic decisions without an authority looking over our shoulder all the time. 
The surveillance society is one in which adults are made to feel like small children who 
cannot be trusted.
This surveillance concern is one avenue by which the War on Cash is exposing rifts in 
market libertarian philosophy. Isn’t it ironic that our individual privacy may be protected 
by the old state cash? Isn’t it ironic that privatized payments systems allow for far 
greater state monitoring of transactions?
But the War on Cash presents a second uncomfortable issue for libertarian theorists. 
How will overall markets function when every general market transaction has to be 
passed through a specific market of private payments companies that may not have 
10 See ‘WikiLeaks: Banking Blockade and Donations Campaign’, WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/
IMG/pdf/WikiLeaks-Banking-Blockade-Information-Pack.pdf.
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incentives to let all players trade? The treasured intellectual edifice of ‘state vs. market’ 
starts to creak as it becomes more apparent that states support markets by upholding 
the base infrastructure that enables them to work. One half of modern capitalist ex-
change — the money — has a public component. Cash is M0 money, the base money, 
the fall-back money, the state money of last resort. It’s the money you use when the 
shop’s debit card system crashes. It’s the money you use when you’re a stranger in a 
foreign country. Its replacement with the fickle digital promises issued by private com-
mercial banks is risky for good ole capitalism.
And thus, in the context of the cashless society hype, we find a parallel rise in specula-
tions about ‘state digital money’.11 If we indeed are going to become cashless, and if 
private digital payments intermediaries cannot be trusted to keep a market system run-
ning for all, there will be pressure to create a public digital payments infrastructure to 
guarantee everyone’s ability to transact. Right now, the choice is between commercial 
bank digital and state cash, but the imagined future battle is one between bank digital 
and state digital.
But, unlike state cash, state digital money is also a potential vector of surveillance 
and monitoring. This concern of getting trapped in a prison of watchable payments 
inspired the original attempts at building non-state, non-bank digital currencies. David 
Chaum — founder of the early privacy currency initiative Digicash — noted this in his 
1983 paper ‘Blind signatures for untraceable payments’:
On the one hand, knowledge by a third party of the payee, amount, and time of 
payment for every transaction made by an individual can reveal a great deal about 
the individual’s whereabouts, associations and lifestyle. For example, consider pay-
ments for such things as transportation, hotels, restaurants, movies, theater, lec-
tures, food, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, books, periodicals, dues, religious and politi-
cal contributions.12
Cypherpunks like Chaum were acutely aware of the potential for state abuse of this 
data, but also of corporate abuse. The increased data allows fine-tuned profiling of 
individuals, opening up ever-more subtle and advanced forms of manipulation. This 
push has continued apace, with large tech firms entering into collaborations with large 
financial firms to create hybrid digital payments systems. Companies like Google al-
ready have location and search data and to add payments data would deepen their 
knowledge of individuals greatly. With the rise of machine-learning and predictive ana-
lytics, these combined data sets are used as the fuel to produce offerings and nudges 
that steer you onto future paths. This is a source of that growing feeling — creeping 
into the back of our minds — that we are being ‘helped’ and guided by seemingly-
benevolent yet eerily overbearing corporate butlers that are always present. It may 
appear convenient, but may also carry with it the slow erosion of our personal agency 
and clear independent thought.
11 See, for example, John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof. ‘The Macroeconomics of Central Bank 
Issued Digital Currencies’, Bank of England, July 2016, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/
Documents/workingpapers/2016/swp605.pdf.
12 See David Chaum, ‘Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments’, Taxable Anonymous Libre 
Electronic Reserves (TALER), https://taler.net/papers/chaum-blind-signatures.pdf.
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Against Autocorrect: Defending a Right to Criminality
The tradition of Digicash is now being carried forward by the likes of Bitcoin, Monero 
and Zcash that stand as alternatives to both bank and state digital payment systems. 
This places them in the somewhat surprising position of being aligned to state cash, 
mimicking its flexibility, anonymity and with that, an association to the criminal under-
world where cash is presumed to be king.
The assertion that cash is the realm of criminality remains one of the most pervasive 
lines in the War on Cash. To counter it, one could attempt to argue that cash is used 
for many things beyond crime, that the crime figures are overstated, or that, even if it 
is a crime-facilitator, its benefits justify that.
There is, however, an even deeper problem to the cash-as-crime narrative, something 
bigger at stake. As the digital realm expands and seeps into every aspect of our exis-
tence, avenues for deviance are being shut down, and this threatens the very basis of 
our legal morality. In Ursula Le Guin’s science fiction classic The Dispossessed, teen-
agers on the anarchist planet Anarres condemn the state-corporate hierarchies of the 
rival capitalist planet Urras. One asks:
Would you really like to live in a society where you had no responsibility and no free-
dom, no choice, only the option of obedience to the law, or disobedience followed 
by punishment? Would you really want to go live in a prison?
Their point is that living in a society where failure to obey the law automatically results 
in punishment is essentially the same as living in a prison. The reason we do not feel 
this in our current society is that failure to obey the law does not automatically lead 
to punishment. There is a buffer zone of variable probability in which we can take a 
chance and maybe get away with it. The speeder on the highway doesn’t always get 
caught. The cat-and-mouse game between law-breakers and law enforcement is what 
makes law-abiders feel virtuous for having decided to obey the law. If you cannot 
break the law — or if its breaking automatically condemns you — you cannot feel virtu-
ous for not breaking it. A world where there is no cat-and-mouse game is one where 
the law is a hardcoded auto-enforced electric fence that leaves no room for personal 
responsibility in upholding it.
It’s for this reason that we need to protect and uphold a Right to Criminality. A world 
without it is a world of Behavioural Autocorrect, and corporate digital payments sys-
tems are vectors via which such autocorrect will assert itself. The automatic flagging 
of tax infringements, the automatic fining of the traffic offender, the automatic banning 
of the political dissident.
The Internet of Fully-Automated Capitalism
The emergent concerns about cashless surveillance and financial exclusion have led 
anti-cash cheerleaders like Kenneth Rogoff — author of The Curse of Cash — to pref-
ace his speaker tours of the world’s intellectual salons with pre-emptive marketing 
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material. An advert for his talk at London School of Economics promised that the pro-
fessor would address issues the removal of cash will pose, ‘ranging from fears about 
privacy and price stability to the need to provide subsidized debit cards for the poor’.13
Let’s say Kenneth is right. It is not inconceivable that we could adequately resolve or 
reduce problems that accompany the privatization and digitization of all money move-
ment, and put in place protections.
But cast your eyes into the far future. Cash is standing in the way of fully automated 
capitalism. We’ve seen our economic system increasingly automated at the production 
level, with businesses using robots and conveyer belts. Then we’ve seen it get auto-
mated at the management and co-ordination level, the algorithms of work flows and 
logistics, and the huge digital platform corporations that hover above smaller players, 
matchmaking them. But at the exchange level many transactions remain manual, or 
organic. We still have to go through a cognitive decision-making process and — some-
times — a social interaction in order to exchange. It is here that traditional economists 
imagine their ‘rational agent’, considering a product in light of their money budget, 
deciding whether it is good value, and perhaps bargaining.
To fully automate capitalism — to make it a truly inhuman, machinic system — would 
involve not only the automation of production, management and co-ordination, but 
also the full automation of exchange. This requires the automation of the seller, the 
buyer and the payment process. This is the Internet-of-Things utopia of fridges buy-
ing milk from passing drones. This is the world of toll-road payments automatically 
triggered by facial recognition as you silently drive by. The further you push this, the 
more alienated the individual becomes, a passive participant watching markets un-
fold around them.
Perhaps we’ll see a cyberpunk dual economy, with cash eking out an underground 
existence as a currency for those seeking to preserve the last remnants of human 
emotional connection within markets. Perhaps we’ll tell romantic tales of an imagined 
past in which red-blooded debates over value were found in marketplaces.
But perhaps it will not reach this stage. You see, while you cannot burn digital money, 
you can certainly turn it off. We like to think we’re electro-digital technological gods, 
but if our fossil-fuel power transmission lines go down, our cashless economy quickly 
chokes to death. Maybe cashless society is a dirty radical conspiracy, the ultimate 
Trojan Horse. Make everyone dependent on digital payment, then break the electrical 
grid, and watch the system fall like never before.
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THE DEMONS OF DEMONETIZATION: DEVALUING 
‘TRUST’ AS A CURRENCY IN INFORMAL ECONOMIES, 
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT
TRIPTA CHANDOLA
In our business, there is no scope of conducting it on credit or barter. Our bodies 
were our ATMs, and now like all others in the city, it has no currency.  
—Pooja, a sex-worker and resident of Govindpuri, commenting on the impact of 
demonetization.
Pooja and Akki are residents of the lane no. 15 of Govindpuri, a resettlement colony in 
South Delhi. They are erstwhile residents of one of the three camps which collectively 
constitute, and are colloquially referred to as, the slums of Govindpuri (hereafter, GP), 
evoking the spatial proximity with the legal colony as a marker. One of the first camps 
to be settled is across the road from Pooja and Akki’s house. All their official documen-
tation still bears that address. The identification as slum-dwellers allows them to avail 
subsidies under different schemes, especially for their children’s education. It is on the 
account of their professional engagement as sex-workers that they decided to rent a 
house in this side of the locality. It gives them freedom outside of constant social scru-
tiny and judgement, but also a sense of ‘security, ease and trust’ to their clients. Whilst 
both of them have partners who live with them, they are the breadwinners of the family.
When I first got to know them, they were young girls of under 20. I was pursuing my 
doctoral research in GP, highly keen and motivated by its soundscapes, but not always 
confident about articulating either the research questions or agenda, and was intensely 
humbled by the time given by the inhabitants to these ramblings. My acquaintance 
with Pooja and Akki was one such encounter, and our relationship, mutual interest and 
tenderness in each other’s lives has continued steadfastly ever since. Their age differ-
ence is of a couple of years, though it is hard to tell either the difference or their exact 
age. Whilst their histories, geographies and negotiations as sex-workers is a demand-
ing (and necessary) narrative to engage and understand the modalities of living on the 
margins, in the context of this present discussion the focus is on the intersection of 
their bodies, as precarious commodities, and credit-interest enterprises, the mainstay 
of their financial investments and future securities, as precarious networks.
The credit-interest enterprise, or byaaz ka business, as it is colloquially and in its literal 
translation referred to, operates on the principle of lending money to the interested 
parties on a negotiable interest rate and time period. These loan businesses form a 
patchwork of credit and debt connections throughout the community sewn together 
with its particular, peculiar practices; negotiating skills and fantastical tales of either 
meteoritic gains or colossal failures.
In both these networks, credit and debt, trust as a currency, and the extent to which it 
can be accrued, circulated and appropriated, determines the respective position and 
benefits that can be accrued.
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From the early days, when the conversations and interactions with Pooja and Akki 
were not determined by any specific research agenda, the importance of ‘trust’ in their 
professional lives was constantly insisted on:
Didi, our dhanda (colloquially referring to any business practice, but in popular, cul-
tural reference often evoked to refer to the sex-work) seems to be all random, there 
are people who still think we stand by the roads and call out to the customers. We 
have never done it. One of the first things we learn and have to rely on this when we 
enter this dhanda is to be part of a trustworthy network. Usually we have to travel to 
other cities and engage with men of all kinds of backgrounds — politicians, goons, 
muscle-men, etc., in strange hotels and houses, if we are not with people we can 
trust we put ourselves in great risk. And in Delhi, most of our clients are either regu-
lar or through recommendations. Even they need to be able to ‘trust’ to become 
regulars, otherwise as has instances some of them are blackmailed or threatened to 
be charged with 376... and sometimes we have to pull out these cards to keep the 
customers in tow.
During the last decade, I have closely witnessed the many turmoils the two of them 
have to undergo on account of their profession. These have included, but are not 
limited to, one of them being threatened at gun point in a hill resort away from Delhi; 
a raid in a hotel in Jaipur where they were stationed; and, coming under the cops-on-
duty’s radar. But whilst negotiating all these hurdles, Pooja and Akki have consistently 
worked to improve their lives in ways which the opportunities available to them as 
illiterate, young women from the slums would not have allowed. The intent here — in 
the capacity of a researcher and as their interlocutor — is not to normalize the violence 
which the sex-workers have to undergo, but to insist that the reality and experience 
of earning a living as a sex-worker cannot be collapsed into one singular narrative of 
oppression and exploitation.
The byaaz ka business operates on the principle of lending money to the interested 
parties on a negotiable interest rate and time-period. Both the interest rate and time-
period are not arbitrarily arrived at but correspond to the present ‘going rate’ in the 
credit-interest network. And the backbone of these transactions is the currency of 
‘trust’ which both the creditor, but especially, the party seeking a loan can establish. I 
will return to the significance of ‘trust’ as currency in sustaining these networks, and 
the impact of demonitization on disrupting the processes which institute it and thus 
causing long-term ruptures (and perhaps need for innovation and invention) in these 
networks. However, at the juncture, it is important to acknowledge that the byaaz ka 
business operates within the informal practices and networks which are identified as 
a ‘set of activities that lies largely outside of the government regulation and supports’. 
Though being outside of the ‘institutional’ purview does not render either the networks 
or the transactions lacking regulations in themselves.
But for the moment, I return to Pooja and Akki’s narrative. It is not a matter of mere 
coincidence (or convenience) that both Pooja and Akki (and many others in their 
network) find investment in byaaz ka business as a logical continuation of their 
professional engagements and financial investments. Both these involvements ac-
commodate the precarity which becomes of the lives of Pooja and Akki for being 
outside the ‘institutional and state regulations’. The former, sex-work, being illegal 
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and posing a threat of persecution for its practitioners, whilst the latter, byaaz ka 
business, though not strictly illegal, invites scrutiny for the same on account of pur-
porting black money, and illicit activities.
In the last decade, Pooja and Akki through astute and timely investments in the byaaz 
ka business managed to accumulate enough money to buy gold, send their children to 
private schools and maintain a ‘respectable’ lifestyle. Even their extended families, still 
living in the slums, accept them by maintaining a stoic silence and distance from their 
choice of profession, especially since Pooja and Akki offer financial support to them.
Until 8 November 2016, even though aware of the precarious nature of the transactions 
— both as sex-workers and money in the informal networks — both Pooja and Akki not 
only felt secured financially and socially, but also were planning to finally take the ‘big’ 
plunge of investing in property.
That manfoos raat (fateful night), which at first was reckoned to be a mazaak (joke) 
of sorts by Pooja, Akki and many others, and whose impact as it has been unfolding 
since, has in Pooja’s words ‘shifted the ground beneath their feet. Never before, even 
with all the problems — cops, raids and everything — have we felt so helpless. Neither 
are we in control of our business nor our monies. What has most significantly been 
compromised is vishwaas (trust) and not to mention the humiliation we have to endure’.
On that ‘fateful’ night, demonitization (notebandi) was announced by the Prime Minis-
ter, Narender Modi, in an address to the country on national media in his now charac-
teristic highly performative, hyperbolic style:
The evil of corruption has been spread by certain sections of society for their selfish 
interest. They have ignored the poor and cornered benefits. [...]
There comes a time in the history of a country's development when a need is felt 
for a strong and decisive step. For years, this country has felt that corruption, black 
money and terrorism are festering sores, holding us back in the race towards de-
velopment. [...]
Brothers and sisters, 
To break the grip of corruption and black money, we have decided that the five 
hundred rupee and thousand rupee currency notes presently in use will no longer 
be legal tender from midnight tonight, that is 8th November 2016. This means that 
these notes will not be acceptable for transactions from midnight onwards. The five 
hundred and thousand rupee notes hoarded by anti-national and anti-social ele-
ments will become just worthless pieces of paper. The rights and the interests of 
honest, hard-working people will be fully protected. Let me assure you that notes of 
one hundred, fifty, twenty, ten, five, two and one rupee and all coins will remain legal 
tender and will not be affected. [...]
Time and again, I have seen that when the average citizen has to choose between 
accepting dishonesty and bearing inconvenience, they always choose to put up with 
inconvenience. They will not support dishonesty. 
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Once again, let me invite you to make your contribution to this grand sacrifice for 
cleansing our country, just as you cleaned up your surroundings during Diwali. 
Let us ignore the temporary hardship 
Let us join this festival of integrity and credibility 
Let us enable coming generations to live their lives with dignity 
Let us fight corruption and black money 
Let us ensure that the nation's wealth benefits the poor 
Let us enable law-abiding citizens to get their due share. 
I am confident in the 125 crore people of India and I am sure country will get 
success. 
Thank you very much. Thanks a lot.1
Decoding the Byaaz Ka Business
The biyaaz ka business, which is the practice of raising and loaning cash at and for an 
interest (literally translated, business of interest), forms the backbone of the informal 
modalities of monetary exchange in the slums of Govindpuri. Most residents of the 
three camps have in one way or another been involved in these networks, mostly in the 
capacity of raising loans ranging from a few hundreds to more substantial amounts.
The reasons for the residents of the slums to rely on these informal credit networks 
are complex and unfold within the particular materiality of negotiating different insti-
tutions and agencies — here, banks — as slum-dwellers, illiterate and more often 
than not lacking cash, credit history, and collaterals. One of the reasons for the panic 
that was unleashed — owing to the lack of circulating and available cash among the 
urban poor — immediately following demonitization was accorded to the poor not 
being part of the formal networks, particularly banking institutions. But the reality 
within which the urban poor claims and takes charge of their financial destiny is far 
more complex and complicated.
The ‘trust’ in these informal networks, the access to the agents lending money and the 
convenient availability of cash — amount, time and urgency notwithstanding — are 
some of the significant reasons quoted by the residents of the slums for their reliance 
on these networks.
However, the informal nature of these monetary exchanges does not imply an informal-
ity of the social structures and networks within which they unfold. In fact, these infor-
mal monetary exchanges have a history in the slums, which in turn accords them their 
longevity and robustness as a viable and reliable economic practice, as also accruing 
the ‘trust’ both amongst the borrowers and the lenders.
One of the many agendas of the demonitization project was to include a significant 
section of the population — namely, urban and rural poor — in the formal networks, 
sectors and practices of banking. In pursuing this rhetoric and agenda with a high de-
1 For the full text of the speech, see: ‘Here's the Full Text of Modi's Speech on the Discontinuation 
of ₹500 and ₹1,000 Bank Notes’, Huffington Post, 9 November 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.
in/2016/11/08/heres-the-full-text-of-modis-speech-on-the-discontinuation-of_a_21601525/.
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gree of coercion — the analyses in support of the project demonitization lend towards 
demonizing informal networks. Within this imagination, of including the urban poor 
in formal networks of banking, the social structures and practices within which they 
unfold — here, in the materiality of the slums, are identified to have a lack of social, 
cultural and political cohesiveness and solidity. The practices of informal monetary 
exchanges in the slums are thus reckoned to have symbiotic relationship to the social 
order within which they can thrive, the impetus being to formalize both these at once 
towards as a discipling agenda to transform these spaces, and their residents, into 
complicit, responsible citizens.
And thus, the identification of the practices of informal monetary exchanges in the 
slums — as a constituency representing the urban poor — with the informality of so-
cial order is not without its deliberation to deny the well-consolidated and constituted 
social structures, with their conflicts and politics, legitimacy in marginalized spaces.
The networks of informal monetary exchange abound in Govindpuri in that, indeed 
to the members of the 'collective' (residents of Govindpuri), cash is readily available 
outside of both state regulatory norms and structures. However, the access into these 
networks, the available credit limit, the interest rates offered and the default period 
available, are determined by the borrower's social position (caste, religious, political 
affiliations), credibility (the connectedness and embeddedness of the borrower in the 
broader networks) and collateral (these are not 'mortgaged' but a rented tenement will 
mean imposition of a higher credit interest and lower credit limit compared to someone 
who owns a two-room tenement) in value. Moreover, not anyone with available and 
extra cash can casually start lending it to others.
One of the factors, when inquired of the members of the community who are directly 
or indirectly involved in the biyaaz ka business — creditors, investors and borrowers 
— significant in getting the loans sanctioned and negotiating the desired interest-
rates, is the trust and position the interested debtor has amongst the community. 
I inquired of the creditors, many of whom I have long-standing engagements with, 
their ways of monetizing trust to deliberate on the amount of the loan and its inter-
est rate. The usual manner in which trust circulates, and is accrued, in marginalized 
spaces is on account of a sense of community, religious affiliations and the shared 
predicaments of being slum-dwellers. Position in the community is also significant to 
determine the negotiations between the creditor and debtor, this is not established 
on account of collective affiliation and shared predicaments. Position is evaluated 
on account of the duration of the individual's or family's stay in the community; their 
social networks and their credit history.
Besides these considerations it is the collaterals which determine the amount of the 
loan extended and the interest rates offered. These collaterals include the validity 
of the ration card, the ownership of the jhughi, the number of rooms and whether 
there are spare rooms which are rented out along with an account payee cheque 
written in the name of the lender. For example, an individual who owns a jhughi and 
has a valid ration card to establish it will be able to raise a loan of not only a higher 
amount but also on a lower interest rate, and can also negotiate not handing over 
an account payee cheque.
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The repayment of the loan is not undertaken via bank transfers, but the demand of 
the account payee cheque is to levy the extra pressure, as this tender being dishon-
ored can lead to criminal persecution against the issuing party. Once the entire credit 
amount is returned, these collaterals are returned to the borrower.
A new migrant renting a room in one of the camps in Govindpuri and desiring a 
loan will not be able to raise one beyond a certain amount but will have to bear 
highly exorbitant interest-rates, often touching 22% payable on a daily or weekly 
basis. More often than not, the migrants cannot give an account payee cheque to 
the creditor, and in this situation either the tenant in question has to present the 
security of a permanent resident as a collateral or repay the calculated interest rate 
on a daily basis.
However, in the last few years these collaterals, especially with the tenants and mi-
grants (who are often the ones in need of urgent cash and can be demanded any inter-
est rate), are not considered sufficient. And thus, in the present, those seeking loans 
have to deposit their ration cards and/or voter identity cards in the original. In the last 
few years of following the byaaz ka business I have only twice come across instances 
of default when the borrowing party has ‘left’ without paying the dues. In the first case, 
it was a young girl of 19 who eloped with her lover, and in the second instance, it was 
a migrant worker from Nepal who never came back. And in both instances, the amount 
was less than 5,000 INR.
The ‘trust’ in the informal networks that is accrued is then a delicately calibrated proj-
ect of social, cultural and financial histories. Whilst the creditors, depending on the 
scale they operate on, have their ‘boys’ who act in the capacity of loan-sharks, the 
visits are ‘gentle reminders’ and never lend to humiliating the borrowers/clients. Sha-
keel, a prominent creditor in Govindpuri, contextualized this approach, ‘we will get the 
monies, one way or another. Everyone knows if they default or run away, they will never 
really be able to find a standing again in the community here. But we also know the 
compulsions people living here work within, and belonging to the same place, it will 
be just bad for the business, along with being completely merciless, to extort money 
from them under duress’.
Losing ‘Trust’: In Between Visits to the Bank and Notebandi
In the third week of the demonetization drive, an afternoon was spent with the few 
women from the Navjeevan camp deliberating its impact but more importantly trying to 
make sense of what it – notebandi - means. ‘I really thought it was a joke’, said an old, 
wizened lady. Another added, ‘what will happen to all the old notes? I never thought 
about notes having a lifetime, they also die’ to be supported by the reckoning that, 
‘never really thought that having loose change would make you feel rich’. Such was 
the tenor of these discussions. It was in part seriously jocular, but that did not mean 
the gravity of the situation was lost to any one of us.
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The discussions soon steered toward the visits to the banks2 and the act of queuing 
the demonetization drive had necessitated. All the women present in the company 
had bank accounts, most of them opened prior to the Jan Dhan Yojna,3 however their 
visits to the banks were few and far between and mostly undertaken in the company 
of others as a group. In the last few years, I have discussed at length the engagement 
and experience of residents, and more specifically the women in present company, 
with (and of) ‘formal banking practices’. And, more often than not, these would focus 
on their visits to the bank.
From evoking anxiety, ‘bayaankar sar dard’ (splitting headache) to a sense of helpless-
ness ‘kutch samaaj mein hi nahin aata hai’ (don’t fathom anything) and anger, ‘saale, 
humse aise baat karte hain ki hum insaan hi na hon’ (they talk to us as if we are not 
humans), the visit to the banks for the women from Govindpuri, even in the pre-demon-
etization era, was fraught with uneasiness, constantly reminding them of their position 
as slum-dwellers. These women carry, and are contained within, the slumming bodies; 
illiterate as they are, the lives they live on the margins are etched on their bodies with 
seemingly an indelible ink. Of all the State institutions, banks4 as spaces of interactions 
between the slum-dwellers and the mainstream networks evoke the most immediate 
and violent sense of disenfranchisement amongst the residents of the slums. ‘We are 
not valued here, the poor are not given any respect’ is one of the most-often evoked 
sentiments in regard to the visit to the banks articulated by the urban poor.
The announcement of demonetization necessitated visits to the banks by some, if not 
all, of these women. Most of them are beneficiaries of one of the many state-pensions, 
in this situation either old-aged or widowed. However, the main reason for the visit to 
the bank was not withdrawal, but to exchange the thus announced illegal tenders of 
500 and 1000 either for themselves or their family members and others in their extend-
ed networks. When recounting their experiences of the visits to the bank, interlinked 
as they were with the demonetization drive, what irked the women was not as much 
the waiting, standing in the queues or even compromising on their daily schedules, as 
much as having to seek ‘bheek’, alms, of their own money from the State. ‘Ek tho saala 
paisa nahin, us par bhi jo thoda bahut hai uske ke liye bhi maara-maari’ (this money is 
ours, and then we have to suffer to claim it), is the usual refrain.
2 The media coverage of the demonitization as a ‘disaster’ and its focus on the queues captured 
the imagination of the masses, and allowed a common vocabulary to insert themselves into the 
narrative by sharing their experiences.
3 Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana (P.M.J.D.Y), Prime Minister's People Money Scheme is India's 
National Mission for Financial Inclusion to ensure access to financial services, namely Banking 
Savings & Deposit Accounts, Remittance, Credit, Insurance, Pension in an affordable manner. This 
financial inclusion campaign was launched by the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi on 28 
August 2014 (‘Prime Minister to Launch Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana Tomorrow: To Dedicate 
Mobile Banking Facility on Basic Mobile Phones to the Nation’, Press Information Bureau, 
Government of India, 27 August 2014, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=109113). He 
had announced this scheme on his first Independence Day speech on 15 August 2014; (‘Pradhan 
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pradhan_Mantri_Jan_Dhan_
Yojana. For more information, see ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY)’, Pradhan Mantri Jan 
Dhan Yojana, https://www.pmjdy.gov.in/scheme.
4 State hospitals and educational institutions are also uncomfortable spaces of interactions, but 
here the sense of disenfranchisement is not so acute as in these spaces the middle-class 
presence is not so pronounced.
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‘Being there means not being somewhere else’ is how Lela Aunty, the one with a slight 
limp, spoke about waiting, here in particular reference to queuing at the banks immedi-
ately following notebandi. The manner in which 'not being there' — evoked in the sense 
of routines of the everyday being disrupted — was negotiated by relying on social 
networks (mostly in the immediate materiality of the lane, comprising of a few families) 
to take shifts in ensuring the smooth operations of different chores, errands, especially 
towards tending to the children.
The waiting at the banks evoked reminiscence of the days when the women from the 
Navjeevan camp had to queue to fetch water, almost a decade back. In the conversa-
tions that followed parallels were drawn: from the need to collect the wares (plastic 
bottles/containers and here plastic cards — Aadhar cards, Voters IDs); the anticipation 
of how much could be expected depending on the spot in the queue and the fights that 
happened whilst standing in the queues.
The preparations, queuing and waiting for water, as I have elaborated in my thesis, 
have a sociality which cannot be singularly viewed from the lens of lacks. Here, social, 
cultural and political identities and spaces were claimed and recalibrated, which had 
resonances in the manner that the everyday was negotiated among the residents. In 
a similar vein, the spatial-temporal ‘ruptures’ of queuing for the banks in the wake of 
demonetization thus have to be situated in the context of the continuation of everyday 
negotiations which those living in the margins have to negotiate with.
The deliberations of the residents of Govindpuri then compel a far more engaged, in-
depth understanding of how poverty is sustained (structurally, socially, politically) but 
also more importantly the manner the poor articulate this predicament. A very strong 
sense of one’s self was evidenced in the categorical manner in which the difference be-
tween queuing for water and banks was identified as ‘zaroorat’ (need) and ‘haq’ (right), 
respectively: ‘to stand in the queues for water was our need, compulsion, but to stand 
in front of the banks to what is rightfully ours is humiliating, this is only exaggerated by 
the manner in which they treat the poor’.
Cashless Bodies, Bouncing Cheques:
In the first couple of weeks of demonetization Pooja and Akki’s business suffered sig-
nificant cut-backs. Their regular clients, mostly men from business and middle-class 
households, were equally affected by the cash crunch which brought a halt to their vis-
its to Pooja and Akki’s. They contextualised the situation thus: ‘Earlier they could easily 
account for the missing few thousands, especially to their wives, but now with each 
penny being guarded over, how do they explain? They call us, and are sympathetic, 
some rather worried as well, but what can even they do?’ Some of the clients offered 
to pay for their services in old currency notes of 500 and 1000, but the offer was not 
amenable to Pooja and Akki.
As soon as demonetization was announced, in the local markets it was possible to 
‘change’ the old currency notes for still-legal tender of 100-rupee notes for a ‘cut’. 
And thus, to change 500 currency notes for legal tender, 100 rupees was charged. 
Whilst most daily-wage laborers, more often than not migrants, illiterate and not 
having a bank account (or at least in any of city’s local banks), had little or no choice 
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but to make do with the loss. Moreover, they could not afford to lose out on a day’s 
wages to queue outside the banks to change the currencies.
Pooja and Akki’s household is run on a day-to-day basis of procuring the necessary 
items, rice, lentils, vegetables and milk. Considering both have been residents of the 
local neighbourhood for a few years, in the initial phase of cash-crunch they could rely 
on good-will and their position here to acquire the necessary items on credit. During 
this phase, I found myself spending a lot of time with the two of them, but also oth-
ers in the extended networks whom I have known for a few years. Whilst the sense of 
something going wrong was palpable, the gloom and doom of demonetization has still 
not settled in. And most of these women were treating this slow-time in their business 
as well-deserved holiday.
The gravity of the situation drew closer to home with the demonetization severely im-
pacting the byaaz ka business, destabilizing the until then secured social and financial 
position and investments. Here, Pooja and Akki encountered the double-whammy of 
not receiving the monthly interests on the money they had lent out but also in being 
harassed by the loan-sharks whom they had in return borrowed from. Pooja and Akki’s 
involvement (and investments) in the byaaz ka business were an astute, ingenious and 
innovative negotiation between their role as ‘creditors’ and borrowers. In effect, Pooja 
and Akki would raise a significant amount (usually up to 100,000 INR) from the ‘big 
guys’, the creditors, at a negotiable interest rate of 8-10%. This money they would 
then further re-introduce into the byaaz ka business by lending them out piecemeal, in 
smaller amounts, for a shorter period of time on an interest rate significantly higher to 
what they pay.
The rate, depending on the need of the borrower, time-period and collateral provided, 
can be as high as 22% per month. In the last decade, Pooja and Akki managed to 
significantly improve their financial situation, and thus also alleviating the opportunities 
available to them, by their ingenious investments in these intersecting and overlapping 
credit networks.
Both have had bank accounts since the last decade, but these are rarely used to con-
duct financial transactions. They do not receive payments for their services through 
these accounts, and their investments are primarily in the byaaz ka business. The most 
significant use of having a bank account in the last few years, since they have made se-
rious investments in the byaaz ka business, for them is in issuing cheques whilst seek-
ing loans, and in turn demanding from borrowers who can issue them as collaterals.
As mentioned earlier, the threat of criminal persecution in case of the issued cheque 
being dishonoured was evoked merely as that, a threat as everyone involved knows 
that the proceedings are long and tedious, and more often than not the sum is not as 
significant to pursue it legally. It is the combined loss of valid identification, threat of 
criminal persecution but most importantly losing the ‘trust’ of the creditors that lends 
these informal networks their tenacity and robustness.
With the announcement of notebandi on the night of 8 November, the sustenance of 
the informal networks of monetary exchange in Govindpuri suffered a serious blow, 
and this was not solely on account of the lack of circulating currencies but more sig-
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nificantly on the challenging of the delicately calibrated project of ensuring ‘trust’. In 
the weeks following demonetization, an announcement was made to the effect of the 
government considering taking sterner actions against default and dishonouring of the 
cheques issued (i.e. bouncing of cheques). These included the threat of arrest after a 
month’s notice-period to the issuing party, even if the case is not yet settled.
By the second-week of demonetization, Pooja and Akki’s professional engagements 
were still limited, and the task of running their household on a daily basis was posing 
serious concerns. The shopkeepers were refusing credit beyond a limit, and whatever 
few thousand cash they had in old currencies had been changed, even at the cost of 
the change commission. The byaaz ka business was not yielding any returns. The bor-
rowers were unable to return either the principal amount or the interest accrued, and 
whilst Pooja and Akki took turns to visit them on an almost daily basis, even their hope-
less situation was not lost to them to exert any undue pressure.
As Akki put it, ‘of course we would go there, and often abusive arguments would en-
sue, but what else to be done? They did not have the money, period. We were only so 
insistent because we had the creditors breathing down our necks, but what could have 
been done? We have been in this business together for so long, but never has it been 
this bad. We have lost monies, trust and respect. The creditors have started sending 
their ‘boys’ as regularly as we were visiting those who borrowed money from us. We 
have never felt so humiliated and helpless in all these years’.
Pooja tried to raise a loan against her gold jewellery, which is another common practice 
of those who can afford it in the slums, from firms operating locally. However, she was 
informed that not only are the credit-interest rates as high as 24% but also that the 
money will be transferred in the bank accounts and handed to them in cash. This was 
not a viable option on both the accounts; the high interest rate (and the subsequent 
inability to repay it and thus loss of the jewellery) but also the transfer into their bank 
account did not offer them any respite as the withdrawals were still limited to a daily 
amount of only 2,500, if indeed cash was available in the banks.
Unable to manage the serious and severe financial crisis, Akki decided to take on 
an assignment for two weeks in Jaipur whilst Pooja agreed to stay back to hold the 
fort in Delhi. It was thought that Akki’s visit would yield earnings up to 80,000 INR 
of which they would pay half to the creditors, thus placating them until the situation 
was stabilised.
On one of the days whilst Akki was away, and Pooja was not at home running some 
errands, two of the ‘boys’ paid a visit to ‘yet again remind them’ about their due pay-
ments. At their house, the ‘boys’ have visited when I have been there, both before 
and during demonetization. Even when Pooja and Akki’s respective partners would be 
present (both of them are unemployed), it would be the women of the house who would 
engage with them. These interactions even though meant to be showing of strength are 
marked by friendly banter and gentle reminders of the payments due.
However, on this occasion with both Akki and Pooja absent, their payment overdue 
by almost two-months and a cold, reticent welcome by the latter’s partner refusing 
to give any reassurance irked the creditors. They tried to reach Akki, but she was 
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unavailable, and dreading that they might have done a runner, the creditor depos-
ited the post-dated, account payee cheque issued by Akki in his bank.
Discussion
In the immediate, everyday materiality it was not so much the lack of the money to 
transact with — the loose change, so to say — which was being lamented upon, but 
its impact on networks of monetary exchanges which form the lifeline of sustenance in 
the slums, especially for the women with no regular jobs (steady employment). These 
included the manner that the chit-fund groups would conduct their business; the in-
vestments (or the money) circulating in the informal, credit interest networks (byaaz ka 
business) and how it would affect the ‘side-businesses’. The last included, but were 
not limited to, taking up sowing assignments from nearby ‘import-export’ factories, 
casual sex-work and such ‘beech ka kaam’, which remains an indeterminate but im-
portant form of employment and revenue generation for the women.
In that, the demons that the machinations of demonization had (and are still continu-
ally) unleashing were compelling women to not reflect on new strategies to negotiate 
the ‘disaster’, but instead accessing the accrued lived, experiential knowledge(s) and 
strategies of living in poverty as a series of continual, concomitant disastrous events.
Once the realization and the reality that the currency notes of 500 and 1000 were no 
longer legal, but to indeed actualize its worth, the residents of Govindpuri had to go 
through a long, arduous and ‘humiliating’ experience, the initial ‘euphoria’ about de-
monetization as ‘surgical strike’ began to be treated with certain circumspection. In the 
first week of the drive, the residents’ response to it resounded the ‘popular’ sentiment: 
‘of course, it is a good move, finally all the black monies in the county will be dealt with; 
there will be no corruption; for the good of the Nation, we can endure some pains’. 
In the initial-euphoric phase, the ‘ruptures’ the demonetization drive necessitated – 
namely, being cashless and standing in the queues – did not pose a threat to the fabric 
of everyday life in Govindpuri. These predicaments are not ‘new’ to the residents, and it 
was reckoned ‘jo thoda bahut saheyega woh sambaal lega’, those who persevere, they 
will wade through the tide.
However, the everyday, especially for those living in conditions of precarity, is not a 
neatly folded negotiation between individuals, situations, structures, interruptions 
and eventualities. The co-and-inter-dependence between the different factors/actors/
events which lend to the everyday of the poor the tenacity — often (problematically) 
celebrated as ‘juggad’ — to ‘innovate, improvise and eventually overcome’ the ‘rup-
tures’ also operate in the same or similar realm of precarity which becomes of the poor.
The precariousness of the networks within which the poor have to negotiate their 
everyday lives however should not be confused with a lack of tenacity of these net-
works. The tenacity of these networks (and thus the lives of the poor) is a delicately 
balanced and negotiated act of ‘trust’, accrued on account of long-term, sustained 
and shared experiences of poverty; a compulsion to constantly negotiate structures 
of power for often basic access of resources; and a collective experiencing of mar-
ginality insidiously and extensively affected in their immediate, extended, imagined 
and aspirational sites of selves which lends to further accentuating their distance 
from the sites of the structures of power.
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Whilst it is tempting, and the general tendency is, to situate the value of trust as a 
currency in the lives of those living in conditions of precarity and on the margins, an 
arbitrariness outside of the realm of formal logic and reasoning, this is a deliberately 
(systemically and systematically) perpetuated reckoning solely on the account that 
poverty is a difficult text to read, and its committed readers few and far between.
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Crowdfund Everything
What is crowdfunding for? One could assume that, if asked such a question, most of 
the people that know this word (according to a study by the Pew Research Center, 
61% of Americans have never heard of it1) would refer to innovative products or ser-
vices, album releases, documentaries, books, videogames, or comics. In other words, 
they will be inclined to associate crowdfunding with the endeavors of tech startups and 
the creative industries.
This assumption is partly confirmed by the data available on the highest funded crowd-
funding projects.2 Besides the great number of cryptocurrency-related campaigns run 
independently or through Ethereum in the top ten, most of the projects were hosted 
by either Kickstarter or Indiegogo, both platforms generally used to finance creative or 
innovative undertakings. Of course, the sheer amount of money raised lures a compa-
rable magnitude of media attention, thus establishing a feedback loop between the ag-
gregation of a large public through big news outlets and financial success. This is the 
case of Pebble, a smartwatch idea which collected more than 40 million dollars during 
three separate Kickstarter campaigns. This massive crowdfunding achievement didn't 
prevent the company from shutting down after four years of activity.
Another reason why crowdfunding is generally associated with creativity and innova-
tion has to do with its origins. The practice of collecting monetary contributions from 
internet users emerged primarily as a means of financing artistic ventures. One of these 
was the U.S. tour of the British rock band Marillion, made possible in 1997 by the 
$60,000 of their fans' online donations.3 This early instance, in which online fundrais-
ing wasn't yet a streamlined process, reminds us that crowdfunding itself is an entre-
preneurial idea first implemented in the context of the arts. Thanks to crowdfunding, 
what was an informal exchange with an audience was turned into a business model. 
Now, two decades later, nurturing a community is considered one of the fundamental 
features of crowdfunding.4
1 Aaron Smith, ‘Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy’, Pew Research 
Center: Internet, Science & Tech, 19 May 2016, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-
digital-economy/.
2 ‘List of Highest Funded Crowdfunding Projects.’ Wikipedia, 12 May 2017, https://en.wikipedia.
org/w/index.php?title=List_of_highest_funded_crowdfunding_projects&oldid=780102024.
3 Jack Preston, ‘How Marillion Pioneered Crowdfunding in Music’, Virgin Blog, 20 October 2014, 
https://www.virgin.com/music/how-marillion-pioneered-crowdfunding-in-music.
4 Ethan Mollick, ‘The Unique Value of Crowdfunding Is Not Money — It’s Community’, Harvard 
Business Review, 21 April 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-unique-value-of-crowdfunding-is-not-
money-its-community.
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The managerial impetus of these musicians adds a new layer of meaning to the notion 
of creative destruction formulated by Viennese economist Joseph Schumpeter, where 
a new commodity, technology, type of organization, etc. erodes preexisting economic 
structures and creates new ones.5 Since the relationship with fans is part of an artist's 
practice, using it to gather donations is a financial invention where the artistic, creative 
component is fundamental. Crowdfunding originates as an idea that creatively dete-
riorates the role and position of middlemen and evolves as an expression of creative 
entrepreneurialism, where there is no clear boundary between the ‘creative’ and the 
‘entrepreneurial’. More specifically, the former becomes a function of the latter and 
vice-versa. As the band recounts:
We then sacked the manager. We emailed the 6000 fans on our database to ask, 
‘Would you buy the album in advance?’ most replied ‘yes.’ [...] That was the crowd-
funding model that has been so successfully imitated by many others including the 
most successful, KickStarter.
Surprisingly, despite the artistic legacy of crowdfunding and the recurrent media coverage 
of innovation, the primary destination of online contributions is neither edgy technology 
nor artistic work, but personal fundraising. While 68% of U.S. donors have contributed 
to campaigns launched to help a person in need, only 34% funded a new product and 
30% decided to support musicians and other kind of artists.6 Furthermore, GoFundMe, 
a platform focused on social and personal campaigns, surpassed the bar of $3 billion 
dollar raised in 2016 while Kickstarter reached that goal only one year afterwards.7
GoFundMe is not the only platform mainly devoted to personal crowdfunding. There is 
also YouCaring, GiveForward, and even Indiegogo has its own parallel charity crowd-
funding platform called Generosity. Does their core business make them different from, 
say, Kickstarter? Do they incarnate a fundraising logic different from the one of crowd-
funding sites focused on art and invention? In other words, is there a fundamental 
difference between asking money for a medical emergency and an Internet of Things 
gadget? In the following sections I describe a series of campaigns that reveal the way 
in which personal crowdfunding encourages, and to some extent requires, creative 
entrepreneurialism. The reason why I am specifically interested in the campaigns ini-
tiated by these ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ is that while undergoing the dynamics of 
crowdfunding, they expand its scope in different ways.
The Unpaid Intern as Media Company
Nowadays, internships represent one of the few viable paths to initiate a career in the 
most diverse professional sectors. The internship, which is originally meant to be a 
learning experience, is therefore reframed as an opportunity to eventually land a job. 
5 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London and New York, NY: Routledge, 
2013, pp. 83, 84.
6 Aaron Smith, ‘Shared, Collaborative and On Demand’.
7 Ingrid Lunden, ‘Gofundme Passes $3b Raised on Its Platform, Adding $1b in Only the Last 5 
Months’, TechCrunch, 18 October 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/18/gofundme-raises-
3b-on-its-platform-raising-1b-in-only-the-last-5-months/. Justin Kazmark, ‘$3 Billion Pledged 
to Independent Creators on Kickstarter.’ Kickstarter Blog, 26 April 2017, https://www.kickstarter.
com/blog/3-billion-pledged-to-independent-creators-on-kickstarter.
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Because of high demand, companies and institutions — even well-established ones — 
can easily offer internships that are paid little money or not paid at all. In other words, 
the internship is understood as a required investment to enter the labor market. It isn't 
hard to appreciate the way in which these unpaid internships contribute to exacerbate 
class advantage, since only the individuals who have enough financial stamina are able 
to afford this point of access to professional life.8
 
 
Fig. 1. Unpaid internship campaigns on GoFundMe.
What about all the others? They need to come up with creative solutions. Crowdfund-
ing is one of those. At the time of writing, a search for ‘unpaid internship’ on GoFund-
Me generates almost five hundred results, while the campaigns generically related to 
internships are more than ten thousand. These campaigns feature young graduates 
smiling at the camera, passionately describing their interests and academic achieve-
ments while detailing their specific financial needs. The descriptions, which fluctuate 
between very elaborate pitches and extremely concise blurbs, are characterized by a 
mongrel literary genre in which the diary, the résumé and the business plan converge. 
This new literature already has its own manuals, like a GoFundMe guide for a success-
ful education-related campaign.9
 
Fig. 2. Still from Clement Nocos’ video pitch.
8 Cfr. Precarious Workers Brigade, Training for Exploitation?, London/Leipzig/Los Angeles: Journal 
of Aesthetics and Protest, 2017, pp. 12-3; Ross Perlin, Intern Nation: How to Earn Nothing and 
Learn Little in the Brave New Economy, London: Verso, 2014.
9 ‘How to Run a Successful GoFundMe Campaign for College Expenses.’ GoFundMe Tutorials, 
https://pages.gofundme.com/fundraiser-success-tips/college-fundraising-tips/.
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The story of Clement Nocos is at the same time an exemplary case of crowdfunding 
an unpaid internship and an exceptional one. In 2016, Nocos, a Master of Public Policy 
graduate and activist from Canada, got accepted for a prestigious internship at the 
United Nations, a ‘one-time-only’ opportunity, as he somehow ironically defines it.10 
There was only one drawback: the internship was unpaid, a decisive problem given the 
steep cost of living in a city like New York.
For his campaign, Nocos chose Generosity, Indiegogo's side-platform ‘for human 
goodness’, because of the absence of an expiry date, the possibility of adding ‘perks’ 
and the regular disbursement of funds. In order to gather attention, he produced a 
four-minute-long videoclip explaining why people should donate to his campaign. To 
make the video effective, Nocos, a political scientist, crafted his message with the aim 
of entertaining his audience: he included some photoshopped images of himself and 
a few ironic intermezzos accompanied by an old school hip-hop soundtrack. Further-
more, Nocos took advantage of some promotional strategies, such as asking only half 
of the money he needed or offering a United Nations mug (‘not for sale!’) to particularly 
generous donors. The campaign's description resembles the FAQ section of a website, 
including such questions as ‘Why should I help you?’ and ‘What do you need?’ At the 
bottom of the page, Nocos offers a breakdown of his expenses (250$ per month are for 
food). His efforts included a ‘crafty social media campaign’, deemed almost indispens-
able by the platform which constantly insists on sharing public updates.
 
 
Fig. 3. Detail from Nocos' video pitch.
In a post on Medium, Nocos explains the reasons and the results of his campaign in 
detail.11 As he puts it,
it seems like getting on the internship grind was the only way to get that work ex-
perience that has apparently become necessary for securing at least precarious, 
entry-level employment.
10 Clement Nocos’ crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo’s Generosity, https://www.generosity.com/
education-fundraising/clem-s-united-nations-internship-blog-podcast/.
11 Clement Nocos, ‘The Crowdfunding Grind: Why It’s Not Paying for an Unpaid Internship’, Medium, 
1 August 2016, https://medium.com/@amaturhistorian/the-crowdfunding-grind-why-its-not-
paying-for-an-unpaid-internship-96a3d82c0d22#.j3vs4pw2j.
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He describes crowdfunding as his only viable choice for financing the internship, 
while still having to deal with student debt (‘Why Crowdfunding? What else do I 
got?’). In preparation of his campaign, Nocos realized that he wasn't the only one 
trying to finance his internship through crowdfunding, and this is why he ‘felt the 
need to differentiate’. So, he started a blog and a podcast about the grinds of in-
ternship at the United Nations (12 episodes to date). Out of the $6,000 he aimed 
to raise, he was able to gather less than $2,000 over a year. Reflecting back on 
his experience, Nocos, who was skeptical of crowdfunding in the first place, could 
only confirm his original feelings. He speaks of social media fatigue, he mentions 
the uneasiness of having to ask money to a circle of friends who are often going 
through a tough situation, and he concludes that ‘the crowdfunding market has liter-
ally crowded itself out when it comes to people asking for money to replace labour 
income for their unpaid internships.’
Despite the meager loot he gained, Nocos’ efforts produced an additional result. It 
didn’t take long before self-promotion turned into a critique addressing the very is-
sue of unpaid internships. In his podcast ‘The Internship Grind’, he discussed the Fair 
Internship Initiative, the book Intern Nation by Ross Perlin, and he interviewed Na-
thalie Berger and David Leo Hyde, currently shooting An Unpaid Act, a documentary 
on unpaid internships and precarity. Nonetheless, looking back at this activity, Nocos 
humbly acknowledges the ambivalence of ‘selfishly’ lobbying for a personal cause and 
addressing a structural condition:
But to be frank, the podcast isn’t all just about documenting this kind of crappy 
quirk of the modern labour market. It was intentionally self-serving, in a way, to 
draw attention to my own crowdfunding campaign and make it more visible for 
potential donors.
What role did Nocos play in his own campaign? As he was aware that crowdfund-
ing success is strictly related to the user's ability to operate as a media company, 
he acted simultaneously as a copywriter, a video-maker, a social media manager, 
and an accountant.
Call to Action Meets Activism
On personal crowdfunding platforms, it is not uncommon to read about a broken arm, 
a heart transplant, or a rare disease. In these cases the campaign goals range from a 
few thousand dollars to more than half a million. $60,000 was the amount asked by Kati 
McFarland, a 25 year-old photographer from Arkansas suffering from Ehlers-Danlos 
Syndrome, a genetic disorder causing many different complications like fainting, fa-
tigue and stomach paralysis. She sums up her condition by saying that she ‘can barely 
walk /stand / eat w/o severe pain/ dislocations / vomiting / blackout’.12
12 Kati McFarland’s campaign on YouCaring: https://www.youcaring.com/kati-mcfarland-588646.
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 Fig. 4. Detail from the image gallery on McFarland's campaign.
After her father suddenly passed away, McFarland found herself alone struggling to 
manage her medical expenses that exceed by far the benefits provided by the State. 
This is why she started a fundraiser on YouCaring, a platform that unlike GoFundMe 
doesn't take any fee on the donations.13 McFarland's campaign doesn't look as care-
fully crafted as Nocos’ one. She doesn't have a video on her page, only a few images 
showing her while being under medical treatments and some screenshots of the relat-
ed costs. The first part of the description follows the usual script of personal storytell-
ing while the second part is an extremely detailed cost breakdown filled with medical 
technicalities. Given the short attention spans internet users have grown accustomed 
to, it isn't hard to understand why it took her more than 7,000 re-blogs and shares to 
reach a preliminary goal of 1,200 dollars.
 
 
Fig. 5. Detail from the interface of Generosity.
Things changed for McFarland when she attended a talk by congressman Tom Cot-
ton, an ardent opponent of Obamacare, the healthcare act that the new Trump ad-
ministration is trying to repeal. During the event, she took the floor and explained to 
the congressman that without the coverage provided by the Affordable Care Act she 
13 YouCaring and Generosity don’t charge any fee. However, a 2.9% is deducted by credit card 
processors like Paypal, We Pay, or Stripe: ‘Free Fundraising’, YouCaring, https://www.youcaring.
com/c/free-fundraising.
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would lose her life (‘I will die. That is not hyperbole.’). McFarland asked him whether 
he would commit not only to the repeal of the act, but also to building a proper sub-
stitute. This is when the audience exploded in a big round of applause. After Cotton 
tried to skirt the issue, the crowd vocally expressed its disapproval by repeatedly 
shouting ‘do your job’.14
After being published on the internet, Kati McFarland’s intervention gained some de-
gree of virality. Then, she started to see her fundraiser grow at a surprisingly increased 
rate. In the meantime, McFarland had been invited to talk about what happened on 
several TV news programs, where she asserted the need to give a face to the collective 
demand for accessible healthcare. However, this effort wasn’t disconnected from the 
promotion of the campaign, a matter of life and death for her:
there are many things I wish I could have said [...] but unfortunately I just had to fo-
cus on shoehorning in the link to this fundraiser (probably to Don Lemon’s chagrin), 
but you gotta do what you gotta do when medical bills are involved.15
Of course, the media attention that McFarland got thanks to her intervention had a 
positive effect on the donations to her campaign. But at the same time, her story be-
came symbolic of all the patients endangered by ill-advised policy making. In a similar 
way to Nocos, Kati McFarland had to deal with the highly ambiguous space where per-
sonal promotion goes hand in hand with the attempt to shed light on a structural deficit.
First as Arts, Then as Tragedy
Around 2007 a meme started to circulate on the internet. It was the picture of a kid on 
a beach holding a fist full of sand, with an expression of pride on his face. The picture 
became known as ‘Success Kid’ and it is still used nowadays to either express frus-
tration or describe situations in which one is ‘winning’.16 In 2015, Sam Griner, the boy 
impersonating the ‘Success Kid’ meme, now 8 years old, availed himself of his online 
popularity to fund the transplant of his father’s kidney. A campaign was launched on 
GofundMe including only one family picture with Sam in the middle and a concise 
account of the calamity. The campaign raised more than $100,000, thanks to which 
the transplant was eventually possible. Significantly, on The Verge, the news was pub-
lished under the category of entertainment.17
Despite its happy ending, this vicissitude can be read as a cautionary tale about the 
role played by social and news media attention when it comes to personal crowd-
funding. Here, a series of more or less arbitrary criteria increase the chances of a 
campaign's success, although without guaranteeing it. After all, there is still no such 
thing as a science of virality. Such vagueness is confirmed by the overly generic tips 
14 Adi Cohen, ‘Donations Pour In For Woman Who Yelled At Her Senator’, Vocativ, 23 February 2017, 
http://www.vocativ.com/405313/donations-woman-yelled-senator-town-hall/.
15 McFarland, ibid.
16 ‘Success Kid / I Hate Sandcastles’, Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/
success-kid-i-hate-sandcastles.
17 Amar Toor, ‘The Internet Just Helped ‘Success Kid’ Raise Money for His Dad’s Kidney Transplant’, 
The Verge, 17 April 2015, https://www.theverge.com/2015/4/17/8439483/success-kid-father-
kidney-transplant-crowdfunding.
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offered by GoFundMe itself: ‘avoid blurry pictures [...] Write a catchy and descriptive 
title. Which title sounds better? ‘I Need Money!’ or ‘Julie’s Rally Against Cancer’... the 
second one, right?’18 A title needs to be ‘catchy’ in order to stand out from the plethora 
of running campaigns. In this scenario, the access to an informal means of protection 
against emergencies turns into a race where online media literacy is a valuable com-
petitive advantage.
 
Fig. 6. Message from a donor to the ‘Success Kid’’s father.
As writer Alana Massey points out, crowdfunding for medical care represents the most 
radical transformation of fundraising since the 80s. At that time, another crucial shift 
was taking place: charities were converting their model into an individual-based spon-
sorship. Instead of being asked to ‘sponsor children in need’, donors would be now 
invited to ‘sponsor a child in need’.19 The singularization of solidarity which is also 
embedded in crowdfunding sites is often understood as a positive feature, because it 
offers ‘the opportunity to help one specific person and help change one person’s life’.20 
Furthermore, the individual-based relationship between the donor and the beneficiary 
is reinforced by the direct contact between them offered by crowdfunding platforms.
Considering the telegraphic style of several campaigns, one could assume that many 
of those are only meant to address family members and friends who are already aware 
of the issue at stake. In this case, crowdfunding offers a convenient interface that fa-
cilitates the coordination of fundraising. But frequently the hope is to reach a crowd of 
strangers and therefore compete for their attention. A crowd whose choices are likely 
reflective of several biases.21 Among them, there is one that sounds particularly gloomy 
18 ‘GoFundMe Guide: Six Steps to a Successful Campaign.’ GoFundMe Help Center, http://support.
gofundme.com/hc/en-us/articles/203604494-GoFundMe-Guide-Six-Steps-to-a-Successful-
Campaign.
19 Alana Massey, ‘Mercy Markets’, Real Life, 11 April 2017, http://reallifemag.com/mercy-markets/.
20 Amanda Mikelberg, ‘Gofundme Is a Tuition Money Machine in New York City’, Metro, 15 February 
2017, http://www.metro.us/new-york/gofundme-is-a-tuition-money-machine-in-new-york-city/
zsJqbo---bbddbvpGbRm6.
21 A 2016 study shows that Kickstarter crowdfunding projects including photos of black subjects 
have a significantly lower success rate. Cfr. Lauren Rhue and Jessica Clark. ‘Who Gets Started on 
Kickstarter? Racial Disparities in Crowdfunding Success’, SSRN Scholarly Paper, Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 9 September 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2837042.
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when associated with personal crowdfunding: survivorship bias, the habit of focusing 
on successful past experiences while ignoring the others.22 As writer Anne Helen Pe-
tersen puts it, ‘crowdfunding is fantastic at addressing need — but only certain types, 
and for certain people.’23
Crowdfunding success is bolstered by online media dexterity. Journalist Luke O'Neil 
emphasizes this aspect: ‘I often joke lately that I used to think I've wasted my life on 
Twitter, but it might actually come in handy when I inevitably need to crowdfund an op-
eration. You have to hustle. You have to market. You have to build your brand.’ O’Neil 
also draws a direct parallel between medical crowdfunding and the ecosystem of tech 
entrepreneurship. He sarcastically associates the presentation of GoFundMe users’ 
medical history to the stereotypical narrative of startups, implicitly revealing a similarity 
between an appeal to charitable spirits and a pitch to a venture capital firm: ‘Think of 
your cancer as the origin story a tech startup tells about itself on the About section of 
its website’, he suggests.24
Emerging from O’Neil’s remarks is the alleged content neutrality of crowdfunding, no 
matter whether it is employed to finance the ‘Coolest Cooler’ or used as a means to 
alleviate the hardships looming throughout the whole spectrum of a lifetime.25 The way 
in which Indiegogo introduces Generosity reveals the way in which crowdfunding is 
generalized by a mere extension of its target group:
We started Indiegogo in 2008 with a simple idea: Give people the power and 
resources to bring their ideas to life. Over the years we’ve watched in delight 
as inventors, musicians, storytellers, and activists pushed the boundaries of our 
original vision. [...] Inspired by the seemingly boundless compassion and creative 
spirit of our users, we challenged ourselves to do more — this time for the very 
people and causes that often need help the most. The ones that fall through the 
cracks. The ones that need a second chance. The ones on the brink. Generos-
ity helps cancer patients with bills and students with tuition. Generosity boosts 
humanitarian efforts into new countries and helps nonprofits move quickly with 
their causes. Generosity fills the gap at the end of a tough month and supports 
the village after the storm.26
In other words, crowdfunding repeats itself, first as arts, then as tragedy. But while 
doing so, it preserves the promotional language and entrepreneurial dynamics that 
characterize fundraising for art or innovation: things like ‘perks’, enforced social 
media bombardment, strategies borrowed from advertising, and, as Ian Bogost 
22 In 2014, I created Kickended.com, an archive of Kickstarter’s $0-pledged campaigns, to be able 
to navigate and bring attention to campaigns unable to raise any money, thus opposing the 
survivorship bias embedded in both news media and the interfaces of crowdfunding platforms.
23 Anne Helen Petersen, ‘The Real Peril of Crowdfunding Health Care’, BuzzFeed, 10 March 2017, 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/annehelenpetersen/real-peril-of-crowdfunding-healthcare.
24 Luke O’Neil, ‘Go Viral or Die Trying.’ Esquire, 28 March 2017, http://www.esquire.com/news-
politics/a54132/go-viral-or-die-trying/.
25 The ‘Coolest Cooler’ is a cooler equipped with a blender and speakers that raised more than 13 
million dollars on Kickstarter.
26 Generosity's mission statement: https://www.generosity.com/.
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maintains, a semblance of the reality show.27 All of these aspects, critically ad-
dressed by artist and activist Josh MacPhee, survive in campaigns about survival:
Our goal — our imperative — is to harden ourselves and our projects into cohesive, 
likable, and salable commodities. We wake up as brands, joyously exulting in these 
flattened, logo-like versions of ourselves. Clean and efficient with soft, smooth cor-
ners and antiseptic Helvetica expressions. What is not to love about these new forms, 
so sleek and attractive on the outside, with the promise of aiding us in the fulfillment 
of the last remaining human right in our society: the right to be an entrepreneur?28
Sadtrepreneurs
During the MyCreativity Sweatshop event, American novelist Bruce Sterling gave a 
talk entitled ‘Whatever Happens to Musicians, Happens to Everybody’. He portrayed 
musicians as ‘patient zero in the critical injury clinic of the creative sweatshop’. Sterling 
referred to them as an avant-garde of the precarity experienced by creative workers. 
He also reflected on crowdfunding as a means to sustain their practice, concluding 
that wouldn't be a good idea since ‘the crowd lacks imagination’.29 According to Brett 
Neilson and Ned Rossiter, the creative worker is considered by many the precarious 
subject par excellence.30 Now that creative solutions are becoming a crucial means of 
addressing various forms of precariousness, we might read Sterling’s portrait of musi-
cians as canaries in the coal mine as an alarmingly vivid prediction. The people running 
campaigns on sites like GoFundMe can be seen as creative workers whose very me-
dium is their own adversities, carrying out a practice sustained by an entrepreneurial 
attitude that includes management and promotion.
The Web is full of labels referring to specific types of entrepreneurs. Online, we read of 
kidtrepreneurs, solopreneurs, or even botrepreneurs. Looking at these campaigns, it 
seems that the more precariousness is present, the less entrepreneurialism becomes 
voluntary.31 So, we might introduce yet another blend-word to identify the users of 
personal crowdfunding sites. Many of those are ‘sadtrepreneurs’, subjects that unwill-
ingly, or at least ambivalently, behave as entrepreneurs. To them, the creativity needed 
to run a successful campaign is not a liberating force, but a strategic necessity linked 
to subsistence or even survival.
Far from being uniquely the result of one’s own passion, entrepreneurially performed 
‘creative’ undertakings are increasingly becoming an obligation. More and more peo-
ple reluctantly join the ranks of a novel kind of creative underclass whose very medium 
27 Ian Bogost, ‘Kickstarter: Crowdfunding Platform Or Reality Show?’, Fast Company, 18 July 2012, 
https://www.fastcompany.com/1843007/kickstarter-crowdfunding-platform-or-reality-show.
28 Josh MacPhee. ‘Who’s the Shop Steward on Your Kickstarter?’, The Baffler, 4 March 2014, 
https://thebaffler.com/salvos/whos-the-shop-steward-on-your-kickstarter.
29 Bruce Sterling, ‘Whatever Happens to Musicians, Happens to Everybody’, MyCreativity 
Sweatshop, Amsterdam, 20 November 2014, https://vimeo.com/114217888.
30 Brett Nielson and Ned Rossiter, ‘From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again: Labour, Life 
and Unstable Networks’, Fibreculture 5 (2005), http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-022-from-
precarity-to-precariousness-and-back-again-labour-life-and-unstable-networks/.
31 I call ‘entreprecariat’ the mutual relationship between entrepreneurialism and precarity. Cfr. 
Silvio Lorusso, ‘What Is the Entreprecariat?’, The Entreprecariat, 27 November 2016, http://
networkcultures.org/entreprecariat/what-is-the-entreprecariat/.
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is constituted by its members’ personal necessities. Is there a possibility to combine 
compulsory creative entrepreneurialism with genuine expressions of discomfort? Is 
it possible to do PR through precarity and against precarization? In this grim sce-
nario, the stories of Clement Nocos and Kati McFarland reflect the urge to divert atten-
tion solely from individual miseries to the broader structural conditions causing them. 
Would this effort be worth a monumental crowdfunding campaign?
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Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an Uncontested Practice’, Media and Communi-
cation 3.3 (20 October 2015).
Introduction
One of the main functions of government is to provide certain benefits (cash, goods, 
or services) to the people who need them. We call this ‘the welfare state’. Some needs 
are universal (clean running water, national security) while others only apply to certain 
categories of people (only children go to public schools; only homeowners get home-
owner tax credits). The state collects data on people in order to know what categories 
they fall in, and consequently what kinds of benefits they should receive. At times it 
may collect additional data to learn how well a program is working and how it might be 
improved. Ideally, the point of this surveillance is to direct resources to the right places 
to maximize human wellbeing and minimize waste. Unfortunately, it doesn’t always 
work that way. The system of poverty relief (‘welfare’) in the United States exemplifies 
how surveillance systems can reinforce social structures of oppression by measuring 
what elites care about (welfare fraud) and ignoring the things that common sense and 
human decency might emphasize (alleviating poverty).
The Surveillance Society
We are now living in a pervasive surveillance society, and most of us either don’t know it 
or don’t care. There are at least three interlinked yet distinct ‘surveillant assemblages’: 
the remnants of the welfare state, the national security state, and surveillance capital-
ism. While some people are uncomfortable with any data being collected about them 
at all, others argue that some degree of surveillance is necessary for governments and 
businesses to function. States need to know how many children live in a given city to 
ensure there are enough teachers, and law enforcement agencies have a legitimate 
interest in (for example) lawfully wiretapping suspected criminals in order to prosecute 
them. Meanwhile, businesses can often provide better service when they know who 
their customers are, what they want, and how much they are willing to pay for it.
There are a lot of good reasons to resent and resist surveillance. One of those reasons 
is that surveillance systems are designed with particular goals in mind that aren’t nec-
essarily clear to the people being surveilled, that they may not share, and that may not 
be to their benefit. Once the system is in place it takes on a life of its own, ruthlessly 
replicating its own logic even if that logic defies common sense. In this essay, I use 
the example of poverty relief programs in the United States, also known as ‘welfare’, 
to show how a mass surveillance system built on faulty premises — key among them, 
the notion that preventing fraud is more important than ending poverty — actually per-
petuates poverty and prevents itself from learning how to end it. Even as the system 
relentlessly seeks out every scrap of information about the poor to verify their deserv-
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ingness, it deliberately fails to provide data that would help administer programs more 
effectively. This is a stunning paradox: a system whose guiding principle is the collec-
tion of information yields virtually no data that could meaningfully inform public policy.
What I Mean by ‘Surveillance’
By surveillance, I mean the routinized collection of data and monitoring of populations 
in their daily lives and routines through the use of networked databases — what Roger 
Clarke calls ‘dataveillance’.1 Many individual data collection events — a web search, 
a car rental, a fingerprint — are fairly trivial on their own. When people say they have 
‘nothing to hide’, what they often mean is that they can’t imagine the mundane data 
points of their daily lives being interesting to someone else. And that’s often true of 
individual data points taken in isolation. They acquire their value when billions of them 
are combined in vast networked databases. Data sitting quietly in vast repositories 
isn’t the main issue either. It’s what people do with the data that matters. Big data ana-
lytics, data science and data mining all refer to the complex operations of discovery 
that allow surveillant organizations to piece together disparate pieces of information 
in order to generate insight and act on it. That action can take many forms: to grant a 
government benefit, to order a drone strike against a suspected terrorist target, or to 
display a ‘more relevant’ piece of advertising.
Government surveillance conducted for law enforcement, intelligence or national security 
reasons has gotten a lot of attention since Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations about 
US government surveillance of the internet. As the Snowden documents showed, this 
surveillance often piggybacks on corporate data collection through covert programs like 
PRISM, overt law enforcement requests for user information, and brazen demands for 
access to certain travelers’ social media accounts. Unconstitutional government pro-
grams should be resisted on their own merits, yet it is important to remember that gov-
ernment agencies’ appetite for unlimited data access is enabled by the private sector.
Indeed, the past quarter-century has seen the emergence and growth of surveillance 
capitalism, ‘a deeply intentional and highly consequential new logic of accumulation’ 
built on ‘big data’, which ‘aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to 
produce revenue and market control’.2 Google was among the first major companies 
to monetize internet users’ data, and before long, advertising became the default busi-
ness model for new technology companies.3 Surveillance capitalism has consequenc-
es for social institutions, and even for democracy itself. Claims of voter manipulation 
perpetrated by private and/or foreign interests during the 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote and US 
presidential election via social media platforms have spurred renewed interest in the 
power of internet giants like Facebook, Google and Twitter.
The third type of routinized mass surveillance involves government agencies outside of 
the national security sphere, notably the ones tasked with providing social welfare — 
what I call ‘governance surveillance’. At its best, governance surveillance aims to be 
1 Roger A. Clarke, ‘Information Technology and Dataveillance’, Communications of the ACM 31 
(1988): 498–511.
2 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization’, Journal of Information Technology 30 (2015): 75–89.
3 Zuboff, ‘Big Other’, p. 77.
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responsive to the needs of the population, and public servants put safeguards in place 
to protect citizens from privacy violations and human rights harms. Population regis-
tries and identification systems in both rich and developing countries are the corner-
stone of this ‘surveillant assemblage’. Beyond that, the types of data that is collected 
and the uses of that data are highly context-specific. Some countries consider certain 
types of information too dangerous to be collected at all. For example, after population 
registries containing information about religious affiliation were used to murder over 
6 million Jews during World War II, a number of European countries banned the col-
lection of data about religion, race or ethnicity. This raises challenges for monitoring 
various kinds of disparities between ethnic groups, and is powerless to prevent many 
forms of discrimination, but the experience of the Holocaust taught many Europeans 
that the risks of collecting this data outweighed the potential benefits.
As societies become more connected, it becomes more and more rare for people to 
take even mundane actions without leaving a digital trace of that activity. Most of this 
activity is recorded in some database, somewhere. The ‘digital exhaust’ produced by 
the everyday activities of millions of internet users is mined by internet companies, 
whose databases are in turn targeted by national governments eager to use this data 
for their own purposes, using both legal and extralegal means.4 Companies outside of 
the internet sector are also amassing data on users, customers, and other humans, 
and leveraging this data for financial profit. The data brokerage system is so complex 
and so opaque, it is impossible to know for certain what the cybernetic machine of the 
surveillance society knows about any of us.5
Together, the parallel logics of governance surveillance, national security surveillance, 
and surveillance capitalism point to a near-future where all human activity is recorded 
and monitored, and where people are sorted into categories based on what the da-
tabases know about them. People then receive differential treatment based on their 
assigned categories, such as extra screening at airports, public subsidies, and tar-
geted advertising. This is what French philosopher Gilles Deleuze called the ‘control 
society’,6 and what Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson7 call the ‘surveillant assem-
blage’: an ‘only partially coordinated coming together of many and varied contem-
porary practices and processes that record, monitor, locate, track, observe and, yes, 
identify individuals so that they can be profiled and their personal data can be mined 
for further analysis’.8
In this context, the use of the term ‘surveillance’ isn’t necessarily a moral judgment. 
The word can have positive, negative, or neutral connotations depending on the con-
text. For example, public health surveillance (as understood by epidemiologists, for 
instance) is decidedly beneficial, while wiretapping leaders of an opposition political 
4 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State, 
New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co, 2014.
5 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, New York, N.Y: Da 
Capo Press, 1988.
6 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October (Winter 1992): 3–7.
7 Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty (eds), The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.
8 David Lyon, Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance, Cambridge, UK  and Malden, MA: Polity, 
2009, p. 55.
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party is more negative. A surveillance camera in a parking garage can be used for 
good (preventing or solving crimes) or for bad (surreptitiously recording the comings 
and goings of one’s spouse). Indeed, many kinds of surveillance and ‘dataveillance’ 
are requirements for modern societies to function. In many cases the phrase ‘monitor-
ing and evaluation’ is an accurate stand-in for ‘surveillance’. The people who run both 
public and private programs or projects use data to check whether they are meeting 
their goals, or to look for ways to make programs more efficient. Few people would 
disagree with this strategy in principle. The problem emerges when people in positions 
of power decide to measure the things that are important to them — and nothing else. 
The American social welfare system provides a poignant — if dispiriting — example of 
what happens when a system measures what elites care about (in this case, welfare 
fraud) and ignores the things that common sense and human decency might empha-
size (in this case, alleviating poverty).
Surveilling the Poor: The US Welfare State
It’s important to understand that the history of US social welfare diverges from the his-
tory of comparable programs in other rich countries. While European countries began 
providing state-run and tax-funded social safety nets and labor protections starting 
in the late 19th century, in the US the prevailing view of the elites was that assis-
tance to the needy would only encourage idleness and other undesirable behavior, 
and that social Darwinism would ensure that only the individuals with the best work 
ethic and moral character would prosper and reproduce. Franklin Delanoe Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, in the wake of the Great Depression, represented a departure from the 
past through programs such as the Works Progress Administration, later renamed the 
Works Projects Administration (WPA), which created employment through great work 
projects; Social Security, a retirement program for old age and the disabled; and many 
other poverty-relief programs collectively referred to as ‘welfare’.9
In addition to Social Security, intended to care for those relatively few (compared to 
today) individuals who made it to old age, New Deal welfare programs were designed 
to replace the earnings of an absent, deceased or otherwise incapacitated father fig-
ure, thereby allowing mothers to continue in their roles as homemakers and primary 
caregivers for their children. It is important to note that women of color were largely 
excluded from receiving benefits through both structural and individual-level racism on 
the part of program administrators.10
Decades later, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, which included both the War on Pov-
erty and civil rights legislation, went a long way toward easing the structural barri-
ers preventing poor blacks from receiving aid as well as institutionalizing the welfare 
system. The welfare assistance program was further expanded in the 60s as part of 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiative, intended to eradicate poverty and correct 
structural racial injustice. The War on Poverty was thus intertwined with government 
efforts to enact the demands of the civil rights movement. By the end of the Johnson 
Administration, the US appeared to be on its way to easing, if not eradicating, poverty.11
9 Brendon O’Connor, A Political History of the American Welfare System: When Ideas Have 
Consequences, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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However, as black Americans fought to access welfare programs,12 public perception 
of the average welfare recipient shifted from the virtuous white widow heroically raising 
her children alone to the lazy, promiscuous, deviant (and wholly imaginary) black ‘wel-
fare queen’ mythologized by Ronald Reagan.13 In the context of the Republican Party’s 
Nixon-era Southern Strategy, conservative attacks on poverty relief programs are to be 
understood as part of the ideology of white supremacy.
The 70s, 80s and early 90s saw two broad social changes that would prove crucial to 
the welfare system: changes to the family structure and demographic composition of 
welfare rolls, and technological advances in information management.14 Divorce and 
single parenthood became more prevalent, some of the structural barriers preventing 
poor people of color from accessing aid were dismantled, and the availability of birth 
control made single motherhood seem more and more like a choice, and less like an 
unavoidable tragedy. As a result, the American public (and legislators) became less 
willing to provide support to the poor, and especially to poor, black, single mothers 
who were increasingly stigmatized as lazy, promiscuous and undeserving. The ‘welfare 
queen’ rhetoric espoused by Reagan and others also contributed to increased preju-
dice and stigmatization of poor Americans.15
At the same time, networked databases made it possible to classify and surveil large 
populations, and to do so across administrative boundaries of city, county and state 
human services offices. The combination of increased motivation to reduce welfare 
spending and increased technical ability to monitor welfare recipients could only lead 
to increased surveillance. In the run-up to the 1996 election, Bill Clinton made a deal 
with the Gingrich Republicans to ‘end welfare as we know it’. The War on Poverty gave 
way to a war on the poor.
The 1996 welfare reform bill, formally (and tellingly) titled the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), was more concerned with sending a 
message to the poor (especially women of color) about personal morality than about 
designing evidence-based interventions to provide Americans with a basic minimum 
standard of living, much less durably lifting families out of poverty. As Brendon O’Connor 
notes, ‘the preamble to the PRWORA openly describes it as being principally concerned 
with overcoming the problems caused by out-of-wedlock births and welfare dependency. 
Further, the act claims that its purpose is to strengthen marriage, personal responsibility, 
and the work ethic’.16 Actually reducing poverty is nowhere on the agenda; the guiding 
principle is not meeting the basic needs of poor Americans, but fraud prevention.17
The Clinton welfare reform was based on the premise that nearly all parents should 
work outside the home to support their children, even if the wages they could com-
12 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward. Poor People's Movements: Why they Succeed, How 
they Fail. Vintage, 1979.
13 Ibid.
14 John Gilliom, Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001.
15 Kaaryn S. Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance and the Criminalization of Poverty, New 
York, NY: New York University Press, 2011.
16 O’Connor, A Political History of the American Welfare System. 
17 Gustafson, Cheating Welfare.
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mand in the labor market were less than the cost of childcare. By the 90s, women’s 
participation in the workforce was already well-entrenched, and that the idea that 
welfare ought to provide an income to poor, husbandless mothers, so that they might 
stay at home raising their children, was no longer acceptable to the American public. 
For many, the difficulties of raising children alone while working outside the home 
were simply the natural consequence of the ‘irresponsible choice’ to have children 
without a husband’s practical and financial support. As we will see, restricting poor 
women’s options with respect to their sexual and reproductive lives — arguably the 
most personal, private realms of human existence — is a feature, not a bug, of the 
American welfare system.
As a result, the welfare system’s priority isn’t relieving poverty, but making sure that no 
one who could be working receives public assistance — regardless of whether they are 
in school or caring for small children. The system prioritizes short-term self-sufficiency 
over giving people the tools to lift themselves out of poverty in the long run. Benefit lev-
els are woefully inadequate,18 and families must resort to alternative sources of income 
to make ends meet. The result is both endemic fraud and widespread underutilization 
of benefits to which individuals and families are legally entitled.19
The 1996 Act set time limits on how long individuals could receive benefits, imposed 
work requirements, and drastically tightened eligibility rules. The federally-run Assis-
tance for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced by Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF), which is implemented by the states. Under PRWORA 
the states are given clear incentives from the federal government to get as many of 
their welfare population working as possible. States are also free to impose even tight-
er eligibility rules and shorter time limits than those envisioned by the PRWORA.20
The Act also empowered state governments to delve into women’s personal and 
sexual lives by requiring single mothers to identify the biological fathers of their off-
spring and by capping TANF payments to families, meaning that ‘recipients do not 
receive any further money if they have more children while on the TANF program’. 
These ‘family size caps’ are meant to dissuade women from having additional chil-
dren while on welfare by barring newly born children from being included in benefit 
calculations. The implication is that the only ‘legitimate’ children are those born to 
a married mother and father, and that, by definition, the child of a mother on welfare 
18 Any good faith discussion of welfare fraud must begin by acknowledging the inadequacy of 
benefits. To use California as an example, as of 2011, the minimum basic standard of adequate 
care, as determined by the federal government, for a family of three was $1,135 per month. The 
Maximum Income for Initial Eligibility for a Family of Three was $1,224, meaning that families 
earning more than that amount are ineligible for aid. Families needed to already be significantly 
below the poverty line before they could even apply for aid. The asset limit was $2,000 ($3,000 
for households including an elderly person), plus one automobile per licensed driver — requiring 
families to have sold off virtually all their assets. The Maximum Monthly Benefit for a Family of 
Three with No Income was $638 (non-exempt) or $714 (exempt) — slightly more than half of what 
the government considers necessary for survival. By contrast, the MIT Living Wage Calculator 
project estimates that such a family needs $54,764 per year, or $4,564 per month, to make ends 
meet in California. See Amy K. Glasmeier and Eric Schulteis. ‘Poverty in America: Living Wage 
Calculator (California)’, MIT, 2015, http://livingwage.mit.edu/states/06.
19 Gustafson, Cheating Welfare.
20 O’Connor, A Political History of the American Welfare System.
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is not ‘legitimate’. During the PRWORA negotiations, ‘much of the debate cast ‘ille-
gitimacy’ as America’s most pressing social problem, and quickly blamed ‘welfare’ 
as its root cause’.21
While the Act’s authors preferred co-parents to be married to each other, in the absence 
of marriage they were determined to more strictly enforce child support requirements. 
The implementation of a national computer tracking system made it easier to locate 
non-resident parents across state lines and garnish their wages. Mothers who can’t or 
won’t identify their children’s biological father risk losing their TANF eligibility. Money 
recouped from so-called ‘dead-beat dads’ goes not to the children or their mother, 
but to the state as a reimbursement for the cost of support that the father should have 
been providing in the first place, with the exception of a $50 pass-through. Mothers 
thus have every economic incentive to resist identifying their children’s father.22
States also ‘have the discretion to deny benefits to unmarried teenage mothers’, ‘can 
mandate teenage mothers attend school’, and ‘require unwed minors to live with a par-
ent or guardian’ to receive aid23 — regardless of whether that is in the best interest of the 
young mother or her child. Meanwhile, ‘the act required the federal government to spend 
$50 million per year on a new abstinence education program in American schools’24 and 
provided ‘financial rewards to states that reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births 
as long as there is not a corresponding increase in the number of abortions performed 
in that state’.25 Yet for all the emphasis on preventing child-bearing by unmarried poor 
women, PRWORA did nothing to promote use or affordability of methods of birth con-
trol other than sexual abstinence. The real problem that PRWORA sought to eradicate 
wasn’t child poverty or even fatherlessness, but sexual activity by poor women (and 
especially poor women of color) outside the bounds of holy matrimony.
The Data That isn’t Collected
Welfare offices at every level of government spend exorbitant sums cross-referencing 
databases, following up on tips from welfare fraud hotlines, drug-testing, physically 
surveilling, and legally prosecuting the poor, ostensibly to save the taxpayer money by 
cutting off welfare frauds and cheaters. Yet there is next to no effort to measure how 
good these welfare programs are at actually relieving poverty.
The decentralized structure of welfare administration since 1996 makes it all but im-
possible to come by nationally comparable datasets on the welfare population or ben-
efit levels (or how much fraud prevention and eligibility enforcement costs). Because 
welfare programs are administered by the states on a county-by-county basis, the fed-
eral government has little to no authority to oversee or critically assess the adequacy of 
benefit levels, bureaucratic processes, or the return on investment in terms of assuring 
a decent quality of life for the poorest among us, much less helping people durably lift 
themselves out of poverty. For example, the statistics maintained by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) measure expenditures and the number of beneficia-
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23.  Ibid., p. 230.
24.  Ibid., p. 231.
25 Ibid.
192 MONEYLAB READER 2
A
ries; no effort is made to account for how well welfare programs meet recipients’ basic 
needs, or how well the programs are administered. In fact, states measure the success 
of their welfare programs by the number of needy Americans they can remove from the 
welfare rolls, regardless of what happens to these families afterward. Many simply lose 
eligibility and stop receiving aid.
The official statistics on welfare and poverty measure the wrong things in the wrong 
way, thereby creating non-factual ‘knowledge’ that hides genuine problems (hunger, 
poverty) while surfacing imaginary ones (illegitimacy, drug abuse, fraud, etc.). Rather 
than measuring the prevalence of poverty and its human costs, federal statistics focus 
on the administration of the programs. For example, the Tenth TANF Annual Report to 
Congress noted that in 2011, the Federal poverty threshold for a family of four (two 
adults plus two children) was $22,811, that 21.9% of children were living in poverty 
that year (16.1 million), and that the child poverty rate in 2011 was 5.7 percentage 
points higher than in 2000. However, the report does not mention whether TANF (or 
other welfare programs) was successful in reducing the number of American children 
(much less adults) living in poverty, or the percentage of need that is met. Even the 
report’s authors seem to be aware of the limitations of their data, noting that only a 
minority of poor families actually received the aid to which they were entitled:
Participation of Eligible Families
While many see TANF’s caseload decline as a measure of the success of welfare re-
form, the sharp decline in participation among eligible families also raises concerns 
about its effectiveness as a safety net program. HHS uses an Urban Institute model 
to estimate the percentage of families eligible for assistance under state rules that 
are actually receiving TANF assistance.
As shown in Figure 2-E, and Appendix Table 2:3, this participation rate data shows 
that the share of eligible families receiving TANF declined from 84 percent in 1995 
to 32 percent in 2009.26
From these figures, it should be possible to compare benefits awarded against the 
need they are intended to ameliorate, yet this is not done. The closest that the report 
comes is Figure 9B, ‘Income Poverty Gap for All Families with Children 1997−2011’. 
The poverty gap refers to the amount of money that would be required to raise all poor 
families to the poverty line. However, the figures are only provided with respect to fami-
lies with children — demonstrating a lack of concern for adults living in poverty — and 
are not broken down by state or by any other category. The figures convey the fact that 
in 2011, it would have cost $76.5 billion to raise all American children out of poverty, but 
stops short of providing any information that would help achieve this.
The example of federal statistics concerning TANF illustrates the broader reality that 
assessments of welfare programs emphasize inputs such as expenditures, ignoring pro-
26 ‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF): Tenth Report to Congress’, US 
Department of Health and Human Services, 12 December 2013, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/resource/tenth-report-to-congress.
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gram outputs and other measures of human wellbeing. From a public administration 
perspective this makes sense: the Department of Health and Human Services is legally 
mandated to collect and report these statistics. The question remains why it does not 
also provide measures of human wellbeing. Moreover, the fact that a practice is legally 
mandated provides an explanation for why it exists, but does not constitute a moral or 
ethical justification. As with many other situations (legal protections for whistleblowers 
come to mind), the United States and post-modern societies more broadly lack a mech-
anism for reconciling the gap between what is legal and what is ethically or morally just.
The information that is most crucially lacking in the current data flows concerning wel-
fare fall under three categories: the extent of need, how much of that need is met by the 
social safety net, and cost/benefit analyses of fraud prevention. The fact that so many 
members of the wealthiest society in human history are needy is reprehensible, and 
welfare programs ought to be evaluated by their success in meeting that need. Granular 
datasets and tables that examine these two types of measures by state, county, and 
various demographic dimensions would shed light on outcome disparities between dif-
ferent groups, thus allowing for targeted remedies. Finally, the effectiveness of fraud-
prevention schemes should be methodically assessed. Schemes that cost more than the 
amount saved should be eliminated, and the funding reinvested into benefit payments. 
For example, in 2009 the California State Auditor found that ‘the measurable savings 
resulting from early fraud detection activities exceed the costs of such efforts for Cal-
WORKs and approach cost neutrality for the food stamp program’.27 By this logic, then, 
early fraud detection was a valuable investment for CalWORKS, but not for food stamps. 
More state and local level auditors and Inspectors General should pursue this kind of 
analysis and pressure the agencies that administer welfare programs to do the same.
Conclusion
This brief case study on the American welfare system has demonstrated how a cyber-
netic surveillance system can perpetuate existing social inequality by measuring the 
wrong things in the wrong way, thereby creating non-factual ‘knowledge’ that hides 
genuine problems (hunger, poverty) while surfacing imaginary ones (illegitimacy, drug 
abuse, fraud, etc.).
Surveillance of welfare recipients is overwhelmingly concerned with the sexual and 
reproductive lives of poor women, as reflected by practices such as bed checks, 
family size caps, and home visits designed to catch women living with an unrelated 
male. Additionally, poor women — and increasingly, working class women — are 
denied access to birth control, then shamed and punished for becoming pregnant. 
As abortion care becomes increasingly restricted, the message sent to poor women 
is a simple choice: marriage or abstinence. Meanwhile, poor men are largely ex-
cluded from receiving aid since most welfare programs are designed to support 
children (and by association their caregivers, albeit begrudgingly). The main mech-
anism through which poor men are expected to interact with the welfare system is 
through child support collections.
27 Elain M. Howle, ‘Department of Social Services: For the CalWORKs and Food Stamp Programs, 
It Lacks Assessments of Cost-Effectiveness and Misses Opportunities to Improve Counties’ 
Antifraud Efforts’, California State Auditor, November 2009, https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/
reports/2009-101.pdf.
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Paradoxically, the reality is that welfare fraud is indeed endemic (both because benefits 
are inadequate and because compliance with the Kafkaesque welfare rules is nearly 
impossible), but so is underutilization of benefits to which individuals and families are 
legally entitled.28 The guiding principle of the welfare system, and of the Temporary 
Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program in particular, is not ensuring that people’s basic 
needs are met but preventing fraud through labyrinthine means tests and reporting 
requirements.29 States measure the success of their welfare programs by the number 
of needy Americans they can remove from the welfare rolls, regardless of what hap-
pens to these families afterward. A large body of social science research suggests that 
the guiding logic of the US welfare system is not the actual wellbeing of poor families, 
but punishing the poor for being poor and setting them up as cautionary examples to 
discourage others from being poor as well.30
American welfare policy is plagued by the inaccurate beliefs that many Americans hold 
about people who receive public assistance. Popular opposition to welfare is deeply 
rooted in the historical legacy of racism.31 Indeed, opposition to the social safety net is 
connected to the (inaccurate) belief that welfare recipients are overwhelmingly black.32
In turn, correcting these misperceptions is hindered by the information and data flows 
concerning welfare and its beneficiaries. Even as the system relentlessly seeks out ev-
ery scrap of information about the poor to verify their deservingness, it deliberately fails 
to provide systemic data that would help administer programs more effectively. This is 
a stunning paradox: a system whose guiding principle is the collection of information 
yields virtually no data that could meaningfully inform public policy.
The administration of welfare in the United States is a vicious cycle that must be broken. 
Only when the state, and the bureaucrats who comprise it, start measuring success by 
human impact factors rather than economic measures of thrift will meaningful policy 
change be possible. In light of the political situation in the US, civil society should lead 
the way by producing these datasets to the extent possible, perhaps by focusing on a 
specific state or local jurisdiction, then confronting relevant public sector actors about 
the relative inadequacy of their own data. Legislative and regulatory changes will be 
necessary as well. Once county, state, and federal agencies start evaluating welfare 
28 Gustafson, Cheating Welfare.
29 Ibid.
30 Elizabeth Bussiere, (Dis)entitling the Poor: The Warren Court, Welfare Rights, and the American 
Political Tradition, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; Virginia 
Eubanks, Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age. Cambridge, MA 
and London: MIT Press, 2012; John Gilliom, Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and 
the Limits of Privacy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001; Gustafson, Cheating Welfare; 
O’Connor, A Political History of the American Welfare System; Piven and Cloward, Regulating the 
Poor; Karen Seccombe, ‘So You Think I Drive a Cadillac?’ Welfare Recipients’ Perspectives on 
the System and Its Reform, 3rd edition, Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2011; Joe Soss, Unwanted 
Claims: The Politics of Participation in the US Welfare System, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2002.
31.  Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994; Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the 
War on Poverty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
32.  Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
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programs not on the basis of how little they cost and how few people receive support, 
but according to human needs being met and families becoming economically self-
sufficient in the long term, we can start building a cybernetic surveillance machine that 
can perpetuate a virtuous cycle of data collection, action, and adjustment.
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Over the past few years, investor-funded internet firms have continued to push un-
abated into market sectors such as food delivery, home health care, house clean-
ing, and data entry, offering customers much-appreciated, immediate convenience. 
Just take the geo-location-driven ride-ordering capabilities that Uber’s app offers, 
with all its fare splitting between friends and automatic carpooling. These tech-
nological features are a meaningful improvement over the low-tech cab riding that 
was brought to you by way of hand waves, phone calls, and whistles. The poten-
tial benefits for an Uber driver are also clear: she can work when she wants, and 
it is easy for her to be reached via the app. The company subjects drivers to the 
same five-star rating system as customers, potentially shielding them from abuse. 
Fares and fees are charged automatically, avoiding the need for awkward exchang-
es of loose change. For one thing, Uber’s model is reasonably beneficial, providing 
the opportunity to earn a supplemental income for people in between jobs and oth-
ers in need of immediate and somewhat flexible work. For another, there is now a 
subgenre of books, news articles, blog essays, and research papers that have pro-
vided ample evidence of the harm caused by the extractive platform economy.1 
The list of wrongs is long. It includes meager pay, predatory market practices, unlawful 
operations such as gray balling,2 and a misogynistic work culture (think: #susanfowler). 
There have been lawsuits by workers demanding their reclassification from indepen-
dent contractors to full-fledged employees, as well as the strikes of thousands of Uber 
and Ola drivers in India. In Capetown, South Africa, Uber drivers sued the company, 
and are likely to set up a cooperatively owned platform.3 With the notable exception 
of a handful of cities and a ruling by the EU court, municipalities and governments 
have been eager to embrace the extractive platform economy.4 Though Austin, Texas 
stood its ground against Uber and Lyft, and Barcelona has repeatedly fined Airbnb 
while crafting policy in favor of a more just sharing economy, these efforts still have to 
develop into coordinated global dissent.
The Economy is not Working for Most People
Why do we need platform coops? A discussion about platform capitalism that only 
considers platforms is as inadequate as a narrow study of the mechanics of the as-
sembly line meant to explain Fordism. The platform economy is inseparable from the 
condition of labor and the market failures and broader challenges of capitalism that 
platform coops challenge.
1 https://platform.coop/resources/tags/platform-capitalism.
2 ‘Gray balling’ is based on Uber’s algorithmic blacklisting of municipal policy makers.
3 The Platform Cooperativism Consortium is supporting the efforts of local activists and a union to 
form a platform coop.
4 ‘Collaborative Economy’, European Commission on Growth, 22 May 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/
growth/single-market/services/collaborative-economy_en.
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Income inequality. Unsurprisingly, the sharing economy emerged against the back-
ground of deliberate shockwaves of austerity that followed the global inflation of 
the 70s, the explosion of public debt in the 80s, and the 2008 financial crash. 
Income inequality has continued to grow as capital gains have outpaced those 
of labor.5 In 2015, sixty-two people controlled the combined wealth of 3.5 billion 
people.6 Women are overrepresented in the bottom half of the economy in most 
countries. In addition, the lowest paid workers dominate the service sector, bring-
ing about a neo-feudal servant culture. In 2014 in the United States, the median 
adjusted income for households headed by blacks was $43,300, and for whites it 
was $71,300.7
Platform monopolies and the monetization of surveillance. The Web has hit rock 
bottom; the concentration of power and surveillance are at odds with how Tim 
Berners-Lee had envisioned the World Wide Web in 1989. The concerning power 
of platform companies enabled through network effects, and data concentration 
weakens competition and creates vast power asymmetries. Why should a small 
number of owners and investors be the main benefactors of the riches of the Web? 
And this question not only concerns those who are toiling in the digital economy 
to make a living but it also applies to the users of Google, Facebook, Twitter, or 
Microsoft who don’t have control over the very platforms that organize their lives. 
Workers and internet users toil under conditions they do not choose, for CEOs they 
cannot ouster.
A lack of digital workplace democracy. Democracy is at the core of the rhetoric of 
Silicon Valley, and yet it is a far cry from being a reality on the Net. While the project 
of political democracy made inroads in many countries in the 20th century, the idea of 
workplace democracy has skipped the digital workplace. In fact, insofar as workers 
on app-mediated factory floors fall outside of the National Labor Relations Board’s 
definition of ‘employees’, workers in the sharing economy have lost the ability to 
unionize and collectively bargain — a step backward from the democratic gains of 
the labor movement.8
Stalled rights. Those working on digital labor brokerages like TaskRabbit pay broker-
age fees of 30% on each transaction, yet as independent contractors they do not ben-
efit from workers comp, unemployment benefits, health insurance, or minimum wage 
protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act.9
5 Trebor Scholz, ‘Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy’, Medium, 5 December 2014, 
https://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy-2ea737f1b5ad.
6 Oxfam, ‘62 People Own Same as Half World’, Oxfam, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/media-centre/
press-releases/206/01/62-people-own-same-as-half-world-says-oxfam-inequality-report-davos-
world-economic-forum.
7 ‘On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart’, Pew Research Center, 27 
June 2016, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-
and-whites-are-worlds-apart/.
8 Chris Opfer, ‘Gig Worker Organizers Still Looking for Road Map’, Bloomberg BNA, 26 May 2017, 
https://www.bna.com/gig-worker-organizers-n73014451571/.
9 Taskrabbit, ‘What is the TaskRabbit Service Fee?’, TaskRabbit, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/
en-us/articles/204411610-What-is-the-TaskRabbit-Service-Fee-.
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Stagnating wages. Over the last forty years, real wages of most American workers 
have stagnated and there is a growing sense that capitalism is not good for most 
people. The expansion of demands by the #FightFor15 campaign, which began 
with a focus on fast-food workers and expanded to a push for a more than 100% 
increase in the federal minimum wage, is evidence that the rate of seven dollars 
and twenty-five cents an hour, instituted in 1991, is not viable. Models of digitally-
mediated work which evade even this meager existing protection further exacer-
bate the problem.
Systemic racism. Consumers have found themselves equally in the wild, with African-
American Airbnb guests expressing their frustrations on Twitter through the hashtag 
#AirbnbWhileBlack.10 One study found that booking requests by African-American us-
ers are 16% less likely to be accepted than their white counterparts.11 Another study 
showed that the problem of catching a cab as a person of color persists on ride-hailing 
platforms, with increased acceptance times on Lyft and twice as many canceled rides 
on Uber for users with ‘African-American sounding’ names.12
The myth of choice. ‘Flexible workers’ not only include Uber drivers but also baristas, 
crowd workers, fast-food cooks, models, and adjunct professors. Workers in the plat-
form economy can decide when to work but the choice of which fourteen-hours in a 
day to work, and on which low-paying, platform is little choice at all.
Shift away from direct employment. Over the past decades in the United States, labor 
markets have increasingly shifted to the internet. In 2016, an estimated fifty-five million 
Americans were freelancers, representing a steady shift away from direct employment 
toward an economy dominated by independent contractors. In the same year, 24% 
of Americans reported earning money from the digital platform economy, which is in-
creasingly dominated by the Big Five.13
Invisible labor. ‘486,679 floors made flawless in Manhattan’, the ad by a cleaning ser-
vice platform boasts in the New York City subway. The cleaning professionals who 
power the app are not mentioned — your apartment will simply be clean after a swipe 
on your on your mobile phone. Law professor Marion Crain emphasizes that, ‘invis-
ibility has physical effects on workers and their bodies. If workers are symbolically 
invisible, then no one sees their health conditions.’14
10 Maggie Penman and Shankar Vedantam, ‘#AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes The 
Sharing Economy’, NPR, 26 April 2016; learn more about racial discrimination at Airbnb in 
Benjamin Edelman and Michael Luca, ‘Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com’, Harvard 
Business School Working Paper 14.054 (January 2014).
11 Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, and Dan Svirsky, ‘Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 
2016, http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-2016-09-16.pdf.
12 Eric Newcomer, ‘Study Finds Racial Discrimination by Uber and Lyft Drivers’, Bloomberg, 31 
October 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-31/study-finds-racial-
discrimination-by-uber-and-lyft-drivers.
13 Aaron Smith, ‘Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing’, Pew Research Center, 17 November 
2016, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing/.
14 Marion G. Crain, Winifred Poster, and Miriam A. Cherry, Invisible labor: Hidden Work in the 
Contemporary World, Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016, p. 284.
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Risks are shifted onto workers. Airbnb is the largest hotelier and yet, it owns no hotels; 
Uber is the largest taxi company and owns no cars. Drivers for Uber do not ‘share’ 
their cars with passengers: it is the assets these workers own which are rented out 
through these firms. The costs of fixed-capital depreciation have been outsourced 
onto the workers. Sharing economy firms have been running on your car, apartment, 
labor, and importantly, time. Uber and Airbnb are logistics companies where all par-
ticipants pay up the middleman.
Rights for the disabled. Americans with disabilities have also been victimized by the 
platform economy. As it scaled up, Uber maintained that, as a technology company, 
the onus of fulfilling the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act lay squarely 
on its contracted workforce. Lawsuits in California, Texas, Arizona, and Illinois have led 
to the creation of services like UberASSIST, but the number of accessible vehicles on 
the road is nowhere near those required of licensed taxi companies.15 Using the slogan 
‘Nothing About Us Without Us!’, disabled people fight back.
Market appropriation of social reciprocity. Social practices that were once outside of 
the realm of market transactions have become subject to capital. Canadian technolo-
gist Tom Slee observes that ‘the sharing economy is extending a harsh and deregu-
lated free market into previously protected areas of our lives’.16 The sharing economy 
could be a boon to the communities and individuals who constitute it, but extractive 
speculation has led to outcomes quite different than those originally proposed by the 
likes of BlaBlaCar and Couchsurfing.
The smokescreen of counterculture. The gig economy is morphing into a dangerous 
fantasy; the television show Silicon Valley is frightfully accurate in its satire. By now, 
only few people still fall for the sharing theater of the extractive platform economy and 
its deceptive ‘peer’ rhetoric. Sharing economy monopolies promote their companies as 
a #woke friend, with their CEOs delivering a ‘we are all connected’ voiceover, ending 
with mystifying references to environmental sustainability or Occupy Wall Street. Their 
community managers highjack the values and social capital not only of open source 
and peer-to-peer projects but also the cooperative movement. The language of innova-
tion is equal part of this linguistic obfuscation. How is a firm innovative when its main 
focus is the creation of short-term benefits for shareholders? We need to downplay this 
kind of innovation and instead promote a focus on broader, long-term impact, actual 
needs, and a people-centered economy.
All too often it seems that all of these challenges — from inequality to exploitation — 
point to an inevitable future of work in which inequality has significantly sharpened, 
and the digital economy is in the hand of just four or five players. In his book Aver-
age is Over, the conservative economist Tyler Cowen introduces us to one possible 
endgame for this trend. Soon, he predicts, there will be a superclass of 10 to 15% of 
the population that will make over $1 million per year. For the bottom 85%, he envi-
15 There have been new developments like the ‘Toronto model’, where Uber has essentially been 
mandated by the city to subsidize rides for the disabled, but they are far and few between.
16 Tom Slee, What’s Yours Is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy, New York City: OR Books, 2015, p. 
11.
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sions an annual income along the lines of $5,000–10,00017 In Cowen’s vision, there’s 
nothing that we can do to avert a future in which a tiny ‘hyper-meritocracy’ of Ameri-
cans enjoy fantastically interesting lives while the rest slog along, tranquilized by free 
internet and low-paying gigs.
But the future of work is by no means uncontested. As this economy is not working for 
most people, the need for alternative economic models is as pressing as it is apparent. 
It is time for cooperatives to speak truth to platform capitalists. They can re-envision 
the internet–mediated economy as something that can work for the benefit of all its 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.
Humane Alternatives to the Winner-Takes-All Economy
Platform cooperativism is about economics by other means. It is a nascent but 
growing political and economical movement that builds a fairer future of work by 
joining the values of the cooperative movement with internet technologies — apps, 
platforms, and protocols. Building on the successes of the free software move-
ment, coop members, technologists, unionists, and freelancers create a concrete 
near-future alternative to the extractive sharing economy that is rooted in demo-
cratic ownership.
By decentralizing the power of apps, protocols, or websites, platform coops allow 
low and volatile income households to benefit from the shift of labor markets to the 
internet. Steering clear of the belief in one-click fixes of social problems, the model is 
poised to vitalize genuine innovation by joining the rich heritage and values of coops 
with emerging internet technologies.
Platform cooperatives are owned and governed by those who depend on them most 
— workers, users, and other relevant stakeholders. In their most common form, plat-
form cooperatives are operated through websites or mobile apps that facilitate the 
sale of goods or services, not unlike other businesses in the platform economy. Plat-
form coops are based on values of pluralistic, egalitarian ownership and worker self-
governance, seeking to create a dignified and sustainable digital economy. By return-
ing control of platforms to those whose lives and livelihoods they impact, platform 
coops make good on the democratizing aspirations of the early internet.
Platform Coops Build on an Economic Model that Works — It’s Hidden Around Us in 
Plain Sight
Platform coops build on the cooperative business model. Coops offer a clear and 
successful alternative to the extractive economy, with a history that dates back to the 
Society of Equitable Pioneers, a consumer cooperative of weavers founded in Roch-
dale in 1844. Today, coops understand the need for businesses to be responsive to 
all their stakeholders, which include not only the men and women who work for them 
but also the consumers who depend on them and the communities in which they 
live. Coops aim to be sustainable, proving by example that alternatives to predatory 
markets are feasible.
17 Tyler Cowen, Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation, New 
York: E P Dutton & Co, 2013.
202 MONEYLAB READER 2
A
In the U.S. to date, coops have created close to one million jobs with $25 billion in 
wages and benefits. One in three Americans is a coop member.18 233 million Americans 
are served by coop owned and affiliated insurance companies.19 Worldwide, AC Hard-
ware, REI Coop, Ocean Spray, Mondragon, Associated Press, and FC Barcelona are 
well known, but because they project few of their cooperative values outward, there is 
little public awareness of them being coops.
Cooperative businesses worldwide employ 250 million people.20 Mondragon, an 
often-cited example of a thriving coop in a competitive market, is a federation of 
worker cooperatives that was founded in 1956 in the Basque region of Spain. It is 
worker-owned but not worker-managed.21 At the end of 2013, it employed 74,061 
people in finance, retail, and education. Mondragon cooperatives are united by a 
humanist concept of business, with the general manager in a Mondragon coop 
making no more than five times the minimum wage paid in his or her cooperative. 
Compare that to Walmart’s CEO who is paid 1,034 times more than the median 
Walmart worker.22
Existing platform coops and the larger ecosystem. Can platform coops overcome the 
challenges of inequality, crowd fleecing, systemic racism, and invisible labor? A few 
examples will sketch an overview of the platform cooperative ecosystem.
The labor-brokerage Up & Go is a platform that connects users with professional house 
cleaning services provided by low-income immigrant women who organized in local 
cooperatives.23 The platform is cooperatively owned and governed by the women who 
use it. As owners, they decide how they want to provide their services to clients. 95% 
of Up & Go’s profits go to the workers in a market where corporate platforms take 25 to 
50%. Up & Go provides access to dignified work for low-income communities and of-
fers a living wage in an industry of predominantly Latino and African-American women, 
to the benefit of their families and children.
The music-streaming site Resonate offers a stream-to-own model driven by block-
chain technology.24 Resonate is a multi-stakeholder cooperative that gives stakehold-
ers democratic control: artists (45%), listeners (35%), employees (20%). The coop pays 
musicians 200% more on 100,000 plays than Spotify.
Fairmondo is a cooperative online marketplace for ethical goods and services serv-
ing Germany and the UK. It is owned by a diverse group of stakeholders — buy-
ers, sellers, workers, and investors — who exercise democratic control over the 
platform through the one-member-one-vote principle.25 Contentiously, Fairmondo 
18 National Cooperative Business Association, ‘Building a Cooperative Future,’ NCBA, 2014.
19 Ibid.
20 ‘Facts and Figures’, International Co-operative Alliance, http://ica.coop/en/facts-and-figures.
21  George Cheney, Values at Work: Employee Participation Meets Market Pressure at Mondragon, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
22 ‘CEO Pay in Perspective: Infographic’, Payscale, http://www.payscale.com/career-news/2013/03/
ceo-pay-in-perspective-infographic.
23 https://www.upandgo.coop/.
24 http://resonate.is.
25 http://fairmondo.de.
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describes itself a cooperative alternative to Amazon and eBay, with the goal of de-
fying such ‘winner takes all’ marketplaces.
MIDATA is a cooperatively owned, Zurich-based, online platform that seeks to serve 
as an exchange for members’ medical data. Using an open-source application, mem-
bers can selectively and securely share their medical data with doctors, friends, and 
researchers. For-profit researchers are charged a fee, negotiated by the cooperative, 
for the opt-in use of users’ data. These funds are used for the development and ad-
ministration of the cooperative, with all surplus funds directed to public-good projects 
selected by the cooperative. The cooperative aspires to use medical data as a proof-
of-concept for how cooperative data-aggregation can provide a safe way of monetizing 
user-data for social benefit.
Green Taxi Coop, launched in 2015, is a cooperative taxi service that uses a mobile 
phone app.26 It has 800 members among which are immigrants from thirty-seven coun-
tries.27 The Communication Workers of America Local 7777 helped clear regulatory 
hurdles for them and leased Green Taxi Coop a basement office. The coop received 
$2,000 from each driver for startup costs and today, it holds a third of the ride-hailing 
market in Denver, Colorado.
These five examples can give you a sense of the various forms of platform coops. But 
there is more. For me, 2014 was an intellectual turning point; I developed the concept 
of platform cooperativism but a directory of this ecosystem did not yet exist. But it was 
immediately clear that as an ecosystem, the organizations that supported platform 
cooperatives were equally important actors. They provided them with, for instance, 
payment systems (think: GratiPay28) or democratic decision-making tools like Loo-
mio.29 Thanks to the work by the team at Internet of Ownership, close to 200 platform 
cooperatives and related organizations worldwide have now been counted.30 These 
businesses operate in sectors like short-term rental, transportation, data, finance, food, 
governance, home services, music, and news. Platform coops are part of the scaffold-
ing on which a fairer future of work will be built.
Stocksy United
Let’s have a closer look at Stocksy. In early 2000, Bruce Livingstone founded the stock 
photography company iStockphoto, which reached near-immediate profitability.31 iS-
tock was the first website of its kind and grew to support a vibrant community of free-
lance photographers. In 2006, Livingstone sold the company to Getty Images, one of 
the largest American stock photography agencies, for fifty million dollars. Livingstone 
resigned just three years later.32
26 http://greentaxico-op.com.
27 Out of the 800 members, only about 280 were active in 2017.
28 https://gratipay.com/about/.
29 https://www.loomio.org/.
30 http://ioo.coop.
31 https://web.archive.org/web/20000501000000*/iStockphoto.com.
32 Stephen Shankland, ‘iStockphoto founder, CEO leaves Getty’, CNET, 23 March 2009, https://www.
cnet.com/news/istockphoto-founder-ceo-leaves-getty/.
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Though Getty had paid 29% of revenues to photographers in the first year after its pur-
chase, the average rate for stock photographers at the time, the proportion of revenues 
it paid out would eventually fall to just fourteen.33 As the reason for his forced resigna-
tion, Livingstone would later cite his refusal to enact policies of profit-maximization, to 
the detriment of iStockphoto’s community.34 Tensions in the community grew, with calls 
by iStockphoto contributors for the representation of photographers in the company 
but Getty Images refused.35 Brianna Wettlaufer, the number four employee at iStock-
photo, said of that period, ‘Everyone had the same story. They were feeling disenfran-
chised. They weren’t creatively inspired anymore. The magic was gone.’36
In March 2013, Livingstone and Wettlaufer founded a new stock photography website, 
Stocksy United, with the funds from the sale of iStockphoto. For Livingstone and Wet-
tlaufer, Stocksy United was a chance to make a better platform, informed by their ex-
periences at iStockPhoto. The duo chose a cooperative model as a way of protecting 
photographers’ interests and ensuring that a repeat of the Getty Images buyout could 
not occur without the majority support of the cooperative’s members.37 Wettlaufer: ‘We 
realized we could do it differently this time. We could enter the market with a model 
that ensured artists were treated fairly and ethically.’38
How it Works. Stocksy United is registered in British Columbia, Canada, as laws in the 
United States are too restrictive to efficiently manage the payment of photographers 
in countries across the globe.39 As Stocksy United’s more than 960 members reside in 
sixty-five countries, laws amenable to global operations are a prerequisite.40 If global 
platform cooperatives are to become a more common challenge to investor-backed 
firms that incorporate in each national market they enter, there is a an urgency to work 
with local policymakers to secure regulatory frameworks which can support them.
Stocksy United’s low membership is a strategic decision the cooperative has made 
in an attempt to sustainably scale itself. It began with 500 photographers and only 
later opened applications for 500 more, but they still receive around 5,000 applica-
tions a year.
33 Roger Mexico, ‘Front Page Blog: A H*ck of a Lot! iStock contributors make $21 Million in 2007’, 
iStock, 1 April 2008, http://www.istockphoto.com/forum_messages.php?threadid=67521; Brianna 
Wettlaufer, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 2017.
34 Ashleigh Macro, ‘iStock Founder Reveals Real Reason He Left & Why He’s Started a New Stock 
Company’, Digital Arts, 10 October 2013, http://www.digitalartsonline.co.uk/news/creative-
business/founder-of-istockphoto-reveals-real-reason-he-left-why-hes-started-new-stock-photo-
company/.
35 Sean Locke, ‘Steering the Ship’, Sean Locke Photography, 15 October 2013, http://www.
seanlockephotography.com/2013/10/15/steering-the-ship/.
36 Amy Cortese, ‘A New Wrinkle in the Gig Economy: Workers Get Most of the Money’, The New 
York Times, 20 July 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/smallbusiness/a-new-
wrinkle-in-the-gig-economy-workers-get-most-of-the-money.html.
37 Brianna Wettlaufer, ‘No More Bad Stock Photos: How a Great Image Inspired Me to Launch 
Stocksy’, Success, 13 May 2015, http://www.success.com/mobile/blog/no-more-bad-stock-
photos-how-a-great-image-helped-inspire-me-to-launch-stocksy.
38 Cortese, ‘A New Wrinkle in the Gig Economy’.
39 Brianna Wettlaufer, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 
2017.
40 Nuno Silva, presentation on Stocksy United in Sydney, notes made by author in attendance, 23 
May 2017.
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A lot of the other agencies have upwards of a million contributors, and at that point 
everybody’s uploading the same thing shot in ten different ways, and people are 
fighting over that one sale because the profit is so dispersed. We wanted to keep 
the numbers low enough that people’s portfolios could sustainably grow, and their 
income could similarly grow.41
According to Livingstone, this slow growth has allowed cooperative members to get 
to know each other on a personal basis, writing to each other on forums hosted by 
Stocksy United and helping to create a tightknit community. When photographers stop 
participating in discussions or begin to submit fewer photographs, these interpersonal 
relationships allow management to reach out and resolve the issue. To ensure there is 
no rupture in these bonds, prospective applicants are judged specifically on their dif-
ference from the already contributing photographers. Livingstone noted that, ‘If some-
one’s shooting particular content in a particular style, and then we bring in someone 
who’s doing the same thing, that’s no longer going to be a collaborative relationship 
— it’s going to get very competitive.’42
In 2015 Stocksy United brought in $7.9 million in revenue, doubling its 2014 revenues, 
and paid more than half of that — $4.3 million — in royalties.43 While most stock pho-
tography firms pay 15 to 45% of sales, Stocksy United pays photographers 50% of 
revenue from non-exclusive licenses and 75% from exclusives.44 2015 was also the 
first year the platform brought in surplus revenue, which allowed it to pay $200,000 
to the cooperative’s membership as dividends.45 The trend continued into 2016, with 
the cooperative generating $10.7 million in sales, allowing it to pay $300,000 in divi-
dends.46 As a multi-stakeholder cooperative, there are three different categories of 
members which are afforded different proportions of this surplus under Stocksy Unit-
ed’s bylaws: the founders and full-time staff each receive 5% and contributing pho-
tographers receive 90% divided in proportion to individual photographers’ earnings on 
the platform.47
As the Stocksy team is not planning to increase the number of photographers beyond 
the 1,000 mark, it is reliant on the output of that relatively small group. They have to de-
liver a product that holds up to Stocksy’s criteria. To achieve that, the cooperative runs 
online training that aims at showing photographers the way to take photographs that will 
be accepted, a process which develops the talent of the photographers and increases 
the value of the product. Rather than a race to the bottom with countless photographers 
competing with ever lower price offerings and huge quantities of images, Stocksy United 
invests in their photographers. Continuing education, one of the rules that I had defined 
for good digital work in 2014, is part of Stocksy United’s business model.
41 Anna Bergren Miller, ‘Interviewed: Stocksy’s Brianna Wettlaufer and Nuno Silva on Building a 
Cooperative Stock Photo Platform’, Shareable, 31 May 2016, http://www.shareable.net/blog/
interviewed-stocksys-brianna-wettlaufer-and-nuno-silva-on-building-a-cooperative-stock-photo.
42 Ibid.
43 Cortese, ‘A New Wrinkle in the Gig Economy’.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Email exchange with the author. June 2017.
47 Brianna Wettlaufer, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 
2017.
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Ownership. Stocksy United is a producer cooperative which is a form similar to but 
distinct from ‘worker-owned’ cooperatives. While worker-owned cooperatives take the 
individual as their base unit of membership, classifying members as employees of the 
cooperative, producer cooperatives are typically comprised of individual businesses 
that share cooperatively owned infrastructure to gain advantages from economies of 
scale.48 For example, farmers who belong to the producer cooperative Land of Lakes 
share the costs of processing and distribution facilities, as well as a brand name under 
which to market their goods, but still function as independent businesses with mostly 
independent paths to market.49
Similarly, photographers who are members of Stocksy United are not employees, but 
rather independent producers who cooperatively own the platform which markets and 
sells their work. According to Wettlaufer, this producer-cooperative model was chosen 
because though photographers are interested in having an outlet for their work that treats 
them fairly and ethically, they tend to not be interested in the demands of the coop model 
itself.50 Stocksy leadership is learning how to engage members to teach them about the 
coop model and to give member-owners more of a sense of co-governance.
To become a member of the cooperative, applicants must submit a portfolio of their 
work for review through Stocksy’s website. The artists selected from that pool are con-
tacted for a more complete submission of full-resolution sample images.51 The cap on 
cooperative membership to one thousand photographers allows for close observation 
of members’ contributions, part of Stocksy’s goal of supporting career photographers, 
not just people churning out cheap, ‘stocky stock’ product.52
Governance. Stocksy United’s governance structure is broken down into three 
groups, with each group having a different level of involvement in the scale of the 
cooperative’s operations. Class A is composed of the founders and senior advisors. 
Class B is staff: the people who run the day-to-day. Class C is the photographers. 
Major decisions — such as changing the terms of profit sharing, or business strategy 
— are presented to the members for a vote in annual general meetings where any 
member can propose a resolution.53
A resolution model based on member votes not only demands organizational trans-
parency, it also gives members tangible voice in the big-picture operations. The prag-
matic potential of the resolution process was made remarkably evident when the 
48 John R. Whitman, ‘Types of Cooperatives’, Cooperative-Curriculum, 7 March 2011, https://
cooperative-curriculum.wikispaces.com/file/view/Types+of+Cooperatives-Whitman.pdf.
49 Andrew McLeod, ‘Types of Cooperatives’, Cooperative Starter Series, December 2006, http://
cets.coop/moodle/pluginfile.php/75/mod_folder/content/0/Types%20of%20Co-operative.
pdf?forcedownload=1.
50 Brianna Wettlaufer, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 
2017.
51 ‘About Becoming A Stocksy Contributor’, Stocksy.com, https://www.stocksy.com/contributor.
52 Lee Torrens, ‘Stocksy United’, Microstock Diaries, 13 July 2015, http://www.microstockdiaries.
com/stocksy.html.
53 Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider (eds), Ours to Hack and to Own: The Rise of Platform 
Cooperativism, a New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet, New York City: OR 
Books, 2016. 
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members — by a margin of 400 votes to four — voted to change the profit sharing 
of extended licenses, accepting a decrease in payment to 75% from 100% profit 
margin.54 The member-approved decision to reinvest value into the coop, instead of 
retaining it as individual members, was, according to Wettlaufer, ‘a really proud mo-
ment — of everyone being truly committed to what was best for the company, and 
what was best for them.’55
While the prospect of upwards of a thousand people meeting to discuss strategic plan-
ning may sound daunting, Stocksy United’s track record demonstrates that the meth-
od of member-based resolution is feasible. Cooperatives aren’t always more work, 
as some critics have leveled. (Or, as Oscar Wilde put it, ‘The trouble with Socialism 
is that it takes too many evenings.’) Wettlaufer: ‘It’s a matter of where you invest your 
efforts, because at the end of the day if you’re a business, you’re always accountable 
to somebody, and if you can choose who you’re accountable to, I would always want 
to choose members.’56
What differentiates Stocksy United from traditional stock photography websites is its 
focus on quality over quantity. Wettlaufer says that the cooperative’s members are 
proud to host only 700,000 photos, an exceptionally low number in an industry where 
the volume of photos on offer is considered a key to success.57 Cooperative members 
use a private channel to examine new submissions, up and down voting them to deter-
mine which are appropriate for the site.58 Content curators reject about 50% of photo 
submissions and an even higher percentage of video content.59
The goal is to avoid the quantity trap of the micro stock industry which iStockphoto 
invented. Stocksy United claims a certain prestige position in the stock photography 
industry. It has sold photos to 124 of Fortune 500 firms60 and its photos have appeared 
in magazines like Elle and Glamour.61 By paying its photographers fairly and giving 
them voice in the cooperative’s operations, the cooperative has been able to avoid a 
race to the bottom and produce what it calls ‘sustainable stock’ that will not be diluted 
as the platform’s catalog grows.62
Making Good
Platform cooperativism is only a few years old; it’s still an unproven economic model 
but its cultural influence is hard to ignore. Cooperativists are working on the ground 
54 Anna Bergren Miller, ‘Interviewed’.
55 Ibid.
56 Brianna Wettlaufer, ‘Power and Ethics in Online Communities with Stocksy United’, Lecture, 
University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, 15 September 2016, https://livestream.com/
accounts/983593/events/6351458/videos/135862964.
57 Nuno de Silva, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 
2017.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 ‘Platform Co-Op, Stocksy United, Doubles Revenue to $7.9M’, Business Wire, 8 June 2016, http://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160608005340/en/Platform-Co-Op-Stocksy-United-
Doubles-Revenue-7.9M.
61 Amy Cortese, ‘A New Wrinkle in the Gig Economy’.
62 Brianna Wettlaufer, presentation on Stocksy United, notes made by author in attendance, 23 May 
2017.
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and scholars, going beyond advocacy and inspiring articles, founded a new subfield of 
academic research focusing on platform cooperativism: what works and what does not 
in terms of novel organizational forms and startup methodologies.63
With the fast-approaching baby boomer retirement wave, where business owners 
may be amenable to buyouts by workers, the conversion of dated infrastructures 
into platform coops also becomes a viable strategy to expand the model. Similarly, 
the taking over of failing venture capitalist–funded platforms has become a possible 
avenue of conversion.
The #WeAreTwitter64 campaign inspired scores of journalists, geeks, coop leaders to 
think about ownership and governance of the platforms that we rely on most. It made a 
name for itself. As a practical proposal, the campaign had only modest success when, 
in May 2017, Twitter’s shareholders voted on whether to discuss the transformation 
the platform into a user-owned cooperative. Over 4% of Twitter’s shareholders voted 
in favor of discussing the proposal and it is now eligible to be debated again at next 
year’s board meeting.
The Benefits of the Platform Coop Model
Platform cooperatives have numerous advantages over the traditional start-up model, 
both in terms of market competition and societal benefit.
Protection from exploitation. Workers are protected from exploitation because they 
co-own and steer the cooperative. Budgets and other financial data are transparent to 
members in platform coops like Fairmondo.
Lower retention costs. Retention is less of an issue on a platform where ownership, 
transparency, and control protect workers from exploitation. It should surprise no one 
that, given the extractive practices of Uber, 50% of drivers quit the platform after six 
months, and only 4% of drivers make it a full year.65 Stocksy showed that photogra-
phers who are well compensated, being trained, and who have a say in what happens 
on the platform, will stick with it.
Surplus revenues are transferred to members. Surplus revenue is seen by extractive 
platforms as capital to be used for reinvestment or to be doled out as dividends to 
investors. In contrast, numerous platform cooperatives return surplus revenue to 
member-owners at the end of the year. Stocksy, which paid dividends of $200,000 
to its members in 2015, uses this model but also Fairmondo, which returned 25% 
of its yearly surplus to members.
63 Fewer millenials tolerate burnout in traditional structures. Top-down firms increasingly fail to hire 
talent. How can platform coops structure themselves to welcome such young professionals? How 
can they attract corporate dropouts?
64 http://buytwitter.org.
65 Chantel McGee, ‘Only 4% of Uber Drivers Remain on the Platform a Year Later, Says Report’, 
CNBC, 20 April 2017, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/20/only-4-percent-of-uber-drivers-remain-
after-a-year-says-report.html; Chris Tomlinson, ‘The Problem is with Uber and Lyft, Not City 
Rules’, Huston Chronicle, 10 May 2016, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/columnists/
tomlinson/article/The-problem-is-with-Uber-and-Lyft-not-city-rules-7450937.php.
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Lower failure rate. 80% of cooperatives survive their first five years in business, as 
compared to 41% of other business ownership models.66 On the one hand, this may 
be because worker cooperatives are themselves more productive than conventional 
businesses, ‘with staff working ‘better and smarter’ and production [being] organized 
more efficiently’.67 On the other, the belief in a cooperative’s mission, can keep the busi-
ness afloat long enough to achieve success. While Fairmondo is now self-sustaining, 
its communications-lead, Christian Peters, describes that up to now, Fairmondo was 
‘mainly carried by the ideology of the people who work’ there.68
Money flows within local communities. Corporate platforms use their intermediary 
status to exact high rents on workers’ earnings. This means that a large portion of 
money, which would have passed between the local participants of each transaction is 
siphoned out of the community.
Against short-termism and the growth imperative . The Silicon Valley model motivated 
by ‘exit’ rather than sustainable business has been perfected: 1) invest in a startup, 
2) develop its technology just enough to grow a user base, 3) sell to a larger company 
for a golden payday. This mode of thinking breeds apostles of short-termism and 
growth at all costs.
Prospect of a cooperative data commons. For-profit companies that rely on the mon-
etization of users’ data, such as Facebook, FitBit, and personal-genoming service 
23andMe, do not pay users for the valuable data that they generate. Essentially, peo-
ple are performing uncompensated data labor. Unlike corporations, the advantage of 
coops is that they are explicitly designed to benefit each other. The health data coop-
erative MIDATA aims to allow users to come together and monetize the health-related 
data, which they generate, particularly the genetic data of which we all have an equal 
amount. While MIDATA will donate all its surplus revenue to public-benefit projects, 
co-founder Ernst Hafen has noted that data cooperatives in developing countries 
could generate a meaningful revenues for their populations. Amidst a broader dis-
cussion about privacy as a right versus privacy as a commodity, a cooperative data 
commons is in reach.
Advantages Despite Obstacles
While several key obstacles to the proliferation of platform cooperatives pose difficul-
ties to the model’s expansion, they are in no way insurmountable.
Funding. The greatest challenge faced by platform cooperatives is the acquisition 
of funding in the absence of venture capital investment. So far, member-founders, 
members of multi-stakeholder coops, and foundation capital have often borne the 
brunt of startup costs. The Platform Cooperativism Consortium and Outlierventures.
io are experimenting with a platform coop crypto token that could pay FLOSS pro-
66 ‘The Co-operative Economy 2015: An Ownership Agenda for Britain’, Co-operatives UK, http://
www.uk.coop/sites/default/files/uploads/attachments/co-op_economy_2015.pdf.
67 Virginie Perotin cited in Odin, ‘Worker Cooperatives are More Productive than Normal Companies’, 
Generational Theory Forum, 13 May 2016, http://generational-theory.com/forum/thread-68-
post-416.html.
68 Felix Weth, Christian Peters, Merlint, and Fairmondo staff in discussion with the author, 2015.
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grammers. Redundant costs could be greatly reduced if the code bases of platform 
coops would be made freely licensable for other coops.
Governance. The problem of governance of distributed workers is unresolved. Plat-
form cooperatives, however, explore new models of worker representation following 
the one-worker, one-vote model, but no dominant form has emerged so far. Gover-
nance models focus on tools like Loomio and the democratic representation of differ-
ent stakeholders via the election of board members.
Marketing. The marketing resources available to platform cooperatives are dwarfed 
by those of incumbents like Uber and Airbnb who spend millions of dollars to seed 
network effects in individual cities. Guerilla marketing projects like Crowdacting should 
also leverage the vast social networks of conventional cooperatives.69
Value proposition. Platform cooperatives must keep their eyes on a strong value 
proposition. They need to build dignified workplace practices that are also a suf-
ficient draw for consumers.
Network effects. As user bases grow, the value of a platform increases exponentially. 
As platforms accumulate data, the efficiency of their algorithms rapidly increases. One 
solution for this may be to create federations of local cooperatives, which can scale 
locally while still benefiting from their participation in larger networks. Alternatively, 
platform cooperatives may find their greatest success when they are able to enter 
untapped markets too small to hold interest for the Big Five.
Regulation. Finally, the regulatory inroads of incumbent platforms serve as some-
thing of a double-edged sword; while, for example, Uber’s challenges to local regu-
lations prohibiting non-licensed ride-hailing services opens up space for ride-hail 
platform cooperatives, they are also able to lobby to eliminate regulations that favor 
platform cooperatives.
Broader questions still remain. Will any of the historical disadvantages of coops be 
offset by the technological affordances of platform cooperatives? What models for 
democratic governance effectively account for the reality of dispersed gig-work-
ers? What is the reason that relatively few coops have decided to enter the digital 
economy? Is voting for a board of directors sufficient? Are there existing funding 
solutions that have been overlooked, such as blockchain-driven social currencies 
and crypto-tokens? What interface design models can counteract the harmful ra-
cial dynamics of online labor markets such as TaskRabbit? What sectors are most 
promising for the growth of this model? How can the principles of economic de-
mocracy — which drove the 20th century cooperative movement — be brought 
into, and accelerated, in today’s emerging digital economy? How can investors in 
the digital economy make a fair return while these types of platforms achieve sus-
tainability? How can we find a framework of analysis that goes beyond the success 
or failure dichotomy given the diverging forms of value creation that may play out 
over the long- rather than the short term?
69 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6tqZqoh8DY.
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Platform cooperativism can serve as a remedy for some of the corrosive effects of 
capitalism, serving as a reminder that work can be dignifying rather than diminishing 
for the human experience. Platform cooperatives are not a panacea for all the wrongs 
of platform capitalism. They will have to tie in with the diverse efforts of the solidarity 
economy, the pro-commons movement, b-corps, green activists, localist movements, 
and others. There is a common fight and platform cooperativism can do its part against 
the shared enemy of exploitation. It’s time to weave some ethical threads into the fabric 
of 21st-century work.
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This article was first published by Furtherfield.1
Basic income is often promoted as an idea that will solve inequality and make people 
less dependent on capitalist employment. However, it will instead aggravate inequality 
and reduce social programs that benefit the majority of people.
At its Winnipeg 2016 Biennial Convention, the Canadian Liberal Party passed a resolu-
tion in support of ‘Basic Income’. The resolution, called ‘Poverty Reduction: Minimum 
Income,’ contains the following rationale: ‘The ever growing gap between the wealthy 
and the poor in Canada will lead to social unrest, increased crime rates and violence. 
[...] Savings in health, justice, education and social welfare as well as the building of 
self-reliant, taxpaying citizens more than offset the investment.’2
The reason many people on the left are excited about proposals such as universal 
basic income is that they acknowledge economic inequality and its social conse-
quences. However, a closer look at how universal basic income (UBI) is expected to 
work reveals that it is intended to provide political cover for the elimination of social 
programs and the privatization of social services. The Liberal Party’s resolution is 
no exception. Calling for ‘Savings in health, justice, education and social welfare 
as well as the building of self-reliant, taxpaying citizen’,3 clearly means social cuts 
and privatization.
UBI has been endorsed by neoliberal economists for a long time. One of its early cham-
pions was the patron saint of neoliberalism, Milton Friedman. In his book Capitalism 
and Freedom,4 Friedman argues for a ‘negative income tax’ as a means to deliver a 
basic income. After arguing that private charity is the best way to alleviate poverty, 
and praising the ‘private […] organizations and institutions’ that delivered charity for 
the poor in the capitalist heyday of the nineteenth century, Friedman blames social 
programs for the disappearance of private charities: ‘One of the major costs of the 
extension of governmental welfare activities has been the corresponding decline in 
private charitable activities.’
To Friedman and his many powerful followers, the cause of poverty is not enough 
capitalism. Thus, their solution is to provide a ‘basic income’ as a means to eliminate 
social programs and replace them with private organizations. Friedman specifically 
1. https://www.furtherfield.org/universal-basic-income-is-a-neoliberal-plot-to-make-you-poorer/.
2 ‘Poverty Reduction: Minimum Income’, Liberal Party of Canada, https://winnipeg2016.liberal.ca/
policy/poverty-reduction-minimum-income/.
3 Ibid.
4 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
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argues that ‘if enacted as a substitute for the present rag bag of measures directed at 
the same end, the total administrative burden would surely be reduced’.5
Friedman goes on to list some the ‘rag bag’ of measures he would hope to eliminate: 
direct welfare payments and programs of all kinds, old age assistance, social security, 
aid to dependent children, public housing, veterans’ benefits, minimum-wage laws, 
and public health programs, hospitals and mental institutions.
Friedman also spends a few paragraphs worrying whether people who depend on 
‘Basic Income’ should have the right to vote, since politically enfranchised dependents 
could vote for more money and services at the expense of those who do not depend 
on these. Using the example of pension recipients in the United Kingdom, he con-
cludes that they ‘have not destroyed, at least as yet, Britain’s liberties or its predomi-
nantly capitalistic system’.6
Charles Murray, another prominent libertarian promoter of UBI, shares Friedman’s 
views. In an interview with PBS, he said: ‘America’s always been very good at provid-
ing help to people in need. It hasn’t been perfect, but they’ve been very good at it. 
Those relationships have been undercut in recent years by a welfare state that has, in 
my view, denuded the civic culture’.7 Like Friedman, Murray blames the welfare state 
for the loss of apparently effective private charity.
Murray adds: ‘The first rule is that the basic guaranteed income has to replace ev-
erything else — it’s not an add-on. So there’s no more food stamps; there’s no more 
Medicaid; you just go down the whole list. None of that’s left. The government gives 
money; other human needs are dealt with by other human beings in the neighborhood, 
in the community, in the organizations. I think that’s great.’8
To the Cato Institute, the elimination of social programs is a part of the meaning of Uni-
versal Income. In an article about the Finish pilot project, the Institute defines UBI as 
‘scrapping the existing welfare system and distributing the same cash benefit to every 
adult citizen without additional strings or eligibility criteria’.9 And in fact, the options 
being considered by Finland are constrained to limiting the amount of the basic income 
to the savings from the programs it would replace.
‘Basic Income’ Won’t Alleviate Poverty
From a social welfare point of view, the substitution of social programs with market-
based and charitable provision of everything from health to housing, from child support 
to old-age assistance, clearly creates a multi-tier system in which the poorest may be 
5 Ibid., p. 158.
6 Ibid., p. 160.
7 Charles Murray, ‘Libertarian Charles Murray: The Welfare State has Denuded our Civic Culture’, 
PBS News Hour, 10 April 2014, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/libertarian-charles-murray-
the-welfare-state-has-denuded-our-civic-culture.
8 Ibid.
9 Charles Hughes, ‘Finland to Break New Ground with Basic Income Experiment’, CATO Institute, 
9 December 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/finland-break-new-ground-basic-income-
experiment?utm_content=buffer3f10a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_
campaign=buffer.
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able to afford some housing and health care, but clearly much less than the rich — 
most importantly, with no guarantee that the income will be sufficient for their actual 
need for health care, child care, education, housing, and other needs, which would be 
available only by way of for-profit markets and private charities.
Looking specifically at the question of whether Friedman’s proposal would actu-
ally improve the conditions of the poor, Hyman A. Minsky, himself a renowned and 
highly regarded economist, wrote the The Macroeconomics of a Negative Income 
Tax.10 Minsky looks at the outcome of a ‘social dividend,’ which ‘transfers to every 
person alive, rich or poor, working or unemployed, young or old, a designated money 
income by right’.11 Minsky conclusively shows that such a program would ‘be infla-
tionary even if budgets are balanced’12 and that the ‘rise in prices will erode the real 
value of benefits to the poor […] and may impose unintended real costs upon fami-
lies with modest incomes’.13 This means that any improved spending power afforded 
to citizens through an instrument such as UBI will be completely absorbed by higher 
prices for necessities.
Rather than alleviating poverty, UBI will most likely exacerbate it. The core reason-
ing is quite simple: the prices that people pay for housing and other necessities are 
derived from how much they can afford to pay in the first place. If you imagine the 
way housing is distributed in a modern capitalist society, the poorest get the worst 
housing, and the richest get the best. Giving everyone in the community, rich and 
poor alike, more money, would not allow the poorest to get better housing, it would 
just raise the price of housing.
If UBI came at the expense of other social programs, such as health care or child care, 
as Friedman intended, then the rising cost of housing would draw money away from 
other previously socially provisioned services, forcing families with modest incomes to 
improve their substandard housing by accepting worse or less childcare or healthcare, 
or vice versa. A disabled person whose mobility needs requires additional expenditure 
on accessible housing may not have enough of the basic income left for any additional 
health care they also require. Yet replacing means testing and special programs that 
address specific needs is the big idea of UBI.
The notion that we can solve inequality within capitalism by indiscriminately giving 
people money and leaving the provisioning of all social needs to corporations is ex-
tremely dubious. While this view is to be expected among those, like Murray and Fried-
man, who promote capitalism, it is not compatible with anticapitalism. UBI will end 
up in the hands of capitalists. We will be dependent on these same capitalists for 
everything we need. But to truly alleviate poverty, productive capacity must be directed 
toward creating real value for society and not toward maximizing shareholder value of 
profit-seeking investors.
10 Hyman P. Minsky, ‘The Macroeconomics of a Negative Income Tax’, Hyman O, Minsky Archive, 16 
May 1969, digitalcommons.bard.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=hm_archive.
11 Ibid., p. 1.
12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 Ibid., p. 5.
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There is No Possibility of Another Kind of Basic Income
Many people don’t dispute the fact that establishment promoters of UBI are only do-
ing it in order to eliminate social programs, but they imagine that another kind of basic 
income is possible. They call for a basic income that disregards the deal that Charles 
Murray advocates, but want UBI in addition to other social program, including means-
tested benefits, protections for housing, guarantees of education and child care, and 
so on. This view ignores the political dimension of the question. Proposing UBI in ad-
dition to existing program mistakes a general consensus for replacing social programs 
with a guaranteed income for a broad base of support for increasing social programs. 
But, no such broad base exists.
Writing in 1943, with the wartime policies of ‘full employment’ enjoying wide sup-
port, Michal Kalecki wrote a remarkable essay entitled ‘Political Aspects of Full 
Employment.’14 Kalecki opens by writing, ‘a solid majority of economists is now of 
the opinion that, even in a capitalist system, full employment may be secured by a 
government spending programme’.15 Though he is talking about full employment, 
which means an ‘adequate plan to employ all existing labour power’,16 the same 
is true of UBI. The majority of economists would agree that a plan to guarantee an 
income for all is possible.
However, Kalecki ultimately argues that full employment policies will be aban-
doned: ‘The maintenance of full employment would cause social and political 
changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business lead-
ers. Indeed, under a regime of permanent full employment, the “sack” would cease 
to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be 
undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class 
would grow.’17
The conflict between the worker and the capitalist, or between the rich and the poor, 
can not be sidestepped simply by giving people money, if capitalists are allowed to 
continue to monopolize the supply of goods. Such a notion ignores the political strug-
gle between the workers to maintain (or extend) the ‘basic income’ and the capitalists 
to lower or eliminate it in order to strengthen their social position over the worker and 
to protect the power of ‘the sack’.
Business leaders fight tooth and nail against any increase of social benefits for work-
ers. Under their dominion, only one kind of UBI is possible: the one supported by 
Friedman and Murray, the Canadian Liberal Party, and all others who want to sub-
ject workers to bosses. The UBI will be under constant attack, and unlike established 
social programs with planned outcomes that are socially entrenched and difficult to 
eliminate, UBI is just a number, one that can be reduced, eliminated, or simply allowed 
to fall behind inflation.
14 Michael Kalecki, ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’, Political Quarterly (October 1943): 322-
330.
15 Ibid., p. 322.
16 Ibid., p. 322.
17 Ibid., p. 326.
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UBI does not alleviate poverty and turns social necessities into products for profit. To 
truly address inequality we need adequate social provisioning. If we want to reduce 
means testing and dependency on capitalist employment, we can do so with capacity 
planning. Our political demands should mandate sufficient housing, healthcare, edu-
cation, childcare and all basic human necessities for all. Rather than a basic income, 
we need to demand and fight for a basic outcome — for the right to life and justice, 
not just the right to spend.
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Il n’y qu’à une population parfaitement sous contrôle  
que l’on peut songer offrir un revenu universel. 
—Comité Invisible, Maintenant
UBI — universal, unconditional basic income — is popular talk regarding both the 
economic future of the majority, and the ‘labour market’. Amazingly, UBI’s inevitability 
is taken for granted, but opinions on its format and modalities are so fiercely debated 
as to result in confusion about what UBI (should) represent(s). This essay attempts to 
outline common opposing viewpoints and propose a simple resolution to reach con-
sensus on the matter.
Precarity is defined here as crippling uncertainty about one’s economic and/or social 
future. If precarity is the problem then UBI is, to some extent, the answer.
The increasingly precarious conditions of an increasingly large number of people, 
in both the Global South and North, is the most urgent socioeconomic and political 
problem of the moment. Poverty and inequality are both its result and its most visible 
symptoms. This translates to hardships including want, homelessness, poor mental 
and physical health, hitting a substantial, and ever growing number of people. It is also 
seen in even more widespread long-term economic uncertainty and vulnerability. Fur-
thermore, it affects negatively the overall well-being of society, making it ‘meaner and 
leaner’, less benevolent and unified. Last but not least: it ultimately hurts the economy, 
and in no small measure.
Precarity now affects the population at large, directly or indirectly. It evidently affects 
the under-privileged, but also hurts large swathes of the better-off. Middle class peo-
ple live increasingly in fear of becoming victims of economic melt-down and social 
status downgrade. Their often highly educated offspring are confronted by a labor 
market where steady job openings are vanishing. There is great anxiety regarding a 
future that appears devoid of any prospect of a better life, even one as good as their 
parents had enjoyed.
The provision of a universal, unconditional income is the sole reasonable and realistic 
answer. Yet one should realize that, if ever, and properly, implemented, UBI will in no 
way resolve all at once society’s many socioeconomic problems; pockets of poverty 
will remain, and inequality will decrease, but not disappear. Far more importantly, 
humanity still will have to resolutely address an unprecedented convergence of cri-
ses, foremost environmental. But the odds of this endeavor succeeding will surely be 
enhanced with UBI.
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On the Shifting Nature, and Valuation, of Work, and its Consequences
A largely shared premise is that regular, secure, long term salaried employment as we 
know it will greatly disappear thanks to robots and algorithms. Observers of current 
trends talk of a major disruption, predicting that artificial intelligence of all kinds will 
destroy not only low-skilled work (e.g. cleaning), but also those more highly-skilled 
occupations (e.g. accounting), leaving only a minority of especially creative and in-
novative tasks for humans. This assumption, reasonable as it appears, is not totally 
warranted. It depends on the evolution of what Marxists call the ‘social relations of 
production’. Under specific, unwelcome socio-political dispensations, large-scale au-
tomation could just as well result in a plethora of ‘coolie labor’, provided its costs are 
low enough. However, we can be sure about the disappearance of work-as-we-know 
it, something already experienced by the younger generations.
This scenario will obtain whether through outright job destruction, or rather large-scale 
job displacement. This is also the consequence of another, unfortunate development: 
the waging of essential work like ‘care’ as traditional community and household bonds 
dissolve. Yet such newly waged work is not translated into secure employment at a 
fair rate of pay, but instead into a variety of flexible, exploitative contractual or informal 
arrangements. This has in turn spawned the notion that all work should be viewed and 
remunerated in this way. Business and its right-wing advocates have demanding this 
for a long time, and they increasingly succeed in imposing this ‘new normal’ as the 
template for employment in general, transferring previously salaried work into unpre-
dictable jobs without guarantees and rights and with lower remunerations, worsening 
working conditions and diminishing benefits.
Society, as it moves away from the ‘abusive, historic, identification of work with sala-
ried work’ (Carlo Vercellone), appears to jettison salary instead of work. UBI, properly 
understood and implemented, should foster security of income entirely independent of 
work, whether waged or not.
The ongoing disappearance of salaried work has engendered the perverse belief, 
widely shared in libertarian and neoliberal circles, that traditional, collective work has 
no merit, and should be spurned. Merit (and value) should solely accrue to individual 
entrepreneurship, and the labor that underwrites it should ruthlessly be flexibilized 
for profitability. Labor, like all other ‘factors of production’, is deemed to carry a zero-
base price, meaning that every increment should be viewed as a cost and pruned as 
much as possible.
The withering of a stable link between work and a secure wage has been well-theo-
rized. ‘Gig economy’ and ‘Uberization’ typify economic relationships praised by the 
libertarian elite, but hardly by those forced by circumstances to engage in them. Where 
work is remunerated it is for the outcome of the actual work, at an often much lower 
rate. I will illustrate the point through the example of the ‘intermittents du spectacle’ 
in France (portrayed, a.o. by Bernard Stiegler). The ‘intermittents’ are people working 
during the cultural season, and hence only part of the year, in the technical side of 
cultural events and productions. Theirs is a condition of part-time employment (hence 
‘intermittent’), but of full-time work, spending the cultural season’s ‘slack time’ (roughly 
7-8 months) in quasi-permanent education and training, honing the skills they need 
to perform the array of tasks assigned during the summer’s events. The later work is 
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perceived as merely technical, routine-like, and paid accordingly, but the real work in 
the ‘slack’ times is not waged, while the waged job, in season, only consists in putting 
the outcomes of this work into practice — at devalued rates. Workers are paid, part of 
the year, low-skilled wages for their efforts at maintaining high-skilled competence, the 
time spent on which is only retributed in the form of unemployment benefit. Needless 
to add, this is itself under vociferous attack by employers, since the ‘intermittents’ do 
not perform visible, and hence quantifiable work during that time.
This pattern, which arose in the realm of ‘cultural production’, is now becoming the 
‘new normal’ in more professions. That it took root in the traditionally underfunded and 
looked-down-on spheres of the arts and culture is not an unfortunate coincidence. It 
reverberates the increasingly ‘dematerialized’ quality of work in many sectors of the 
economy (e.g. ‘services’ instead of ‘industrial production’), where erratic relationships 
between work and pay are easier to implement. This is why teachers with short-term 
and part-time contracts are no longer paid for the time they spend preparing lessons 
and refresh courses.
Thus all forms of work tend to be downgraded in monetary terms and security of 
employment, while working conditions go down almost faster than the pay. This fol-
lows from the deleterious economic discourse described above, which should be un-
derstood as profoundly ideological. Where only entrepreneurship is valued, ‘ordinary’ 
work and the human being performing it, becomes an inconvenience, a maximally 
compressible cost factor. No wonder this attitude often goes together with wet dreams 
about full automation, where illusions of zero labor costs are only outmatched by delu-
sions about the direct and indirect costs of ‘hiring’ robots.
This is further fueled by widely adopted, pernicious algorithm-based management 
tools, appropriately dubbed ‘weapons of math destruction’ by Cathy O’Neil in her 
book of the same name. Make no mistake, such ideas about managing the corporate 
economy are not merely business-as-usual; they are also detrimental to sound and 
sustainable business in the long term. Since the effects of short-termism are perfectly 
well known, it simply comes down to lining one’s pockets at the helm.
UBI disrupts the commonly held belief that earning money through work is essential 
for survival, something society apparently inherited from the Judeo-Christian tradition 
(‘in the sweat of thy brows thou shall eat bread ...’). UBI, by providing the guarantee of 
an acceptable standard of living to all, prevents the foreseeable race to the bottom in 
terms of wages, working conditions, and security of income for the majority. It enables 
the 99% to invoke and enforce the power to say no. Conversely, in the absence of UBI, 
increasingly scarcely remunerated slots of the future global workplace will continue 
under increasingly abusive conditions. Society at large will revert to something close 
to a Hobbesian state: solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Such a scenario would 
hopefully be unpalatable even to the 1%. Therefore we may conclude that UBI is both 
necessary and unavoidable.
What UBI Should Be — or Not Be
Having looked at the material aspects which point to the implementation of UBI, it is 
also essential to look at the immaterial ones.
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If UBI is conceived as not only a mere prop to personal incomes but also an essential 
building block towards a fairer society, it becomes impossible to implement if looked 
at only from a strictly individual security point of view. A purely economic approach to 
UBI risks becoming an argument about ‘reforming’ the welfare state, replacing not only 
individual, but also collective benefits. This is the hardly concealed design of the right, 
bent on abolishing welfare altogether, releasing huge savings on the state budget to 
immediately transform these in tax cuts for the rich.
It is therefore essential that UBI be not only a guaranteed income, but also an assur-
ance regarding one’s opportunities as a fully participating member of society. What the 
latter makes possible is freedom, both negatively — e.g. freedom of fear — but also 
positively, as the enhanced possibility to act at one’s own liking. UBI is therefore the 
harbinger and the pre-condition to bring about a just and more convivial society.
We can also look at UBI as the rightful retribution for what one does for society, merely 
by virtue of one’s existence — by simply being there. That may seem abstruse at first 
sight, but it is not different from the rights granted to any person on the constitutional 
level. It only extends such rights in the material sphere, which are already enshrined in 
most constitutions where it is the first and final duty of society to ensure the well-being 
of each of its members.
We can conclude that UBI should be and cannot be anything else but a contributory 
benefit, representing a universal and unconditional right to the material means of a 
decent life. It presents an all-inclusive opportunity to participate actively and fully in 
societal life. We understand by this the freedom to engage in activities which are both 
beneficial to the community and gratifying to the person performing them, something 
sorely lacking under present conditions. If UBI were to come about, there is no doubt 
that a different type of human society would slowly emerge, which would take up seri-
ously, at the very least, the development of so-called ‘green capitalism’. One may of 
course hope, campaign and militate for more, for a vast and genuine transformation of 
society towards the sustainable future we all crave.
We can now turn to a few practical questions which have bedeviled the debate 
about UBI.
On 3 Practical Questions Commonly Voiced About UBI
1. Can UBI be Financed?
The answer is an unqualified yes — the money is there. But only if there is the political 
will strong enough to take the necessary economic measures, specifically in the sphere 
of taxation. This requires a relatively easy (if politically daunting) realignment of the 
share of the fiscal burden between categories of contributors, and this means between 
households and firms. It would also require a substantial ‘de-financialization’ of the 
economy on a somewhat longer term, that is a near-reversion of the ratio between ‘im-
material’ (aka ‘virtual’) and ‘material (aka ‘real’) money in society’s fiduciary balances. 
Indeed, the amounts rolling over in the global financial sphere exceed the sum total of 
actual on the ground economic activities by a factor 10 — or higher. Once introduced, 
UBI may well accelerate this shift even further since, at present, the financial behemoth 
largely feeds on debt, a lot of which consists of consumptive credit.
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Taxation-wise, after careful study of its consequences on the distribution of wealth and 
incomes, (specifically, on its impact on the incomes of the poorer parts of the popula-
tion) one could think of fully streamlining taxation into one single measure: a tax on all 
monetary and financial transactions, that is, on all formal movements of money.
2. Will the Introduction of UBI Depress Work-Related Incomes, Wages and Other Re-
munerations?
Here the answer is a slightly more qualified no, as very much hinges on the modalities 
of UBI as implemented. However, a genuine UBI sets the floor of individual income 
at a level that secures all a person’s basic needs. Obviously, the problem here lies 
with the definition of basic needs. The higher the standard is set, the more difficult 
it becomes to fund. But conversely, too low a standard would obliterate the very 
opportunities UBI is intended to provide. And on the marketplace of labor the most 
important one for a job seeker is the effective right to say ‘no’. This is the trickiest 
issue regarding the implementation of a sustainable and effective UBI policy. Yet in 
any case, having to pay good money for work which by its nature cannot fall within 
the voluntary sphere, and for which there still is a demand, will remain a fact of life in 
the commercial sphere. Thus businesses will have to propose appropriate earnings if 
they wish to recruit motivated collaborators.
Therefore, once a reasonable standard of UBI is established, there is little reason to be-
lieve that ‘the going rate for labor’ would fall substantially below the currently prevailing 
one. Wages might even turn out to increase, since businesses will have to compete 
with the non-commercial, non-profit sector of the economy, opening up many reward-
ing activities in the ‘commons’ sphere, given the existence of UBI.
This is the also the principal argument to reject any declination of UBI implemented 
along lines proposed by some right-wing/ libertarian opinion leaders: slashing or abol-
ishing outright social/public services as a quid pro quo for its introduction under the 
false pretense of budget neutrality. Such a fraudulent neo-liberal/ libertarian interpreta-
tion would not only keep the scourge of precarity going, but indeed quickly transform 
UBI into not a minimum but a maximum income for the ‘99%’.
3. What of the Place of Welfare (as We Know it) After UBI?
The answer is that it should largely stay in place — if thoroughly reformed. Neo-liberal/
libertarian economic doctrine, having, reluctantly, accepted the inevitability of UBI, 
demands it be traded against a massive reduction, or even total abolition, of welfare 
as we know it. Yet, cuts in social benefits and subsidies on public service provisions 
like housing, health or education, translates in immediate additional expenditures for 
recipients of UBI, nullifying all the advances it represents. Slashing subsidies and mak-
ing public services more expensive would defeat UBI’s other crucial purpose: buying 
social peace in economically unsettled times for the majority.
Hence, maintaining a welfare state — minus direct monetary transfers — that is con-
sistent with providing access of essential services to all is not only a corollary condi-
tion, it is a sine qua non of an authentic UBI. In the end, UBI, the maintaining of such 
subsidies and the provision of public services at a budget neutral level will have to be 
funded by mobilizing existing resources in society, meaning an increase in taxation. 
Many economists have done the math already and concluded that the overall level of 
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taxation would indeed rise after UBI, but far less than argued by detractors. Further-
more, shifts in the modalities of taxation, as already alluded to, will enhance the income 
position of the poorer households, and would make little or no difference to the aver-
age taxpayer (though wealthier classes will be hit harder than at present).
We may look now at some other important issues pertaining to, or impairing, the de-
bate around UBI.
On the Political Outcomes and Consequences of UBI
A growing perception of economic and other forms of insecurity among an increasing 
part of the population — well-illustrated by the popularity of the precarity moniker — 
has made those individuals disgruntled with the existing political dispensation.
This has fostered, in the Global North, the appearance and stark expansion of extreme 
political movements, especially at the right side of the spectrum. These are threatening 
democracy, the rule of law, the arts and culture, and human rights and fundamental 
liberties in general. Unlike those of the political left, the right’s arguments are, not so 
slowly and stealthily, being adopted by established (center-)right parties.
One should never forget the rise of European Fascisms in the 30s. However uncom-
fortable the fact, these were truly popular movements, and their rise was greatly helped 
by the previous powers being unable or unwilling to stem the general impoverishment 
caused by capitalism’s crisis and the ensuing Great Depression. We are at the thresh-
old of a crisis of the same, if not perhaps even greater, magnitude.
That lesson should be clear and UBI is evidently the sole alternative to this disaster 
happening repeatedly. Decision makers failing to confront this, be it by design or by de-
fault, can be sure to pay sooner rather than later for the price of their shortsightedness.
The Risk of a ‘Pull Effect’ of UBI on Immigration
This issue is indeed a big elephant in the room when discussing the likely outcomes 
of UBI. The opinion that granting UBI to everyone in a given territory would attract 
masses of (poor) outsiders and make the system unsustainable is widely shared in 
some circles, and is just as widely being suppressed among their opponents. Both 
extremes are unfortunate and prevent cool-headed reasoning.
The likelihood of a pull effect is real. But it should be seen in present and future con-
texts. Granting unrestricted UBI to immigrants delivers a different outcome compared 
with the settled population because immigrants wish, in general, to earn money not 
only for themselves, but also for their kin at home. They are thus resolute savers and 
remitters, and this practice undermines an unstated but not unimportant purpose of 
UBI: pushing local demand for goods and services.
There are several possible answers to this situation short of preventing immigration, 
which is as impractical as it insults basic morality.
To start with, the imbalances caused within society at large — specifically by excessive 
marketisation and financialization — should be addressed. Regarding UBI, part of it 
could be ‘demonitized’ by making a basket of social goods and public services avail-
227ALTERNATIVES IN FINANCIAL IMAGINATION
able for free, e.g. health, and education, or at a very nominal cost, e.g. housing, utilities, 
transport. This would be to retain part of UBI in the economy that funds it. Formalizing 
and expanding the use of local currencies, possibly ones carrying a demurrage charge 
(cf Silvio Gesell), is another option. Making UBI partly payable on electronic instru-
ments (e.g. chipcards) with a limited geographical validity is feasible, but goes with a 
contraction of a recipient’s freely disposable income. Even non-fiat crypto-currencies 
have popped up in some UBI blueprints, but then, among other things, stark issues of 
general usability arise.
Finally, one could trade an initial UBI disqualification of immigrants, against allowing 
them free movement in and out of a particular UBI-allocating jurisdiction. Immigrants 
could then gradually gain access to UBI, say after several years, as is the case with 
naturalizations. This would also alleviate fears of an ‘alien tsunami’.
‘Legions of Couch Potatoes’ as a Consequence of UBI
Morally (turbo-)charged opponents of UBI often allege that, among many other evils, 
UBI would effectively amount to a premium on laziness and lull its beneficiaries into 
a terminal coma of gawking in front of screens 24/7/365. Some corroboration to this 
might come from surveys in the U.S. among recipients of social benefits, especially 
MedicAid. They also point out the addictive effects of almost permanent ‘social’ media 
usage within our thoroughly fragmented and individualized society, especially among 
those with limited schooling and skills
This, however, appears to be an exaggerated scenario. One can expect UBI, once 
implemented, to trigger an at least partial reformation of society towards more vol-
untary work openings, more conviviality and more co-operative and relaxed life-
styles in general. This would provide both the opportunity and the drive to partici-
pate in ‘the commons’ in one way or another. There for sure will be a minority of 
people preferring to enjoy what others may see as totally empty idleness, but that 
will be a very tolerably small one (one recipient in 10? One in 8?). This is not a valid 
reason to ditch UBI.
Taxation and the ’Poverty Trap’
We have briefly discussed that, given reform in the current system of taxation, UBI is 
affordable, even if it would constitute a major component of public expenditure. But 
this is no way unworkable, or even unprecedented. The French social security system, 
for instance, swallows up 30% of current GDP (100% when it began after WWII!), and 
yet nobody seriously suggests abolishing it.
Some tricky issues will remain unresolved, however, and might derail UBI implementa-
tion unless carefully attended to:
1. Direct (Income) Taxation After UBI
Some have suggested income-taxing from the very first unit earned after and above 
UBI, preferably in conjunction with a (low) flat tax — the evergreen dream of the po-
litical right. This suggestion should be resisted; like the curtailing of social and public 
services, this would intolerably reduce recipients’ actual disposable income, as well as 
reduce the total amount of tax leviable.
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There should be a tax credit/rescission extending quite some way after UBI (my 
hunch is: up to the amount of another UBI) to offer maximum incentive to partici-
pate, in some way, in economic life. After that, income tax rate should not be flat but 
instead progressive, and steeply so, both to fund UBI, and also to decrease income 
inequality. Concurrently, punitive taxation should apply to (very) high incomes, to 
achieve a further reduction in (material) inequality. This would be merely a reversal to 
the situation prevailing for two or three decades after WWII in the Global North, where 
in some countries the highest marginal rate of tax was surprisingly close to 100% (as 
in the USA!).
2. Indirect Taxation and UBI
The idea of substantially funding UBI, and state expenditures in general, by way 
of steep levies on consumption, particularly sales and value added taxes (VAT), 
has proved invidiously popular, especially on the right. This only confirms what is 
economically acknowledged, and politically ignored: that indirect taxation is highly 
regressive and favors the wealthier segments of society. In fact, the tweaking of 
VAT upwards functions as a proxy for unrealizable flat tax on incomes, and should 
be rejected on the same grounds. Levies on consumption affect people with low 
incomes much more than they burden the rich, whose larger outlays in investments, 
savings etc. are taxed less if at all. High levels of indirect taxation hence inevitably 
cancel out some of the desired income effects of UBI, even though high demerit 
taxes on environmentally or otherwise socially objectionable elements of consump-
tion should be admissible.
3. (Social) Benefits After UBI, and the Scourge of the ‘Poverty Trap’
We have already argued that a curtailment of social benefits after UBI is a total no-go. 
However, maintaining them as they are administered in many jurisdictions is also a 
dead-end. Under the current dispensation, benefit recipients are gradually weaned 
off them as their income increase. Unfortunately, this ‘decrement by increment’ policy 
results in practice in a tax on the additional income approaching 100% — sometimes 
even exceeding it — something that would of course be utterly unacceptable if it hit 
wealthier citizens. This state of affairs now constitutes a potent disincentive to accept 
any form of work not very highly paid, and that would not change under a UBI regime. 
Hence, phasing out of income supporting subsidies, while acceptable in itself, should 
be done very gradually like slabs in a progressive income tax, and so not result in an 
unfair loss of incremental income.
It should be clear by now that UBI demands a new approach to taxation and all its 
income-related corollaries affecting households. But it should be equally clear that this 
approach requires caution, lest the appearance of perverse, negative effects. A prag-
matic, if politically tricky, approach would simply be shifting away the main burden of 
taxation from the personal (‘households’) to the corporate (‘firms’), as mentioned ear-
lier. A more radical but preferable approach, in my view, would be to do away with the 
whole concept of taxation and move towards a single, universal levy on the movement 
of scriptural money — the money of the rich and the corporates — while leaving cash, 
and/or its (yet to be developed), electronic stand-ins off the hook. This is undoubtedly 
heady stuff, which clearly needs further research. But it might be our only way towards 
a better society in the long run.
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The ‘Problem’ of Funding UBI
The absurdly simple — if difficult to comprehend in a politically productive manner — 
answer to any ‘TINA’-styled objection to UBI merely lies in an elementary modification 
of the choice of two out of three options made by a government, options which, if 
taken together, are incompatible.
These options are: (i) maintaining/increasing the standards of living of the national 
population as a whole; (ii) allowing for the free movement of capital between unequally 
governed jurisdictions with regard to taxes, labor laws, etc. and (iii) stabilizing mon-
etary values, i.e. the exchange rate of the national units of account against those of 
other countries.
Under transnational capitalism, fired by a neo-liberal, and now increasingly libertarian, 
ideology, this choice has systematically favored the last two elements. This at the detri-
ment of the first, even though it embodies the vast majority of the people.
Undoing this choice is a primal condition, yet also an inescapable outcome of intro-
ducing UBI on a large scale. It will also have the positive effect of cutting deeply into 
the rent incomes of the 1%.
Basic or Minimum Income, Disposable Income, and UBI: Welcome to Obfusca-
tion Central
Under our current dispensation the common attribute and trend of all lower incomes, 
indifferent to whether they are waged or obtained through social benefits, is an ever-
diminishing proportion of freely disposable household income left after all necessary, 
incompressible expenses (e.g. rent, insurances, taxes, etc.) have been paid. This is 
even the case when the income obtained is itself not declining or even moderately 
increasing. This is the first thing that needs to be considered, and reverted, before and 
when implementing UBI. Therefore, a healthy margin of freely disposable income must 
be ensured for UBI recipients, because it forms a basic requirement to alleviate the 
feeling of precarity and encourage initiatives.
The question of at which amount UBI should be set is a vexed one. Here opinions 
vary greatly, and aside from real or perceived funding issues this is caused by con-
fusing UBI with a minimum or ‘basic’ income. A better point of departure would be a 
living income (as in ‘living wage’ demanded by labor unions), ensuring one lives not 
on the edge of poverty but with dignity. That need not require an extravagant sum, 
but is surely something significantly above the absolute poverty line. Amounts of 
CHF 2550 or €1200 a month for a single person in Switzerland and the Netherlands 
respectively have been suggested, and appear realistic to ensure a decent, if so-
ber, living standard. Conversely, any amount dished out to citizens (a.k.a. ‘helicopter 
money’) is welcome and will some way go towards fulfilling the purpose of UBI. But 
it should not be called UBI.
Finally, it is unavoidable to stress and repeat that UBI should be unconditionally uni-
versal. Ridiculing the prospect of zillionaires receiving UBI is damnably disingenuous, 
since progressive income tax will recoup those monies, and then some. Playing ball 
with unconditional universality is a blueprint for the kind of red tape and meddlesome-
ness that has disqualified for good ‘nanny state’ welfare.
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Introducing UBI at a fair level of allowance will largely, if not entirely, eradicate precarity, 
precarity understood as economic uncertainty and/or vulnerability. After receiving UBI 
it will remain each individual’s responsibility to deploy the necessary initiatives to move 
up the ladder of material achievement, if so wished.
Poverty, especially relative poverty, will be substantially lessened, although not totally 
obliterated. At the bottom tier of the social order, UBI payments will ensure a decent, 
if sober, living standard. At the top of the income and wealth pyramid, steeply pro-
gressive taxes should reduce incentives to demand and obtain unbecoming levels of 
remuneration. Furthermore, outlandish displays of wealth and luxury, which are all too 
common in our times, will carry, if not moral rejection, then a hefty tariff. Outlandish 
levels of conspicuous consumption are a powerful social destabilizer, and should be 
challenged.
Inequality, to conclude, will be partially tackled but certainly not overturned, with the 
introduction of UBI. One should dare to argue that its elimination does not, and should 
not, rank very high in the aims of UBI. Social engineering has limits which should be 
acknowledged and respected, and experience shows that inequality is not much re-
sented if kept within reasonable bounds. Meanwhile, a general ‘softening’ of society, 
which one may expect from implementing UBI, should go a long way to flatten the dis-
tribution of what former Dutch PM Joop den Uyl famously, if problematically, described 
as the hallowed trinity of ‘knowledge, power, and income’.
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Preamble in the shape of an offering
The power of finance in our hands doesn’t need to be just about raising funds or mak-
ing money. It can be an invitation to risk and speculate together to open up new pos-
sibilities and modes of coming together.
For most of us, finance is a predatory and extractive practice that takes more than it 
gives. But what if at the heart of finance we found a logic of active offering? A ritual 
offering gesture — the creation of a time interval in the derivative form of a gift1 — that 
both opens up and holds open new economic spaces?
Economic Space Agency is crafting a new platform, Space, to take up a unique 
economic, ethical, aesthetical and political challenge: reinventing finance as a col-
lective practice of crafting futures and rethinking value at the end of the economy as 
we know it.
For we are always already at stake with each other, partnered all the way down. In-
habitants of the world, earthlings and earthbounds, creatures of all kinds, human and 
non-human, we are entangled in a series of interlaced trails and creative feedback 
loops, holding open life for one another. In the economic spaces to come — the world 
we want — everyone holds pieces of each other’s life, socially and financially. We are 
entre-preneurs and entre-donneurs — inter-holders and inter-givers — networked to-
gether to collectively distribute the risks and opportunities of living.
From Robin Hood Asset Management to Economic Space Agency
Back in the day we were a group of hard core researchers of the coming forms of 
economy and organization. We knew that it would not be a picnic when we start-
ed using thinkers from the French post-structuralist tradition like Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and the then Italian autonomist writ-
ers, Toni Negri, Christian Marazzi, Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, Franco Berardi, 
1 The Wealth of Societies project has developed a compelling reading of the derivative form as gift. 
Instead of rehearsing the usual critique about the extent to which markets are colonizing our lives 
and institutions, they instead wonder if derivative finance offers anything new to the old debate 
over what money can or can’t buy. Their answer articulates as a multi-faceted inquiry about how 
the gift economy foreshadows contemporary derivative form: ‘The gift and the derivative share 
the property that both take the volatilities and uncertainties of social life and transform them into 
manageable risks by equating things that are different. […] It is the play of the interval (unlike 
stocks, options have expiration dates) that produces the wealth that derivatives are capable of 
producing (what’s known technically as “convexity”). Gift exchanges take different inherently risky 
“social flows” and commensurate them via ritualized performances. The interval of time between 
gift and countergift produces the “social convexity” that creates wealth in the form of new social 
claims and obligations.’ Benjamin Lee and Randy Martin (eds), Derivatives and the Wealth of 
Societies, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2016, p.2.
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and others to study and understand economy, finance and organization. But we knew 
that this was the way to do it if we were to really grasp how post-Fordist economy, 
semiocapitalism, immaterial and affective labor, and the financial technologies work 
and intertwine with our destiny.
With these thinkers, we were able to discern a couple of interesting things:
 –  how signs and meanings are part of real production and not only some kind of 
ideology or superstructure of production;
 –  how the dynamic of the production of value lies in the coming together of 
heterogeneous forces, and not only in the relationship between capital and labor;
 – how information overflow and semiotic inflation lead to imitation;
 – how finance can curb time, how it is essentially a technology to affect the future 
from the present;
 – how economy is essentially about organization, not of action but its potentiality;
 – how the meaning of autonomy is in internal displacements, shiftings, iterations, 
settlings and dissolutions that are the processes of the self-composition; autonomy 
means to be able to set the attractors of one’s own behavior.
The paradoxes of immaterial production and precarious work, and the blurring of the 
boundaries between economy and politics, disrupt the approaches and distinctions 
of industrial economy and its institutions. We think that the common ground of art 
and politics is in the collapse of old forms of society, economy and subjectivity and 
in the creation of these new forms. This is where they meet, and this is where we find 
ourselves in work. We need to start creating new concepts and imagining new social 
and financial forms.
What can these new forms be today? How can they be created?
Our pilot in hacking finance to create new social and financial forms was Robin Hood 
Asset Management  —  a hedge fund with a twist. In fact, three twists. First, it is a coop-
erative. Individuals who buy shares become members and decide how the coop is run. 
One member, one vote. Second, part of the profit generated by the fund is invested 
into projects building the commons. Third, the money put into the fund is managed by 
an algorithm called ‘the Parasite’. She logs into the brains of the bankers at Wall Street, 
deconstructs them into databanks, and uses big data analysis and structured finance 
to share their most important means of production to everyone.
The next step takes the logic further: not only stealing from the rich and giving to the 
poor (like Robin Hood did), but exploring, building new ecologies, new ecosystems, 
new universes, new possibilities, new worlds of value. For this purpose the Robin 
Hood hydra grew a new head: a start-up company called Economic Space Agency 
(ECSA). Here is what we propose to remake the DNA of the economy as we know it.
The Space Platform: Toward Programmable and Non-Linear Economic Spaces
This is a historic moment. Following the emergence of blockchain and decentralized 
digital technology, social, economic and financial forms are becoming for the first time 
integrally programmable.
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The Space platform initiated by Economic Space Agency is an open, collaborative 
smart contract ecosystem based on the fourth generation (post)blockchain technology, 
Gravity.2 The Space platform enables the creation of fully modular and interoperable 
economic spaces. Economic spaces are protocols of economic, financial and social 
interaction, of value and risk creation, of sharing and distribution of resources. They are 
self-governed, peer-to-peer programmable organizations that can operate together in 
an emergent network, formed dynamically through the relations they establish be-
tween each other. Rather than conceiving one totalizing economy, Space envisions the 
interoperation of a plurality of micro-economies, each with its own governance model, 
value creation logic and capacity for tokenized self-issuance. These micro-economies 
will be structurally interoperable to the extent they desire, and they will be able to utilize 
the structures created by others as a basis of their own operations.
The Space platform responds to the necessity of envisaging and concretizing emer-
gent and non-linear ways of coming together. These new modes of event-based col-
lective self-organization are better attuned to the value creation processes that are 
already happening in our midst and to which our current economic system is mostly 
blind. The limitedness of the current monetary and economic system does not provide 
an adequate metric to assess all other kinds of values that do not fit economic quanti-
fication and outcome-based evaluation models — such as psychological, social, aes-
thetic, and ecologic ‘profitability’, flattening the heterogeneity of collective initiatives 
and neutralizing their potential to generate and distribute values in our milieus.
Every digital platform, from goliaths like Facebook to the fringest of forums, creates 
a space of encounter and gathering generating values of different types. We use the 
term economic space to designate the immaterial and material system of coordinates 
and attractors that gives shape to how people create and interact with resources, as-
sets, values and their different modes of expression and representation. We conceive 
of these economic spaces as non-Euclidean. The term may sound strange or even 
extravagant, but non-Euclidean economic space has a specific meaning. A Euclid-
ean economic space is defined by the competition of economic agents over scarce 
resources. The individual agents are deemed to have clear and persistent boundaries, 
and relate to each other via linear transactions. In a Euclidean economic space, some-
thing pre-produced is divided. This is the space the politicians and economic experts 
talk about when they say there is no alternative to the current economic system and 
ask us to blindly abide to austere monetary policies.
In contrast, non-Euclidean economic spaces move beyond the imaginary of limita-
tions, austerity, scarcity and powerlessness, foregrounding a continuous unfolding of 
possibilities, options, connections and creativity. When resources and affordances get 
shared on a distributed platform, they become nomadic and start to mutate. Non-
Euclidean economic spaces call for a non-linear distribution where nothing pertains or 
belongs only to one person, but all persons are arrayed here and there in such a man-
ner as to make possible a greater range of interactions. Nomadic economic spaces 
are the associated milieu of the networked tribes of the 21st century. They are the 
2 For more detailed information about both Space and Gravity, check the respective White papers 
on our website: www.economicspace.agency.
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spaces of continuous innovation and metamorphosis. Think of them as n-dimensional 
programmable and vibratory organizations that allow for the creation and circulation 
of new types of value. Econauts will navigate these financial and futurial borderspaces 
that are not hard and bounded — liminal spaces that allow you to fold yourself within 
and without.
The general purpose of the Space platform consists in open sourcing finance: to be-
come an easily usable launch pad for rapid creation, deployment, sharing, customizing, 
copying and remixing of modular, interoperable and self-governing economic spaces. 
The platform enables communities and individuals to make their own offers, issue their 
own programmable tokens and set their own value systems. As such, the design of 
economic space becomes a means of collective self-expression; that is: an occasion 
to enunciate and manifest financial values that escape the disfiguring market logic of 
generalized equivalence. Through the platform’s template approach, users have access 
to flexible tools to invent and construct new (or simply reproduce existing) modes of 
organization to leverage the unrealized value of socially networked production.
Currently, every process of value creation is forced to plug into an exploitative mono-
economy3 core system that flattens out all other forms of value. The resulting finan-
cialization of the social has fostered spiraling indebtedness, the decreasing price of 
labor, and erosion of the welfare state. Yet, from households to cities, from software 
to trade, the work and very being of people are what back the underlying value of fi-
nance. Simultaneous to this unrecognized backing, we are tethered to the instruments 
of finance to access new value.
We are only seeing the beginning of an intensive and multi-faceted process of decen-
tralization and redefinition of socio-financial relations towards greater multiplicity and 
autonomy. One way of critically engaging with this nomadic re-engineering of finance 
is to envisage it as an expressive medium. In essence, finance is not primarily about 
money: it is a mode of coordinating the future and its emerging possibilities through 
the collective design of attractors and the distribution of flows of desire. Finance thus 
appears as the opening of a shared temporal interval in which new things can happen 
by risking and speculating together.
Finance concerns the capacity to bring future potential into the present through mon-
etization, enabling future investments in the present by making them liquid. The pos-
sibility for financial actors to manufacture financial instruments out of debt and equity, 
thereby impacting volatility and liquidity in markets, has become a political weapon 
to orient and organize the masses. In response, Economic Space Agency makes it 
possible to approach finance with a hacker attitude and a poetics of experimentation.
This is our wager: we want everyone to be able to harness the power of finance as a 
technology for coordinating and sharing the future in which we want to live. 
3 We use ‘monoeconomy’ in analogy with the term monoculture (monocropping etc.), in which one 
species (out of a whole spectrum of possible species) dominates the ecosystem, and not in the 
precise technical sense the term monoeconomy is used in development economics. ‘Monotheistic 
economy’ might be another term, connoting the theistic elements discernible in current economic 
dogma.
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Short Technical Overview
The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) that defines how information is transmitted 
over the web is ‘stateless’ and it needed a data layer on top of it for any application 
functionality. This data layer was provided by the winners of yesterday: Google/search, 
Facebook/social, eBay/commerce. It allowed them to capture the data and the value 
and drove the centralization of the web.
Bitcoin introduced blockchain technology and cryptocurrency to the world, creating a 
decentralized network of trust optimized for resiliency, verifiability and anonymity. Block-
chain allows data to be maintained in a decentralized way, thus challenging value cap-
ture models based on centralized control. Ethereum then built upon the consensus-
based decentralized architecture of Bitcoin, adding a Turing complete scripting language 
with which to build applications. P2P crypto-currencies, smart contracts and second-
generation blockchain tokens are introducing new ways of coordinating vast networks, 
as well as new ownership models based on mutual stakeholding in the protocol layer.
While crowdfunding and P2P lending are the first steps toward the disintermediation 
and personalization of financial relations, the next phase in technological and financial 
development must involve the possibility for everyone to gain concrete access to the 
design of their own economic agency. As a truly distributed smart contract ecosystem 
that enables a new way of designing and powering event-based and other forms of 
programmable organizations, the Gravity + Space platforms are overcoming the limita-
tions of logically centralized blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Both of these 
models are fundamentally based on the same computing platform: a shared distribut-
ed ledger in case of Bitcoin, and a shared world computer in the case of Ethereum, run 
by every node on the network, processing every line of application code run by every 
application in the system. This replication has tremendous benefits in terms of trans-
parency and fault tolerance. However, the World Computer architecture introduces re-
dundancies and limitations that are inconvenient and inefficient for many applications. 
Smart contract-based applications have become varied enough so as to benefit from 
more flexibility than the World Computer architecture typically offers.
Instead of a World Computer implementation, Gravity offers a platform for building 
interoperating networks of decentralized computers — a World Computing Fabric ar-
chitecture. A World Computing Fabric is a modular, object capability-oriented archi-
tecture for building resilient, verifiable networks of virtual machines. This enables a 
new approach for creating systems and protocols for the digital economy made of 
natively scalable, interoperable smart contract and smart organization networks. Grav-
ity is smart contracts and smart organizations unchained.
Beyond Extractive Finance: Toward Mutual Stakeholding
While financial institutions and corporations are seeking to take advantage of blockchain 
affordances, they merely reproduce old familiar models and logics on these emerging 
technologies. But the new smart contract platforms have not yet been irretrievably colo-
nized by existing financial interests. We have a small (and closing) temporal window to 
create something else. As the history of the Internet shows, the early adopters will play 
a profound role in shaping the sense and direction of the novel, emergent economic and 
organizational forms that might, one day, be as commonplace as social media today.
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The current financial system is essentially based on relations of debt and equity — the 
former concentrated in the hands of the many and the latter controlled by the elite few. 
The increasing supply of government bonds (safe means for capital preservation) is 
possible only through deficit cuts and excluding all inflationary spending. Presently, 
expansion in the forms of indebtedness is the condition for capital accumulation, just 
like the growth of labor force participation was for expanding commodity production.
ECSA wants to change this state of affairs by promoting relations of equity between 
the different economic spaces. By doing so, ECSA conceives of the economic spaces 
built on top of its platform as partners, rather than subjecting them to the extractive re-
lations that characterize the contemporary financial paradigm. Equity acts as the hori-
zontalizing force through which all econauts have access to, share in, and harvest the 
derivative value made available through the interoperability of heterogeneous abstract 
metrics. By offering the possibility to participate (i.e. have actual stakes) in occasions 
for financialization through equity relations, ECSA enables the collective steering of 
financial dynamics and mechanisms for the purpose of collective redistribution and the 
overspilling of heterogeneous values. It does so by concretely giving econauts the abil-
ity to issue their own offers, organizations and tokens (and other kind of instruments) 
— that is, providing the capacity to index those values they want to share and sustain 
according to metrics they determine. This unprecedented move furnishes liquidity to 
the social and relational insensible production of value, and allows for the circulation/
distribution of that liquidity in an ecosystem that collectively acknowledges those val-
ues — for the collective livelihood of that ecosystem.
By activating our mutual stakeholding with equity relations, we offer people production 
power, finance’s future-wielding capacity, rather than merely empty consumption pow-
er. As a technology for the de-differentiation of risk and value flows, synthetic finance 
becomes a powerful instrument for the dynamical creation and distribution of common 
equity, as the lifeblood circulating through and interconnecting the ECSA ecosystem.
Following a crucial insight developed by Randy Martin and further extended by the Vola-
tility Group, we think of the financial derivative as a technology to amplify the power of 
autonomous organizations, once it is used in the context of self-created economic space 
and made accessible through easy user interfaces and ready-made templates. These 
financial instruments organize — weave together, distribute, branch — economic flows, 
and thereby create new modes of relation — modes which were previously unavailable, 
impossible, or even nonexistent. By operating the instruments of synthetic finance, one 
gets to arrange the attractors of one’s own behavior, to shape the rhythms and patterns 
of the economic spacetime where behaviour expresses itself. With the Space platform, 
it becomes possible to express ‘the way we are social with each other’, the mutual in-
debtedness and collective stakeholding that compose our common wealth.4
4 ‘Such would be the political promise of a politics for derivatives, namely that it treated the 
immanent mutual indebtedness of populations as a means for them to gather and enact what the 
social could mean and embody. [...] recognizing the world crafted through the operations of the 
derivatives leads toward the entangled constitution of mutual indebtedness, of the ways that we 
are social together, even if we never fuse as one.’ Randy Martin, ‘From the Critique of Political 
Economy to the Critique of Finance’, in Benjamin Lee & Randy Martin (eds), Derivatives and the 
Wealth of Societies, p. 190.
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ECSA wishes to provide a new array of financial tools to those of us who are not 
bankers, traders or state-actors, such that a new generation of non-exploitative finan-
cial arrangements may emerge. With the Space platform, you will be able to leverage 
the power of finance — the power of risking and speculating together — allowing 
participation in a multi-dimensional ecosystem of economic spaces relying on equity 
relations and all sorts of optionalities. The time has come for people to take finance 
back into their own hands so as to make a claim on the enormous amount of wealth 
surrounding us. In the end, ECSA is committed to supporting a collective shift from fi-
nance as a technology of capital, based in debt and primitive accumulation, to finance 
as a form of production of new kinds of equity relations and commonfare production.
Responding to the financialization of the social, the inherent flaws of the sharing 
economy, the tendency toward the automation of work, and the limitations of cur-
rent blockchain solutions, ECSA's mission is to provide an open yet safe platform 
for the interoperability of heterogeneous value and risk systems and the scalability 
of token-based economies to create new social, economic and financial relations. 
Just as the internet fundamentally changed communication by transforming the role 
of author, publisher, photographer, and media maker, ECSA will transform finance, 
potentially enabling hundreds of millions of people to author economic spaces and 
control their financial relations.
In sum, ECSA’s Gravity + Space platform offers:
1. an operating system for the crypto-economy based on World Computing Fabric;
2. modular, copy-able, interoperable tools for the design of new economic spaces;
3. a repository of smart programmable organization templates;
4. a unique occasion to unleash the power of collaborative finance.
We Don’t Know Yet What a Token Can Do: Notes on Intensive Self-Issuance
The Re-Engineering of Money
Money isn’t simply something that serves as an intermediary for exchanges: it informs 
the very way we come together as large-scale collectivities. The complexity of financial 
instruments (money-forms) has developed to hedge the risk of interdependence: gold, 
paper, systems of account, debt, credit, stocks, options, derivatives all indicate an ad-
vancing complexity in the functionality of quantitative metrics. Money is, for all practi-
cal purposes, the medium for social synthesis in capitalist commodified societies. It is 
the elementary technology for psycho-collective individuation in the techno-social and 
economic ensemble known as capitalism. Therefore, we need to conceive of money 
as a technical object of social design, that is, something that can and needs to be re-
engineered to serve our collective aspirations.
The invention of Bitcoin urged us to rethink fundamental assumptions about the func-
tional organization of the contemporary monetary architecture and its impact on the 
operative logic of finance. Bitcoin and subsequent alt-coins remind us that money is 
not a natural given, but an artificial medium — precisely, a technology. This doesn’t 
mean that money is simply ‘arbitrary’; it is rather a real abstraction that has developed 
in complexity with the increasing complexity of society. As such, we should start tak-
ing control of its constitution, design, and functioning for our own communities of 
exchange, instead of letting it be designed by and for the wealthy.
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The excitement around blockchain is an excitement around a new means of encryption 
that takes one huge step towards the democratization of finance through techniques 
of decentralization. Hold a dollar and you have no idea of its history or of the history of 
its production. Beyond your immediate moment, you don’t know who sweated for that 
dollar, or for that matter, who died for it. Money has always been a kind of encryption 
process, but the code and thus the controls have been hidden away — sequestered 
in the hands of the most powerful: central banks, financiers and their militaries and 
states. With the domination imposed by imperial finance ordinary people were inca-
pable of engineering their own financial spaces or of proposing the rules of their own 
systems of valuation in the financial register.
Today’s extractive logic of finance is intimately linked to monetization as the mecha-
nism by which social, cultural, economic, ecologic values are rendered commensura-
ble with each other, flattening heterogeneous values-in-formation onto the only unit of 
account we know of (so far) — fiat money — according to the principle of scarcity em-
bedded in it. In contrast, the Space platform offers the opportunity to any individual or 
collective to issue fully programmable tokens and organizations. These crypto-based 
tokens and organizations allow anyone to design metrics of value that will function as 
attractors around which to orient the creation of their own economic spaces or eco-
nomic constellation. Self-issuance signifies that any agent can issue value, proposing 
it to other agents — its valuation is therefore a general question for the society at large 
and a practical question for each individual agent, whenever they face an offer for it.
In current finance, value masquerades as objective, actively suppressing the highly 
protean emergence of value and the variegated forms it takes. But valuation, we argue, 
is ultimately a matter of collective expression. Instead of imposing a uniform system of 
value upon us, like fiat currencies enforce, ECSA's key goal is to create a platform for 
rendering the rich, heterogeneous multiverse of values socially and financially liquid. 
Ultimately, ECSA envisages self-issued tokens not just as currency or equity, but also 
as speculative prions that begin to propagate new forms of exchange and new decen-
tralized organizational models.
Anarchiving Finance?
Let’s venture one step further into what the collectively expressed multiverse of values 
could entail. One of the challenges we have been facing concerns the economic im-
perative of conservation-through-exchange, that is, the function of money as store of 
value. Schematically put, the problem with the traditional economic form of exchange 
is two-fold. On the objective end, the capitalist form of exchange obviously enables a 
deleterious logic of infinite accumulation. It conditions the flattening regime of general-
ized equivalence and the thoroughgoing quantification of our life-world. On the sub-
jective end, it creates a practical solipsism that engenders the reciprocal exclusion of 
ownership. Social value is always intimated at some level, but it is muted by the store-
value capacity of money which establishes and re-establishes the individual with every 
transaction. The economical subject of interest is essentially a conservative subject: 
it is a terminal at the end of the economy stuck within a proprietary subjective form.
The key question at the core of new economic space design relates to the anarchiving 
of the value stored in the traditional money-form. How do we anarchive the surplus-
value of life in order to distribute it anew? From the processual perspective of the anar-
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chive, something always escapes. The notion of the anarchive foregrounds the qualita-
tive eventfulness that exceeds any computational and systemic capture. For example, 
an economic exchange is never only a binary relation between two pre-existing parties. 
It is always-also a generative event with its own forward-momentum, a singular space-
time created by the encounter of heterogeneous forces at a given moment. What other 
measures of magnitudes could be used to modulate the dissipation of value throughout 
the network against the logic of capture and storage inherent in the traditional process 
of exchange? How do we distribute value so that it is virtually and immediately felt as 
free-flowing abundance instead of triggering patterns of restrictive accumulation? How 
do we design a token that does not simply store value but dissipates it throughout the 
ecosystems through which it circulates? This is fundamentally an ecological problem, 
one that requires assuming new monetary perspectives folding and unfolding of n-
dimensional relationships that distribute value in impersonal, generative ways.
Think of the token as a propositional force, a sparkle of potentiality. It is a multi-dimen-
sional docking port that can germinate new forms of relations and value sharing. The 
token here is an occurrence, a virtual time-crystal expecting its transductive associ-
ated milieu in which to catalyze new relational constellations. It is an instance of value 
capture, but only insofar as it acts, simultaneously, as, a fugitive relay collectively mod-
ulating and amplifying values. Conceiving of tokens as speculative pragmatic relays of 
anarchic shares is a way of entertaining them as generator of collective effervescence 
that escapes usual forms of capture and containment.
An intensive and eventful issuance of the kind we are envisioning here needs to inter-
act with other self-issuances in order to express, sustain and appreciate its qualitative 
value difference in time. As anything truly social and valuable, the propositional force of 
each token is both joyful and precarious — in a word: adventuresque. Self-issuance is 
about exposure to an outside, but it doesn’t necessarily mean a full-fledged exposure 
to the ‘great outside’ of the market. Self-issuance can be modulated at will, following 
the affordances of a given ecosystem and in response to the inter-species web of en-
tanglements in which it is embedded. Finance as an expressive medium commands a 
logic of implication. The anarchiving power of the self-designed crypto-token, in con-
trast with the traditional money-form, could look for that which overspills as the neces-
sary condition for what has occurred and may yet occur, through forms of retrospective 
valuations. In any economic space in-formation, fields of relation are in operation, not 
just exchanges between individuals. The anarchive is the awareness of the inter-touch 
concurring with/in an environment spreading ecologically.5
To Value or Not to Value? Abstraction Without Extraction
Trotsky, somehow anticipating Hayek, believed that the transition to communism still 
required a metrics of value. One could not dispense with the notion of ‘abstract uni-
versal labor time’ or the money-form prematurely. The emergence of ever more supple 
forms of computation/communication seems to indicate that it may be possible to ab-
stract and self-capture our (immaterial) production without submitting to exploitation. 
5 For further considerations about the anarchiving power of self-issuance, see Anarchiving finance: 
A Free Indirect Deck About the Ee-engineering of Money, a document realized onsite during the 
SenseLab event ‘Distributing the Insensible: Performing the Anarchive’, Montreal, December 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeClrxHrg98.
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Abstraction without extraction: we need to imagine new economic spaces that would 
preserve the qualitative dimension of our modes of relationality, but could also produce 
quantified and interoperable value-units; that is, potentially exchangeable with other 
emergent commons and micro-economies.
Our hope is that if we allow for the construction of economic spaces of open, at will 
participation that simultaneously produce horizontal wealth, these cooperative com-
mons will interact not only among themselves but with one another, as to ultimately 
attract all who are exploited into a more nurturing economy — one where the price of 
entry is not selling your proverbial soul.
Postlude: Félix Guattari Foreseeing ECSA and the Space Platform
It is less and less legitimate that only a profit-based market should regulate financial 
and prestige-based rewards for human social activities, for there is a range of other 
value systems that ought to be considered, including social and aesthetic ‘profit-
ability’ and the values of desire. Until now, these non-capitalist domains of value 
have only been regulated by the State; hence, for example, the esteem in which 
national heritage is held. […] Beyond recognizing a universal basic income — as a 
right rather than as some kind of ‘New Deal’ – the question becomes one of how to 
encourage the organization of individual and collective ventures, and how to direct 
them towards an ecology of resingularization. […]
What condemns the capitalist value system is that it is characterized by general 
equivalence, which flattens out all other forms of value, alienating them in its he-
gemony. On this basis we must if not oppose, at least superimpose instruments of 
valorization founded on existential productions that cannot be determined simply 
in terms of abstract labour-time or by an expected capitalist profit. The information 
and telematic revolutions are supporting new 'stock exchanges' of value and new 
collective debate, providing opportunities for the most individual, most singular and 
most dissensual enterprises. […]
It must also be stressed that this promotion of existential values and the values of 
desire will not present itself as a fully-fledged global alternative. It will result from 
widespread shifts in current value systems and from the appearance of new poles 
of valorization.6 (our emphasis)
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OF THE COMMONWEALTH
GENERAL INTELLECT
In contemporary capitalism, both labor and social policies are indissolubly linked. The 
separation between labor-time and lifetime disappears with the prevarication of labor. 
Bio-capitalism1 abstracts the time of life into a relational commodity. Neoliberal gover-
nance ensures all value is drained from whatever potency lingers in the struggle of ex-
istence. Any residue of welfare, as has been handed down in Europe by hard fought po-
litical gains and for a time upheld by the state, is completely overwhelmed by technics 
of extraction. Now is the time to update the concept of welfare. It must be adequate 
to the current situation, respectful of gender, ethnic and educational differences, and it 
must guarantee the wellbeing of the community; the welfare of commonwealth2 must 
replenish life with quality and a right to joy.
The compensative expansion that characterized Fordism, simultaneous growth of 
wages and profits, has now been exhausted. Today public welfare is perceived as a 
cost whose funding depends on the fiscal deduction of value produced by the capi-
talist market economy: a deduction that jeopardizes market competitiveness. In this 
logic, public welfare is no longer affordable.
With the spread of neoliberal policies, welfare institutions are increasingly ‘capital-
izing’. Above all, they become directly manageable by the private market hierarchy. 
Keynesian public welfare, no longer governable with the constraints imposed on the 
public budget, is gradually replaced by an exclusionary form of workfare. Workfare is 
a not a welfare system: it is guaranteed only to those who have the financial means to 
pay for it (such as private pension). It is a self-financed welfare system, as in most of 
today’s European retirement system, comparable to the privatization policy of health 
and education. Therefore, workfare is complementary to the so-called ‘principle of 
subsidiary’ according to which a state may take action only if, and in so far as, the 
objectives cannot be satisfactorily achieved in a private way.
The concept of social re/production is paradigmatic of cognitive bio-capitalism. It in-
cludes the main novelties of the accumulation and valorization paradigm, by consider-
ing a wide range of activities, from care, health, education to knowledge and culture. 
1 Bio-capitalism (or bio-cognitive capitalism) is defined as an accumulation and valorization process 
based on the exploitation of knowledge and the commodification of life. Learning and network 
processes are at the core of value creation, as well the different daily acts of life, more and more 
inserted in a productive cycle, often without being aware of that (e.g. education, consumption, 
leisure time, care, and so on).
2 The term commonwealth, as used in this text, refers to its original meaning of ‘wealth of the 
common’. In its etymological origin, commonwealth means the wealth created more by the 
common (the human capacity to share relations, skills, experiences, attention, etc. inside a social 
cooperation) then by common goods (the governance of tangible and intangible goods which are 
the basis of human existence and survive).
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With social re/production we mean the complex of interactions and exchanges that 
are generated, in life, within the social environment. The content and the form of social 
reproduction, more clearly than in the past, deals with the material body, processed by 
bio-capitalism, and is inextricably linked to the time and the needs of life.
Welfare institutions today have become directly productive activities (as opposed to 
supportive reproductive activities). The share of capital understood as supportive of 
immaterial wealth (R&D, education, training and health) has exceeded the share of 
material capital as once accumulated in the traditional spaces such as factories and 
offices. This became visible in the beginning of the 80s in the US, and later in Europe.
Nowadays, financial capital has become the determining factor in growth and com-
petitiveness. Material capital tends to turn into human capital (the stock of knowledge, 
habits, social and personality attributes, including creativity, embodied in the ability 
to perform labor so as to produce economic value). Thus, welfare, after it has been 
privatized and financialized, starts to serve inside the accumulation process as the pri-
mary productive factor. Market actors substitute states and public actors, resulting in 
a process of segmentation among the population. As a result, universality has become 
an empty word.
Traditionally, care work has been considered ancillary to the factory’s production work. 
Now, in contemporary capitalism, it has become a direct source of value, partially 
waged and partially unpaid.
Given the new phase of bio-capitalism, we propose to direct critical discourse in the 
following ways:
1. we need to become aware of the forms of direct exploitation of both the human 
body (organ transplants, surrogacy, …) and the earth, which increases the de-
gree to which the biosphere can be commodified (in part, thanks to innovations 
in bio-technology);
2. we need to think about the consequences of ‘emotional’ care and affect as 
productive labor, an aspect crucial to many professions in the service sector 
(not only the teacher and the nurse but also the PR and the fashion/TV profes-
sional worker);
3. we need to reflect on how social life, induced by cooperative forms of social 
networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), is also becoming productive labor;
4. we need to think about how water and health have become privatized. Social 
reproduction is at the same time a collective and individual activity, since it 
simultaneously deals with individual learning and social relations. Promot-
ing oneself on LinkedIn, using Google and smartphone apps, participating in 
Duolingo as life-long learning, liking on Facebook... The issue of exploitation 
of re/production, and the becoming-invisible of domestic labor and care, is the 
contemporary mechanisms of reproduction and production that have dramati-
cally expanded within the horizons voluntary work under neo-liberalism. The 
expropriation of the value of social reproduction today represents the core of 
accumulation in a capitalist production context. The governance of social re-
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production, outside and beyond the commodified logic of profit accumulation, 
is the core of what the commonfare project addresses.3
The transformation of the labor market over the past two decades in Europe has 
made increasingly urgent the need to redefine welfare policies. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to introduce a new idea of welfare, what we call the commonfare (welfare of the 
commonwealth). Through the commonfare concept we will be able to deal with two 
elements that characterize the current phase of bio-cognitive capitalism, especially 
in so-called Western countries:
 – precarity and the debt condition as dispositive of social control and dominance;
 – the generation of wealth that arises from social reproduction, cooperation and 
general intellect.4
Labor is becoming more fragmented, not only from a legal point of view, but more 
commonly from the qualitative and subjective point of view. There is a growing 
multitude of atypical and precarious para-subordinate and autonomous workers. 
The primacy of individual over collective bargaining empties the capacity for trade 
unions to represent in the traditional way. Furthermore, in times of crisis, the pre-
carious condition is strengthened by the increasing of the debt condition, in a vi-
cious circle. The result is the ‘precarity trap’, which nowadays tends to substitute 
the ‘poverty trap’.
3 The concept of commonfare originates from a debate in Italy during the struggle against 
precarious conditions. The first time the claim for commonfare appeared in a political document 
was in Mayday Network Milano, ‘Charter of knowledge-workers rights’, European Institute for 
Progressive Cultural Policies, May 2009, http://eipcp.net/n/124117049. From a theoretical point, 
as stated by Tiziana Terranova, Carlo Vercellone, and Andrea Fumagalli, see Tiziana Terranova, 
‘Red Stack Attack! Algorithms, Capital and the Automation of the Common’, Effimera, 12 February 
2014, http://effimera.org/red-stack-attack-algorithms-capital-and-the-automation-of-the-
common-di-tiziana-terranova/; Andrea Fumagalli, ‘Trasformazione del Lavoro e Trasformazioni 
del Welfare: Precarietà e Welfare del Comune (Commonfare) in Europa’, in Paolo Leon, Riccardo 
Realfonso (eds), L’Economia della precarietà, Roma: Manifestolibri, 2008, pp. 159-174; Andrea 
Fumagalli, ‘Commonfare: Per la Riappropriazione del Libero Accesso ai Beni Comuni’, Doppio 
Zero, 14 January 2014, http://www.doppiozero.com/materiali/quinto-stato/commonfare; Carlo 
Vercellone, Il comune come modo di produzione, Ombre Corte: Verona, 2017.
4 General intellect is a term that originates from Karl Marx. In his Grundrisse, General intellect 
represents a crucial force of production, as a combination of technological expertise and social 
intellect, or general social knowledge: ‘Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, 
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They 
are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. 
The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become 
a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social 
life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance 
with it; to what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the 
form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process’ (Karl 
Marx, The Grundrisse: Notebook VII, 1858, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/
grundrisse/ch14.htm). See also: Carlo Vercellone, ‘From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect: 
Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive Capitalism’, Historical Materialism, 15.1 
(2007): 13–36.
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As we stated before, the production of wealth is no longer based solely on mate-
rial production. The existence of learning economies (which generate knowledge) and 
network economies (which allow its diffusion, at different levels) now represent the 
key variables that are at the origin of the increases in productivity: a productivity that 
comes from the exploitation of both common goods and the commonwealth, aris-
ing from the social cooperation of humans (such as in education, health, knowledge, 
space, social relations, etc).
A redefinition of welfare policy should be able to respond to the unstable trade-off 
inside the accumulation process of bio-cognitive capitalism: the negative relationship 
between precarity and social cooperation under platform capitalism (such as Peerby, 
Airbnb etc.). It is necessary to remunerate social cooperation, from one side, and favor 
forms of social production, from the other.
Our commonfare proposal is based on four pillars:
First Pillar: Unconditional Basic Income
Basic income should be available for everyone who lives in the territory, regardless 
of his/her professional and civil status, and should begin with the people under the 
relative poverty threshold. Basic income should be understood as a kind of monetary 
compensation (remuneration) of social productivity and of productive time which is 
not certified by the existing labor contracts. It occurs at the primary level of income 
distribution (it’s a primary income), hence it cannot be considered merely as a welfare 
intervention, according both to workfare and Keynesian logic. This measure must be 
accompanied by the introduction of a minimum wage both for employees and free-
lancers, in order to avoid a substitution effect (dumping) between basic income and 
the same wages in favor of firms and to the detriment of the employees. Basic income 
together with minimum wage makes possible an expansion of the range of choices in 
the labor market, i.e. to refuse a ‘bad’ job and then modify the same labor conditions. 
The unconditional possibility of the refusal of labor opens up perspectives of libera-
tion that go far beyond the simple distributive measure. Minimum wage for freelancers 
should be introduced. The group of people doing freelance work is increasing rapidly. 
For these people it is hard, if not impossible to join a union to fight for their rights. Indi-
vidual bargaining leads often to too low wages for freelancers, which in their place will 
lead to reduced wages for employees.
Conversely, traditional welfare is based on the fact that people get back to work re-
gardless of the uselessness of the task performed. ‘Getting back on the horse’ (of 
work) by doing obsolete or superfluous work seems more important than staying at 
home and maintaining the family. This is despite the fact that a well-cared for family re-
duces (future) costs of criminality, healthcare and poverty support, due to more space 
for education and upbringing, more so than the current costs of poverty support. The 
state of care has become a state of control. The fear of the state that people will stop 
working when receiving an unconditional basic income is partly well founded in the 
sense that people will stop doing unnecessary and meaningless jobs. Instead, many 
will get more education, before returning to do meaningful work. Others will spend 
(part of their) time doing social work or other highly underrated, often voluntary, work 
such as care for the elderly or needy.
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Second Pillar: Managing Both Common Goods and Commonwealth
The idea of  commonfare implies, as a prerequisite, the social re-appropriation of the 
gains arising from the exploitation of common goods that are the basis of accumula-
tion today. This re-appropriation does not necessarily lead to the transition from private 
to public ownership. As far as basic services such as health care, education or mobil-
ity are concerned, the goal is to install public management of the use-value supply in 
order to protect it against any attempt of commodification and extraction.
But if we refer to the commonwealth, the framework is different, since the fruits of 
social cooperation and general intellect are neither private nor public goods. The only 
way to manage the commonwealth is through self-organization, by imagining a differ-
ent régime of valorization.
Concerning common goods, the proposal of commonfare entails that:
 – as far as the cognitive commonwealth (general intellect) is concerned, it is 
able to reduce intellectual property rights and patent laws in favor of greater 
freedom of the circulation of knowledge and the ability to acquire free informa-
tion infrastructures; simultaneously, it should dismantle all social and monetary 
barriers to a free, autonomous and universal education (access to immaterial 
common goods);
 – as far as social re-production is concerned, it is able to provide free basic con-
ditions of health, housing, mobility, transport and sociality, by improving good 
practices to experiment in new forms of self-organized welfare from below (access 
to the self-organization of life);
 – it is able to be free from the hierarchy imposed by economic oligarchy, commodi-
ties and utilities. Over the past 20 years, these have been subject to extensive 
privatization as a consequence of the Cardiff process5 on the regulation of the 
market for goods and services (access to material common goods);
 – it is able to provide institutions of the common, at the local level, regarding essen-
tial goods such as water, energy, housing stock, and environmental sustainability, 
through forms of ‘municipalism’ from below (democratic principle).
Third Pillar: Alternative Sharing Economy
We need to offer accessible alternatives against the negative externalities of the 
capitalist sharing economy, which include: (1) the generation of relations between 
users as the cornerstone of digital sharing platforms, and (2) the ownership of what-
ever physical asset is being shared. The second point even has scarier implications 
than the first if we start to imagine a full-fledged capitalist sharing economy. This 
would be an economy in which ‘everything is shared and nothing is owned’. This 
is already a nerd dream in which there is a hope for ‘sharing power tools’. What a 
poor, nurtured dream! We can do better than that and instead really need to open 
our collective imaginaries.
5 The Cardiff process is a reference to the 1996 European Treaty about the liberalization of public 
utilities inside the European Union in order to ease the constitution of Monetary European Union.
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Fourth Pillar: Commoncoin
Commonfare presupposes autonomy and independence, so it requires the activation 
of processes of self-organization or self-governance. The development and imple-
mentation of good practices requires a test-bed of experimentation and is therefore 
not always productive. To this end, it is essential to ensure full economic sustain-
ability in order to avoid subsidence processes. From this point of view, commonfare 
presupposes its own self-capitalization in the direction of growing and widespread 
alternative productions, aimed at producing use-value instead of exchange-value. It 
follows that commonfare can be financially autonomous only if it is placed within a 
monetary circuit which is in turn independent from diktat and the imposition of domi-
nant financial conventions.
Commoncoin is therefore the expression of commonfare and defines the framework 
of its implementation. Commonfare justifies Commoncoin when this currency is 
functional to an alternative production context based on the production of human 
beings for human beings. Commoncoin is designed to take care of the relation 
between bio-political value produced by the singularities composing the multitude 
and the social relations necessary to produce such value. At the economic and 
monetary levels, this self-reinforcing process needs then to be organized with the 
implementation of a set of monetary tools that can help answer the following ques-
tion: how can the processes that define different redistributive models be auto-
mated with digital technologies, starting from a platform made to share bio-political 
value production by and for the multitude?
Capital is not keen to let the multitude enact the exodus from its yoke. Therefore, the 
underlying assumption for the creation of a complementary crypto-currency such as 
Commoncoin emerges from the need to enable the multitude to fight against monetary 
bio-power in the process of an exodus by weaponizing money itself. In reality, this 
may happen through bottom-up initiatives that apply critical thinking to crypto-curren-
cy design for the common good of the multitude. Hence, if implemented as crypto-
currencies on distributed ledgers, the Commoncoin crypto-currency system could be 
operated at a fraction of the cost of both current public welfare provisions in that 
disintermediation and transaction costs near to zero would make them more attractive 
for the bottom-up institutionalization of commonfare. More concretely, Commoncoin is 
thought of more as a means of exchange to flow in alternative economic circuits than 
a store of value for ordinary crypto-currencies.
Commonfare, thanks to the growth of the service sector, could favor the spread of 
alternative forms of production, compatible with environmental constraints, respect-
ful of human nature and above all aimed at valorizing the creative activity of otium 
(leisure) and opus (work) against today's dictatorship of labor: a dictatorship based 
on performance efficiency, productivity for capital, and with the result to destroy any 
social and natural ties.
Commonfare, therefore, is also adapted to the ecological constraints that emerged af-
ter more than 50 years of the Taylorist efficiency regime. This can be done according to 
two guidelines. The first concerns a ‘common’ management of environmental goods, 
subject to scarcity, from air to water, to nature in general (forests, animals, seas, and 
so forth), from one side, and of social reproduction and human relationships, from the 
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other. The second derives from the implementation of an unconditional basic income 
which, in the name of the right of choice and self-determination of one’s own life, can 
favor eco-compatible value-generation against production which damages environ-
mental equilibrium.
Commonfare implies an ad hoc economic policy for a better governance of the 
present phase of what has been termed the ‘capitalocene’. Since the dimension of 
life is the core of the processes of accumulation and exploitation and thus of valo-
rization, welfare conditions are today the elements that condense these issues as a 
mode of production.
Commonfare intends to overcome the imperative of contemporary pessimism, con-
nected with the current processes of impoverishment and proletarianization of the 
general intellect, by creating new imaginaries. Its aim is to develop concrete forms of 
micro-politics able to valorize presence and the capacity of different talents, the rich-
ness of human exchanges. It should also be able to adapt, at least partially, production 
to the needs and desires of the community. The metropolitan and social spaces, the 
relations between individuals and communities, the engines of valorization and the 
means of production are already directly in our hands, bodies and minds.
To get out of paralysis, we can already map out an infinity of realities that build ‘com-
monwealth’, social cooperation, self-production, inventions on the ground of social re-
production and inclusive exoduses. Such mapping is to begin to imagine the contours 
of a desirable society.
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10 BITCOIN MYTHS
EDUARD DE JONG, GEERT LOVINK 
AND PATRICE RIEMENS
Amsterdam, November 2015
Pigs will fly, but not in the next 100 million years. 
—Johan Sjerpstra
1. ‘Bitcoin is a Peer-to-Peer System.’
In order to transfer value from one Bitcoin account to another, the owner of bitcoins 
uses the services of a collective of operators known as ‘miners’ who validate the trans-
action on the Bitcoin distributed database also known as ‘the ledger.’ The relationship 
between these operators and an individual user, i.e. owner of bitcoins, is hence one 
between merchants and customer and not one of equals. Only miners are, and then 
only operationally speaking, peers, since they all perform the same software program. 
However, they are also, and mostly, in competition which each other because they 
need revenue to pay for the equipment they operate. Also, any time an update to the 
database is made, only a single miner is actually adding the transaction records with 
Bitcoin value transfers to the ledger, and gets the financial rewards for doing this. In 
this way, the incentive for miners to support each other is limited, and one cannot 
speak of a peer-to-peer relationship in the traditional sense.
Over the time Bitcoin has been operational the inherent hierarchical relation between 
miners and users has become more pronounced by an ever rising technical and finan-
cial barrier to becoming a miner. Investments and operating costs of the necessary 
equipment rise in tandem with the continuously increasing difficulty of adding a new 
record to the database that is built into the Bitcoin protocol.
Conclusion: Bitcoin is not a peer-to-peer system, but an online merchant-customer 
transaction market place.
2. ‘Bitcoin does Away with Intermediaries and Fees.’
To make a payment using bitcoins a Bitcoin user needs a ‘Bitcoin exchange’ and these 
exchanges charge a fee. The sole exception is if the user is a data base operator (a.k.a 
miner), having aggregated some bitcoins by mining and exclusively pays other users 
who have decided to accept and keep bitcoins.
There is an other intermediary in Bitcoin, the operators of the distributed data base, 
the Bitcoin miners. A miner also needs to charge for its labor and expenses. For the 
time being, a miner is rewarded with newly created bitcoins, that is why updating the 
database is called ‘mining’. By design, the available amount of bitcoins that can be 
mined is restricted, and it is expected to be exhausted somewhere around 2040. After 
exhausting the lode miners can only earn money by explicitly charging a fee.
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Conclusion: De-facto, Bitcoin users need to engage services of intermediaries and do 
pay fees for their transactions.
3. ‘Bitcoin is an Alternative Currency.’
An alternative currency, by definition, is designed to _entirely_ displace and replace ex-
isting currencies. Complementary currencies intend to _partially_ displace and replace 
existing currencies, usually in a local setting.
By design, Bitcoin is  an alternative currency. Real world observation however, shows 
that most transactions in bitcoins translate, either at the point of purchase, or at the 
point of sale, in transactions in existing currencies. Only miners can create bitcoins, 
non-miners need to acquire them, usually by way of purchase.
In practices Bitcoin transactions are often intended to avoid high transfer fees or by-
pass local restrictions in making international payments. In such cases, bitcoins are 
purchased, swiftly change hands, and are just as fast converted again in another cur-
rency. In this ‘cash-in cash-out’ scheme Bitcoin operates then as a facilitator in the 
circulation of existing currencies and not as a replacement of these. Cash-in cash-out 
has been shown the most common mode of operation in bitcoins. A Bitcoin transaction 
can also be speculative in purpose, to hoard bitcoins  expecting a raise in their value. 
In this case Bitcoin can be considered an alternative to other currencies, comparable 
to a speculative investment in dollars or in commodities, like iron ore, gold or grain.
Conclusion: Bitcoin does not actually operate as an alternative currency.
4. ‘Bitcoin is Not a Fiat Currency.’
In practice, acceptance of Bitcoin payments takes place before the (irrevocable) re-
cording of the transaction in the distributed database. That is, without formal confir-
mation of its validity. Apparently, the parties involved in payments in bitcoins _believe_ 
in their eventual recording. The payee therefore trusts the _eventual_ availability of 
received funds.
This looks distinctly similar to the way traditional instruments of payments, such as 
coins, banknotes and bank transfers, operate. The users trust, based on  experience 
and social convention, the correct operation of the system such that received funds 
are available for further spending. This ‘systemic trust’ in traditional, fiat, currency is 
underpinned by a mix of technical features such as hard to copy bank notes, fraud 
detection software in financial institutions and government imposed and enforced 
regulations.
Conclusion: Where in practice the ‘systemic trust’ in Bitcoin is no different from that of 
traditional currencies, Bitcoin operates _de facto_ as a fiat currency.
5. ‘Bitcoin is Anonymous.’
The central database with transactions in bitcoins is publicly accessible. This is an es-
sential Bitcoin design property to, at least in theory, allow any party to participate as 
processing node (miner) in order to get involved in updating the distributed database. 
The parties in a transaction are identified by unique numbers, and a payment transaction 
is linked through this number to the transaction wherein the spend value was received.
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But as most Bitcoin transactions effectively constitute a payment in traditional cur-
rency at one end or the other, or both, they involve well known parties that ex-
change bitcoins for and against these currencies, the Bitcoin exchanges. Hence, 
payments in bitcoins can be traced as the value flows between these exchanges. 
Identification to the humans involved in a payment, e.g. by law enforcement, are 
therefore _potentially_ possible.
Conclusion: Bitcoin is not an electronic form of cash and does not protect privacy.
6. ‘Bitcoin is Secure and Cannot Be Hacked.’
Security for electronic payments has several parts: first to make sure that only the 
rightful owner can make a payment, secondly to make sure that the intended recipient 
actually receives the moneys paid and finally that only money can be paid that is actu-
ally owned by the payer and hence can not be spend twice.
In the Bitcoin sphere a payer uses a password to initiate a payment from her computer. 
The password unlocks a private cryptographic key stored on the computer to send 
cryptographically protected messages to be recorded in the Bitcoin database to make 
the payment. Yet, computers can be hacked, and a hacker can gain control of the pri-
vate key and hence initiate a fraudulent payment. A loss of the private key, for instance 
by a crashed hard disk, does not just lose access to the money, it actually loses all the 
moneys controlled. Indeed one of the design features of Bitcoin is that payments, once 
made, cannot be reversed or recalled.
For the ordinary user, this represents a much higher level of risk than in traditional 
banking, where losing the bank card or PIN does usually not result in losing the whole 
balance held in the bank account.
On the functional side, the operators of the processing nodes in the distributed imple-
mentation of the shared Bitcoin database use a protocol to  agree on the next version 
of the database. This is required to correctly incorporate the payment transactions 
made since the last update. The software in each of the processing nodes must ver-
ify the correctness of the transactions by inspecting previous transactions where the 
payer has received the value to be spend. Yet, servers can be hacked (e.g. with a virus) 
and the continued operations can therefore not be guaranteed.
By design, the blockchain protocol does not guarantee that all past transactions re-
main stored for ever or can be available to each of the processing nodes (miners) for 
inspection in a fail-safe way. The protocol does also not guarantee that a processing 
node actually verifies the transactions it records. The blockchain protocol cannot pre-
vent that fraudulent transactions get recorded, and does not provide a way to remove 
or correct fraudulent transactions.
Conclusion: using Bitcoin is more risky than the traditional payment infrastructure.
7. ‘Bitcoin Operates Without Trust.’
Bitcoin literature is adamant that the Bitcoin set-up successfully substitutes ‘objective’ 
‘algorithmic’ trust for less reliable, because human error and trickery-prone, ‘subjec-
tive’ institutional or political trust.
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As described previously, the blockchain protocol used to synchronize updates to the 
Bitcoin central database (or ledger) does not guarantee the correctness of the updates 
made. Most processing nodes that update the database, use the same open source 
implementation, the Bitcoin ‘miner’ program. This program includes verification of 
transactions, but transaction verification by the miner program might be compromised 
either accidentally, by a software bug, or maliciously, e.g. by a virus, or by a miner 
intent on undue gains. Users engaging in Bitcoin transactions implicitly trust that the 
miner programs continues to operate correctly, that the equipment is protected against 
virus attacks and that the miners will not subvert it.
Also, protection of the stored value at the level of the individual owner is not very strong 
in the Bitcoin set-up. As a consequence, Bitcoin service providers have emerged of-
fering enhanced payment security, in the form of managing their clients’ wallets. This 
service can be provided both online and with physical tokens like smart cards. Making 
use of ‘wallet providers’ evidently entails trust in the continued correct and honest 
operations of the online service or of the physical device.
Conclusion: Bitcoin substitutes one form of ‘subjective’ trust in traditional institutions 
for another in new organizational forms.
8. ‘Bitcoin is Politically Neutral.’
British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, in a famous ‘last words’ speech against the 
Euro, affirmed that decisions about money and currency are all essentially political in 
nature. In this context politics must be understood as more than what politicians do, 
essential politics is about the citizens and the state they live in. The  decision that is 
embodied in Bitcoin’s design to limit the issuable volume of bitcoins to 21 million units 
can only be seen as political.
Other characteristic Bitcoin features, such as it rewards for early adopters and big 
operators, its essentially deflationary and hoarding-inducing nature (also due to the 
designed scarcity of bitcoins), its rejection of regulatory oversight and consumer pro-
tection and of state intervention generally, all resonate with political beliefs of ‘techno-
libertarians’. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine how Bitcoin could effectively function 
in a capitalism-unfriendly political dispensation.
Conclusion: like any other monetary system, Bitcoin, in its technical design reflects 
explicit or implicit political choices.
9. ‘Bitcoin is a Sustainable System.’
The whole Bitcoin set-up is, and especially the functioning of the distributed imple-
mentation of its central database with the compute-intensive blockchain protocol, 
is dependent on increasingly sophisticated and trouble-free network infrastructure 
resulting in an ever increasing consumption of resources. This clearly is at variance 
with the ever more forceful, and inescapable calls for less consumption, foremost in 
the energy sector.
Conclusion: Bitcoin does not fit well in the required transition to sustainability. This 
contrasts with traditional financial institutions that can reduce energy consumption a 
pace with improvements in IT technology.
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10. ‘Bitcoin Can Scale to World Size.’
Both the limited number of possible units of bitcoins and inherently severe technical 
limits to the operational speed of the blockchain protocol pose such insurmountable 
obstacles to a global economy that would run exclusively with bitcoins. In the absence 
of governance of Bitcoin, even a technical modification to increase transaction capac-
ity are very hard to implement.
For consumer payment transactions, for instance, it is hard to conceive how the  block-
chain protocol in Bitcoin can be made to operate effectively at the same speed and 
volume as systems maintained by, e.g., VISA, Mastercard, AmEx, JCB and such.
As shown in Argentina or Greece Bitcoin can be useful in some specific situations. In 
these cases it has been  a mediator between traditional monetary systems. For Bitcoin 
to ‘scale up’ to a true global scale, while maintaining (a semblance of) stability and 
security would for quite some time to come require such large amount of resources as 
to defeat any short or medium term perspective of attainability.
Conclusion: As Yanis Varoufakis, the economist and former finance minister in Greece, 
formulated it: ‘Bitcoin is not capable of “powering” an advanced, industrial society.’
—
The authors thank Boudewijn de Kerf for a quick review, while keeping full responsibil-
ity for the substance of the argument.
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MONEYL B CONFERENCE #2: 
ECONOMIES OF DISSENT
3–4 December 2015 — Pakhuis de Zwijger, Amsterdam
THURSDAY, 3 December 2015
Session 1: Blockchain: Revolution or Business as Usual
Moderator: Eduard de Jong
Speakers: Primavera De Filippi, David Golumbia, Bruce Pon
Session 2: Free Money Movement and the Commons
Workshop by: Jim Costanzo
Session 3: Avenging Money
Workshop by: Max Haiven
Session 4: Negotiating Trust on Crowdfunding Platforms
Workshop by: Robert van Boeschoten
Session 5: Artistic Interventions in Finance
Moderator: Max Haiven
Speakers: Núria Güell, Levi Orta, Silvio Lorusso, Stephanie Rothenberg, Scott Kildall, 
DullTechTM
FRIDAY, 4 December 2015
Session 6: Bringin the Dark Side of Money to Light
Moderator: Cecile Landman
Speakers: Paul Radu, Femke Herregraven, Paulo Cirio
Session 7: Building an Ownership Layer for the Internet
Workshop by: Ascribe
Session 8: Peerhood Gaming
Workshop by: Pekko Koskinen
Session 9: Commoneasy P2P Insurance
Workshop by: Jip & Florian de Ridder
Session 10: Tactics for Economic Dissent
Moderator: Brett Scott
Speakers: Enric Duran, Rachel O'Dwyer, Robin Hood Minor Asset Management
Exhibition: Trading Floor
Artists: Gordana Nikolić, Šefik Tatlić, Scott Kildall, Rob Myers, Aline Baggio
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MONEYL B CONFERENCE #3: 
FAILING BETTER
1–2 December 2016 — Pakhuis de Zwijger, Amsterdam
THURSDAY, 1 December 2016
Session 1: Global Finance: Failing Better?
Moderator: Geert Lovink
Speakers: Alex Foti, Menno Grootveld, Renzo Martens, Cassie Thornton
Session 2: When Art Mirrors Marx
Moderator: Stephanie Rothenberg
Speakers: Steyn Bergs, Dan Mihaltianu, Tori Abernathy, Jeroen van Loon, Anne Breure
Session 3: How Can Accountants Save the World?
Workshop by: Frank de Graaf, Nick McGuigan, Thomas Kern, Herman Gels
Session 4: Politics of the Cyphersphere: After the Blockchain Revolution
Workshop by: Matthias Tarasiewicz, FIBER
Session 5: Prevailing over Money
Workshop by: Dmytri Kleiner, Baruch Gottlieb
Session 6: Save the Last Dance?
Moderator: Max Dovey
Speakers: Henry Warwick, Koos Zwaan, Bindu de Knock
Evening Program: Fiscal Drag Live
Performers: Max Haiven, Cassie Thornton, Fine Art Financ€ Lab, Tori Abernathy
FRIDAY, 2 December 2016
Session 7: Cooperatives and the Commons
Moderation: Sabine Niederer
Speakers, Trebor Scholz, Arthur Röing Baer, Michel Vogler
Session 8: Big Pocket is Watching You!
Moderation: Patricia de Vries
Speakers: Brett Scott, Nathalie Maréchal, Emily Rosamond, Austin Houldsworth
Session 9: Governance in the Age of Blockchains and Digital Currencies
Workshop by: Richard Khol
Session 10: Flexonomix District Currency Game
Workshop by: Jens Martignoni, Panayotis Antoniadis, Ileana Apostol
A
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Session 11: Role Play Your Way to Budgetary Blockchain Bliss
Workshop by: Ruth Catlow, Ben Vickers
Session 12: Universal Basic Income: For One and for All
Moderator: Tori Abernathy
Speakers: Johannes Ponader, Baruch Gottlieb, Patrice Riemens
Exhibition: No Hidden Costs
Artists: Steve Rowell, Fine Art Financ€ Lab, Arthur Röing Baer, Javier Lloret, Oliver 
Barstow, Luca Claessens, Nicoleta Pana, Pete Gomes, Ruth Catlow, Max Dovey
MONEYL B LONDON: 
ART, CULTURE AND FINANCIAL ACTIVISM
20 January 2018 — Somerset House Studios, London
SATURDAY, 20 January 2018
Session 1: Offshore Investigation Vehicle
Workshop by: The Demystification Committee
Session 2: Patternist
Workshop by: Kei Kreutler
Session 3: Playing to Lose: Exploring Strategy, Simulation and Scenario Gameplay in 
Art and Finance
Moderator: Brett Scott
Speakers: The Demystification Committee, Kei Keutler, Stephanie Polsky
Session 4: FairCoop - Earth’s Cooperative for Economic Fairness
Workshop by: FairCoop
Session 5: Data Workers Union
Workshop by: Institute of Human Obsolescence
Session 6: Art and Equity? Tokenizing Culture with the Blockchain
Moderator: Ruth Catlow
Speakers: Jérôme Croisier, Rachel O’Dwyer, Sarah Friend, Marija Bozinovska Jones
Session 7: The INC presents MoneyLab Reader 2: Overcoming the Hype 
Moderator: Inte Gloerich
Speakers: Geert Lovink, Emily Rosamond, Nathaniel Tkacz
A
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